Epictetus : the discourses as reported by Arrian, the manual, and fragments

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THE LOEB CLASSICAL LIBRARY
FOUNDED BY JAMES LOEB, LL.D.
EDITED BY
+T. E. PAGE, o.n., wirr.p.
+E. CAPPS, Pu.p., LL. +W. H. Ὁ. ROUSE, trrt.p.
L. A. POST, μα. E. H. WARMINGTON, M.a., ¥.B.HIST.SOC.

EPICTETUS

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meerCTETUS

THE DISCOURSES AS REPORTED
BY ARRIAN, THE MANUAL,
AND FRAGMENTS

WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY
W. A. OLDFATHER

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

IN TWO VOLUMES
VOL. I

DISCOURSES, BOOKS I AND II

CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS
HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS
LONDON
WILLIAM HEINEMANN LTD
MOCMLYI

First printed 1925
Reprinted 1946, 1956

Printed in Great Britain

INTRODUCTION

Slave, poor as Irus, halting as I trod,
7, Epictetus, was the friend of God.

Epicretus was a slave woman’s son, and for many
years a slave himself.2 The tone and temper of
his whole life were determined thereby. An all-
engulfing passion for independence and freedom so

1 Δοῦλος Ἐπίκτητος γενόμην καὶ σῶμ᾽ ἀνάπηρος καὶ πενίην
Ἶρος καὶ φίλος ἀθανάτοι. An anonymous epigram (John
Chrys., Patrol. Gr. LX. 111; Macrob. Sat. 1. 11, 45; Anth:
Pal, Vil. 676), as translated by H. Macnaghten. The ascrip-
tion to Leonidas is merely a palaeographical blunder in part
of the MS. tradition, that to Epictetus himself (by Macrobius)
a patent absurdity.

This is the explicit testimony of an undated but fairly
early inscription from Pisidia (J. R. S. Sterrett: Papers
ζ the Amer. School of Class. Stud. at Athens, 1884-5, 3, 315f. ;

. Kaibel: Hermes, 1888, 23, 542 8), and of Palladius
(Ps.—Callisthenes, III. 10, ed. C. Miiller), and is distinctly
implied by a phrase in a letter professedly addressed to him
by one of the Philostrati (Ep. 69: ἐτλανθάνεσθαι tis εἶ καὶ
τίνων γέγονας). I see, therefore, no reason to doubt the
statement, as does Schenkl (2nd ed., p. xvi). The phrase
δοῦλος...γενόμην in the epigram cited above cannot be used
as certain evidence. because γίγνεσθαι, as Schenkl observes,
too frequently equals εἶναι in the poets, but, in view of the
other testimony, it is probable that servile origin was what
the author of it had in mind.—There is little reason to
think, with Martha (Les Moralistes, etc., 159), that Epictetus
was not his real name, and that the employment of it is
indicative of a modesty so real that it sought even a kind of
anonymity, since the designation is by no means restricted
to slaves, while his modesty, because coupled with Stoic
straightforwardness, is far removed from the shrinking
humility that seeks self-effacement.

vii

A2

INTRODUCTION

preoccupied him in his youth, that throughout his life
he was obsessed with the fear of restraint, and
tended to regard mere liberty, even in its negative
aspect alone, as almost the highest conceivable
good. It is perhaps no less noteworthy that he
came from Hierapolis in Phrygia. From of old the
Phrygians had conceived of their deities with a
singular intensity and entered into their worship
with a passion that was often fanaticism, and
sometimes downright frenzy. It is, therefore, not
unnatural that the one Greek philosopher who,
despite the monistic and necessitarian postulates of
his philosophy, conceived of his God in as vivid
a fashion as the writers of the New Testament, and
almost as intimately as the founder of Christianity
himself, should have inherited the passion for a per-
sonal god from the folk and land of his nativity,+
Beside these two illuminating facts, the other
details of his life history are of relatively little im-
portance. He was owned for a time by Epaphro-
ditus, the freedman and administrative secretary of
Nero, and it was while yet in his service that he
began to take lessons from Musonius Rufus, the
greatest Stoic teacher of the age, whose influence
was the dominant one in his career.2 He was of

1 It is noteworthy, as Lagrange, p. 201, observes, that
Montanus, who soon after the time of Epictetus ‘‘ threatened
Christianity with the invasion of undisciplined spiritual
graces,” was also a Phrygian.

2 So many passages in Epictetus can be paralleled closely
from the remaining fragments of Rufus (as Epictetus always
calls him) that there can be no doubt but the system of
thought in the pupil is little more than an echo, with
changes of emphasis due to the personal equation, of that of
the master.

viii

- INTRODUCTION

feeble health, and lame, the latter probably because
of the brutality of a master in his early years ;*

1 This is generally doubted nowadays, especially since
Bentley's emphatic pronouncement (cf. Trans. Am. Philol.
Assoc., 1921, 53, 42) in favour of the account in Suidas,
to the effect that his lameness was the result of rheumatism.
Ceteris paribus one would, of course, accept as probable the
less sensational story. But it requires unusual powers of
credulity to believe Suidas against any authority whomso-
ever, and in this case the other authorities are several,
early, and excellent. In the first place Celsus (in Origen,
contra Celswm, VII, 53), who was probably a younger
contemporary of Epictetus and had every occasion to be
well informed ; further, Origen (/.c.), who clearly accepted
and believed the story, since his very answer to the

ent admits the authenticity of the account, while
the easiest or most convincing retort would have been to
deny it; then Gregory of Nazianzus and his brother
Caesarius (in a number of places, see the testimonia in
Schenkl*, pp viii-ix ; of course the absurdities in Pseudo-
Nonnus, Cosmas of Jerusalem, Elias of Crete, εἰ id genus
omne, have no bearing either way). Now the fact that such
men as Origen and Gregory accepted and propagated the
account (even though Epictetus, and in this particular
instance especially, had been exploited as a pagan saint, the
equal or the superior of even Jesus himself) is sufficient to
show that the best-informed Christians of the third and
fourth centuries knew of no otber record. To my feeling
it is distinctly probable that the denial of the incident
may have emanated from some over-zealous Christian, in
a period of less scrupulous apologetics, who thought to take
down the Pagansa notch or two. The very brief statement
in Simplicius, ‘‘that he was lame from an early period of
his life” (Comm. on the Encheiridion, 102b Heins.), establishes
nothing and would agree perfectly with either story. The
connection in which the words occur would make any
explanatory oe unnatural, and, whereas similar
conciseness in Plutarch might perhaps argue ignorance of
further details, such an inference would be false for
Simplicius, the dullness of whose commentary is so por-
tentous that it cannot be explained as merely the unavoidable

1x

INTRODUCTION

long unmarried, until in his old age he took a wife
to help him bring up a little child whose parents,
friends of his, were about to expose it ;1 so simple
in his style of living, that in Rome he never locked
the doors of a habitation, whose only furniture was
said to be a pallet and a rush mat, and in Nicopolis
(in Epirus, opposite Actium) contented himself with
an earthenware lamp after the theft of his iron one.

Of the external aspects of his career it should
be noted that he had a recognized position as a
philosopher when Domitian banished all such
persons from Rome (presumably in a.p. 89 or 92);
that he settled in Nicopolis, where he conducted
what seems to have been a fairly large and well-
regarded school ; that he travelled a little, probably
to Olympia, and certainly once to Athens.* In

1 He had been stung, no doubt, by the bitter and in
his case unfair gibe of Demonax, who, on hearing Epictetus’
exhortation to marry, had sarcastically asked the hand of
one of his daughters (Lucian, Demon. 55).

2 Philostratus, Epist.69; Lucian, Demon. 55 would not be
inconsistent with the idea of such a visit, but does not
necessarily presuppose it.

concomitant of vast scholarship and erudition, but must
have required a deliberate effort directed to the suppression
of the elements of human interest. Epictetus’ own allusions
to his lameness are non-committal, but of course he would
have been the last person to boast about such things. And
yet, even then, the references to the pe of one’s master,
or tyrant, to do injury by means of chains, sword, rack,
scourging, prison, exile, crucifixion, and the like (although
the general theme is a kind of Stoic commonplace). are so
very numerous as compared with the physical afflictions
which come in the course of nature, that it is altogether
reasonable to think of his imagination having been profoundly
affected during his impressionable years by a personal
experience of this very sort.

x

INTRODUCTION

this connection it should also be observed that his
general literary education was not extensive—
Homer, of course, a little Plato and Xenophon,
principally for their testimony about Socrates, a few
stock references to tragedy, and the professional’s
acquaintance with the philosophy of the later schools,
and this is practically all. It can scarcely be
doubted, as Schenkl observes (p. xci), that this
literary apparatus comes almost entirely from the
extensive collections of Chrysippus. And the same
may be said of his aesthetic culture. He seems to
have seen and been impressed by the gold-and-
ivory statues of Zeus and Athena, at Olympia and
Athens respectively, but he set no very high value
upon the work of artists, for he allowed himself
once the almost blasphemous characterization of the
Acropolis and its incomparable marbles as “ pretty
bits of stone and a pretty rock.” Epictetus was
merely moralist and teacher, but yet of such tran-
scendent attainments as such that it seems almost
impertinent to expect anything more of him.

The dates of his birth and of his death cannot
be determined with any accuracy. The burning
of the Capitol in a.p. 69 was yet a vivid memory
while he was still a pupil of Musonius;1 he enjoyed
the personal acquaintance of Hadrian, but not of
Marcus Aurelius, for all the latter's admiration of
him; and he speaks freely of himself as an old
man, and is characterized as such by Lucian (Adv.

1 The Capitol was burned in 69 and again in a.p. 80, but
the reference to the event (I. 7, 32) as a crime suggests that
the earlier date should be understood, since the burning
then was due to revolution, while that in a.p 80 was
accidental.

xi

INTRODUCTION

Indoctum, 13) ; accordingly his life must have covered
roughly the period ca. a.v. 50-120, with which
limits the rare and rather vague references to
contemporary events agree. He was, accordingly,
an almost exact contemporary of Plutarch and
Tacitus.

Like Socrates and others whom he admired, he
wrote nothing for publication, and but little
memory would have survived of him had not a
faithful pupil, successful as historian and adminis-
trator, Flavius Arrian, recorded many a discourse
and informal conversation. These are saved to us
in four books of Avatp:Bai, or Discourses,? out of
the original eight, and in a very brief compendium,
the Ἐγχειρίδιον, a Manual or Handbook, in which,

1 Although he must have written much for his own
purposes in elaborating his argumentation by dialectic,
since he lauds Socrates for such a practice and speaks of
it as usual for a ‘‘philosopher.” Besides, in his own discourses
he is always looking for an interlocutor, whom he often
finds in the person of pupil or visitor, but, failing these,
he — on both sides of the debate himself. Cf. Colardeau,

. 2941.
τὰ Some, especially Schenkl, have believed in the existence
of other collections, and it was long thought that Arrian
had composed a special biography. But the evidence for
the other works seems to be based entirely upon those
variations in title and form of reference which ancient
methods of citation freely allowed, and it is improbable
that there ever existed any but the works just mentioned.
See the special study by R. Asmus, whose conclusions have
been accepted by Zeller, 767, n., and many others.

3 This has occasionally been translated by Pugio, or
Dagger, in early modern editions, possibly with a half-
conscious memory of Hebrews iv. 12: For the word of God
is quick and powerful, and sharper than any two-edged sword,
piercing even to the dividing asunder of sowl and spirit, and
of the joints and marrow, and is a discerner of the thoughts

xii

INTRODUCTION

for the sake of a general public which could not
take time to read the larger ones, the elements
of his doctrine were somewhat mechanically put
together out of verbatim, or practically verbatim,
extracts from the Discourses. That Arrian’s report
is a stenographic! record of the ipsissima verba of
the master there can be no doubt. His own
compositions are in Attic, while these works are
in the Koine, and there are such marked differences
in style, especially in the use of several of the
prepositions, as Miicke has pointed out, that one
is clearly dealing with another personality. Add
to that the utter difference in spirit and tempo,
and Arrian’s inability when writing propria persona
to characterize sharply a personality, while the
conversations of Epictetus are nothing if not vivid.
We have, accordingly, in Arrian’s Discourses a
work which, if my knowledge does not fail me,
is really unique in literature, the actual words of
an extraordinarily gifted teacher upon scores, not
to say hundreds, of occasions in his own class-room,
conversing with visitors, reproving, exhorting,
encouraging his pupils, enlivening the dullness of
the formal instruction, and, in his own parable,
shooting it through with the red stripe of a
conscious moral purpose in preparation for the

1 Hartmann, p. 252 ff., has settled this point.

and intents of the heart. But despite the not inappropriate
character of such a designation, and the fact that Simplicius
himself (preface to his commentary) misunderstood the
application, there can be no doubt but the word βιβλίον
is to be supplied and that the correct meaning is Handbook
or Compendium ; cf. Colardeau’s discussion, p. 25.

INTRODUCTION

problem of right living.t The regular class exer-
cises were clearly reading and interpretation of
characteristic portions of Stoic philosophical works,
somewhat as in an oral examination; problems in
formal logic, these apparently conducted by assistants,
or advanced pupils ; and the preparation of themes
or essays on a large scale which required much
writing and allowed an ambitious pupil to imitate
the style of celebrated authors. The Master super-
vised the formal instruction in logic, even though
it might be conducted by others, but there is no
indication that he delivered systematic lectures,
although he clearly made special preparation to
criticize the interpretations of his pupils (1. 10, 8).
From the nature of the comments, which presuppose
a fair elementary training in literature, we can feel
sure that only young men and not boys were ad-
mitted to the school, and there are some remarks
which sound very much like introductions to the
general subject of study, while others are pretty
clearly addressed to those who were about to leave
—constituting, in fact, an early and somewhat
rudimentary variety of. Commencement Address.”
Some of the pupils were preparing to teach, but the
majority, no doubt, like Arrian, were of high social
position and contemplated entering the public service.

For a proper understanding of the Discourses it
is important to bear in mind their true character,

1 Colardeau, pp. 71-113, has an admirable discussion of
the method and technique of instruction employed. In
view of the singularly valuable nature of the material it
seems strange that more attention has not been paid to
Epictetus in the history of ancient education.

* See Halbauer, p. 45 ff., for a good discussion of these
points and a critique of the views of Bruns, Colardeau, and
Hartmann,

xiv

INTRODUCTION

which Halbauer in a valuable study has most clearly
stated thus (p. 56): “The Diatribae are not the
curriculum proper, nor even a part of that curricu-
lum. On the contrary, this consisted of readings
from the Stoic writings, while the Diatribae
accompany the formal instruction, dwell on this
point or on that, which Epictetus regarded as of
special importance, above all give him an oppor-
tunity for familiar discourse with his pupils, and
for discussing with them in a friendly spirit their
personal affairs.” They are not, therefore, a formal
presentation of Stoic philosophy, so that it is unfair
to criticize their lack of system and their relative
neglect of logic and physics, upon which the other
Stoics laid such stress, for they were not designed
as formal lectures, and the class exercises had dwelt
satis superque, as Epictetus must have felt, upon
the physics and logic, which were after all only
the foundation of conduct, the subject in which
he was primarily interested. They are class-room
comment, in the frank and open spirit which was
characteristic of the man, containing not a little of
what we should now be inclined to restrict to a
private conference, often closely connected, no
doubt, with the readings and themes, but quite as
often, apparently, little more than obier dicta.

1 Cf. Bonhéffer, 1890, 22. The arrangement of topics by
Arrian is a point which seems not to have been discussed
as fully as it deserves. Hartmann’s view, that the order
is that of exact chronological sequence, seems to be an
exaggeration of what may be in the main correct, but I
think I can trace evidences of a somewhat formal nature in
some of the groupings, and it seems not unlikely that a few
of the chapters contain remarks delivered on several oc-
casions. However, thisis a point which requires an elaborate
investigation and cannot be discussed here.

xv

INTRODUCTION

They constitute a remarkable self-revelation of a
character of extraordinary strength, elevation, and
sweetness, and despite their frequent repetitions
and occasional obscurity must ever rank high in the
literature of personal portrayal, even were one
inclined to disregard their moral elevation. For
Epictetus was without doubt, as the great wit and
cynic Lucian calls him, “a marvellous old man.”

It may not be amiss to dwell a few moments
upon the outstanding features of his personality,
before saying a few words upon his doctrines, for
his doctrines, or at all events the varying emphasis
laid on his doctrines, were to a marked degree
influenced by the kind of man that he was.

And first of all I should observe that he had
the point of view of a man who had suffered from
slavery and abhorred it, but had not been altogether
able to escape its influence. He was predisposed
to suffer, to renounce, to yield, and to accept
whatever burden might be laid upon him.' He
was not a revolutionist, or a cultured gentleman, or
a statesman, as were other Stoics before and after.
Many of the good things of life which others
enjoyed as a matter of course he had grown accus-
tomed never to demand for himself ; and the social
obligations for the maintenance and advancement
of order and civilization, towards which men of
higher station were sensitive, clearly did not weigh
heavily upon his conscience. His whole teaching
was to make men free and happy by a severe
restriction of effort to the realm of the moral

1 Compare the excellent remarks of Εἰ. V. Arnold upon
this point, Hncyclop., etc., 324.

xv1

INTRODUCTION

nature+ The celebrated life-formula, ἀνέχου καὶ
ἀπέχου, which one feels inclined to retranslate as
“Endure and Renounce,” in order to give it once
more the definite meaning of which the cliché,
‘Bear and Forbear,’ has almost robbed it, is, to
speak frankly, with all its wisdom, and humility,
and purificatory power, not a sufficient programme
for a highly organized society making towards an
envisaged goal of general improvement.

And again, in youth he must have been almost
consumed by a passion for freedom. 1 know no
man upon whose lips the idea more frequently
occurs. The words “free” (adjective and verb) and
“freedom” appear some 130 times in Epictetus,
that is, with a relative frequency about six times
that of their occurrence in the New Testament
and twice that of their occurrence in Marcus
Aurelius, to take contemporary works of somewhat
the same general content And with the attain-
ment of his personal freedom there must have
come such an upwelling of gratitude to God as
that which finds expression in the beautiful hymn
of praise concluding the sixteenth chapter of the
first book, so that, while most Stoics assumed or
at least recognized the possibility of a kind of
immortality, he could wholly dispense with that
desire for the survival of personality after death
which even Marcus Aurelius felt to be almost
necessary for his own austere ideal of happiness.”

' See Zeller’s admirable discussion of this topic, p. 776.

2 **Sich aber als Menschheit (und nicht nur als In-
dividuum) ebenso vergeudet zu fiihlen, wie wir die einzelne
Bliithe von der Natur vergeudet sehen, ist ein Gefiihl iiber
alle Gefiihle.— Wer ist aber desselben fahig?” F. Nietzsche:
Menschlich:s, Allzwmcnschliches, 1. 51.

xvii

INTRODUCTION

Almost as characteristic was his intensity. He
speaks much of tranquillity, as might be expected
of a Stoic, but he was not one of those for whom
that virtue is to be achieved only by Henry James’s
formula of successive accumulations of “endless”
amounts of history, and tradition, and taste. His
was a tranquillity, if there really be such a thing,
of moral fervour, and of religious devotion. His
vehemence gave him an extraordinarily firm and
clean-cut character, and made him a singularly
impressive teacher, as Arrian in the introductory
epistle attests. For he was enormously interested
in his teaching, knowing well that in this gift
lay his single talent; made great efforts to present
his material in the simplest terms and in well-
arranged sequence ; and sharply reproved those who
blamed the stupidity of their pupils for what was
due to their own incompetence in instruction. It
also gave a notable vigour to his vocabulary and
utterance, his παρρησία, or freedom of speech, suo
quamque rem nomine appellare, as Cicero (Ad. Fam.
1X. 22, 1) characterizes that Stoic virtue, which
few exemplified more effectively than Epictetus;
but it also, it must be confessed, made him some-
what intolerant of the opinions of others, were they
philosophic or religious, in a fashion which for
better or for worse was rapidly gaining ground in
his day.

But he was at the same time extremely modest.
He never calls himself a “ philosopher,” he speaks
frankly of his own failings, blames himself quite
as much as his pupils for the failure of his instrue-
tion ofttimes to produce its perfect work, and quotes

1 See Bonhiffer’s remarks upon this point (1911, 346).
XViii

Tye) ον are”

INTRODUCTION

freely the disrespectful remarks of others about him.
He is severe in the condemnation of the unrepentant
sinner, but charitable towards the naive wrong-
doer, going so far, in fact, in this direction as to
advocate principles which would lead to the abolition
of all capital punishment.1 He is much more an

el of mercy than a messenger of vengeance.”
And this aspect of his character comes out most
clearly perhaps in his attitude towards children, for
with them a man can be more nearly himself than
with his sophisticated associates. No ancient author
speaks as frequently of them, or as sympathetically.
They are one of his favourite parables, and though
he is well aware that a child is only an incomplete
man, he likes their straightforwardness in play,
he claps his hands to them and returns their
“ Merry Saturnalia!” greeting, yearns to get down
on hands and knees and talk baby talk with them.
There is, of course, a sense in which Pascal’s
stricture of Stoic pride applies to Epictetus, for
the Stoic virtues were somewhat self-consciously
erected upon the basis of self-respect and self-
reliance; but a more humble and charitable Stoic
it would have been impossible to find, and what
pride there is belongs to the system and not to
the man. Towards God he is always devout,

1 Το 18, especially sections 5 ff.

2 See Colardeau, p. 209 ff., and Zeller, p. 780 f.

3 Cf. Renner’s interesting study.

4 Pascal’s judgment (to say nothing of the grotesque
misconceptions of J. B. Rousseau) was undoubtedly in-
fluenced by his preoccupation with the Encheiridion, which,
as necessarily in such a compendium of doctrine, is more
Stoic than Epictetean, and suppresses many of the more
amiable traits of personality. The actual man of the

xix

INTRODUCTION

grateful, humble, and there is a little trace in him
of that exaltation of self which in some of the
Stoics tended to accord to the ideal man a moral
elevation that made him sometimes the equal if not
in certain aspects almost the superior of Godt

His doctrines were the conventional ones of
Stoicism, representing rather the teaching of the
early Stoics than that of the middle and later
schools, as Bonhéffer has elaborately proven. There
is, accordingly, no occasion to dwell at length upon
them, but for the sake of those who may wish
to fit a particular teaching into his general scheme,
a very brief outline may here be attempted.?

Every man bears the exclusive responsibility
himself for his own good or evil, since it is im-
possible to imagine a moral order in which one
person does the wrong and another, the innocent,
suffers. Therefore, good and evil can be only those
things which depend entirely upon our moral
purpose, what we generally call, but from the
Stoic’s point of view a little inaccurately, our free

1 As expressed, e.g., in Seneca, De Prov. VI. 6: Hoe est
quo deum antecedatis: ille extra patientiam malorum est, vos
supra patientiam. Cf. also Zeller, 257.

* I am following here in the main, but not uniformly,
Von Arnim’s admirable summary.

Discourses is ἃ very much more attractive figure than the
imaginary reconstruction of the man from the abstracted
principles of the Manual; there he is a man, here a statue
(Martha, 162 f.). It would go hard with many to have
their personal traits deduced from the evidence supplied by
the grammars, indices, or even confessions of faith that
they have written; especially hard if the compendium
were drawn up somewhat mechanically by another’s hand.
xX

INTRODUCTION

will; they cannot consist in any of those things
which others can do either to us or for us. Man's
highest good lies in the reason, which distinguishes
him from other animals. This reason shows itself
in assent or dissent, in desire or aversion, and in
choice or refusal,1 which in turn are based upon
an external impression, φαντασία, that is, a prime
datum, a “constant,” beyond our power to alter.
But we remain free in regard to our attitude
towards them. The use which we make of the
external impressions is our one chief concern, and
upon the right kind of use depends exclusively
our happiness. In the realm of judgement the
truth or falsity of the external impression is to be
decided. Here our concern is to assent to the true
impression, reject the false, and suspend judgement
regarding the uncertain. This is an act of the
moral purpose, or free will. We should never
forget this responsibility, and never assent to an
external impression without this preliminary testing.
In order to escape from being misled by fallacious
reasoning in the formation of these judgements we
need instruction in logic, although Epictetus warns
against undue devotion to the subtleties of the
subject.

Corresponding to assent or dissent in the realm
of the intellectual are desire or aversion in the
realm of good and evil, which is the most important

1 This triple division of philosophy, with especial but
not exclusive application to ethics, is the only notably
original element which the minute studies of many investi-
gators have found in Epictetus, and it is rather a peda-
gogical device for lucid presentation than an innovation in

thought. See Bonhdéffer, 1890, 22 ff. ; Zeller, p. 769; especi-
ally More, p. 107 f.

xxi

INTRODUCTION

thing for man, since from failing to attain one’s
desire, and from encountering what one would
avoid, come all the passions and sorrows of man-
kind. In every desire or aversion there is implicit
a value-judgement concerning the good or evil of
the particular thing involved, and these in turn
rest upon general judgements (δόγματα) regarding
things of value. If we are to make the proper
use of our freedom in the field of desire or aversion
we must have the correct judgements concerning
good and evil. Now the correct judgement is, that
nothing outside the realm of our moral purpose is
either good or evil. Nothing, therefore, of that
kind can rightly be the object of desire or aversion,
hence we should restrict the will to the field in
which alone it is free, and cannot, therefore, come
to grief. But herein we need not merely the
correct theoretical conviction, but also continual
practice in application (ἄσκησις), and it is this which
Epictetus attempts to impart to his pupils, for it
is the foundation of his whole system of education.
Finally, in the field of choice or refusal belongs
the duty? (τὸ καθῆκον) of man, his intelligent action
in human and social relations. Externals, which
are neither good nor evil, and so indifferent (ἀδιά-
dopa), because not subject to our control, play a
certain réle, none the less, as matters with which
we have to deal, indeed, but should regard no
more seriously than players treat the actual ball
with which they play, in comparison with the game
itself. It is characteristic of Epictetus that, although
he recognizes this part of Stoic doctrine in which
the theoretical indifference of externals is in practice

1 On the use of this term, cf. More, p. 116, 12.
xxii

INTRODUCTION

largely abandoned, he manifests but slight interest
in it.

Among duties he is concerned principally with
those of a social character. Nature places us in
certain relations to other persons, and these de-
termine our obligations to parents, brothers, children,
kinsmen, friends, fellow-citizens, and mankind in
general. We ought to have the sense of fellowship
and partnership (κοινωνικοῦ, that is, in thought and
in action we ought to remember the social organiza-
tion in which we have been placed by the divine
order. The shortcomings of our fellow-men are to
be met with patience and charity, and we should
not allow ourselves to grow indignant over them, for
they too area necessary element in the universal plan.

The religious possibilities of Stoicism are de-
veloped further by Epictetus than by any other
representative of the school. The conviction that
the universe is wholly governed by an all-wise,
divine Providence is for him one of the principal
supports of the doctrine of values. All things,
even apparent evils, are the will of God, compre-
hended in his universal plan, and therefore good
from the point of view of the whole. It is our
moral duty to elevate ourselves to this conception,
to see things as God sees them. The man who
reconciles his will to the will of God, and so
recognizes that every event is necessary and reason-
able for the best interest of the whole, feels no
discontent with anything outside the control of
his free will. His happiness he finds in filling the
réle which God has assigned him, becoming thereby
a voluntary co-worker with God, and in filling this
réle no man can hinder him.

INTRODUCTION

Religion as reconciliation to the inevitable—éxovra
δέχεσθαι τὰ ἀναγκαῖα (frg. 8), in gratiam cum fato
revertere \—is almost perfectly exemplified in Epic-
tetus, for with him philosophy has definitely turned
religion, and his instruction has become less secular
than clerical. But it is astonishing to what heights
of sincere devotion, of intimate communion, he
attained, though starting with the monistie pre-
conceptions of his school, for the very God who
took, as he felt, such personal interest in him, was
after all but “a subtle form of matter pervading
the grosser physical elements... this Providence
only another name for a mechanical law of ex-
pansion and contraction, absolutely predetermined
in its everlasting recurrences.’”’* Of his theology
one can scarcely speak. His personal needs and
his acquiescence with tradition led him to make
of his God more than the materials of his philo-
sophical tenets could allow. The result is for our
modern thinking an almost incredible mixture of
Theism, Pantheism, and Polytheism, and it is im-
possible, out of detached expressions, to construct
a consistent system. As a matter of fact, with a
naive faith in God as a kind of personification of
the soul’s desire, he seems to have cherished
simultaneously all of these mutually exclusive views
of his nature. His moral end was eudaemonism,

1 Seneca, Hp. 91,15. ‘* Dass der Mensch ins Unvermeid-
liche sich fiige, darauf dringen alle Religionen; jede sucht
auf ihre Weise mit dieser Aufgabe fertig zu werden.”—
Goethe.

2 Cf. Lagrange, p. 211.—‘‘ The school of the philosophers
is a hospital” (¢/. Bpict. IIT. 23, 30).

* More, p. 167, and οὖ the whole brilliant passage,
p. 162 ff.

Xxiv

INTRODUCTION

to which, in a singularly frank expression (I. 4, 27),
he was ready to sacrifice even truth itself. No
wonder, then, he cared little for logic as such and
not at all for science.1 “The moralist assumes
that what lies upon his heart as an essential need,
must also be the essence and heart of reality... .
In looking at everything from the point of view
of happiness men bound the arteries of scientific
research.” Though spoken of the Socratic schools
in general, this word of Nietzsche's? seems especi-
ally apt of Epictetus. He was of an age when
the search for happiness by the process of consulting
merely the instincts of the heart was leading
rapidly to an alienation from scientific truth and
a prodigious decline in richness of cultural ex-
ence,

Yet even in his happiness, which we cannot dismiss
as a mere pose, there was something wanting. The
existence of evil was in one breath denied, and in
another presumed by the elaborate preparations that
one must make to withstand it. “ And having done
all,tostand?”” No, even after having done all, “ the
house might get too full of smoke,” the hardships of
life too great any longer to endure; the ominous
phrase, “ the door is open,” or its equivalent, the final
recourse of suicide, recurs at intervals through his
pages like a tolling bell. And beyond? Nothing.
Nothing to fear indeed ; “‘ the dewdrop sinks into the
shining sea.’ “ When He provides the necessities
no longer, He sounds the recall ; He opens the door
and says, ‘Go.’ Where? To nothing you need
fear, but back to that from which you came, to what

1 Cf. Zeller, p. 770.
3 Menschliches, Allzwmenschliches, I. 21 ; 23.

XXV

INTRODUCTION

is friendly and akin to you, to the physical elements”
(III. 13,14). But at the same time there is nothing
to hope for.*

That Epictetus was influenced by the writings of
the New Testament has often been suggested.
There were those in late antiquity who asserted
it,2 and it was natural enough in an age when
Tertullian and Jerome believed that Seneca had
conversed with Paul, and in Musonius Rufus, the
teacher of Epictetus, Justin (II. 8) recognizes a
kindred spirit. But despite the recrudescence of
the idea from time to time, and the existence of a
few scholars in our own generation who seem yet
to believe it, this question can be regarded as
definitely settled by the elaborate researches of
Bonhéffer (1911). Of course Epictetus knew about
the existence of Christians, to whom he twice refers,
calling them once Jews (II. 9, 19 ff.), and a second
time Galilaeans (IV. 7, 6), for there was an early
community at Nicopolis (Paul’s Epistle to Titus, iii.
12), but he shared clearly in the vulgar prejudices
against them, and his general intolerance of variant
opinion, even when for conscience’ sake, makes it
certain that he would never have bothered to read
their literature. The linguistic resemblances, which
are occasionally striking, like “ Lord, have mercy!”
κύριε, ἐλέησον, are only accidental, because Epictetus
was speaking the common language of ethical
exhortation in which the evangelists and apostles
wrote; while the few specious similarities are
counterbalanced by as many striking differences
In the field of doctrine, the one notable point of

1 See More, p. 168 ff.
* A Byzantine scholiast in Schenkl? xv.
“XXvi

INTRODUCTION

disregard for the things of this world? is offset by
so many fundamental differences in presupposition,
if not in common ethical practice, that any kind
of a sympathetic understanding of the new religion
on the part of Epictetus is inconceivable. A certain
ground-tone of religious capability, a fading of
interest in the conventional fields of human achieve-
ment, a personal kindliness and “ harmlessness” of
character, a truly pathetic longing as of tired men
for a passive kind of happiness, an_ ill-defined
yearning to be “saved” by some spectacular and
divine intervention, these things are all to be found
in the Discourses, yet they are not there as an
effect of Christian teaching, but as a true reflection
of the tone and temper of those social circles to
which the Gospel made its powerful appeal.”

His influence has been extensive and has not
yet waned. Hadrian was his friend, and, in the
next generation, Marcus Aurelius was his ardent
disciple. Celsus, Gellius, and Lucian lauded him,
and Galen wrote a special treatise in his defence.
His merits were recognized by Christians like
Chrysostom, Gregory of Nazianzus, and Augustine,
while Origen rated him in some respects even

1 “T find in Epictetus,” says Pascal, ‘‘an incomparable
art to disturb the repose of those who seek it in thin
external, and to force them to recognize that it is impossible
for them to find anything but the error and the suffering
which they are seeking to escape, if they do not give
themselves without reserve to God alone.”

2 «For it is doubtful if there was ever a Christian of
the early Church,” remarks von Wilamowitz (Kultur der
Gegenwaré, I. 8, 244), ““ who came as close to the real teaching
of Jesus as it stands in the synoptic gospels as did this
Phrygian.”

Xxvii

INTRODUCTION

above Plato. His Manual, with a few simple
changes, principally in the proper names, was
adapted by two different Christian ascetics as a rule
and guide of monastic life.

In modern times his vogue started rather slowly
with translations by Perotti and Politian, but ver-
nacular versions began to appear in the sixteenth
century, and at the end of that century and the
first part of the subsequent one, Epictetus was one
of the most powerful forces in the movement of
Neo-Stoicism, especially under the protagonists
Justus Lipsius and Bishop Guillaume Du Vair.2 His
work and the essays of Montaigne were the principal
secular readings of Pascal, and it was with Epictetus
and his disciple Marcus Aurelius that the Earl
of Shaftesbury “was most thoroughly conversant.” 4
Men as different as Touissant L’Ouverture and
Landor, Frederick the Great and Leopardi, have
been among his admirers. The number of editions
and new printings of his works, or of portions or
translations of the same, averages considerably
more than one for each year since the invention
of printing. In the twentieth century, through
the inclusion of Crossley’s Golden Sayings of
Epictetus in Charles William Eliot’s Harvard Series
of Classics, and of the Manual in Carl Hilty’s Glick,
of which two works upwards of three hundred and

1 The same was done again in the seventeenth century for
the Carthusians by Matthias Mittner (1632), who took the
first 35 of his 50 precepts Ad conservandam animi pacem
from the Encheiridion. See Acta Erudit, 1726, 264.

2 See Zanta’s elaborate work upon the share taken by
these men in the movement.

3B. Rand: The Life, etc., of Anthony, Earl of Shaftesbury
(author of the Characteristics), (1900), p. xi.

KXViii

INTRODUCTION

fifty thousand copies had, at a recent date, been
sold, it may safely be asserted that more copies
of portions of his work have been printed in the last
two decades than ever existed all told from his own
day down to that time.

In concluding one can hardly refrain from trans-
lating a portion of the sincere and stirring passage
in which Justus Lipsius, a great man and a dis-
tinguished scholar, paid Epictetus the tribute of his
homage :

“So much for Seneca; another brilliant star
arises, Epictetus, his second in time, but not in
merit; comparable with him in the weight, if not
in the bulk, of his writings; superior in his life.
He was a man who relied wholly upon himself
and God, but not on Fortune. In origin low and
servile, in body lame and feeble, in mind most
exalted, and brilliant among the lights of every
age....
“ But few of his works remain: the Encheiridion,
assuredly a noble piece, and as it were the soul
of Stoic moral philosophy; besides that, the Dis-
courses, which he delivered on the streets, in his
house, and in the school, collected and arranged
by Arrian. Nor are these all extant... . But, so
help me God, what a keen and lofty spirit in
them! a soul aflame, and burning with love of the
honourable! There is nothing in Greek their like,
unless I am mistaken; I mean with such notable
vigour and fire. A novice or one unacquainted with
true philosophy he will hardly stir or affect, but
when a man has made some progress or is already
far advanced, it is amazing how Epictetus stirs him
up, and though he is always touching some tender

xxix

INTRODUCTION

spot, yet he gives delight also.... There is no one
who better influences and shapes a good mind. 1
never read that old man without a stirring of m
soul within me, and, as with Homer, 1 think the
more of him each time I re-read him, for he seems
always new; and even after I have returned to
him I feel that I ought to return to him yet once
more.”

xxx

BIBLIOGRAPHY :

Tue editio princeps of Epictetus was prepared by
Victor Trincavelli at Venice, in 1535, from a singu-
larly faulty MS., so that it is valueless for the
purposes of textual criticism. The first substantial
work of a critical character was done by Jacob
Schegk, a distinguished professor of medicine at
Tiibingen, in the edition of Basel, 1554. Although
few changes were made in the Greek text, Schegk
employed his admirable Latin version as a medium
for the correction of hundreds of passages. Even
greater were the services of Hieronymus Wolf,
whose edition, with translation and commentary,
Basel, 1560, is perhaps the most important landmark
in Epictetean studies, but for some reason failed to
influence markedly the common tradition, which
long thereafter continued to reproduce the inferior
Greek text of Schegk (Trincavelli).

The next advance is connected with the name of
John Upton, whose work appeared in parts, London,
1739-41. Upton had some knowledge of a number
of MSS., and in particular a “ codex,” which was a
copy of the Trincavelli edition that contained in the
margins numerous readings of a MS. now in Mutina,
and possibly other MSS., together with notes and
emendations from Wolf, Salmasius, and others, so
that one cannot be certain always just what
“authority” is behind any particular reading whose

1 For details see my ioatemniitg Contributions toward a
Bibliography of Epictetus.
Xxxi
VOL. L B

BIBLIOGRAPHY

source is otherwise not accounted for. He had,
moreover, the annotations of Anthony, Earl of
Shaftesbury, and the assistance of the learned James
Harris, and his contributions to the interpretation of
Epictetus in the elaborate commentary are numerous.
Richard Bentley’s sagacious and often brilliant
emendations entered in the margins of his copy of
the Trincavelli edition remained unfortunately un-
known until quite recently, as also the ingenious
and stimulating, but on the whole less carefully
considered, annotations of J. J. Reiske (in H.
Schenkl’s edition).

Appropriately designated Monumenta (Epicteteae
Philosophiae Monumenta) is the great work in five
large volumes by Johannes Schweighauser, Leipzig,
1799-1800, immediately following a notable edition,
in fact the only really critical edition, of the Enchei-
ridion (1798), which, despite its imperfections, subse-
quent editors have been content merely to reprint.
Schweighauser’s work is characterized by acumen,
industry, and lucidity, and it will be long before it
is entirely superseded. The edition by A. Koraes,
Paris, 1826, although its author was a learned and
ingenious scholar, is marred by a number of unneces-
sary rewritings.

A substantial critical edition we owe to the pains-
taking labours of Heinrich Schenk] (Leipzig, 1894;
editio minor, 1898; second edition, 1916). This is
based upon the Bodleian MS. Misc. Graec. 251, 8.
xi/xii, which Schenk] and, it would appear, J. L. G.
Mowat before him (Journ, of. Philol, 1877, 60 ff. ; οὐ
J. B. Mayor, Cl. Rev. 1895, 31 ἢ, and Schenk, ed.
minor, 1898, p. iv; ed. 1916, p. iv) have shown to be
the archetype of all the numerous existing MSS. of

Xxxii

BIBLIOGRAPHY

the Discourses.1 For the edilio minor (1898) a new
collation was prepared by the skilled hand of W. M.
Lindsay, and for the second edition (1916) Schenkl
himself had photographs of the complete MS. to
work with, while T. W. Allen furnished an expert's
transcription of the Scholia, with the result that,
although the first edition by Schenkl left something
to be desired in the accuracy and fullness of its MS.
readings, one can approach the apparatus criticus of
the second edition with all reasonable confidence.
Schenkl’s own contributions to the constitution of
the text by way of emendation are considerable, the
number of emendations, however, wisely somewhat
reduced in the latest printing. A very full index
verborum greatly facilitates studies of all kinds.

Of the Encheiridion scores of editions have
appeared, but hardly any that deserve mention
either for critical or exegetical value, except those
that form parts of the above-mentioned editions by
Wolf, Upton, and Schweighauser (a better text in
his separate edition of the Encheiridion, Leipzig,
1798). But a few necessary remarks about that
work and the Fragments will be given in the intro-
duction to the second volume of the present work.

A brief list of some of the most important titles
bearing upon the criticism of Epictetus :—

H. von Arnim, article “Epiktetos,” in Pauly’s
Realencyclopidie, etc., Zweite Bearbeitung, VI.

1 For some account of a large number of these, see Schenk] 2,
LY-LVIII. Their value is very slight indeed, and only for
purposes of emendation, since as yet there seem to exist no
authentic traces of the existence of a second early MS. of
Epictetus, so that the Discourses must have survived the
Middl e Ages in only a single exemplar.

XXxXiii

BIBLIOGRAPHY

126-31. Contains an ectotienit ccigiptpie 2 of his
teaching.

E. V. Arnold, Roman Stoicism. Catibhider; 1911:
Article “ “Epictetus,” in Hastings, Enc. of Rel.
VI, 323 ἢ.

R. Amine: Quaestiones Epicteteae. Freiburg i. B. 1888.

R. Bentley’ 5 eitient notes on Arrian’s “ Discourses
of Epictetus” ; Trans. Amer. Philol. Assoc. 1921,
53, 40-52 (by W. A. Oldfather).

A. Bonhéffer, Epiktet und die Stoa, Stuttgart, 190.
Die Ethik des Stoikers Epiktet. Stuttgart, 1894.
Epiktet und das Neue Testament. Giessen, 1911.
“Epiktet und das Neue Testament,” Zeitschr. fiir
die neutest, Wiss. 1912, 13, 281-92. These are
incomparably the most important critical works
on the subjects which they cover, and on many
points have reached definitive conclusions.

R. Bultmann, Der Stil der paulinischen Predigt und die
kynisch-stoische Diatribe. Marburg, 1910. Das
religidse Moment in der ethischen Unterweisung
des Epiktets und das Neue Testament,” Zeitschr.
Suir die neutest, Wiss. 1912, 13, 97 ff, 177 ff,

Th. Colardeau, Etude sur Epictéte. Paris; 1903.

F. W. Farrar, Seekers after God. London, 1863, and
often reprinted.

H. Gomperz, Die Lebensauffassung der griechischen
Philosophen und das Ideal der inneren Freiheit.
Jena, 1904. P. 186, and especially 195 ff. 2nd
ed. 1915.

O. Halbauer, De diatribis Epicteti. Leipzig, 1911.

K. Hartmann, “ Arrian und Epiktet,’ Neue Jahrb.
1905, 15, 248-75.

E. Hatch, The Influence of Greek Ideas and Usages
upon the Christian Church. Sixth ed., London,
1897.

XXxiv

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Fr. M. J. Lagrange, “La philosophie religieuse d@’Epic-
téte, ete.” Revue Biblique, 1912, 91 ff. ; 192 ff.

W. 5. Landor, Imaginary Conversations of Greeks and
Romans. London, 1853, and often reprinted.
*« Epictetus and Seneca.”

J. Lipsius, Manuductio ad Sioicam philosophiam. 1. xix,
pp. 62-64. ed. Antwerp, 1604. Vol. IV, p.
681 f., ed. Wesel, 1625.

C. Martha, Les moralistes sous [empire romain, phalo-
sophes et poéies, Paris, 1865, and often re-
printed.

J. B. Mayor, Rev. of H. Schenkl’s “ Epictetus,” Class.
Rev., 1895, 9, 31-7.

P. E. H. Melcher, “De sermone Epicteteo quibus

, tebus ab Attica regula discedat,’ Diss. philol.
Hallenses, 17, 1905.

G. Misch, Geschichte der Autobiographie. Leipzig and
Berlin, 1907. Pp. 257-65.

P. E. More, Hellenistic Philosophies. Princeton, 1923.
Epictetus, pp. 94-171.

R. Miicke, Zu Arrians und Epiktets Sprachgebrauch.
Nordhausen, 1887.

B. Pascal, Eniretien avec de Saci sur Epictéte et Mon-
taigne. First published in authentic form in M.
Havet: Pensées de Pascal, Paris, 1852, and fre-
quently since that time. For discussions of
Pascal’s very interesting views see especially
M. J. Guyau: Pascal, ete., Paris, 1815. C. A.
Saint-Beuve: Port Royal, fitth edition. Paris,
1888 ff., Vol. 11. pp. 381 f F.Strowski: Histoire
du sentiment religieux en France au xviii siécle,
fourth edition. Paris, 1909.

R. Renner. Zu Epziktets Diatriben. Amberg, 1904.
Das Kind. — Ein Gleichnismittel aes Epiktets
Miinchen, 1905.

XXXV

BIBLIOGRAPHY

D. S. Sharp, Epictetus and the New Testament. Lon-
don, 1914.

Rt. Rev. J. L. Spalding, Glimpses of Truth, with
essays on Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius.
Chicago, 1903. Third edition, 1913.

L. Stein, Die Psychologie der Stoa. Berlin, 1886,
1888.

J. Stuhrmann, De vocabulis notionum philosophicarum
in Epicteti libris. Neustadt, 1885.

K. Vorlander, “Christliche Gedanken eines heid-
nischen Philosophen,” Preuss. Jahrb., 1897,
pp. 89, 193-222. t

Louis Weber, “ La morale d’Epictéte et les besoins
présents de l’enseignement moral,’ Rev. de
Metaph. et de Moral, six articles, 1905-1909.

U. von Wilamowitz-Méllendorff, “Die griechische

Literatur des Altertums,” in Kultur der

Gegenwart®, I. 8 (Leipzig and Berlin, 1912), 244.

Compare also the admirable statement in his

Griechisches Lesebuch, I. (Berlin, 1902), pp. 230-1.

Zahn, Der Stoker Epiktet und sein Verhiltnis zum

Christentum. Erlangen, 1894. Second edition,

Leipzig, 1895. The thesis, that Epictetus was

acquainted with the New Testament, has been

very generally rejected, but the address has
value apart from that contention.

L. Zanta, La renaissance du stoicisme au xvi’ siécle.
Paris, 1914. La traduction francaise du Manuel
d’Epictéte d’André de Rivaudeau, etc. Paris,
1914.

E. Zeller, Die Philosophie der Griechen*, III. 1
(Leipzig, 1909), 765-81; III. 2 (1902), 910-14,

Th.

-

There have been three notable translations into
XXXVi

BIBLIOGRAPHY

English of Epictetus ; a vigorous and idiomatic repro-
duction by Elizabeth Carter (1758, and often there-
after), a learned and exact rendition by George Long
(1877, and frequently reproduced), and a most fluent
and graceful version by P. E. Matheson (1916). To
all of these, but especially to the last mentioned, I
have been indebted upon occasion.

XXXxvii

SYMBOLS

S = Cod. Bodleianus Misc. Graec. 251, s. xi/xii.

Sa, Sb, Sc, Sd = corrections of different periods, as
discriminated by Schenkl.

5 = one or more copies of δ.

In general only the important deviations from 8
have been recorded in the apparatus criticus. All
substantial emendations, when made by modern
scholars, are recorded, but the obvious corrections
made by Greek scholars themselves, either on 8
itself or in its numerous copies, have generally been
passed over in silence, since the number of these is
so large (for S is full of errors of all kinds) that they
would seriously clutter up the page without adding
anything important to our knowledge. For details
of the MS. tradition the reader is referred to the
elaborate apparatus in Schenkl’s second ed. (Leipzig,
1916), upon which the present text is dependent,
although I have not hesitated to depart from his
reading or his punctuation in a number of passages.

W. A. OLDFATHER,
Urbana, Illinois.
March 6, 1925.

XXXViii

OF EPICTETUS

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APPIANOY
TON EMIKTHTOY AIATPIBON
ABTA?

A

KESAAAIA TOY A BIBAIOT

. Περὶ τῶν ἐφ᾽ ἡμὶν καὶ οὐκ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν.
. Πῶς ἄν τις σῴζοι τὸ κατὰ πρόσωπον ἐν παντί;
. Πῶς ἄν τις ἀπὸ τοῦ τὸν θεὸν πατέρα εἶναι τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐπὶ

τὰ ἑξῆς ἐπέλθοι;

. Περὶ προκοπῆς.

. Πρὸς τοὺς ᾿Ακαδημαικούς.

. Περὶ προνοίας.

. Περὶ τῆς χρείας τῶν μεταπιπτόντων καὶ ὑποθετικῶν καὶ τῶν

ὁμοίων.

. Ὅτι αἱ δυνάμεις τοῖς ἀπανδεύτοις οὐκ ἀσφαλεῖς.
. Πῶς ἀπὸ τοῦ συγγενεῖς ἡμᾶς εἶναι τῷ θεῷ ἐπέλθοι ἄν τις ἐπὶ

τὰ ἑξῆς;

. Πρὸς τοὺς περὶ τάς ἐν Ῥώμῃ mpoaywyas ἐσπουδακότας.
. Περὶ φιλοστοργίας.

. Περὶ εὐαρεστήσεως.

΄, Πῶς ἕκαστα ἔστι ποιεῖν ἀρεστῶς θεοῖς ;

“Ori πάντας ἐφορᾷ τὸ θεῖον.

1 The whole title supplied by Schenk.

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES
OF EPICTETUS

IN FOUR BOOKS

BOOK I

Chapters of-the First Book

Of the things which are under our control and
not under our control.

How may a man preserve his proper character
upon every occasion ?

From the thesis that God is the Father of man-
kind, how may one proceed to the consequences ?

Of progress.

Against the Academics.

Of providence.

Of the use of equivocal premisses, hypothetical
arguments, and the like.

That the reasoning faculties, in the case of the
uneducated, are not free from error.

How from the thesis that we are akin to God may
one proceed to the consequence ?

To those who have set their hearts upon prefer-
ment at Rome.

Of family affection.

Of contentment.

How may each several thing be done acceptably
to the gods?

That the Deity oversees all men.

bo

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

ιε΄. Ti ἐπαγγέλλεται φιλοσοφία;

ix’. Περὶ προνοίας.

1". Ὅτι ἀναγκαῖα τὰ λογικά.

ιη΄. Ὅτι οὐ δεῖ χαλεπαίνειν τοῖς ἁμαρτανομένοις.

ιθ΄, Πῶς ἔχειν δεῖ πρὸς τοὺς τυράννους ;

κ΄. Περὶ τοῦ λόγου πῶς αὑτοῦ θεωρητικός ἐστιν.

ka’, Πρὸς τοὺς θαυμάζεσθαι θέλοντας.

κβ΄. Περὶ τῶν προλήψεων.

κγ΄. Πρὸς ᾿Επίκουρον.

xd’, Πῶς πρὸς τὰς περιστάσεις ἀγωνιστέον ;

ke’. Πρὸς τὸ αὐτό.

Ks’. Τίς ὁ βιωτικὸς νόμος ;

κζ΄. Ποσαχῶς αἱ φαντασίαι γίνονται καὶ τίνα πρόχειρα πρὸς
αὐτὰς βοηθήματα παρασκευαστέον ;

κη΄. Ὅτι οὐ δεῖ χαλεπαίνειν ἀνθρώποις καὶ τίνα τὰ μικρὰ καὶ
μεγάλα ἐν ἀνθρώποις.

κθ΄. Περὶ εὐσταθείας.

λ΄, Τί δεῖ πρόχειρον ἔχειν ἐν ταῖς περιστάσεσιν ;

᾿Αρριανὸς Λουκίῳ Teddi χαίρειν

Οὔτε συνέγραψα ἐγὼ τοὺς ᾿Επικτήτου λόγους
οὕτως ὅπως ἄν τις συγγράψειε τὰ τοιαῦτα οὔτε
ἐξήνεγκα εἰς ἀνθρώπους αὐτός, ὅς γε οὐδὲ συγ-
γράψαι φημί. ὅσα δὲ ἤκουον αὐτοῦ λέγοντος,
ταῦτα αὐτὰ ἐπειράθην αὐτοῖς ὀνόμασιν ws οἷόν
τε ἦν γραψάμενος ὑπομνήματα εἰς ὕστερον
ἐμαυτῷ διαφυλάξαι τῆς ἐκείνου διανοίας καὶ
παρρησίας. ἔστι δὴ τοιαῦτα ὥσπερ εἰκὸς ὁποῖα
ἄν τις αὐτόθεν ὁρμηθεὶς εἴποι πρὸς ἕτερον, οὐχ
ὁποῖα ἂν ἐπὶ τῷ ὕστερον ἐντυγχάνειν τινὰς
αὐτοῖς συγγράφοι. τοιαῦτα δ᾽ ὄντα οὐκ οἶδα
ὅπως οὔτε ἑκόντος ἐμοῦ οὔτε εἰδότος ἐξέπεσεν εἰς

1 The contrast intended is between γράφω, ‘‘ write,” § 2,
and συγγράφω, ‘‘ compose.” Arrian had in mind, no doubt,
the works of Plato and Xenophon, which, although they pur-
ported to reproduce the words of Socrates, were in fact
highly finished literary compositions.

4

ee ee ee ee ee ee

BOOK I
. What does philosophy profess ?

ΧΥ
XVL Of providence.
XVII. That the art of reasoning is indispensable.

XVII. That we ought not to be angry with the erring.
XIX. How ought we to bear ourselves towards tyrants?
XX. How foe the reasoning faculty contemplate
itself?
XXI. To those who would be admired.
XXII. Of preconceptions.
XXIIL._ In answer to Epicurus.
XXIV. How should we struggle against difficulties ?
XXV. Upon the same theme.
XXVI. hat is the rule of life?
XXVIL In how many ways do the external impressions
arise, and what aids should we have ready at
hand to meet them?

XXVIII. That we ought not to be with men; and
what are the little things and the great among
men?

XXIX. Of steadfastness.

XXX. What aid ought we have at hand in difficulties?

Arrian To Lucius GELtivus, greeting:

I Have not composed these Words of Epictetus
as one might be said to “compose” books of this
kind, nor have I of my own act published them to
the world; indeed, I acknowledge that I have not
“composed” them at allt. But whatever I heard
him say I used to write down, word for word, as
best I could, endeavouring to preserve it as a
memorial, for my own future use, of his way of
thinking and the frankness of his speech. They are,
accordingly, as you might expect, such remarks as one
man might make off-hand to another, not such as he
would compose for men to read in after time. This
being their character, they have fallen, I know not
how, without my will or knowledge, into the hands

5

-

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

ἀνθρώπους. ἀλλ᾽ ἐμοί ye ov πολὺς λόγος, εἰ οὐ

ἱκανὸς φανοῦμαι συγγράφειν, Emictynt@ τε οὐδ
ὀλίγος, εἰ καταφρονήσει τις αὐτοῦ τῶν λόγων,
ἐπεὶ καὶ λέγων αὐτοὺς οὐδενὸς ἄλλου δῆλος ἣν
ἐφιέμενος ὅτε μὴ κινῆσαι τὰς γνώμας τῶν ἀκου-
όντων πρὸς τὰ βέλτιστα. εἰ μὲν δὴ τοῦτό γε
αὐτὸ διαπράττοιντο οἱ λόγοι οὗτοι, ἔχοιεν ἂν
οἶμαι ὅπερ χρὴ ἔχειν τοὺς τῶν φιλοσόφων λόγους"
εἰ δὲ μή, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκεῖνο ἴστωσαν οἱ ἐντυγ ἄνοντες
ὅτι, αὐτὸς ὁπότε ἔλεγεν αὐτούς, ἀνάγκη ἣν τοῦτο
πάσχειν τὸν ἀκροώμενον αὐτῶν ὅπερ ἐκεῖνος
αὐτὸν παθεῖν ἠβούλετο. εἰ δ᾽ οἱ λόγοι αὐτοὶ ἐφ᾽
αὑτῶν τοῦτο οὐ διαπράττονται, τυχὸν μὲν ἐγὼ
αἴτιος, τυχὸν δὲ καὶ ἀνάγκη οὕτως ἔχειν. ἔρρωσο.

α΄. Ilept τῶν ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν καὶ οὐκ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν

Τῶν ἄλλων δυνάμεων οὐδεμίαν εὑρήσετε αὐτὴν
αὑτῆς θεωρητικήν, οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ δοκιμαστικὴν
ἢ ἀποδοκιμαστικήν. ἡ γραμματικὴ μέχρι τίνος
κέκτηται τὸ θεωρητικόν ; μέχρι τοῦ διαγνῶναι
τὰ γράμματα. ἡ μουσική ; μέχρι τοῦ διαγνῶναι
τὸ μέλος. αὐτὴ οὖν “αὑτὴν θεωρεῖ τις αὐτῶν ;
οὐδαμῶς. ἀλλ᾽ ὅτε μέν, ἄν τι γράφῃς τῷ ἑταίρῳ,
δεῖ τούτων τῶν γραπτέων, ἡ γραμματικὴ ἐρεῖ:
πότερον δὲ γραπτέον τῷ ἑταίρῳ ἢ οὐ γραπτέον,
ἡ γραμματικὴ οὐκ ἐρεῖ. καὶ περὶ τῶν μελῶν

1 δυνάμεις includes arts as well as faculties, and both are
dealt with in this context.

6

BOCK I. τ 1-3

of men. Yet to me it is a matter of small concern
if I shall be thought incapable of “composing’’ a
work, and to Epictetus of no concern at all if anyone
shall despise his words, seeing that even when he
uttered them he was clearly aiming at nothing else
but to incite the minds of his hearers to the best
things. If, now, these words of his should produce
that same effect, they would have, I think, just that
success which the words of the philosophers ought
to have; but if not, let those who read them be
assured of this, that when Epictetus himself spoke
them, the hearer could not help but feel exactly
what Epictetus wanted him to feel. If, however,
the words by themselves do not produce this effect,
perhaps I am at fault, or else, perhaps, it cannot
well be otherwise. Farewell.

CHAPTER I

Of the things which are under our control and not
under our control

Amone the arts and faculties! in general you will
find none that is self-contemplative, and therefore
none that is either self-approving or self-disapproving.
How far does the art of grammar possess the power
of contemplation? Only so far as to pass judgement
upon what is written. How far the art of music?
Only so far as to pass judgement upon the melody.
Does either of them, then, contemplate itself? Not
at all. But if you are writing to a friend and are at
a loss as to what to write, the art of grammar will
tell you; yet whether or no you are to write to your
friend at all, the art of grammar will not tell. The

7

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

ε ΄ ε ͵ ͵ > ὦ , a AN
ὡσαύτως ἡ μουσική: πότερον δ᾽ ἀστέον νῦν καὶ
θ » > , » θ Ἔν, »
κιθαριστέον ἢ οὔτε ἀστέον οὔτε κιθαριστέον οὐκ

lal - “ ‘
ἐρεῖ. τίς οὖν ἐρεῖ; ἡ καὶ αὑτὴν θεωροῦσα καὶ
τἄλλα πάντα. αὕτη δ᾽ ἐστὶ tis; ἡ δύναμις ἡ
/ 4 ef ‘ ie he A, 4
λογική" μόνη yap αὕτη καὶ αὑτὴν κατανοήσουσα
, / / > \ 7] 4 Ἀ
παρείληπται, τίς τέ ἐστε καὶ τί δύναται καὶ
πόσου ἀξία οὖσα ἐλήλυθεν, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἅπά-
’ὔ
σας. τί γάρ ἐστιν ἄλλο τὸ λέγον ὅτε χρυσίον
καλόν ἐστιν; αὐτὸ γὰρ οὐ λέγει. δῆλον ὅτε ἡ
- / ”.
χρηστικὴ δύναμις ταῖς φαντασίαις. τί ἄλλο
\ , / \ Ν /
TO μουσικήν, γραμματικήν, τὰς ἄλλας δυνάμεις
διακρῖνον, δοκιμάξον τὰς χρήσεις αὐτῶν Kal τοὺς
καιροὺς παραδεικνύον ; οὐδὲν ἄλλο.
ad = 2 ΝΜ \ , ς ΄
Ὥσπερ οὖν ἣν ἄξιον, τὸ κράτιστον ἁπάντων
᾿ a « \ t 3.4}. Φ' δον , \
καὶ κυριεῦον οἱ θεοὶ μόνον ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν ἐποίησαν, τὴν
a a a
χρῆσιν τὴν ὀρθὴν ταῖς φαντασίαις, τὰ δ᾽ ἄλλα
οὐκ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν. apd γε ὅτι οὐκ ἤθελον ; ἐγὼ μὲν
fal a /
δοκῶ ὅτι, εἰ ἠδύναντο, κἀκεῖνα ἂν ἡμῖν ἐπέ-
\ fol
Tpewav' ἀλλὰ πάντως οὐκ ἠδύναντο. ἐπὶ γῆς
γὰρ ὄντας καὶ σώματι συνδεδεμένους τοιούτῳ καὶ
a “ nr e \
κοινωνοῖς τοιούτοις πῶς οἷόν T ἦν εἰς ταῦτα ὑπὸ
τῶν ἐκτὸς μὴ ἐμποδίζεσθαι ;
,
᾿Αλλὰ τί λέγει ὁ Leds; “᾿Εᾷπίκτητε, εἰ οἷόν
[4
τε ἣν, καὶ τὸ σωμάτιον ἄν σου καὶ τὸ κτησίδιον

, “΄ ΄
ll ἐποίησα ἐλεύθερον καὶ ἀπαραπόδιστον. νῦν δέ,
8

BOOK I..1 3-11

same holds true of the art of music with regard to
melodies; but whether you are at this moment to
sing and play on the lyre, or neither sing nor play,
it will not tell. What art or faculty, then, will tell?
That one which contemplates both itself and every-
thing else. And what is this? The reasoning
faculty ; for this is the only one we have inherited
which will take knowledge both of itself—what it is,
and of what it is capable, and how valuable a gift it
is to us—and likewise of all the other faculties.
For what else is it that tells us gold is beautiful? For
the gold itself does not tell us. Clearly it is the
faculty which makes use of external impressions.
What else judges with discernment the art of music,
the art of grammar, the other arts and faculties,
passing judgement upon their uses and pointing out
the seasonable occasions for their use? Nothing
else does,

As was fitting, therefore, the gods have put under
our control only the most excellent faculty of all
and that which dominates the rest, namely, the
power to make correct use of external impressions,
but all the others they have not put under our
control. Was it indeed because they would not?
I for one think that had they been able they would
have entrusted us with the others also; but they
were quite unable to do that. For since we are
upon earth and trammelled by an earthy body and
by earthy associates, how was it possible that, in
respect of them, we should not be hampered by
external things?

But what says Zeus? “Epictetus, had it been
possible I should have made both this paltry body
and this small estate of thine free and unhampered.

9

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

μή σε λανθανέτω, τοῦτο οὐκ ἔστιν σόν, ἀλλὰ
12 πηλὸς κομψῶς πεφυραμένος. ἐπεὶ δὲ τοῦτο οὐκ
ἠδυνάμην ἐδώκαμέν. σοι μέρος τι ἡμέτερον, τὴν
δύναμιν ταύτην τὴν ὁρμητικήν τε καὶ ἀφορ-
μητικὴν καὶ ὀρεκτικήν τε καὶ ἐκκλιτικὴν καὶ
ἁπλῶς τὴν χρηστικὴν ταῖς φαντασίαις, ἧς ἐπι-
μελούμενος καὶ ἐν ἧ τὰ σαυτοῦ τιθέμενος οὐδέποτε
κωλυθήσῃ, οὐδέποτ᾽ ἐμποδισθήσῃ, οὐ στενάξεις,
13 οὐ μέμψῃ, οὐ κολακεύσεις οὐδένα. τί οὖν; μή
τι μικρά σοι φαίνεται ταῦτα ; ἢ" “μὴ γένοιτο."
“ἀρκῇ οὖν αὐτοῖς ;" “εὔχομαι δὲ τοῖς θεοῖς.᾿
Ι4 Νῦν δ᾽ ἑνὸς δυνάμενοι ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καὶ ἑνὶ
προσηρτηκέναι ἑαυτοὺς μᾶλλον θέλομεν πολλῶν
ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καὶ πολλοῖς προσδεδέσθαι καὶ τῷ
σώματι καὶ τῇ κτήσει καὶ ἀδελφῷ καὶ φίχῳ καὶ
15 τέκνῳ καὶ δούλῳ. ἅτε οὖν πολλοῖς προσδεδε-
μένοι βαρούμεθα ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν καὶ καθελκόμεθα.
16 διὰ τοῦτο, ἂν ἄπλοια ἦ, καθήμεθα σπώμενοι καὶ
παρακύπτομεν συνεχῶς" “τίς ἄνεμος πνεῖ;
βορέας. “τί ἡμῖν καὶ αὐτῷ; πότε ὁ ζέφυρος
πνεύσει; "ἢ ὅταν αὐτῷ δόξῃ, ὦ βέλτιστε, ἢ τῷ
Αἰόλῳ. σὲ γὰρ οὐκ ἐποίησεν ὁ θεὸς ταμίαν τῶν
17 ἀνέμων, ἀλλὰ τὸν Αἴολον. “τί οὗν ; ᾽ δεῖ τὰ
ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν βέλτιστα κατασκευάξειν, τοῖς δ᾽ ἄλλοις
χρῆσθαι ὡς πέφυκεν. “πῶς οὖν πέφυκεν ;” ὡς
ἂν ὁ θεὸς θέλῃ.
18. “Ἐμὲ οὖν νῦν τραχηλοκοπεῖσθαι μόνον ; ες τί
οὖν ; ἤθελες πάντας τραχηλοκοπηθῆναι, ἵνα σὺ
19 παραμυθίαν ἔ ἔχης ; οὐ θέλεις οὕτως ἐκτεῖναι τὸν
τράχηλον, ὡς Λατερανός τις ἐν τῇ Ῥώμῃ κελευ-

1 Compare I. ii. 38.
2 The exact meaning of σπώμενοι is uncertain.

Io

BOOK Lt II-19

But as it is—let it not escape thee—this body is
not thine own, but only clay cunningly compounded.
Yet since I could not give thee this, we have given
thee a certain portion of ourself, this faculty of
choice and refusal, of desire and aversion, or, in
a word, the faculty which makes use of external
impressions ; if thou care for this and place all that
thou hast therein, thou shalt never be thwarted,
never hampered, shalt not groan, shalt not blame,
shalt not flatter any man. What then? Are these
things small in thy sight?” “Far be it from me!”
* Art thou, then, content with them?” “I pray
the Gods I may be.’’+

But now, although it is in our power to care for
one thing only and devote ourselves to but one, we
choose rather to care for many things, and to be
tied fast to many, even to our body and our estate
and brother and friend and child and slave. Where-
fore, being tied fast to many things, we are burdened
and dragged down by them. That is why, if the
weather keeps us from sailing, we sit down and
fidget? and keep constantly peering about. ‘* What
wind is blowing?” we ask. Boreas. ‘‘ What have we
to do with it? When will Zephyrus blow?”’ When
it pleases, good sir, or rather when Aeolus pleases.
For God has not made you steward of the winds,

but Aeolus. “What then?” We must make the

best of what is under our control, and take the rest
as its nature is. ‘“‘ How, then, is its nature?”’ As
God wills.

“Must I, then, be the only one to be beheaded
now?” Why, did you want everybody to be be-
headed for your consolation? Are you not willing to

3 Alluding to Homer, Odyssey, X. 21.
It

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

σθεὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ Νέρωνος ἀποκεφαλισθῆναι; : ἐκτείνας
γὰρ τὸν τράχηλον καὶ πληγεὶς καὶ πρὸς αὐτὴν
τὴν πληγὴν ἀσθενῆ γενομένην ἐπ᾽ ὀλίγον συνεὰλ-
20 κυσθεὶς πάλιν ἐξέτεινεν. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἔτι πρότερον
προσελθόντι τις ᾿Επαφροδίτῳ τῷ ᾿ἀπελευθέρῳ
τοῦ Νέρωνος καὶ ἀνακρίνοντι αὐτὸν ὑπὲρ τοῦ
συγκρουσθῆναι “Ἂν tt θέλω," φησίν, “ ἐρῶ σου
τῷ κυρίῳ.
ΟῚ, ὡς ἐν Τί οὖν δεῖ ; πρόχειρον ἔχειν ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ; ;
τί γὰρ ἄχλο ἢ τί ἐμὸν καὶ τί οὐκ ἐμὸν καὶ τί μοι
22 ἔξεστιν καὶ τί μοι οὐκ ἔξεστιν ; ἀποθανεῖν με δεῖ"
μή τι οὖν καὶ στένοντα ; δεθῆναι" μή τι καὶ
θρηνοῦντα ; φυγαδευθῆναι" “μή τις οὖν κωλύει
γελῶντα καὶ εὐθυμοῦντα καὶ εὐροοῦντα ; “εἰπὲ
23 τὰ ἀπόρρητα. οὐ λέγω" τοῦτο yap ἐπ᾽ ἐμοί
ἐστιν. “ ἀλλὰ δήσω σε. ἄνθρωπε, τί λέγεις ;
ἐμέ; τὸ σκέλος μου δήσεις, τὴν προαίρεσιν δὲ
24 οὐδ᾽ ὁ Ζεὺς νικῆσαι δύναται. “εἰς φυλακήν σε
βαλῶ." τὸ σωμάτιον. “ ἀποκεφαλίσω σε. πότε
οὖν σοι εἶπον, ὅτι μόνου ἐμοῦ ὁ τράχηλος ἀναπό-
25 τμητός ἐστιν; i ταῦτα ἔδει μελετᾶν τοὺς φιλο-
σοφοῦντας, ταῦτα καθ᾽ ἡμέραν γράφειν, ἐν τούτοις
γυμνάξεσθαι.
26 Θρασέας εἰώθει λέγειν “Σήμερον ἀναιρεθῆναι
27 θέλω μᾶλλον ἢ αὔριον φυγαδευθῆναι." τί οὖν
αὐτῷ Ῥοῦφος εἶπεν ; x Ὁ μὲν ὡς βαρύτερον
ἐκλέγῃ, τίς ἡ μωρία τῆς ἐκλογῆς ; ; εἰ δ᾽ ὡς
κουφότερον, τίς σοι δέδωκεν ; οὐ θέλεις μελετᾶν ἡ
ἀρκεῖσθαι τῷ δεδομένῳ ; ἢ

1 For all ordinary proper names the reader is referred to
the Index.

2 The point of the retort lies in the defiance of the officious
but all-powerful freedman.

12

; πῶ ee * rie DPT «ἘΠ ΥΩ

Seg οὐδ eS I ME EIT

BOOK I. & 19-27

stretch out your neck as did a certain Lateranus? at
Rome, when Nero ordered him to be beheaded?
For he stretched out his neck and received the
blow, but, as it was a feeble one, he shrank back
for an instant, and then stretched out his neck
Yes, and before that, when Epaphroditus,
a freedman of Nero, approached a certain man and
asked about the ground of his offence, he answered,
“If I wish anything, I will speak to your master.””?

“ What aid, then, must we have ready at hand in
such circumstances?”” Why, what else than the
knowledge of what is mine, and what is not mine,
and what is permitted me, and what is not per-
mitted me? I must die: must I, then, die groaning
too? I must be fettered: and wailing too? I must
go into exile: does anyone, then, keep me from
going with a smile and cheerful and serene? “Tell
your secrets.” I say not a word; for this is under
my control. “ But I will fetter you.” What is that
you say, man? fetter me? My leg you will fetter,
but my moral purpose not even Zeus himself has
power to overcome. “I will throw you into prison.”
My paltry body, rather! ‘I will behead you.”
Well, when did 1 ever tell you that mine was the
only neck that could not be severed? These are
the lessons that philosophers ought to rehearse,
these they ought to write down daily, in these they
ought to exercise themselves.

Thrasea used to say: “I would rather be killed
to-day than banished to-morrow.” What, then, did
Rufus say to him? “If you choose death as the
heavier of two misfortunes, what folly of choice!
But if as the lighter, who has given you the choice?
Are you not willing to practise contentment with
what has been given you?”

13

28

29

30

31

32

no =

i)

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

Διὰ τοῦτο yap ᾿Αγριππῖνος τί ἔλεγεν ; ὅτι
“᾿Ἐπὼ ἐμαυτῷ ἐμπόδιος οὐ γίνομαι." ἀπηγγέλη

ΓᾺΡ eee > , | ¢g? Pe es
αὐτῷ ὅτι “ κρίνῃ ἐν συγκλήτῳ."--““᾿Αγαθῇ τύχῃ.
ἀλλὰ ἦλθεν ἡ πέμπτη " (ταύτῃ δ᾽ εἰώθει γυμνα-
σάμενος ψυχρολουτρεῖν)" ““ ἀπέλθωμεν καὶ γυ-
μνασθῶμεν." γυμνασαμένῳ λέγει τις αὐτῷ ἐλθὼν
4 “ / ΕΣ] « a” ld «ἃ
ὅτι “ Kataxéxpica. —“ Φυγῇ," φησίν, “ἢ θα-

/ ” “ce ay” ςς ε 4 , ”
νάτῳ ;"-—“ Φυγῆ."--“ Τὰ ὑπάρχοντα th; —

»
“Οὐκ ἀφῃρέθη.᾽--“ His ᾿Αρίκειαν οὖν ἀπελθόντες
᾽ “ “-“

ἀριστήσωμεν."--- Τοῦτ᾽ ἔστι μεμελετηκέναι ἃ δεῖ
μελετᾶν, ὄρεξιν ἔκκλισιν ἀκώχλυτα ἀπερίπτωτα
παρεσκευακέναι. ἀποθανεῖν με δεῖ. εἰ ἤδη, ἀπο-
θνήσκω: κἂν} μετ᾽ ὀλίγον, νῦν ἀριστῷῶ τῆς ὥρας
ἐλθούσης, εἶτα τότε τεθνήξομαι. πῶς ; ὡς προ-
σήκει τὸν τὰ ἀλλότρια ἀποδιδόντα.

lal ΕΣ ‘ ‘ \ / >
β΄. Πῶς ἂν τις σῴζοι τὸ κατὰ πρόσωπον ἐν
παντί;
-“ -“ /

Τῷ λογικῷ ζῴῳ μόνον ἀφόρητόν ἐστι τὸ ἄλο-
γον, τὸ δ᾽ εὔλογον φορητόν. πληγαὶ οὐκ εἰσὶν
ἀφόρητοι τῇ φύσει.--- Τἵνα τρόπον ;--Ὁρα ras"

’ n
Λακεδαιμόνιοι μαστιγοῦνται μαθόντες ὅτι εὔλογόν
> \ » » 7 > ΝΜ > ,
ἐστιν.---- Τὸ δ᾽ ἀπάγξασθαι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀφόρητον ;—
ΓΙ lol / “ ΝΜ > Ν
Οταν γοῦν πάθῃ τις ὅτι εὔλογον, ἀπελθὼν

1 ©. Schenkl: καὶ 3,

1 The idea seems to be: By disregarding externals I do
not hinder the natural course of my mind and character,
that is, my true self.

2 The word πρόσωπον carries something of the figurative
meaning ‘‘réle” from the language of drama,

3 Referring to the scourging of Spartan youths before the
altar of Artemis.

14

BOOK I. 1. 28-11. 3

|

Wherefore, what was it that Agrippinus used to

remark? “I am not standing in my own way.”}
Word was brought him, “ Your case is being tried
in the Senate.’”-—*“ Good luck betide! But it is the
fifth hour now” (he was in the habit of taking his
exercise and then a cold bath at that hour); “let
us be off and take our exercise.” After he had
finished his exercise someone came and told him,
“You have been condemned.’—*“To exile,’ says
he, “or to death?”—“To exile.”—“* What about
my property?’’—*“It hes not been confiscated.” —
** Well then, let us go to Aricia and take our lunch
there.” This is what it means to have rehearsed
the lessons one. ought to rehearse, to have set
desire and aversion free from every hindrance and
made them proof against chance. I must die. If
forthwith, I die; and if a little later, I will take
lunch now, since the hour for lunch has come, and
afterwards I will die at the appointed time. How?
As becomes the man who is giving back that which
was another's.

CHAPTER II

How may a man preserve his proper character® upon
every occasion ?

To the rational being only the irrational is un-
endurable, but the rational is endurable. Blows are
not by nature unendurable-—How so?— Observe
how: Lacedaemonians take a scourging * once they
have learned that it is rational.—But is it not
unendurable to be hanged ?>—Hardly ; at all events
whenever a man feels that it is rational he goes and

15

.

we

10

ll

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

ἀπήγξατο. ἁπλῶς ἐὰν προσέχωμεν, ὑπ᾽ οὐδενὸς
οὕτως εὑρήσομεν τὸ ζῷον θλιβόμενον ὡς ὑπὸ τοῦ
ἀλόγου καὶ πάλιν ἐπ᾽ οὐδὲν οὕτως ἑλκόμενον ὡς
ἐπὶ τὸ εὔλογον.

ἼΛλλῳ δ᾽ ἄλλο προσπίπτει τὸ εὔλογον καὶ
ἄλογον, καθάπερ καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν ἄλλο
ἄλλῳ καὶ συμφέρον καὶ ἀσύμφορον. διὰ τοῦτο
μάλιστα παιδείας δεόμεθα, ὥστε μαθεῖν τοῦ ev-
λόγου καὶ ἀλόγου πρόληψιν ταῖς ἐπὶ μέρους"
οὐσίαις ἐφαρμόζειν συμφώνως τῇ φύσει. εἰς δὲ
τὴν τοῦ εὐλόγου καὶ ἀλόγου κρίσιν οὐ μόνον ταῖς
τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀξίαις συγχρώμεθα, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν
κατὰ τὸ πρόσωπον ἑαυτοῦ ἕκαστος. τῷ γάρ τινι
εὔλογον τὸ ἁμίδαν παρακρατεῖν αὐτὸ μόνον Bré-
TOVTL, OTL μὴ παρακρατήσας μὲν πληγὰς λήψεται
καὶ τροφὰς οὐ λήψεται, παρακρατήσας δ᾽ οὐ
πείσεταί TL τραχὺ ἢ ἀνιαρόν: ἄλλῳ δέ τινι οὐ
μόνον τὸ αὐτὸν παρακρατῆσαι ἀφόρητον δοκεῖ,
ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἄλλου παρακρατοῦντος ἀνασχέσθαι.
ἂν οὖν μου πυνθάνῃ “ παρακρατήσω τὴν ἁμίδαν
ἢ μή; ἐρῶ σοι ὅτι μείζονα ἀξίαν ἔχει τὸ λα-
βεῖν τροφὰς τοῦ μὴ λαβεῖν καὶ μείζονα ἀπαξίαν
τὸ δαρῆναι τοῦ μὴ δαρῆναι: ὥστ᾽ εἰ τούτοις
παραμετρεῖς τὰ σαυτοῦ, ἀπελθὼν παρακράτει.
“ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἂν κατ᾽ ἐμέ." τοῦτο σὲ δεῖ συνεις-
φέρειν εἰς τὴν σκέψιν, οὐκ ἐμέ. σὺ yap εἶ
ὁ σαυτὸν εἰδώς, πόσου ἄξιος εἶ σεαυτῷ καὶ
πόσου σεαυτὸν πιπράσκεις: ἄλλοι γὰρ ἄλλων
πιπράσκουσιν.

Wolf: μέρος 8.

16

EN IEE I Ἢ

Prana ny ἢ Caer ρον

BOOK I. a. 3-11

hangs himself. In short, if we observe, we shall find
mankind distressed by nothing so much as by the
irrational, and again attracted to nothing so much
as to the rational.

Now it so happens that the rational and the
irrational are different for different persons, pre-
cisely as good and evil, and the profitable and the
unprofitable, are different for different persons. It
is for this reason especially that we need education,
so as to learn how, in conformity with nature, to
adapt to specific instances our preconceived idea
of what is rational and what is irrational. But for
determining the rational and the irrational, we
employ not only our estimates of the value of
external things, but also the criterion of that which
is in keeping with one’s own character. For to one
man it is reasonable to hold a chamber-pot for
another, since he considers only that, if he does not
hold it, he will get a beating and will not get food,
whereas, if he does hold it, nothing harsh or painful
will be done to him; but some other man feels that
it is not merely unendurable to hold such a pot him-
self, but even to tolerate another's doing so. If you
ask me, then, “Shall I hold the pot or not?” I will
tell you that to get food is of greater value than not
to get it, and to be flayed is of greater detriment
than not to be; so that if you measure your interests
by these standards, go and hold the pot. “Yes, but
it would be unworthy of me.” That is an additional
consideration, which you, and not I, must introduce
into the question. For you are the one that knows
yourself, how much you are worth in your own eyes
and at what price you sell yourself. For different
men sell themselves at different prices.

17

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

Διὰ τοῦτο ᾿Αγριππῖνος Φλώρῳ σκεπτομένῳ,
aA > > ,
εἰ καταβατέον αὐτῷ ἐστιν eis Νέρωνος Oewpias, »
“ ‘ S inf, a » “ ΄
ὥστε καὶ αὐτόν τι λειτουργῆσαι, ἔφη “ Κατά-
> J a
βηθι." πυθομένου δ᾽ αὐτοῦ “ Διὰ ti σὺ οὐ κατα-
βαίνεις ;” ἔφη ὅτι “᾿Εγὼ οὐδὲ βουλεύομαι." ὁ
γὰρ ἅπαξ εἰς τὴν περὶ τῶν τοιούτων σκέψιν καὶ
\ fal
Tas τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀξίας συγκαθεὶς καὶ ψηφίξων
4 fal
ἐγγύς ἐστι τῶν ἐπιλελησμένων τοῦ ἰδίου προ-
σώπου. τί γάρ μου πυνθάνῃ; “θάνατος αἱρε-
, , > x LSet. | 7 7 e / a
τώτερόν ἐστιν ἢ ζωή ;" λέγω ζωή. “πόνος ἢ
55 / »” / 55 Ns oc. sak. | \ ὃ &
ἡδονὴ; λέγω noovn. “ἀλλά, ἂν μὴ τραγῳδήσω,
τραχηλοκοπηθήσομαι." ἄπελθε τοίνυν καὶ τρα-
γῴδει, ἐγὼ δ᾽ οὐ τραγῳδήσω. “διὰ τί; ὅτι σὺ
σεαυτὸν ἡγῇ μίαν τινὰ εἶναι κρόκην τῶν ἐκ τοῦ
χιτῶνος. τί οὖν; σὲ ἔδει φροντίζειν πῶς ἂν
a ’ >
ὅμοιος! ἧς τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις, ὥσπερ οὐδ
ἡ κρόκη πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας κρόκας θέλει τι ἔχειν
ἐξαίρετον. ἐγὼ δὲ πορφύρα εἶναι βούλομαι, τὸ
ὀλίγον ἐκεῖνο καὶ στιλπνὸν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις αἴτιον
τοῦ εὐπρεπῆ φαίνεσθαι καὶ καλά. τί οὖν μοι
a an_y? rn
λέγεις ὅτε “ ἐξομοιώθητι τοῖς πολλοῖς"; Kal πῶς
ἔτι πορφύρα ἔσομαι ;
a «
Ταῦτα εἶδεν καὶ IIpicxos ᾿Ελουίδιος καὶ ἰδὼν
ἐποίησε. προσπέμψαντος αὐτῷ Οὐεσπασιανοῦ, ἵνα
᾽
μὴ εἰσέλθῃ εἰς τὴν σύγκλητον, ἀπεκρίνατο “Εἰπὶ
a ,
σοί ἐστι μὴ ἐᾶσαί με εἶναι συγκλητικόν" μέχρι
LA . a ayes LL RP > Sees:
δὲ ἂν ὦ, δεῖ με εἰσέρχεσθαι. ἄγε ἀλλ᾽ εἰσ-

1 ἀνόμοιος Schenkl, after Blass.

1 This was clearly the contribution to Nero’s festival
which Florus was expected to make.

18

BOOK IL. tm. 12-20

Wherefore, when Florus was debating whether he
should enter Nero’s festival, so as to make some
personal contribution to it, Agrippinus said to him,
“Enter.” And when Florus asked, “Why do you
not enter yourself?” he replied, “I? why, I do
not even raise the question.” For when a man
once stoops to the consideration of such questions,
I mean to estimating the value of externals, and
calculates them one by one, he comes very close
to those who have forgotten their own proper
character. Come, what is this you ask me? “Is
death or life preferable?”’ I answer, life. “Pain
or pleasure?” I answer, pleasure. “ But unless I
take a part in the tragedy! I shall be beheaded.”
Go, then, and take a part, but I will not take a part.
“Why not?” Because you regard yourself as but
a single thread of all that go to make up the gar-
ment. What follows, then? This, that you ought
to take thought how you may resemble all other
men, precisely as even the single thread wants to
have no point of superiority in comparison with the
other threads. But J want to be the red,” that small
and brilliant portion which causes the rest to appear
comely and beautiful. Why, then, do you say to
me, “ Be like the majority of people?” And if I do
that, how shall I any longer be the red?

This is what Helvidius Priscus also saw, and,
having seen, did. When Vespasian sent him word
not to attend a meeting of the Senate, he answered,
“It is in your power not to allow me to be a
member of the Senate, but so long as I am one
I must attend its meetings.” “Very well then, but

3 The reference is to the band of bright red (commonly
called ‘‘ purple ”) woven into the hem of the toga praetexta.

19

22

23

25

26

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

εχθών," φησίν, “ σιώπησον.᾽ “μή p ἐξέταζε καὶ
n > ᾿ ἢ
σιωπήσω. “ἀλλὰ δεῖ με ἐξετάσαι. “κἀμὲ
-“ >
εἰπεῖν TO φαινόμενον δίκαιον." “ἀλλ᾽ ἐὰν εἴπῃς,
> a et τ κά ay By - Ψ sae
ἀποκτενῶ σε. πότε οὖν σοι εἶπον, OTL ἀθά-
νατός εἰμι; καὶ σὺ τὸ σὸν ποιήσεις κἀγὼ τὸ
ἐμόν. σόν ἐστιν ἀποκτεῖναι, ἐμὸν ἀποθανεῖν μὴ
vA Ν “ > \ ᾿ - ‘
τρέμοντα: σὸν φυγαδεῦσαι, ἐμὸν ἐξελθεῖν μὴ
- Ψ
λυπούμενον." τί οὖν ὠφέλησε Πρῖσκος εἷς ὧν ;
“ ΝΜ
τί δ᾽ ὠφελεῖ ἡ πορφύρα τὸ ἱμάτιον ; τί γὰρ ἄλλο
ax ΄ 2) > A ε 4 ad ”
ἢ διαπρέπει ἐν αὐτῷ ws πορφύρα Kal τοῖς ἄλλοις
δὲ καλὸν παράδειγμα ἔκκειται; ἄλλος δ᾽ ἂν
εἰπόντος αὐτῷ Καίσαρος ἐν τοιαύτῃ περιστάσει
Lo θ a > ͵΄ 3 Pree ΄ “
μὴ ἐλθεῖν εἰς σύγκλητον εἶπεν “᾿ἔχω χάριν, OTL
/ ” \ -“ 507 x > , >
μου φείδῃ." τὸν τοιοῦτον οὐδ᾽ ἂν ἐκώλυεν εἰσ-
ἐλθεῖν, ἀλλ᾽ ἤδει, ὅτι ἢ καθεδεῖται ὡς κεράμιον ἢ
λέγων ἐρεῖ, ἃ οἷδεν ὅτι ὁ Καῖσαρ θέλει, καὶ
προσεπισωρεύσει ἔτι πλείονα.
Τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον καὶ ἀθλητής τις κινδυνεύων
ἀποθανεῖν, εἰ μὴ ἀπεκόπη τὸ αἰδοῖον, ἐπελθόντος
na fol “-“ a /
αὐτῷ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ (ἣν δ᾽ ἐκεῖνος φιλόσοφος) καὶ
εἰπόντος “ ἄγε, ἀδελφέ, τί μέλλεις ποιεῖν ; ἀπο-
κόπτομεν τοῦτο τὸ μέρος καὶ ἔτι εἰς γυμνάσιον
>
προερχόμεθα ;” οὐχ ὑπέμεινεν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐγκαρτερήσας
ἀπέθανεν. πυθομένου δέ τινος" Πῶς τοῦτο ἐποί-
΄ c >
ησεν ; ws ἀθλητὴς ἢ ws φιλόσοφος ; ‘Os! ἀνήρ,
, \
ἔφη, ἀνὴρ δ᾽ ᾿Οολύμπια κεκηρυγμένος Kal ἠγωνισ-

1 Added by 8.
20

9 (i συν Pe Ξον ριυ“ τι τίσ

“συ νον τὰν νυν Δ ΑΡ ῊΑ Ν

1} BOOK I. 1. 20-26

when you attend, hold your peace.” ‘Do not ask
for my opinion and I will hold my peace.” “But I
must ask for your opinion.” “And I must answer
what seems to me right.” ‘But if you speak, I
shaJl put you to death.” “Well, when did I ever
tell you that I was immortal? You will do your
part and I mine. It is yours to put me to death,
mine to die without 4 tremor; yours to banish, mine
to leave without sorrow.’’ What good, then, did
Priscus do, who was but a single individual? And
what good does the red do the mantle? What
else than that it stands out conspicuous in it as
red, and is displayed as a goodly example to the
rest? But had Caesar told another man in such
circumstances not to attend the meetings of the
Senate, he would have said, “I thank you for
excusing me.” A man like that Caesar would not
even have tried to keep from attending, but would
have known that he would either sit like a jug, or,
if he spoke, would say what he knew Caesar wanted
said, and would pile up any amount more on the
top of it.

In like manner also a certain athlete acted, who
was in danger of dying unless his private parts were
amputated. His brother (and he was a philosopher)
came to him and said, “ Well, brother, what are
you going to do? Are we going to cut off this
member, and step forth once more into the gym-
nasium?” He would not submit, but hardened his
heart and died. And as someone asked, “‘ How did
he do this? As an athlete, or as a philosopher?”
As a man, replied Epictetus ; and as a man who had
been proclaimed at the Olympic games and had
striven in them, who had been at home in such

21

27

28

29

30

31
32

33

34

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF SECT ERS

μένος, ἐν τοιαύτῃ τινὶ χώρᾳ ἀνεστραμμένος, οὐχὶ
παρὰ τῷ Βάτωνι! ἀλειφόμενος. ἄλλος δὲ κἂν τὸν
τράχηλον ἀπετμήθη, εἰ Sip ἠδύνατο δίχα τοῦ τρα-
χήλου. τοιοῦτόν ἐστι τὸ κατὰ πρόσωπον' οὕτως
ἰσχυρὸν παρὰ" τοῖς εἰθισμένοις. αὐτὸ συνεισφέρειν
ἐξ αὐτῶν ἐν ταῖς σκέψεσιν. “ἄγε οὖν, ᾿Επίκτητε,
διαξύρησαι." ἂν ὦ φιλόσοφος, λέγω, “οὐ διαξυ-
ρῶμαι." “ “ἀλλ᾽ ἀφελῶ σου τὸν τράχηλον." εἰ σοὶ
ἄμεινον, ἄφελε.

᾿Επύθετό τις" Πόθεν οὖν αἰσθησόμεθα τοῦ κατὰ

πρόσωπον ἕκαστος ;---ἰ]όθεν δ᾽ ὁ ταῦρος, ἔφη,
λέοντος ἐπελθόντος μόνος αἰσθάνεται τῆς αὑτοῦ
παρασκευῆς καὶ προβέβληκεν ἑαυτὸν ὑπὲρ τῆς
ἀγέλης πάσης; ἢ δῆλον ὅ ὅτι εὐθὺς ἅμα τῷ τὴν
παρασκευὴν ἔχειν ἀπαντᾷ καὶ συναίσθησις αὐτῆς;
καὶ ἡμῶν τοίνυν ὅστις ἂν ἔχῃ τοιαύτην παρα-
σκευήν, οὐκ ἀγνοήσει αὐτήν. ἄφνω δὲ ταῦρος
οὐ γίνεται οὐδὲ γενναῖος ἄνθρωπος, ἀλλὰ δεῖ
χειμασκῆσαι, “παρασκευάσασθαι καὶ μὴ εἰκῇ
προσπηδᾶν ἐπὶ τὰ μηδὲν προσήκοντα.

Μόνον σκέψαι, πόσου πωλεῖς τὴν σεαυτοῦ
προαίρεσιν. ἄνθρωπε, εἰ μηδὲν ἄλλο, μὴ ὀλίγου
αὐτὴν πωλήσῃς. τὸ δὲ μέγα καὶ ἐξαίρετον ἄλλοις
τάχα “προσήκει, Σωκράτει καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις .---
Διὰ τί οὖν, εἰ πρὸς τοῦτο πεφύκαμεν, οὐ πάντες

1 Scaliger: βάτωι S.

1 Bato seems to have been a well-known athletic trainer of
the time. At least one, and possibly two gladiators at Rome
bore this name. 0.1.1. I. 718, VI. 10188.

® Philosophers, especially Stoics and Cynics, regularly
wore beards in antiquity. See I. 16, 9 ff.

22

BOOK I. π. 26-34

places, and had not merely been rubbed down with
oil in Bato’s! wrestling school. But another would
have had even his neck cut off, if he could have
lived without his neck. This is what we mean by

for one’s proper character; and such is its
strength with those who in their deliberations
habitually make it a personal contribution, “Come
then, Epictetus, shave off your beard.”? If Iam a
philosopher, I answer, “ I will not shave it off.” “ But
I will take off your neck.” If that will do you any
good, take it off.

Someone inquired, “‘ How, then, shall each of us
become aware of what is appropriate to his own
proper character?’’ How comes it, replied he, that
when the lion charges, the bull alone is aware of his
own prowess and rushes forward to defend the whole
herd? Or is it clear that with the possession of the
prowess comes immediately the consciousness of it
also? And so, among us too, whoever has such
prowess will not be unaware of it. Yet a bull
does not become a bull all at once, any more than a
man becomes noble, but a man must undergo a
winter training? he must prepare himself and must
not plunge recklessly into what is inappropriate for

im.

Only consider at what price you sell your freedom
of will. If you must sell it, man, at least do not sell it
cheap. But the great and pre-eminent deed, perhaps,
befits others, Socrates and men of his stamp.—Why
then, pray, if we are endowed by nature for such

3 Ancient armies generally disbanded or went into
permanent quarters during the winter. To continue
military training throughout the winter months was indic-
ative of a sincere and strenuous endeavour.

23

35
36

37

--

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

ἤ πολλοὶ γίνονται τοιοῦτοι ;--Ἵπποι yap ὠκεῖς
ἅπαντες γίνονται, κύνες γὰρ ἰχνευτικοὶ πάντες ;
τί οὖν ; ἐπειδὴ ἀφυής εἰμι, ἀποστῶ τῆς ἐπιμελείας
τούτου ἕνεκα; μὴ γένοιτο. ᾿Επίκτητος κρείσ-
σων Σωκράτους οὐκ ἔσται" εἰ δὲ μή, οὐ χείρων,
τοῦτό μοι ἱκανόν ἐστιν. οὐδὲ γὰρ Μίλων ἔσομαι
καὶ ὅμως οὐκ ἀμελῶ τοῦ σώματος" οὐδὲ Κροῖσος
καὶ ὅμως οὐκ ἀμελῶ τῆς κτήσεως" οὐδ᾽ ἁπλῶς
ἄλλου τινὸς τῆς ἐπιμελείας διὰ τὴν cope saw
τῶν ἄκρων ἐπ see tag

, a ΝΜ b \ n Ν \ / “.
γ΄. Πῶς dv τις ἀπὸ τοῦ τὸν θεὸν πατέρα εἶναι
τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐπὶ τὰ ἑξῆς ἐπέλθοι;

Ei τίς τῷ δόγματι τούτῳ συμπαθῆσαι κατ᾽
ἀξίαν δύναιτο, ὅτι γεγόναμεν ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ πάντες
προηγουμένως καὶ ὁ θεὸς πατήρ ἐστι τῶν T
᾽ ΄ A ~ nr 2 oe > > A
ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῶν θεῶν, οἶμαι ὅτι οὐδὲν ἀγεννὲς

OX \ > / ee a > ?
οὐδὲ ταπεινὸν ἐνθυμηθήσεται περὶ ἑαυτοῦ. ἀλλ

a ,
ἂν μὲν Καῖσαρ εἰσποιήσηταί σε, οὐδείς σου τὴν
5 r / x δὲ fol oe an \ ey
ὀφρῦν βαστάσει: ἂν δὲ γνῷς, ὅτε τοῦ Διὸς vids
s > > / “ 3 > nr > >
el, οὐκ ἐπαρθήσῃ; viv δ᾽ ov ποιοῦμεν, ἀλλ
ἐπειδὴ δύο ταῦτα ἐν τῇ γενέσει ἡμῶν ἐγκατα-
lal \ fol

μέμικται, TO σῶμα μὲν κοινὸν πρὸς τὰ ζῷα, ὁ
λόγος δὲ καὶ ἡ γνώμη κοινὸν πρὸς τοὺς θεούς,
” \ > \ ΄ > / \

ἄλλοι μὲν ἐπὶ ταύτην ἀποκλίνουσιν τὴν συγ-

a ’

γένειαν τὴν ἀτυχῆ καὶ νεκράν, ὀλίγοι δέ τινες
ἐπὶ τὴν θείαν καὶ μακαρίαν. ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν

24

:

BOOK I. π΄ 34-11. 4

greatness, do not all men, or many, become like
him ? - What, do all We te become pee all dogs

keen to follow the scent? What then? Because I
_ have no natural gifts, shall I on that account give up

my discipline? Far be it from me! Epictetus will
not be better than Socrates; but if only I am not
worse, that suffices me. For I shall not be a Milo,
either, and yet I do not neglect my body; nor a
Croesus, and yet I do not neglect my property ; nor,
in a word, is there any other field in which we give
up the appropriate discipline merely from despair
of attaining the highest.

CHAPTER III

From the thesis that God is the father of mankind
how may one proceed to the consequences ?

Ir a man could only subscribe heart and soul, as
he ought, to this doctrine, that we are all primarily
begotten of God, and that God is the father of men

_ as well as of gods, I think that he will entertain no

ignoble or mean thought about himself. Yet, if
Caesar adopts you no one will be able to endure
your conceit, but if you know that you are a son of
Zeus, will you not be elated? As it is, however, we
are not, but inasmuch as these two elements were
comingled in our begetting, on the one hand the
body, which we have in common with the brutes,
and, on the other, reason and intelligence, which we

_ have in common with the gods, some of us incline

toward the former relationship, which is unblessed
by fortune and is mortal, and only a few toward that

_which is divine and blessed. Since, then, it is inevit-

VOL. 1.- ς ἔς

σ:

"-

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

ἀνάγκη πάνθ᾽ ὁντινοῦν οὕτως ἑκάστῳ χρῆσθαι
ὡς ἂν περὶ αὐτοῦ ὑπολάβῃ, ἐκεῖνοι μὲν οἱ ὀλίγοι,
ὅσοι πρὸς πίστιν οἴονται γεγονέναι καὶ πρὸς
αἰδῶ καὶ πρὸς ἀσφάλειαν τῆς χρήσεως τῶν φαν-
τασιῶν, οὐδὲν ταπεινὸν οὐδ᾽ ἀγεννὲς ἐνθυμοῦνται
περὶ αὑτῶν, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ τἀναντία. “Ti γὰρ
εἰμί; ταλαίπωρον ἀνθρωπάριον ᾽" καὶ “τὰ δύστηνά
μου σαρκίδια." τῷ μὲν ὄντι δύστηνα, ἀλλὰ ἔχεις
τι καὶ κρεῖσσον τῶν σαρκιδίων. τί οὖν ἀφεὶς
ἐκεῖνο τούτοις προστέτηκας ;

Διὰ ταύτην τὴν συγγένειαν οἱ μὲν ἀποκλίναντες
λύκοις ὅμοιοι γινόμεθα, ἄπιστοι καὶ ἐπίβουλοι
καὶ BraBepol, οἱ δὲ λέουσιν, ἄγριοι καὶ θηριώδεις
καὶ ἀνήμεροι, οἱ πλείους δ᾽ ἡμῶν ἀλώπεκες καὶ
ὡς ἐν ζῴοις ἀτυχήματα. τί γάρ ἐστιν ἄλλο λοί-
δορος καὶ κακοήθης ἄνθρωπος ἢ ἀλώπηξ ἤ τι
ἄλλο ἀτυχέστερον καὶ ταπεινότερον ; ὁρᾶτε οὖν
καὶ προσέχετε, μή TL τούτων ἀποβῆτε τῶν ἀτυ-

χημάτων.
δ΄, Περὶ προκοπῆς
ὋὉ προκόπτων μεμαθηκὼς παρὰ τῶν φιλοσόφων
ὅτι ἡ μὲν ὄρεξις ἀγαθῶν ἐστιν, ἡ δ᾽ ἔκκλισις πρὸς
κακά, μεμαθηκὼς δὲ καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλως TO
εὔρουν καὶ ἀπαθὲς περιγίνεται τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἢ
ἐν ὀρέξει μὲν μὴ ἀποτυγχώνοντι, ἐν ἐκκλίσει δὲ

1 Sd: καλὰ S.

1 The characteristic moral achievement which the Stoics
sought. The metaphor in the first expression, τὸ εὔρουν, is
admirably rendered by Seneca, Zpist. 120. 11, beata vita,
secundo defluens cursu.

26 ὺ

BOOK I. mt. 4-1v. 1

able that every man, whoever he be, should deal
with each thing according to the opinion which he
forms about it, these few, who think that by their
birth they are called to fidelity, to self-respect, and to
unerring judgement in the use of external impressions,
cherish no mean or ignoble thoughts about them-
selves, whereas the multitude do quite the oppo-
site. “For what am ὃ A miserable, paltry man,”
say they, and, “Lo, my wretched, paltry flesh!”
Wretched indeed, but you have also something
better than your paltry flesh. Why then abandon
that and cleave to this?

It is because of this kinship with the flesh that
those of us who incline toward it become like wolves,
faithless and treacherous and hurtful, and others
like lions, wild and savage and untamed ; but most
of us become foxes, that is to say, rascals of the
animal kingdom. For what else is a slanderous
and malicious man but a fox, or something even
more rascally and degraded? Take heed, there-
fore, and beware that you become not one of these

rascally creatures,

CHAPTER IV

Of progress

He who is making progress, having learned of the ἡ
philosophers that desire is for things good and
aversion is toward things evil, and having also
learned that serenity and calm! are not attained by a
man save as he succeeds in securing the objects of
desire and as he avoids encountering the objects of

27

w

10

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

4 / \ ἈΝ ν Φ > J -"
μὴ περιπίπτοντι, τὴν μὲν ὄρεξιν ἦρκεν ἐξ αὑτοῦ
> ’ a 1 e 4 -“ > , δὲ a ie
εἰσάπαν ἢ ὑπερτέθειται, TH ἐκκλίσει προς
μόνα χρῆται τὰ προαιρετικά. τῶν γὰρ ἀπροαιρέ-
, a ,
των ἄν τι ἐκκλίνῃ, oldev OTL περιπεσεῖταί ποτέ
\ a
τινι Tapa τὴν ἔκκλισιν THY αὑτοῦ Kal δυστυχήσει.
8. ER Φὼν \ 4 4 \ 2 , >
εἰ δ᾽ ἡ ἀρετὴ ταύτην ἔχει THY ἐπαγγελίαν evdat-
μονίαν ποιῆσαι καὶ ἀπάθειαν καὶ εὔροιαν, πάντως
: \
καὶ ἡ προκοπὴ ἡ πρὸς αὐτὴν πρὸς ἕκαστον τού-
Ν ἃ ,
των ἐστὶ προκοπή. ἀεὶ yap πρὸς ὃ ἂν ἡ τελειότης
Ν
τινὸς καθάπαξ ἄγῃ, πρὸς αὐτὸ ἡ προκοπὴ συνεγ-
γισμός ἐστιν.
Πῶς οὖν τὴν μὲν ἀρετὴν τοιοῦτόν TL ὁμολο-
ca) > -“
γοῦμεν, τὴν προκοπὴν δ᾽ ἐν ἄλλοις ζητοῦμεν καὶ
ἐπιδείκνυμεν ; τί ἔργον ἀρετῆς ; εὔροια. τίς οὖν
προκόπτει; ὃ πολλὰς Χρυσίππου συντάξεις
a ,
ἀνεγνωκώς ; μὴ γὰρ ἡ ἀρετὴ τοῦτ᾽ ἔστε Χρυσίπ-
fal €
Tov νενοηκέναι; εἰ yap TOUT ἔστιν, ὁμολογου-
μένως ἡ προκοπὴ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ τὸ πολλὰ.
= ,ὕ “ “ > ” , A
τῶν Χρυσίππου νοεῖν. viv δ᾽ ἄλλο μέν τι τὴν
lal Ν
ἀρετὴν ἐπιφέρειν ὁμολογοῦμεν, ἄλλο δὲ τὸν συν-
,
εγγισμόν, τὴν προκοπήν, aTopatvouev. “ οὗτος,"
, “cc "ὃ \ ὃ ? ε κ ὃ / 6 4
φησίν, ““ἤδη καὶ δι' αὑτοῦ δύναται Χρύσιππον
4 ’
ἀναγιγνώσκειν." εὖ, νὴ τοὺς θεούς, προκόπτεις,
ἄνθρωπε: ποίαν προκοπήν. “τί ἐμπαίξζεις αὐτῷ ;
τί δ᾽ ἀπάγεις αὐτὸν τῆς συναισθήσεως τῶν αὑτοῦ
a Lal lol Net oe an
κακῶν ; ov θέλεις δεῖξαι αὐτῷ TO ἔργον τῆς ape-

1 Koraes: καὶ 3.

28

BOOK IL. ry. 1-10

aversion—such a one has utterly excluded desire
from himself, or else deferred it to another time, and
feels aversion only toward the things which involve
freedom of choice. For if he avoids anything that is
not a matter of free choice, he knows that some time
he will encounter something in spite of his aversion
to it, and will come to grief. Now if it is virtue that
holds out the promise thus to create happiness and
calm and serenity, then assuredly progress toward
virtue is progress toward each of these states of mind.
For it is always true that whatsoever the goal toward
which perfection in anything definitely leads,
progress is an approach thereto.

How comes it, then, that we acknowledge virtue
to be a thing of this sort, and yet seek progress and
make a display of it in other things? What is the
work? of virtue? Serenity. Who, then, is making
progress? The man who has read many treatises of
Chrysippus? What, is virtue no more than this—to
have gained a knowledge of Chrysippus? For if it is
this, progress is confessedly nothing else than a
knowledge of many of the works of Chrysippus.
But now, while acknowledging that virtue produces
one thing, we are declaring that the approach to
virtue, which is progress, produces something else.
** So-and-so,”” says someone, “is already able to read
Chrysippus all by himself.” It is fine headway, by
the gods, that youare making, man! Great progress
this! “Why do you mock him? And why do you
try to divert him from the consciousness of his own
shortcomings? Are you not willing to show him the

1 See the Encheiridion, 11. 2: ‘‘ But for the present totally

make way with desire.”
2 i.e, the result at which virtue aims.

29

11

12

18

14

15

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

τῆς, ἵνα μάθῃ ποῦ τὴν προκοπὴν ξητῇ ; ἐκεῖ
ζήτησον αὐτήν, ταλαίπωρε, ὅπου σου τὸ ἔργον.
ποῦ δέ σου τὸ ἔργον ; ἐν ὀρέξει καὶ ἐκκλίσει, ἵν᾽
ἀναπότευκτος ἧς καὶ ἀπερίπτωτος, ἐν ὁρμαῖς
καὶ ἀφορμαῖς, ἵν᾽ ἀναμάρτητος, ἐν προσθέσει καὶ
ἐποχῇ, ἵν ἀνεξαπάτητος. | πρῶτοι δ' εἰσὶν οἱ
πρῶτοι τόποι καὶ ἀναγκαιότατοι. ἂν δὲ τρέμων
καὶ πενθῶν ζητῇς ἀπερίπτωτος εἶναι, ἄρα πῶς
προκόπτεις ;

Σὺ οὖν ἐνταῦθά μοι δεῖξόν σου τὴν προκοπήν.
καθάπερ εἰ ἀθλητῇ διελεγόμην “ δεῖξόν μοι τοὺς
ὦμους," εἶτα ἔλεγεν ἐκεῖνος “ἴδε μου τοὺς ἀλ-
τῆρας." ἄπιθι σὺ καὶ οἱ ἁλτῆρες, ἐγὼ τὸ ἀπο-
τέλεσμα τῶν ἁλτήρων ἰδεῖν βούλομαι. “ λάβε τὴν
περὶ ὁρμῆς σύνταξιν καὶ γνῶθι πῶς αὐτὴν ἀνέγνω-
ka. ἀνδράποδον, οὐ τοῦτο ζητῶ, ἀλλὰ πῶς ὁρμᾷς
καὶ ἀφορμᾷς, πῶς ὀρέγῃ καὶ ἐκκλίνεις, πῶς ἐπιβάλ-
An? καὶ προτίθεσαι καὶ παρασκευάζῃ, πότερα
συμφώνως τῇ φύσει ἢ ἀσυμφώνως. εἰ γὰρ συμ-
φώνως, τοῦτό μοι δείκνυε καὶ ἐρῶ σοι ὅτι προ-
κόπτεις. εἰ δ᾽ ἀσυμφώνως, ἄπελθε καὶ μὴ μόνον
ἐξηγοῦ τὰ βιβλία, ἀλλὰ καὶ γράφε αὐτὸς τοι-

1 ἄπιθι (οὗ, ἄπελθε ὃ 15) Capps: ὄψει 3.
2 Schweighauser: ἐπιβάλλεις 5.
5. Salmasius and Upton’s ‘codex’: προστίθεσαι S.

1 These are the three spheres or fields (τόποι) of human
activity, inclination, choice, and intellectual assent, upon
which the Stoics laid great stress. For a fuller discussion see
below III. 2, 1 ff.

3 Broad-jumpers in antiquity carried weights which on
being thrust backwards while the jumper was in mid-air
seem to have added materially to the distance covered.

30

BOOK I. tv. ro-15

work of virtue, that he may learn where to look for
his progress?” Look for it there, wretch, where your
work lies. And where is your work ἢ In desire and
aversion, that you may not miss what you desire and
encounter what you would avoid; in choice and in
refusal, that you may commit no fault therein; in
giving and withholding assent of judgement, that
you may not be deceived.! But first come the first
and most necessary points. Yet if you are in a state
of fear and grief when you seek to be proof against
encountering what you would avoid, how, pray, are
you making progress?

Do you yourself show me, therefore, your own
progress in matters like the following. Suppose, for
example, that in talking to an athlete I said, “Show
me your shoulders,’ and then he answered, “ Look
at my jumping-weights.”2 Go to, you and your
jumping-weights! What I want to see is the effect
of the jumping-weights. “Take the treatise Upon
Choice * and see how I have mastered it.’ It is not
that | am looking into, you slave, but how you act in
your choices and refusals, your desires and aversions,
how you go at things, and apply yourself to them,
and prepare yourself, whether you are acting in
harmony with nature therein, or out of harmony with
it. For if you are acting in harmony, show me that,
and I will tell you that you are making progress;
but if out of harmony, begone, and do not confine
yourself to expounding your books, but go and write
These same weights were also used like our dumb-bells for

the development of the arm and trunk muscles, as is
apparently the case here.
* The title, apparently, of a short work by Chrysippus, but

known only from this passage. Zeno and Cleanthes wrote
also on the subject.

31

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

“ /
αῦτα. καὶ τί σοι ὄφελος ; οὐκ οἶδας ὅτι ὅλον
\ ,ὔ ΄ , Φ yy}
τὸ βιβλίον πέντε δηναρίων ἐστίν ; ὁ οὖν ἐξηγού-
a /
μενος αὐτὸ δοκεῖ ὅτι πλείονος ἄξιός ἐστιν ἢ πέντε
/
δηναρίων ; μηδέποτε οὖν ἀλλαχοῦ τὸ ἔργον ζη-
τεῖτε, ἀλλαχοῦ τὴν προκοπήν.
Ποῦ οὖν προκοπή; εἴ τις ὑμῶν ἀποστὰς τῶν
Ν \ / a
ἐκτὸς ἐπὶ THY προαίρεσιν ἐπέστραπται τὴν αὑτοῦ,
’ 3 / > ° [2 4
ταύτην ἐξεργάζεσθαι καὶ ἐκπονεῖν, ὥστε σύμ-
φωνον ἀποτελέσαι τῇ φύσει, ὑψηλὴν ἐλευθέραν
/
ἀκώλυτον ἀνεμπόδιστον πιστὴν αἰδήμονα: με-
μάθηκέν τε, ὅτε ὁ τὰ μὴ ἐφ᾽ αὑτῷ ποθῶν ἢ
φεύγων οὔτε πιστὸς εἶναι δύναται οὔτ᾽ ἐλεύθερος,
> > ? ΄ / \ 4
ἀλλ᾽ ἀνάγκη μεταπίπτειν καὶ μεταρριπίζεσθαι
e ? / > 4 > 4 \
ἅμα ἐκείνοις καὶ αὐτόν, ἀνάγκη δὲ καὶ ὑποτετα-
lA Υ ¢ / “-“ > n a aA
χέναι ἄλλοις ἑαυτόν, τοῖς ἐκεῖνα περιποιεῖν ἢ
͵ / \ Ν σ΄ > 4
κωλύειν δυναμένοις" Kal λοιπὸν ἕωθεν ἀνιστάμενος
fa lal \ / ΄ ες w e
ταῦτα τηρεῖ Kal φυλάσσει, λούεται ὡς πιστός, ὡς
>? 7 > / ε 4 > \ a > lA
αἰδήμων ἐσθίει, ὡσαύτως ἐπὶ τῆς ἀεὶ παραπιπτού-
σης ὕλης τὰ προηγούμενα ἐκπονῶν, ὡς ὁ δρομεὺς
a /
δρομικῶς καὶ ὁ φώνασκος φωνασκικῶς: οὗτός
ἐστιν ὁ προκόπτων ταῖς ἀληθείαις καὶ ὁ μὴ εἰκῇ
» \ eld > 2 - et ΞΟ Ὶ ») > a
ἀποδεδημηκὼς οὗτός ἐστιν. εἰ δ᾽ ἐπὶ THY ἐν τοῖς
’ὔ “ / \ 4 > -" Ν
βιβλίοις ἕξιν τέταται καὶ ταύτην ἐκπονεῖ καὶ
ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἐκδεδήμηκε, λέγω αὐτῷ αὐτόθεν πο-
ρεύεσθαι εἰς οἶκον καὶ μὴ ἀμελεῖν τῶν ἐκεῖ" τοῦτο
32

BOOK I. wv. 15-23

some of the same kind yourself. And what will you
gain thereby? Do you not know that the whole
book costs only five denarii? Is the expounder of it,
then, think you, worth more than five denarii? And
so never look for your work in one place and your
progress in another.

Where, then, is progress? If any man among you,
withdrawing from. external things, has turned his
attention to the question of his own moral purpose,
cultivating and perfecting it so as to make it finally
harmonious with nature, elevated, free, unhindered,
untrammelled, faithful, and honourable ; and if he
has learned that he who craves or shuns the things
that are not under his control can be neither
faithful nor free, but must himself of necessity be
changed and tossed to and fro with them, and must
end by subordinating himself to others, those,
namely, who are able to procure or prevent these
things that he craves or shuns; and if, finally, when
he rises in the morning he proceeds to keep and
observe all this that he has learned; if he bathes as
a faithful man, eats as a self-respecting man,—
similarly, whatever the subject matter may be with
which he has to deal, putting into practice his
guiding principles, as the runner does when he
applies the principles of running, and the voice-
trainer when he applies the principles of voice-
training,—this is the man who in all truth is making
progress, and the man who has not travelled at
random is this one. But if he has striven merely to
attain the state which he finds in his books and
works only at that, and has made that the goal of
his travels, I bid him go home at once and not
neglect his concerns there, since the goal to which

33

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

yap ἐφ᾽ ὃ ἀποδεδήμηκεν οὐδέν ἐστιν" ἀλλ᾽ ἐκεῖνο,
μελετᾶν ἐξελεῖν τοῦ αὑτοῦ βίου πένθη καὶ οἰμωγὰς
ΕΥ ἈΝ 1 77 ” ” \ ἂν ἐδ in é \ 99 ὶ ὃ
καὶ TO? “ οἴμοι" καὶ τὸ “ τάλας ἐγὼ" καὶ δυστυ-
χίαν καὶ ἀτυχίαν καὶ μαθεῖν, τί ἐστι θάνατος,
τί φυγή, τί δεσμωτήριον, τί κώνειον, ἵνα δύνηται
λέγειν ἐν τῇ φυλακῇ “ὦ φίλε Κρίτων, εἰ ταύτῃ
τοῖς θεοῖς φίλον, ταύτῃ γινέσθω," καὶ μὴ ἐκεῖνα
“τάλας ἐγώ, γέρων ἄνθρωπος, ἐπὶ ταῦτά μου τὰς
πολιὰς ἐτήρησα." τίς λέγει ταῦτα ; δοκεῖτε ὅτι
a a /
ὑμῖν ἄδοξόν twa ἐρῶ καὶ ταπεινόν ; Πρίαμος
αὐτὰ οὐ λέγει; Οἰδίπους οὐ λέγει ; ἀλλ᾽ ὁπόσοι
βασιλεῖς λέγουσιν ; τί γάρ εἰσιν ἄλλο τραγῳδίαι
ἢ ἀνθρώπων πάθη τεθαυμακότων τὰ ἐκτὸς διὰ
μέτρου τοιοῦδ᾽ ἐπιδεικνύμενα ; εἰ γὰρ ἐξαπατη-
θέντα τινὰ ἔδει μαθεῖν, ὅτι τῶν ἐκτὸς Kal? ἀπρο-
, ὑδέ > \ € cal > \ x »
αἱρέτων οὐδέν ἐστι πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ἐγὼ μὲν ἤθελον
τὴν ἀπάτην ταύτην, ἐξ ἧς ἤμελλον εὐρόως καὶ
ἀταράχως βιώσεσθαι, ὑμεῖς δ᾽ ὄψεσθ᾽ αὐτοὶ τί
θέλετε.
Te = econ / / cc 7 a ”
i οὖν ἡμῖν παρέχει Χρύσιππος ; “ἵνα γνῷς,
’ὔ “ Lid > δῇ nr ‘ > > Φ €
φησίν, “ὅτι ov ψευδῆ ταῦτα ἐστιν, ἐξ ὧν ἡ
εὔροιά ἐστι καὶ ἀπάθεια ἀπαντᾷ, λάβε μου τὰ
βιβλία καὶ ps ἀκολουθά 8 b σύμ-
γνωσῃ ὡς ἀκολουθάϑ τε καὶ σύμ
φωνά ἐστι τῇ φύσει τὰ ἀπαθῆ με ποιοῦντα."
ὦ μεγάλης εὐτυχίας, ὦ μεγάλου εὐεργέτου τοῦ
δεικνύοντος τὴν ὁδόν. εἶτα Τριπτολέμῳ μὲν ἱερὰ

1 Added by Schweighauser.
2 Supplied by Upton.
5 Supplied by Schenkl.

34

BOOK I. rv. 23-30

he has travelled is nothing; but not so that other
goal—to study how a man may rid his life of
sorrows and lamentations, and of such cries as ‘* Woe
is me!” and “Wretch that I am!” and of mis-
fortune and failure, and to learn the meaning of
death, exile, prison, hemlock ;+ that he may be able
to say in prison, “ Dear Crito, if so it pleases the
gods, so be it,” 5 rather than, “ Alas, poor me, an old
man, it is for this that I have kept my grey hairs!”
Who says such things? Do you think that I will
name you some man held in small esteem and of
low degree? Does not Priam say it? Does not
Oedipus? Nay more, all kings say it! For what
are tragedies but the portrayal in tragic verse of the
sufferings of men who have admired things external?
If indeed one had to be deceived* into learning
that among things external and independent of our
free choice none concerns us, I, for my part, should
consent to a deception which would result in my
living thereafter serenely and without turmoil ; but
as for you, you will yourselves see to your own
preference.

What, then, does Chrysippus furnish us? ‘“ That
you may know,” he says, “that these things are not
false from which serenity arises and tranquillity
comes to us, take my books and you shall know how
conformable and harmonious with nature are the
things which render me tranquil.” O the great
good fortune! O the great benefactor who points
the way! To Triptolemus, indeed, all men have

1 The poison with which Socrates was put to death.

5 Plato, Crito, 43d.

* Probably by witnessing tragedies, the plots of which,
although fictitious, may teach moral lessons.

35

31

32

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

\ \
καὶ βωμοὺς πάντες ἄνθρωποι ἀνεστάκασιν, ὅτι
, A a a \
Tas ἡμέρους τροφὰς ἡμῖν ἔδωκεν, τῷ δὲ τὴν
> 7 7 \ , > yelp
ἀλήθειαν εὑρόντι καὶ φωτίσαντι καὶ εἰς πάντας
ἀνθρώπους ἐξενεγκόντι, οὐ τὴν περὶ τὸ ζῆν, ἀλλὰ
\ Ν ν ha “ / « fal 9X & 7 x
τὴν πρὸς TO εὖ ζῆν, Tis ὑμῶν ἐπὶ τούτῳ βωμὸν
ἱδρύσατο ἢ ναὸν ἢ ἄγαλμα ἀνέθηκεν ἢ τὸν θεὸν
ἐπὶ τούτῳ προσκυνεῖ; GAN ὅτε μὲν ἄμπέλον
gS x 4 > tA 4 σ΄ Ἁ
ἔδωκαν ἢ πυρούς, ἐπιθύομεν τούτου ἕνεκα, ὅτι δὲ
“ > , \ > > 7 ΄
τοιοῦτον ἐξήνεγκαν καρπὸν ἐν ἀνθρωπίνῃ διανοίᾳ,
δι’ οὗ τὴν ἀλήθειαν τὴν περὶ εὐδαιμονίας δείξειν
ἡμῖν ἤμελλον, τούτου δ᾽ ἕνεκα οὐκ εὐχαριστή-

σωμεν τῷ θεῷ;

ε΄. Πρὸς τοὺς ᾿Ακαδημαικούς

“ , ΜΡ \ \ v >
Av τις, φησίν, ἐνίστηται πρὸς τὰ ἄγαν éx-
φανῆ, πρὸς τοῦτον οὐ ῥᾷδιόν ἐστιν εὑρεῖν λόγον,
δι’ οὗ μεταπείσει τις αὐτόν. τοῦτο δ᾽ οὔτε παρὰ
τὴν ἐκείνου γίνεται δύναμιν οὔτε παρὰ τὴν τοῦ
/ ve / > 7 Ψ > \ >
διδάσκοντος ἀσθένειαν, ἀλλ᾽ ὅταν ἀπαχθεὶς ἀπο-
σι a 7 a \
λιθωθῇ, πῶς ἔτι χρήσηταί τις αὐτῷ διὰ λόγου ;

1 The phrase is from Plato, Crito, 48 Β.

2 Referring probably to the mind of Chrysippus.

3 See also II. 20. 4. Epictetus condemns the exaggerations
of the Academic principle of suspended judgement, which

36

BOOK L. vw. 30-v. 2

established shrines and altars, because he gave us as
food the fruits of cultivation, but to him who has
discovered, and brought to light, and imparted to
all men the truth which deals, not with mere life,
but with a good life,~—who among you has for that
set up an altar in his honour, or dedicated a temple
or a statue, or bows down to God in gratitude for
him? But because the gods have given us the vine
or wheat, for that do we make sacrifice, and yet
because they have brought forth such a fruit in a
human mind,? whereby they purposed to show us
the truth touching happiness, shall we fail to render
thanks unto God for this?

CHAPTER V
Against the Academics*

Ir a man, says Epictetus, resists truths that are all
too evident, in opposing him it is not easy to find an
argument by which one may cause him to change
his opinion. The reason for this is neither the
man's ability nor the teacher's weakness; nay, when
a man who has been trapped in an argument
hardens to stone, how shall one any longer deal
with him by argument?

was based on the doctrine that nothing could be actually
known. Cf. Cicero Acad. I. 45: Arcesilas (a prominent
Academic) negabat esse quidquam quod sciri posset . . . sic
omnia latere in occullo: neque esse quidguam quod cerni aut
intellegi posset: quibus de causis nihil oportere neque profiteri
neque adfirmare quemquam neque adsensione approbare, etc.

37

3

~1

10

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

᾿Απολιθώσεις δ᾽ εἰσὶ διτταί: ἡ μὲν τοῦ von-
τικοῦ ἀπολίθωσις, ἡ δὲ τοῦ ἐντρεπτικοῦ, ὅταν
τις παρατεταγμένος ἦ μὴ ἐπινεύειν τοῖς ἐναργέσι
μηδ᾽ ἀπὸ τῶν μαχομένων ἀφίστασθαι. οἱ δὲ
\ \ \ \ > 4
πολλοὶ THY μὲν σωματικὴν ἀπονέκρωσιν φοβού-
μεθα καὶ πάντ᾽ ἂν μηχανησαίμεθα ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ
περιπεσεῖν τοιούτῳ τινί, τῆς Ψυχῆς δ᾽ ἀπονεκρου-
/ OX ¢ a / X 7 > A
μένης οὐδὲν ἡμῖν μέλει. καὶ νὴ Δία ἐπὶ αὐτῆς
a fol “
τῆς ψυχῆς ἂν μὲν ἦ οὕτως διακείμενος, ὥστε
δενὶ 1 θεῖν μηδὲ é δέ ὶ
μηδενὶ ; παρακολουθεῖν μηδὲ συνιέναι μηδέν, καὶ
τοῦτον κακῶς ἔχειν οἰόμεθα: ἂν δέ τινος τὸ ἐν-
τρεπτικὸν καὶ αἰδῆμον ἀπονεκρωθῇ, τοῦτο ἔτι
καὶ δύναμιν καλοῦμεν.
Καταλαμβάνεις ὅτι ἐγρήγορας ; “ov,” φησίν'
«,δθλχ aE > a of ͵ “
οὐδὲ γάρ, ὅταν ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις φαντάζωμαι, ὅτι
> t ” 2OX 3 7 LA Ξε ,
ἐγρήγορα." οὐδὲν οὖν διαφέρει αὕτη ἡ φαντασία
$e RIOT Oe ΄ ΄ \
ἐκείνης ; οὐδέν" ἔτι τούτῳ διαλέγομαι; καὶ
ποῖον αὐτῷ πῦρ ἢ ποῖον σίδηρον προσαγάγω,
ἵν᾽ αἴσθηται ὅτι νενέκρωται ; αἰσθανόμενος οὐ
προσποιεῖται" ἔτι χείρων ἐστὶ τοῦ νεκροῦ. μάχην
οὗτος οὐ συνορᾷ' κακῶς ἔχει. συνορῶν οὗτος οὐ
κινεῖται οὐδὲ προκόπτει: ἔτι ἀθλιώτερον ἔχει.
ἐκτέτμηται τὸ αἰδῆμον αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐντρεπτικὸν καὶ
\ Ν > > , > > > θ
τὸ λογικὸν οὐκ ἀποτέτμηται, ἀλλ ἀποτεθη-
ρίωται. ταύτην ἐγὼ δύναμιν εἴπω ; μὴ γένοιτο,
εἰ μὴ καὶ τὴν τῶν κιναίδων, καθ᾽ ἣν πᾶν τὸ
3 \ > ὕ \ a ,ὔ
ἐπελθὸν ἐν μέσῳ καὶ ποιοῦσι καὶ λέγουσι.

1 Salmasius: μηδὲν J.
38

BOOK I. v. 3-10

Now there are two kinds of petrifaction: one is
the petrifaction of the intellect, the other of the
sense of shame, whena man stands in array, prepared
neither to assent to manifest truths nor to leave the
fighting line. Most of us dread the deadening of the
body and would resort to all means so as to avoid
falling into such a state, but about the deadening of
the soul we care not at all. Indeed, by Zeus, even
in the case of the soul itself, if a man be in such a
state that he cannot follow an argument step by step,
or even understand one, we regard him too as being
in a bad way; but ifa man’s sense of shame and self-
respect be deadened, this we go so far as to call
strength of character!

Do your senses tell you that you are awake?
“ No,” he answers, ‘“‘ any more than they do when
in dreams | have the impression that I am awake.”
Is there, then, no difference between these two
impressions? “None.” Can I argue with this man
any longer? And what cautery or lancet shall I
apply to him, to make him realize that he is
deadened? He does realize it, but pretends that he
does not; he is even worse than a corpse. One
man does not notice the contradiction—he is in a
bad way; another man notices it, indeed, but is
not moved and does not improve—he is in a still
worse state. His self-respect and sense of shame
have been lopped off, and his reasoning faculty has
been—I will not say cut away, but brutalized.
Am I to call this strength of character? Far
from it, unless I am so to describe the strength
that lewd fellows have, which enables them to say
sone in public anything that comes into their

39

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

ς΄. Περὶ προνοίας
1 Ad’ ἑκάστου τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ γινομένων

ς

ῥᾷάδιόν ἐστιν ἐγκωμιάσαι τὴν πρόνοιαν, ἂν δύο
»

ἔχῃ τις ταῦτα ἐν ἑαυτῷ, δύναμίν τε συνορατικὴν

2 τῶν γεγονότων ἑκάστῳ καὶ τὸ εὐχάριστον. εἰ
δὲ μή, ὁ μὲν οὐκ ὄψεται τὴν εὐχρηστίαν τῶν
γεγονότων, ὁ δ᾽ οὐκ εὐχαριστήσει ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῖς οὐδ᾽

3 ἂν tidy. χρώματα ὁ θεὸς ex? πεποιήκει, δύνα-
μιν δὲ θεατικὴν. αὐτῶν μὴ πεποιήκει, τί. ἂν ἢ ἦν

4 ὄφελος ;--Οὐδ᾽ ὁτιοῦν..--- ᾿Αλλ᾽ ἀνάπαλιν εἰ τὴν
μὲν δύναμιν πεποιήκει, τὰ ὄντα δὲ μὴ τοιαῦτα
οἷα ὑ ὑποπίπτειν τῇ δυνάμει τῇ ὁρατικῇ, καὶ οὕτως

5 τί ὄφελος ;--Οὐδ᾽ ὁτιοῦν. 3. Τί δ᾽, εἰ καὶ ,ἀμφό-

6 τερα ταῦτα πεποιήκει, φῶς δὲ μὴ “πεποιήκει ;--
Οὐδ᾽ οὕτως τι dpedos.—Tis οὖν ὁ sees τοῦτο
πρὸς ἐκεῖνο κἀκεῖνο πρὸς τοῦτο; τίς μόσας
τὴν μάχαιραν πρὸς τὸ κολεὸν καὶ τὸ χὴν πρὸς

7 τὴν πάχαιραν ; οὐδείς; καὶ μὴν ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς
κατασκευῆς τῶν ἐπιτετελεσμένων ἀποφαίνεσθαι
εἰώθαμεν, ὅτι τεχνίτου τινὸς πάντως τὸ ἔργον,
οὐχὶ δ᾽ εἰκῇ κατεσκευασμένον.

8 “Ap οὖν τούτων μὲν ἕκαστον ἐμφαίνει τὸν
τεχνίτην, τὰ δ᾽ ὁρατὰ καὶ ὅρασις καὶ φῶς οὐκ
ἐμφαίνει ; τὸ δ᾽ ἄρρεν καὶ τὸ θῆλυ καὶ ἡ προ-
θυμία ἡ ἡ πρὸς τὴν συνουσίαν ἑκατέρου καὶ δύναμες
ἡ χρηστικὴ τοῖς μορίοις τοῖς κατεσκευασμένοις
οὐδὲ ταῦτα ἐμφαινει τὸν τεχνίτην ; ; ἀλλὰ ταῦτα

10 μὲν οὕτω" ἡ δὲ τοιαύτη τῆς διανοίας κατασκευή,
1 Added by Meineke (εἰδῇ Stobaeus).
2 Stobaeus: an erasure in 3.

3 Here follows in S an erasure of about 110 letters.
4 Stobaeus: omitted by S.

40

BOOK I. vi. 1-10

CHAPTER VI
Of providence

From everything that happens in the universe it is
easy for a man to find occasion to praise providence,
if he has within himself these two qualities: the
faculty of taking a comprehensive view of what has
happened in each individual instance, and the sense
of gratitude. Otherwise, one man will not see the
usefulness of what has happened, and another, even
if he does see it, will not be grateful therefor. If
God had made colours, but had not made the faculty
of seeing them, of what good had it been ?—None
at all —But, conversely, if He had made the faculty,
but in making objects, had made them incapable of
falling under the faculty of vision, in that case also
of what good had it been?—None at all.—What
then, if He had even made both of these, but had
not made light ?—-Even thus it would have been of
no use.—Whao is it, then, that has fitted this to that
and that to this? And who is it that has fitted the
sword to the scabbard, and the scabbard to the sword ?
No one? Assuredly from the very structure of all
made objects we are accustomed to prove that the
work is certainly the product of some artificer, and
has not been constructed at random.

Does, then, every such work reveal its artificer,
but do visible objects and vision and light not reveal
him? And the male and the female, and the passion
of each for intercourse with the other, and the faculty
which makes use of the organs which have been con-
structed for this purpose, do these things not reveal
their artificer either ? Well, admit it for these things ;
but the marvellous constitution of the intellect

41

1

---

12

18

14

15

16
17

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

καθ᾽ ἣν οὐχ ἁπλῶς brorimtovtes! τοῖς αἰσθη-
τοῖς τυπούμεθα ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκλαμβάνο-
μέν τι καὶ ἀφαιροῦμεν καὶ προστίθεμεν καὶ
συντίθεμεν τάδε τινὰ δι’ αὐτῶν καὶ νὴ Δία μετα-
βαίνομεν ar ἄλλων ἐπ᾽ ἄλλα Twa? οὕτω πως
παρακείμενα, οὐδὲ ταῦτα ἱκανὰ κινῆσαί τινας καὶ
διατρέψαι πρὸς τὸ μὴ ἀπολιπεῖν τὸν τεχνίτην ;
ἢ ἐξηγησάσθωσαν ἡμῖν τί τὸ ποιοῦν ἐστιν ἕκα-
στον τούτων ἢ πῶς οἷόν τε τὰ οὕτω θαυμαστὰ
καὶ τεχνικὰ εἰκῇ καὶ ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου γίνεσθαι.
Τί οὖν ; ἐφ᾽ ἡμῶν μόνων γίνεται ταῦτα ; πολλὰ
μὲν ἐπὶ μόνων, ὧν ἐξαιρέτως χρείαν εἶχεν τὸ
λογικὸν ζῷον, πολλὰ δὲ κοινὰ εὑρήσεις ἡμῖν καὶ
πρὸς τὰ ἄλογα. ap οὖν καὶ παρακολουθεῖ τοῖς
γινομένοις ἐκεῖνα; οὐδαμῶς. ἄλλο γάρ ἐστι
χρῆσις καὶ ἄλλο παρακολούθησις. ἐκείνων
χρείαν εἶχεν ὁ θεὸς χρωμένων ταῖς φαντασίαις,
ἡμῶν δὲ παρακολουθούντων τῇ χρήσει. διὰ
τοῦτο ἐκείνοις μὲν ἀρκεῖ τὸ ἐσθίειν καὶ πίνειν
καὶ τὸ ἀναπαύεσθαι καὶ ὀχεύειν καὶ τἄλλ᾽ ὅσα
ἐπιτελεῖ τῶν αὑτῶν ἕκαστον, ἡμῖν δ᾽, οἷς καὶ
τὴν παρακολουθητικὴν δύναμιν ἔδωκεν, οὐκέτι
ταῦτ᾽ ἀπαρκεῖ, ἀλλ᾽ ἂν μὴ κατὰ τρόπον καὶ
τεταγμένως καὶ ἀκολούθως τῇ ἑκάστου φύσει
καὶ κατασκευῇ πράττωμεν, οὐκέτι τοῦ τέλους
τευξόμεθα τοῦ ἑαυτῶν. ὧν γὰρ αἱ κατασκευαὶ
διάφοροι, τούτων καὶ τὰ ἔργα καὶ τὰ τέλη. οὗ
τοίνυν ἡ κατασκευὴ μόνον χρηστική, τούτῳ χρῆ-ς

1 Meineke: ἐπιπίπτοντες 8,

2 Schenkl: τὰ 5,

42

BOOK I. vi. 10-17

whereby, when we meet with sensible objects, we
do not merely have their forms impressed upon us,
but also make a selection from among them, and
subtract and add, and make these various combina-
tions by using them, yes, and, by Zeus, pass from some
things to certain others which are in a manner
related to them—is not even all this sufficient to
stir our friends and induce them not to leave the
artificer out of account? Else let them explain to
us what it is that produces each of these results, or
how it is possible that objects so wonderful and so
workmanlike should come into being at random and
spontaneously.

What then? Is it in the case of man alone that
these things oceur? You will, indeed, find many
things in man only, things of which the rational animal
had a peculiar need, but you will also find many

by us in common with the irrational animals.
Dotheyalso,then,understand what happens? No! for
use is one thing, and understanding another. God
had need of the animals in that they make use of
external impressions, and of usin that we understand
the use of external impressions. And so for them it
is sufficient to eat and drink and rest and procreate,
and whatever else of the things within their own
province the animals severally do; while for us, to
whom He has made the additional gift of the faculty
of understanding, these things are no longer sufficient,
but unless we act appropriately, and methodically,
and in conformity each with his own nature and
constitution, we shall no longer achieve our own
ends. For of beings whose constitutions are different,
the works and the ends are likewise different. So
for the being whose constitution is adapted to use

43

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

σθαι ὁπωσοῦν ἀπαρκεῖ: οὗ δὲ καὶ παρακολουθη-
τικὴ τῇ χρήσει, τούτῳ τὸ κατὰ τρόπον ἂν μὴ
προσῇ οὐδέποτε τεύξεται τοῦ τέλους. τί οὗν;
éxeivwv ἕκαστον κατασκευάζει τὸ μὲν ὥστ᾽
ἐσθίεσθαι, τὸ δ᾽ ὥστε ὑπηρετεῖν εἰς γεωργίαν, τὸ
δ᾽ ὥστε τυρὸν φέρειν, τὸ δ᾽ ἄλλο ἐπ᾽ ἄλλῃ χρείᾳ
παραπλησίῳ, πρὸς ἃ τίς χρεία τοῦ παρακολου-
θεῖν ταῖς φαντασίαις καὶ ταύτας διακρίνειν δύ-
νασθαι; τὸν 8 ἄνθρωπον θεατὴν εἰσήγαγεν
αὐτοῦ τε καὶ τῶν ἔργων τῶν αὐτοῦ, καὶ οὐ μόνον
θεατήν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐξηγητὴν αὐτῶν. διὰ τοῦτο
αἰσχρόν ἐστι τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἄρχεσθαι καὶ κατα-
λήγειν ὅπου καὶ τὰ ἄλογα, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἔνθεν
μὲν ἄρχεσθαι, καταλήγειν δὲ ἐφ᾽ ὃ κατέληξεν ἐφ᾽
ἡμῶν καὶ ἡ φύσις. κατέληξεν δ᾽ ἐπὶ θεωρίαν
καὶ παρακολούθησιν καὶ σύμφωνον διεξαγωγὴν
τῇ φύσει. ὁρᾶτε οὖν, μὴ ἀθέατοι τούτων ἀπο-
θάνητε.

"AAN εἰς Ὀλυμπίαν μὲν ἀποδημεῖτε, tv’ ἴδητε
τὸ ἔργον τοῦ Φειδίου, καὶ ἀτύχημα ἕκαστος ὑμῶν
οἴεται τὸ ἀνιστόρητος τούτων ἀποθανεῖν: ὅπου δ᾽
οὐδ᾽ ἀποδημῆσαι χρεία ἐστίν, ἀλλ᾽ ἔστιν ἤδη καὶ
πάρεστιν τοῖς ἔργοις, ταῦτα δὲ θεάσασθαι καὶ
κατανοῆσαι οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσετε; οὐκ αἰσθήσεσθε
τοΐνυν, οὔτε τίνες ἐστὲ οὔτ᾽ ἐπὶ τί γεγόνατε οὔτε
τί τοῦτό ἐστιν, ἐφ᾽ οὗ τὴν θέαν παρείληφθε ;---
᾿Αλλὰ γίνεταί τινα ἀηδῆ καὶ χαλεπὰ ἐν τῷ
βίῳ.----ν ᾿Ολυμπίᾳ δ᾽ οὐ γίνεται; οὐ καυμα-
τίζεσθε; οὐ στενοχωρεῖσθε; οὐ κακῶς λούεσθε;

1 Schweighiuser: εἰδῆτε S.

44

᾿ BOOK I. νι. 17-26

only, mere use is sufficient, but where a being has
also the faculty of understanding the use, unless the
principle of propriety be added, he will never attain
hisend. Whatthen? Each of the animals God con-
stitutes, one to be eaten, another to serve in farming,
another to produce cheese, and yet another for some
other similar use ; to perform these functions what
need have they to understand external impressions
and to be able to differentiate between them? But
God has brought man into the world to be a spectator
of Himself and of His works, and not merely a

tor, but also an interpreter. Wherefore, it is
shameful for man to begin and end just where the
irrational animals do; he should rather begin where
they do, but end where nature has ended in dealing
with us. Now she did not end until she reached
contemplation and understanding and a manner of
life harmonious with nature. Take heed, therefore,
lest you die without ever having been spectators of
these things.

But you travel to Olympia to behold the work 1 of
Pheidias, and each of you regards it as a misfortune to
die without seeing such sights; yet when there is no
need to-travel at all, but where Zeus is already, and
is present in his works, will you not yearn to behold
these works and know them? Will you decline,
therefore, to perceive either who you are, or for what
you have been born, or what that purpose is for
which you have received sight?—But some un-
pleasant and hard things happen in life——And do
they not happen at Olympia? Do you not swelter?
Are you not cramped and crowded? Do you not

1 The famous gold and ivory statue of Zeus.
45

27
28

29

30

31
32

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

ov καταβρέχεσθε, ὅταν βρέχῃ ; θορύβου δὲ καὶ
βοῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων χαλεπῶν οὐκ ἀπολαύετε;
ἀλλ᾽ οἶμαι ὅτι ταῦτα πάντα ἀντιτιθέντες πρὸς
τὸ ἀξιόλογον τῆς θέας φέρετε καὶ ἀνέχεσθε. ἄγε
δυνάμεις δ᾽ οὐκ εἰλήφατε, καθ᾽ ἃς οἴσετε πᾶν τὸ
συμβαῖνον ; μεγαλοψυχίαν οὐκ εἰλήφατε; ἀν-
δρείαν οὐκ εἰλήφατε; καρτερίαν οὐκ εἰλήφατε;
καὶ τί ἔτε μοι μέλει μεγαλοψύχῳ ὄντι τῶν ἀπο-
βῆναι δυναμένων ; τί μ᾽ ἐκστήσει ἢ ταράξει ἢ τί
ὀδυνηρὸν φανεῖται; οὐ χρήσομαι τῇ δυνάμει
πρὸς ἃ εἴληφα αὐτήν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀποβαίνουσιν
πενθήσω καὶ στενάξω ;

“Nai: ἀλλ᾽ αἱ μύξαι μου ῥέουσιν." τίνος οὖν
ἕνεκα χεῖρας ἔχεις, ἀνδράποδον ; οὐχ ἵνα καὶ
ἀπομύσσῃς σεαυτόν ;—Todto οὖν εὔλογον μύξας
γίνεσθαι ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ;--ΚΚαὶ πόσῳ κρεῖττον

. ἀπομύξασθαί σε ἢ ἐγκαλεῖν ; ἢ τί οἴει ὅτε ὁ

33

34

Ἡρακλῆς ἂν ἀπέβη, εἰ μὴ λέων τοιοῦτος ἐγένετο
\ “ Ν Ν \ -“ νΝ VA
καὶ ὕδρα καὶ ἔλαφος καὶ σῦς καὶ ἄδικοί τινες
ἄνθρωποι καὶ θηριώδεις, ods ἐκεῖνος ἐξήλαυνεν
καὶ ἐκάθαιρεν ; καὶ τί ἂν ἐποίει μηδενὸς τοιού-
του γεγονότος ; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι ἐντετυλιγμένος ἂν
ἐκάθευδεν ; οὐκοῦν πρῶτον μὲν οὐκ ἂν ἐγένετο
c cal > nr ΄ e ld /
Ηρακλῆς ἐν τρυφῇ τοιαύτῃ καὶ ἡσυχίᾳ νυστάζων
cA XA / > > »” \ > / 7 ες
ὅλον τὸν βίον" εἰ δ᾽ ἄρα καὶ ἐγένετο, τί ὄφελος
αὐτοῦ ; τίς δὲ χρῆσις τῶν βραχιόνων τῶν ἐκεί-
νου καὶ τῆς ἄλλης ἀλκῆς καὶ καρτερίας καὶ
γενναιότητος, εἰ μὴ τοιαῦταί τινες αὐτὸν περι-
στάσεις καὶ ὗλαι διέσεισαν καὶ ἐγύμνασαν ; τί

46

BOOK I. vi. 26-35

bathe with discomfort? Are you not drenched when-
ever it rains? Do you not have your fill of tumult
and shouting and other annoyances? But I fancy
that you hear and endure all this by balancing it off
against the memorable character of the spectacle.
Come, have you not received faculties that enable
you to bear whatever happens? Have you not
received magnanimity? Have you not received
courage? Have you not received endurance? And
what care I longer for anything that may happen, if
I be magnanimous? What shall perturb me, or
trouble me, or seem grievous to me? Shall I fail to
use my faculty to that end for which I have received
it, but grieve and lament over events that occur?

“ Yes, but my nose is running.’ What have you
hands for, then, slave? [5 it not that you may wipe
yournose? “Is it reasonable, then, that there should
be running noses in the world?”—And how much
better it would be for you to wipe your nose than to
find fault! Or what do you think Heracles would
have amounted to, if there had not been a lion like
the one which he encountered, and a hydra, and a
stag, and a boar, and wicked and brutal men, whom
he made it his business to drive out and clear away ?
And what would he have been doing had nothing of
the sort existed? Is it not clear that he would have
rolled himself upin a blanket andslept? In the first
place, then, he would never have become Heracles by
slumbering away his whole life in such luxury and
ease; but even if he had, of what good would he
‘have been? What would have been the use of those
arms of his and of his prowess in general, and his
steadfastness and nobility, had not such circumstances
and occasions roused and exercised him? What

47

36

37

39
40

41

~

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

2 a
οὖν ; αὑτῷ ταύτας ἔδει κατασκευάζειν καὶ ζητεῖν
ποθεν λέοντα εἰσαγαγεῖν εἰς τὴν χώραν τὴν
αὑτοῦ καὶ σῦν καὶ ὕδραν ; μωρία τοῦτο καὶ
’ ,
μανία. γενόμενα δὲ καὶ εὑρεθέντα εὔχρηστα ἦν
πρὸς τὸ δεῖξαι καὶ γυμνάσαι τὸν Ἡρακλέα.
"Aye οὖν καὶ σὺ τούτων αἰσθόμενος ἀπόβλεψον
> \ ὃ 4 a Ψ \ 2 δὰ > X κε
eis τὰς δυνάμεις ἃς ἔχεις καὶ ἀπιδὼν εἰπὲ “ φέρε
lel Φ a / / Μ
νῦν, ὦ Ζεῦ, ἣν θέλεις περίστασιν: ἔχω γὰρ
\ > nr / 4 >
παρασκευὴν ἐκ σοῦ μοι δεδομένην καὶ ἀφορμὰς
πρὸς τὸ κοσμῆσαι διὰ τῶν ἀποβαινόντων ἐμαυ-
΄ » Ν > \ / \ \ \ lol
TOV. ov ἀλλὰ κάθησθε τὰ μὲν μὴ συμβῇ τρέ-
μοντες, τῶν δὲ συμβαινόντων ὀδυρόμενοι καὶ
πενθοῦντες καὶ στένοντες" εἶτα τοῖς θεοῖς ἐγκα-
λεῖτε. τί γάρ ἐστιν ἄλλο ἀκόλουθον τῇ τοιαύτῃ
BJ , a \ > / / “ ἈΝ »
ἀγεννείᾳ ἢ καὶ ἀσέβεια ; καίτοι ὅ γε θεὸς ov
μόνον ἔδωκεν ἡμῖν τὰς δυνάμεις ταύτας, καθ᾽ ἃς
οἴσομεν πᾶν τὸ ἀποβαῖνον μὴ ταπεινούμενοι μηδὲ
e > > rn > 7A > cal
συγκλώμενοι ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ᾽ ὃ ἦν ἀγαθοῦ βασι-
λέως καὶ ταῖς ἀληθείαις πατρός, ἀκώλυτον τοῦτο
ἔδωκεν, ἀνανάγκαστον, ἀπαραπόδιστον, ὅλον
αὐτὸ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν ἐποίησεν οὐδ᾽ αὑτῷ τινα πρὸς
τοῦτο ἰσχὺν ἀπολιπών, ὥστε κωλῦσαι ἢ ἐμπο-
a /
Sica. ταῦτα ἔχοντες ἐλεύθερα καὶ ὑμέτερα μὴ
a > “- > > / / > ¢
χρῆσθε αὐτοῖς μηδ᾽ αἰσθάνεσθε τίνα εἰλήφατε
καὶ παρὰ τίνος, ἀλλὰ κάθησθε πενθοῦντες καὶ
στένοντες οἱ μὲν πρὸς αὐτὸν τὸν δόντα ἀποτε-
\ /
τυφλωμένοι μηδ᾽ ἐπιγινώσκοντες τὸν εὐεργέτην,
\ > ἊΨ
οἱ δ᾽ ὑπ᾽ ἀγεννείας εἰς μέμψεις καὶ τὰ ἐγκλήματα

43 τῷ θεῷ ἐκτρεπόμενοι. καίτοι πρὸς μεγαλοψυ-

48

BOOK I. vi. 35-43

then? Ought he to have prepared these for
himself, and sought to bring a lion into his own
country from somewhere or other, and a boar, and a
hydra? This would have been folly and madness.
But since they did exist and were found in the
world, they were serviceable as a means of revealing
and exercising our Heracles.

Come then, do you also, now that you are aware
of these things, contemplate the faculties which you
have, and, after contemplating, say: “Bring now,
O Zeus, what difficulty Thou wilt; for I have an
equipment given to me by Thee, and resources
wherewith to distinguish myself by making use of
the things that come to pass.” But no, you sit
trembling for fear something will happen, and
lamenting, and grieving, and groaning about other
things that are happening. And then you blame
the gods! For what else can be the consequence
of so ignoble a spirit but sheer impiety? And yet
God has not merely given us these faculties, to
enable us to bear all that happens without being
degraded or crushed thereby, but—as became a good
king and in very truth a father—He has given them
to us free from all restraint, compulsion, hindrance ;
He has put the whole matter under our control
without reserving even for Himself any power to
prevent or hinder. Although you have these facul-
ties free and entirely your own, you do not use
them, nor do you realize what gifts you have received,
and from whom, but you sit sorrowing and groaning,
some of you blinded toward the giver himself and
not even acknowledging your benefactor, and others,
—such is their ignoble spirit—turning aside to
fault-finding and complaints against God. And yet,

49

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

χίαν μὲν καὶ ἀνδρείαν ἐ ἐγὼ σοὶ δείξω ὅ ὅτε ἀφορμὰς
καὶ παρασκευὴν ἔχεις, πρὸς δὲ τὸ μέμφεσθαι καὶ
ἐγκαλεῖν ποίας ἀφορμὰς ἔχεις σὺ δ᾽ ἐμοὶ δείκνυε.

a / lal
ζ΄. Περὶ τῆς χρείας τῶν μεταπιπτόντων Kal
lal -“ €
ὑποθετικῶν καὶ TOV ὁμοίων

« \ \ , ΄ » ν
1 Ἡ περὶ τοὺς μεταπίπτοντας καὶ ὑποθετικούς,
ἔτι δὲ τῷ ἠρωτῆσθαι περαίνοντας καὶ πάντας
ἁπλῶς τοὺς τοιούτους λόγους πραγματεία λαν-
θάνει τοὺς πολλοὺς ' περὶ καθήκοντος οὖσα.
2 ξητοῦμεν γὰρ ἐπὶ πάσης ὕλης πῶς ἂν eb por?
ὁ καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς τὴν διέξοδον. καὶ ἀναστροφὴν
8 τὴν ἐν αὐτῇ καθήκουσαν. οὐκοῦν ἢ τοῦτο λεγέ-
τωσαν, ὅτι οὐ συγκαθήσει εἰς ἐρώτησιν καὶ
ἀπόκρισιν ὁ σπουδαῖος ἢ ὅτι συγκαθεὶς οὐκ
ἐπιμελήσεται τοῦ μὴ εἰκῇ μηδ᾽ ὡς ἔτυ ev ἐν
4 ἐρωτήσει καὶ ἀποκρίσει ἀναστρέφεσθαι, ἢ 2 τού-
των μηδέτερον προσδεχομένοις ἀναγκαῖον ὁμολο-
γεῖν, ὅτε ἐπίσκεψίν τινα ποιητέον τῶν τόπων
τούτων, περὶ ods μάλιστα στρέφεται ἐρώτησις
καὶ ἀπόκρισις.
5 Τί γὰρ ἐπαγγέλλεται ἐν χλόγῳ; τἀληθῆ τι-

ι Meibom : εὐροοῖ S.
2 Schenkl: μὴ S.

1 With the Stoics, whose sole standard of judgement in
problems of conduct was the appeal to reason, the proper
training of the reasoning faculties was an indispensable pre-
requisite to the good life. Three modes of sophistical
reasoning are here differentiated. ‘‘ Equivocal premisses ”

5°

BOOK I. νι. 43-vn. 5

though I can show you that you have resources and
endowment for magnanimity and courage, do you,
pray, show me what resources you have to justify
faultfinding and complaining!

CHAPTER VII

Of the use of equivocal premisses, hypothetical
arguments and the like

Most men are unaware that the handling of argu-
ments which involve equivocal and hypothetical pre-
misses, and, further, of those which derive syllogisms
by the process of interrogation, and, in general, the
handling of all such arguments, has a bearing upon
the duties of life. For our aim in every matter of
inquiry is to learn how the good and excellent man
may find the appropriate course through it and the
appropriate way of conducting himself init. Let them
say, then, either that the good man will not enter
the contest of question and answer, or that, once he
has entered, he will be at no pains to avoid con-
ducting himself carelessly and at haphazard in
question and answer ; or else, if they accept neither
of these alternatives, they must admit that some
investigation should be made of those topics with
which question and answer are principally concerned.

For what is the professed object of reasoning?

(μεταπίπτοντες λόγοι) are those that contain ambiguities
in terms which are intended to mean one thing at one step
in. the argument, another at another. ‘‘ Hypothetical pre-
misses ” involve assumptions, or conditions. The last class
proceeds by drawing unexpected conclusions from the answers
to questions.

51

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

/ fol
θέναι, τὰ ψευδῆ αἴρειν, πρὸς ra ἄδηλα ἐπέχειν.
6 ἄρ᾽ οὖν ἀρκεῖ τοῦτο μόνον μαθεῖν ;---Ἀρκεῖ,
΄, > on \ a , 2 ΣΧ ΔῚ
φησίν.--Οὐκοῦν καὶ τῷ βουλομένῳ ἐν χρήσει
νομίσματος μὴ διαπίπτειν ἀρκεῖ τοῦτο ἀκοῦσαι,
διὰ τί τὰς μὲν δοκίμους δραχμὰς παραδέχῃ, τὰς
78 ἀδοκίμους ἀποδοκιμάξεις ;---Οὐκ apxet.—Ti
οὖν δεῖ τούτῳ προσλαβεῖν ; τί γὰρ ἄλλο ἢ
δύναμιν δοκιμαστικήν τε καὶ διακριτικὴν τῶν
8 δοκίμων τε καὶ ἀδοκίμων δραχμῶν ; οὐκοῦν καὶ
> \ , > > a \ tA > ? > 4
ἐπὶ λόγου οὐκ ἀρκεῖ TO λεχθέν, ἀλλ᾽ ἀνάγκη
δοκιμαστικὸν γενέσθαι καὶ διακριτικὸν τοῦ ἀλη-
9 θοῦς καὶ τοῦ ψεύδους καὶ τοῦ ἀδήλου ;— Ἀνάγκη.
-Ἐπὶ τούτοις τί παραγγέλλεται ἐν λόγῳ ; τὸ
ἀκόλουθον τοῖς δοθεῖσιν ὑπὸ σοῦ καλῶς παραδέ-
10 you. ἄγε ἀρκεῖ οὖν κἀνταῦθα γνῶναι τοῦτο;
οὐκ ἀρκεῖ, δεῖ δὲ μαθεῖν πῶς τί τισιν ἀκόλουθον
’ \ \ \ a = τ >’ θ tad \
γίνεται καὶ ποτὲ μὲν ἕν ἑνὶ ἀκολουθεῖ, ποτὲ δὲ
11 πλείοσιν κοινῇ. μή ποτε οὖν καὶ τοῦτο ἀνάγκη
a \ , > , “
προσλαβεῖν τὸν μέλλοντα ἐν λόγῳ συνετῶς
> / \ Ε} ‘ δ ν8 ὃ Pe “
ἀναστραφήσεσθαι καὶ αὐτόν τ᾽ ἀποδείξειν ἕκαστα
ἀποδόντα καὶ τοῖς ἀποδεικνύουσι παρακολου-
θήσειν pnd ὑπὸ τῶν σοφιζομένων διαπλανη-
12 θήσεσθαι ὡς ἀποδεικνυόντων ; οὐκοῦν ἐλήλυθεν
ἡμῖν περὶ τῶν συναγόντων λόγων καὶ τρόπων
πραγματεία καὶ γυμνασία καὶ ἀναγκαία πέφηνεν.
13 ᾿Αλλὰ δὴ ἔστιν ἐφ᾽ ὧν δεδώκαμεν ὑγιῶς τὰ

1 Added by Meibom.
52

a ee eo

ἀν ν δα αν»...

φ' ἄς

ΟΡ

BOOK I. vu. 5-13

To state the true, to eliminate the false, to suspend
judgement in doubtful cases. Is it enough, then,
to learn this alone ?>—It is enough, says one.—lIs it,
then, also enough for the man who wants to make
no mistake in the use of money to be told the
reason why you accept genuine drachmas and reject
the counterfeit ?—It is not enough.—What, then,
must be added to this? Why, what else but the
faculty that tests the genuine drachmas and the
counterfeit and distinguishes between them? Where-
fore, in reasoning also the spoken word is not enough,
is it? On the contrary, is it not necessary to
develop the power of testing the true and the false
and the uncertain and of distinguishing between
them ?—It is necessary.—What else besides this is
proposed in reasoning? Pray accept the conse-
quence of what you have properly granted. Come,
is it enough, then, in this case also merely to know
that this particular thing is true? It is not enough,
but one must learn in what way a thing follows as a
consequence upon certain other things, and how
sometimes one thing follows upon one, and at other
times upon several conjointly. Is it not, then, neces-
sary that a man should also acquire this power, if
he is to acquit himself intelligently in argument,
and is himself not only to prove each point when he
tries to prove it, but also to follow the argument of
those who are conducting a proof, and is not to be
misled by men who quibble as though they were
proving something? There has consequently arisen
among us, and shown itself to be necessary, a science
which deals with inferential arguments and with
logical figures and trains men therein.

But of course there are times when we have

53

14
15

16

17

19

20

~

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

λήμματα Kal συμβαίνει τουτὶ ἐξ αὐτῶν: ψεῦδος
δὲ ὃν οὐδὲν ἧττον συμβαίνει. τί οὖν μοι κα-
θήκει ποιεῖν; προσδέχεσθαι τὸ Ψεῦδος ; καὶ
n , > 2 ὰ 4 “ “ > e lal
πῶς οἷόν τ᾽; ἀλλὰ λέγειν ὅτι “οὐχ ὑγιῶς
παρεχώρησα τὰ ὡμολογημένα; καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ
τοῦτο δίδοται. ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι “ov συμβαίνει διὰ τῶν
/ ” > > >. \ lol ,
Tapaxeywpynuévav”; adr οὐδὲ τοῦτο δίδοται.
τί οὖν ἐπὶ τούτων ποιητέον; ἢ μή ποτε ὡς οὐκ
ἀρκεῖ τὸ δανείσασθαι πρὸς τὸ ἔτι ὀφείλειν, ἀλλὰ
δεῖ προσεῖναι καὶ τὸ ἐπιμένειν ἐπὶ τοῦ δανείου
Ν \ 4 > / «“ 3 > val
καὶ μὴ διαλελύσθαι αὐτό, οὕτως οὐκ ἀρκεῖ πρὸς
τὸ δεῖν παραχωρεῖν τὸ ἐπιφερόμενον τὸ δεδωκέναι
τὰ λήμματα, δεῖ δ᾽ ἐπιμένειν ἐπὶ τῆς παρα-
χωρήσεως αὐτῶν; καὶ δὴ μενόντων μὲν αὐτῶν
εἰς τέλος ὁποῖα παρεχωρήθη πᾶσα ἀνάγκη ἡμᾶς
ἐπὶ τῆς παραχωρήσεως ἐπιμένειν καὶ τὸ ἀκό-
λουθον αὐτοῖς προσδέχεσθαι"... οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡμῖν
” >O\ > ¢ cal / a ἘΝ!
ἔτι οὐδὲ καθ᾽ ἡμᾶς συμβαίνει τοῦτο TO ἐπιφερόμε-
νον, ἐπειδὴ τῆς συγχωρήσεως τῶν λημμάτων
ἀπέστημεν. δεῖ οὖν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν λημμά-
των ἱστορῆσαι καὶ τὴν τοιαύτην μεταβολήν τε
καὶ μετάπτωσιν αὐτῶν, καθ᾽ ἣν ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ
an ΄
ἐρωτήσει ἢ τῇ ἀποκρίσει ἢ τῷ συλλελογίσθαι
ἤ τινι ἄλλῳ τοιούτῳ λαμβάνοντα τὰς μετα-

1 At this point Upton introduced from his ‘codex’ a
sentence intended to express fully the transition in the
argument (§18): μὴ μενόντων δὲ αὐτῶν ὁποῖα mapexwphOn, καὶ
ἡμᾶς πᾶσα ἀνάγκη τῆς παραχωρήσεως ἀφίστασθαι καὶ {τοῦ Schw.»
τὸ ἀνακόλουθον αὐτοῖς λόγοις προσδέχεσθαι. “If, however,
they do not remain as they were granted, we are also bound
to abandon our concession and our acceptance of what is

54

de iii σὸ

BOOK I. vu. 13-20

with sound reasoning granted the premisses, and
the inference from them is so-and-so; and, in spite
of its being false, it is none the less the inference.
What, then, should I do? Accept the fallacy?
And how is that possible? Well, should I say, “ It
was not sound reasoning for me to grant the pre-
misses’? Nay, but this is not permissible either.
Or, “This does not follow from what has been

ted”? But that is not permissible, either.
What, then, must be done in these circumstances ?
Is it not this, that the fact of having borrowed is
not enough to prove that one is still in debt, but we
must add the cireumstance that one abides by the
loan—that is, has not paid it—and just so our having
once granted the premisses is not enough to compel
us to accept the inference, but we must abide by our
acceptance of the premisses? And what is more,
if the premisses remain until the end what they
were when they were granted, there is every neces-
sity for us to abide by our acceptance of them, and
to allow the conclusion that has been drawn from
them; . . . for from our point of view and to our way
of thinking this inference does not now result from
the premisses, since we have withdrawn from our
previous assent to the premisses. It is necessary,
therefore, to enquire into premisses of this kind and
into such change and equivocal modification of them,
whereby, at the very moment the question is put,
or the answer made, or the deduction drawn, or at
some other similar stage in the argument, the pre-
misses take on modified meanings and give occasion

inconsistent with the premisses.” Schenk] indicates a
lacuna.

55

21

22

23

25

26

28

29

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

πτώσεις ἀφορμὴν παρέχει τοῖς ἀνοήτοις τοῦ
ταράσσεσθαι μὴ βλέπουσι τὸ ἀκόλουθον. τίνος
ἕνεκα; ἵν᾿ ἐν τῷ τόπῳ τούτῳ μὴ παρὰ τὸ
καθῆκον μηδ᾽ εἰκῇ μηδὲ συγκεχυμένως ἀνα-
στρεφώμεθα.
al τὸ αὐτὸ ἐπί τε τῶν ὑποθέσεων καὶ τῶν
ὑποθετικῶν λόγων. ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ ἔστιν ὅτ᾽
αἰτῆσαί τινα ὑπόθεσιν ὥσπερ ἐπιβάθραν τῷ ἑξῆς
λόγῳ. πᾶσαν οὖν τὴν δοθεῖσαν παραχωρητέον
ἢ οὐ πᾶσαν; καὶ εἰ οὐ πᾶσαν, τίνα ; 1 πα-
ραχωρήσαντι δὲ ᾿μενετέον εἰς ἅπαν ἐπὶ τῆς
τηρήσεως ἢ ἔστιν ὅτε ἀποστατέον, τὰ δ᾽ ἀκόλουθα
προσδεκτέον καὶ τὰ μαχόμενα οὐ προσδεκτέον ;---
Ναί.---Αλλὰ λέγει τις ὅτε “ ποιήσω σε δυνατοῦ
δεξάμενον ὑπόθεσιν ἐπ᾽’ ἀδύνατον ἀπαχθῆναι."
πρὸς τοῦτον οὐ συγκαθήσει ὁ φρόνιμος, ἀλλὰ
φεύξεται ἐξέτασιν καὶ κοινολογίαν ; καὶ τίς ἔτι
ἄλλος ἐστὶ λόγῳ χρηστικὸς καὶ δεινὸς ἐρωτήσει
καὶ ἀποκρίσει καὶ νὴ Δία ἀνεξαπάτητός τε καὶ
ἀσόφιστος; ἀλλὰ συγκαθήσει μέν, οὐκ ἐπι-
στραφήσεται δὲ τοῦ μὴ εἰκῇ καὶ ὡς ἔτυχεν
ἀναστρέφεσθαι ἐν λόγῳ; καὶ πῶς ἔτι ἔσται
τοιοῦτος οἷον αὐτὸν ἐπινοοῦμεν ; ἀλλ᾽ ἄνευ τινὸς
τοιαύτης γυμνασίας καὶ παρασκευῆς φυλάττειν
οἷός τ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ ἑξῆς ; τοῦτο δεικνύτωσαν καὶ
παρέλκει τὰ θεωρήματα ταῦτα πάντα, ἄτοπα
ἦν καὶ ἀνακόλουθα τῇ προλήψει τοῦ σπου-
δαίου. ;
Τί ἔτι ἀργοὶ καὶ ῥάθυμοι καὶ νωθροί ἐσμεν

‘

1 The words περὶ τίνος 4 σκέψις; wept καθήκοντος at this
point were deleted by Wolf.

56

πος τ le δ i en ὦ Ἤν.

Ὡ ee

BOOK I. vu. 20-30

to the unthinking to be disconcerted, if they do not
see what follows in consequence. Why is it neces-
sary? In order that in this matter we may not
behave unsuitably, nor at haphazard, nor confusedly.

And the same holds true of hypotheses and hypo-
thetical arguments. For it is necessary at times to
postulate some hypothesis as a sort of stepping-stone

τ for the subsequent argument. Are we, therefore, to

grant any and every hypothesis that is proposed, or
not every one? And if not every one, what one?
And when a man has granted an hypothesis, must he
abide for ever by it and maintain it, or are there
times when he should abandon it and accept only
the consequences which follow from it without accept-
ing those which are opposed to it?—Yes.—But some-
one says, “If you once admit an hypothesis that
involves a possibility, I will compel you to be drawn
on to an impossibility.” Shall the prudent man
refuse to engage with this person, and avoid enquiry
and discussion with him? Yet who but the pru-
dent is capable of using argument and skilful in
question and answer, and, by Zeus, proof against
deceit and sophistic fallacies? But shall he argue,
indeed, and then not take pains to avoid conducting
himself recklessly and at haphazard in argument?
And if he does not, how will he any longer be the
sort of man we think he is? But without some such
exercise and preparation in formal reasoning, how
will he be able to maintain the continuity of the
argument? Let them show that he will be able,
and all these speculations become mere superfluity ;
they were absurd and inconsistent with our =e
conception of the good man,

Why are we still indolent and easy-going and

VOL. 1. D 57

31

32

33

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

, a Ψ aA > /
καὶ προφάσεις ξητοῦμεν, καθ᾽ ἃς οὐ πονήσομεν
᾽ , a
οὐδ᾽ ἀγρυπνήσομεν ἐξεργαζόμενοι τὸν αὑτῶν
, ” nr
λόγον ;— Av οὖν ἐν τούτοις πλανηθῶ, μή τι
/
τὸν πατέρα, ἀπέκτεινα ; "τ Ανδράποδον, ποῦ γὰρ
ἐνθάδε πατὴρ ἦν, ἵν᾽ αὐτὸν ἀποκτείνῃς ; τί οὖν
ἐποίησας ; ὃ μόνον ἣν κατὰ τὸν τόπον ἁμάρτημα,
τοῦτο ἡμάρτηκας. ἐπεί ToL τοῦτ᾽ αὐτὸ καὶ ἐγὼ
«ς ,ὔ “ > lal / Ὁ Ν
Ῥούφῳ εἶπον ἐπιτιμῶντί μοι ὅτι τὸ παραλει-
πόμενον ἕν ἐν συλλογισμῷ τινι οὐχ εὕρισκον.
“Οὐχ οἷον μέν," φημί, “ εἰ3 τὸ Καπιτώλιον κατέ-
ε
καυσα," ὃ ὁ δ᾽ “᾿Ανδράποδον,᾽ ἔφη, “ἐνθάδε τὸ
, , / > ” n
παραλειπόμενον Καπιτώλιόν ἐστιν ἢ ταῦτα
μόνα ἁμαρτήματά ἐστι τὸ Καπιτώλιον ἐμπρῆσαι
καὶ τὸν πατέρα ἀποκτεῖναι, τὸ δ᾽ εἰκῇ καὶ μάτην
καὶ ὡς ἔτυχεν χρῆσθαι ταῖς φαντασίαις ταῖς
e a \ \ a , ,
αὑτοῦ Kal μὴ παρακολουθεῖν λόγῳ μηδ᾽ ἀποδείξει
\ , ᾽ ς an , - \ .
μηδὲ σοφίσματι μηδ᾽ ἁπλῶς βλέπειν τὸ καθ
αὑτὸν καὶ οὐ καθ᾽ αὑτὸν ἐν ἐρωτήσει καὶ ἀπο.
κρίσει, τούτων δ᾽ οὐδέν ἐστιν ἁμάρτημα ;

“ e ὃ / “ > ὃ Γι. >
η΄. Ὅτε ai δυνάμεις τοῖς ἀπαιδεύτοις οὐκ
ἀσφαλεῖς
Καθ᾿ ὅσους τρόπους μεταλαμβάνειν ἔστι τὰ
ἰσοδυναμοῦντα ἀλλήλοις, κατὰ τοσούτους καὶ
τὰ εἴδη τῶν ἐπιχειρημάτων τε καὶ ἐνθυμημάτων
Ἶ βρη Ἂ

2 ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐκποιεῖ μεταλαμβάνειν. οἷον φέρε

1 Salmasius: αὐτὸν 8, 2 Added by Blass.
3 Schenkl: κατεσκεύασα 8.

58

BOOK I. vn. 30~vu. 2

sluggish, seeking excuses whereby we may avoid
toiling or even late hours, as we try to perfect our
own reason ?—If, then, I err in these matters, I have
not murdered my own father, have 1?—Slave, pray
where was there in this case a father for you to
murder? What, then, have you done, you ask?
You have committed what was the only possible
error in the matter. Indeed this is the very remark
I made to Rufus when he censured me for not dis-
covering the one omission in a certain syllogism.
“Well,” said 1, “it isn’t as bad as if I had burned
down the Capitol.” But he answered, “Slave, the
omission here is the Uapitol.”” Or are there no other
errors than setting fire to the Capitol and murdering
one’s father? But to make a reckless and foolish
and haphazard use of the external impressions that
come to one, to fail to follow an argument, or demon-
stration, or sophism—in a word, to fail to see in
question and answer what is consistent with one’s
position or inconsistent—is none of these things an
error?
CHAPTER VIII

That the reasoning faculties, in the case of the
uneducated, are not free from error

In as many ways as it is possible to vary the mean-
ing of equivalent terms, in so many ways may a man
also vary the forms of his controversial arguments
and of his enthymemes?! in reasoning. Take this

1 An enthymeme is defined by Aristotle (het. 1. i. 11) as

“ἐᾷ rhetorical demonstration,” that is, an argument expressed
in ordinary literary style, not in the formal fashion of a

syllogism. It is thus called an ‘‘ incomplete syllogism” (ὃ 3

below), as falling short of the ‘definite proof” accorded by
the syllogism.

59

ΩΡ:

oO

a

~I

10

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον" εἰ ἐδανείσω καὶ μὴ ἀπέδωκας,
ὀφείλεις μοι τὸ ἀργύριον" οὐχὶ ἐδανείσω. μὲν καὶ
οὐκ ἀπέδωκας" οὐ μὴν ὀφείλεις μοι τὸ ἀργύριον.
καὶ τοῦτο οὐδενὶ μᾶλλον 1 βεο ἢ τῷ φιλοσόφῳ
ἐμπείρως ποιεῖν. εἴπερ Ὑ ρ ἀτελὴς συλλογισμός
ἐστι τὸ ἐνθύμημα, δῆλον ὅτι ὁ περὶ τὸν τέλειον
συλλογισμὸν γεγυμνασμένος οὗτος ἂν ἱκανὸς εἴη
καὶ περὶ τὸν ἀτελῆ οὐδὲν ἧττον.

Τί mor οὖν οὐ γυμνάξομεν αὑτούς τε καὶ
ἀλλήλους τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον ; ὅτι νῦν καίτοι μὴ
γυμναζόμενοι, περὶ ταῦτα μηδ᾽ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπιμελείας
τοῦ ἤθους ὑπό γε ἐμοῦ περισπώμενοι. ὅμως
οὐδὲν ἐπιδίδομεν εἰς καλοκἀγαθίαν. τί οὖν χρὴ
προσδοκᾶν, εἰ καὶ ταύτην τὴν ἀσχολίαν προσλά-
βοιμεν ; ; καὶ μάλισθ᾽, ὅτι οὐ μόνον ἀσ ολία τις
ἀπὸ τῶν ἀναγκαιοτέρων αὐτὴ προσγ our’ ἄν,
ἀλλὰ καὶ οἰήσεως ἀφορμὴ καὶ τύφου οὐχ ἡ
τυχοῦσα. μεγάλη γάρ ἐστι δύναμις ἡ emt
χειρητικὴ καὶ πιθανολογική, καὶ “μάλιστ᾽ εἰ τύ οι
γυμνασίας ἐπιπλέον καί τινα καὶ εὐπρέπειαν ἀπὸ
τῶν ὀνομάτων προσλάβοι. ὅτι καὶ ἐν τῷ καθόλου
πᾶσα δύναμις ἐπισφαλὴς τοῖς ἀπαιδεύτοις καὶ
ἀσθενέσι προσγενομένη πρὸς τὸ ἐπᾶραι καὶ
χαυνῶσαι ἐπ᾽ αὐτῇ. ποίᾳ γὰρ ἄν τις ἔτι μηχανῇ
πείσαι τὸν νέον τὸν ἐν τούτοις διαφέροντα, ὅτι
οὐ δεῖ προσθήκην αὐτὸν ἐκείνων γενέσθαι, ἀλλ᾽
ἐκεῖνα αὐτῷ προσθεῖναι ; οὐχὶ δὲ πάντας τοὺς
λόγους τούτους καταπατήσας ἐπηρμένος ἡμῖν καὶ
πεφυσημένος περιπατεῖ μηδ᾽ ἀνεχόμενος, ἄν τις
ἅπτηται" αὐτοῦ ὑπομιμνήσκων, τίνος ἀπολελειμ-
μένος ποῦ ἀποκέκλικεν ;

1 τι after ἅπτηται deleted in 5.
60

- iil: Gt ga

re πο

δ μἹ

νον ΣῪΝ

BOOK I. vim. 2-10

syllogism, for instance: If you have borrowed and have
not repaid, you owe me the money; now you have not
borrowed and have not repaid ; therefore you do not owe
me the money. And no man is better fitted to employ
such variations skilfully than the philosopher. For
if, indeed, the enthymeme is an incomplete syllogism,
it is clear that he who has been exercised in the
perfect syllogism would be no less competent to
deal with the imperfect also.

Why, then, do we neglect to exercise ourselves
and one another in this way? Because, even now,
without receiving exercise in these matters, or even
being, by me at least, diverted from the study of
morality, we nevertheless make no progress toward
the beautiful and the good. What, therefore, must
we expect, if we should take on this occupation
also? And especially since it would not merely be
an additional occupation to draw us away from those
which are more necessary, but would also be an
exceptional excuse for conceit and vanity. For great
is the power of argumentation and persuasive reason-
ing, and especially if it should enjoy excessive exercise
and receive likewise a certain additional ornament
from language. The reason is that, in general, every
faculty which is acquired by the uneducated and the
weak is dangerous for them, as being apt to make
them conceited and puffed up over it. For by what
device might one any longer persuade a young man
who excels in these faculties to make them an
appendage to himself instead of his becoming an
appendage to them? Does he not trample all these
reasons under foot, and strut about in our presence,
all conceited and puffed up, much less submitting if
any one by way of reproof reminds him of what he
lacks and wherein he has gone astray ?

61

ll

1

bo

13

14

15
16

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

,

Τί οὖν; Πλάτων φιλόσοφος οὐκ ἦν; Ἵππο-
κράτης γὰρ ἰατρὸς οὐκ ἦν; ἀλλ᾽ ὁρᾷς πῶς
/ ts / , ΚΙ : «ε , § [2
φράζει Ἱπποκράτης. μή τι οὖν Ἱπποκράτης οὕτω
φράζει, καθὸ ἰατρός ἐστιν ; τί οὖν μιγνύεις πρά-

Μ » \ n > [ον > vA

γματα ἄλλως ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀνθρώπων συνδρα-

, > \ \ 7 > La Μ
μόντα ; εἰ δὲ καλὸς ἣν Πλάτων καὶ ἰσχυρός, ἔδει
κἀμὲ καθήμενον ἐκπονεῖν, ἵνα καλὸς γένωμαι ἢ
7 a a
iva ἰσχυρός, ὡς τοῦτο ἀναγκαῖον πρὸς φιλο-
σοφίαν, ἐπεί τις φιλόσοφος ἅμα καὶ καλὸς ἣν καὶ
φιλόσοφος ; οὐ θέλεις αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ διακρῖναι

\ / ΝΣ ,ὔ , ᾿ς

κατὰ τί οἱ ἄνθρωποι γίνονται φιλόσοφοι καὶ τίνα
ἄλλως αὐτοῖς πάρεστιν ; ἄγε εἰ δ᾽ ἐγὼ φιλόσοφος
ἤμην, ἔδει ὑμᾶς καὶ χωλοὺς γενέσθαι; τί οὖν ;
αἴρω" τὰς δυνάμεις ταύτας ; μὴ γένοιτο' οὐδὲ
γὰρ τὴν ὁρατικήν. ὅμως δ᾽, ἄν μου πυνθάνῃ τί
? > Ἂ ow te ΄ > Ψ ΝΜ
ἐστιν ἀγαθὸν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, οὐκ ἔχω σοι ἄλλο
εἰπεῖν ἢ ὅτι ποιὰ προαίρεσις.

θ΄. ἸΠῶς ἀπὸ τοῦ συγγενεῖς ἡμᾶς εἶναι τῷ θεῷ
> , ΝΜ 2% \ then
ἐπέλθοι ἄν τις ἐπὶ τὰ ἑξῆς ;
Ei ταῦτά ἐστιν ἀληθῆ τὰ περὶ τῆς συγγενείας
τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ ἀνθρώπων λεγόμενα ὑπὸ τῶν φιλο-
͵ , ΜΝ > , “ > , A
σόφων, τί ἄλλο ἀπολείπεται τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἢ
τὸ τοῦ Σωκράτους, μηδέποτε πρὸς τὸν πυθόμενον
, ᾽ > a oe ; a Δ ,
ποδαπός ἐστιν εἰπεῖν ὅτι ᾿Αθηναῖος ἢ Κορίνθιος,
ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι κόσμιος ; διὰ τί ve λέγεις ᾿Αθηναῖον
1 Schenkl: ἐρῶ S.

2 φαντασιῶν after προαίρεσις deleted by Schenkl.
62

“αν

ΣΝ ΜΒ ΔΝ es «ἐδ

BOOK I. vii. 11-1x. 2

What then? Was not Platoa philosopher? Yes,
and was not Hippocrates a physician? But you see
how eloquently Hippocrates expresses himself. Does
Hippocrates, then, express himself so eloquently by
virtue of his being a physician? Why, then, do you
confuse things that for no particular reason have
been combined in the same man? Now if Plato was
handsome and strong, ought I to sit down and strive
to become handsome, or become strong, on the
assumption that this is necessary for philosophy,
because a certain philosopher was at the same time
both handsome and a philosopher? Are you not
willing to observe and distinguish just what that is
by virtue of which men become philosophers, and
what qualities pertain to them for no particular
reason? Come now, if I were a philosopher, ought
you to become lame like me? What then? Am I
depriving you of these faculties? Far be it from
me! No more than I am depriving you of the faculty
of sight. Yet, if you enquire of me what is man’s
good, 1 can give you no other answer than that it
is a kind of moral purpose.

CHAPTER IX

How from the thesis that we are akin to God may a man
proceed to the consequences ?

Ir what is said by the philosophers regarding the
kinship of God and men be true, what other course
remains for men but that which Socrates took when
asked to what country he belonged, never to say
“T am an Athenian,” or “I am a Corinthian,” but
“T am a citizen of the universe”? For why do you

63

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

εἶναι σεαυτόν, οὐχὶ δ᾽ ἐξ ἐ ἐκείνης μόνον τῆς γωνίας,
3 els ἣν ἐρρίφη γεννηθέν σου τὸ σωμάτιον ; ἢ δῆλον
ὅτι ἀπὸ τοῦ κυριωτέρου καὶ περιέχοντος ¢ οὐ μόνον
αὐτὴν ἐκείνην τὴν γωνίαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅλην σου
τὴν οἰκίαν καὶ ἁπλῶς ὅθεν σου τὸ γένος τῶν
προγόνων εἰς σὲ κατέλήλυθεν ἐντεῦθέν ποθεν
4 καλεῖς σεαυτὸν ᾿Αθηναῖον καὶ Κορίνθιον ; ὁ τοίνυν
τῇ διοικήσει. τοῦ κόσμου πἀρηκολ ον θη ΩΝ καὶ
μεμαθηκώς, ὅ ὅτι “ τὸ μέγιστον καὶ κυριώτατον καὶ
περιεκτικώτατον πάντων τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ σύστημα
τὸ ἐξ ἀνθρώπων͵ καὶ θεοῦ, ἀπ᾽ ἐκείνου δὲ τὰ
σπέρματα καταπέπτωκεν οὐκ εἰς τὸν πατέρα τὸν
ἐμὸν μόνον οὐδ᾽ εἰς τὸν πάππον, ἀλλ᾽ εἰς ἅπαντα
μὲν τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς γεννώμενά τε καὶ φυόμενα, προ-
5 ηγουμένως δ᾽ εἰς τὰ λογικά, ὅτι κοινωνεῖν μόνον
ταῦτα πέφυκεν τῷ θεῷ τῆς Cun ΦΆΒΕΨΗΝΙ κατὰ
6 τὸν λόγον ἐπιπεπλεγμένα," διὰ τί μὴ εἴπη " αὑτὸν
κόσμιον ; διὰ τί μὴ υἱὸν τοῦ θεοῦ ; διὰ τί δὲ
φοβηθήσεταί TL τῶν γιγνομένων ἐν ἀνθρώποις ; :
7 ἀλλὰ πρὸς μὲν τὸν Καίσαρα ἡ συγγένεια ἢ ἄλλον
τινὰ τῶν μέγα δυναμένων ἐν Ῥώμῃ ἱ ἱκανὴ παρ-
έχειν ἐν ἀσφαλείᾳ διάγοντας καὶ ἀκαταφρονήτους
καὶ δεδοικότας μηδ᾽ ὁτιοῦν, τὸ δὲ τὸν θεὸν ποιητὴν
ἔχειν καὶ πατέρα καὶ κηδεμόνα οὐκέτι ἡμᾶς ἐξαι-
8 ρήσεται λυπῶν καὶ φόβων ;---Καὶ πόθεν φάγω,

1 Added by Schenkl.
2 ris after εἴπῃ deleted by von Wilamowitz.

1 The terms ‘‘ Athenian,” ‘‘ Corinthian,” etc. *» characterize
citizens of a country, not merely of a , locality, t.e., citizens of
Attica or Corinthia. The ‘‘corner” in which one was born

64

ee a Δι. on

BOOK I. 1x. 2-8

say that you are an Athenian, instead of mentioning

that corner into which your paltry body was
cast at birth? Or is it clear you take the place
which has a higher degree of authority and compre-
hends not merely that corner of yours, but also your
family and, in a word, the source from which your
race has come, your ancestors down to yourself, and
from some such entity call yourself “ Athenian,” or
“Corinthian”?! Well, then, anyone who has atten-
tively studied the administration of the universe and
has learned that “ the greatest and most authoritative
and most comprehensive of all governments is this
one, which is composed of men and God,? and that
from Him have descended the seeds of being, not
merely to my father or to my grandfather, but to
all things that are begotten and that grow upon
earth, and chiefly to rational beings, seeing that by
nature it is theirs alone to have communion in the
society of God, being intertwined with him through
the reason,’’—why should not such a man call himself
a citizen of the universe? Why should he not call him-
self a son of God? And why shall he fear anything
that happens among men? What! Shall kinship
with Caesar or any other of them that have great
power at Rome be sufficient to enable men to live
securely, proof against contempt, and in fear of
nothing whatsoever, but to have God as our maker,
and father, and guardian,—shall this not suffice to
deliver us from griefs and fears?—-And wherewithal
might have been Marathon, Rhamnus, Lechaeum, Tenea, or
the like.

3 This seems to be a quotation from Poseidonius (Diogenes
Laertius, aes 138), Pat sis ascribed ἜΣΤΗΝ pees oie
in general and especia rysippus (see Die i
Beas 464, 20 and 465. 15, Seeepating SOF = μὰ

65

©

10

Il

12

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

eget ec μηδὲν & ἔχων ;—Kal πῶς οἱ δοῦλοι, πῶς οἱ
ραπέταε, τίνι πεποιθότες ἐ ἐκεῖνοι ἀπαλλάττονται
τῶν δεσποτῶν ; ; τοῖς ἀγροῖς ἢ τοῖς οἰκέταις ἢ τοῖς
ἀργυρώμασιν ; οὐδενί, ἀλλ᾽ ἑαυτοῖς" καὶ ὅ ὅμως οὐκ
ἐπιλείπουσιν αὐτοὺς τροφαί. τὸν δὲ φιλόσοφον
ἡμῖν δεήσει ἄλλοις θαρροῦντα καὶ ἐπαναπαυόμενον
ἀποδημεῖν καὶ μὴ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι αὐτὸν αὑτοῦ καὶ
τῶν θηρίων. τῶν ἀλόγων εἶναι “χείρονα καὶ δειλό-
τερον, ὧν ἕκαστον αὐτὸ αὑτῷ ἀρκούμενον οὔτε
τροφῆς ἀπορεῖ τῆς οἰκείας οὔτε διεξαγωγῆς τῆς
καταλλήλου καὶ κατὰ φύσιν ;

᾿Εγὼ μὲν οἶμαι, ὅτι ἔδει καθῆσθαι τὸν πρεσ-
βύτερον ἐνταῦθα οὐ τοῦτο μηχανώμενον, ὅπως
μὴ ταπεινοφρονήσητε μηδὲ ταπεινοὺς μηδ᾽ “ἀγεν-
νεῖς τινας διαλογισμοὺς διαλογιεῖσθε αὐτοὶ περὶ
ἑαυτῶν, ἀλλὰ μή, ἄν: τίνες ἐμπίπτωσιν τοιοῦτοι
νέοι, ἐπιγνόντες τὴν πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς συγγένειαν
καὶ ὅτι δεσμά τινα ταῦτα προσηρτήμεθα τὸ σῶμα
καὶ τὴν κτῆσιν αὐτοῦ καὶ ὅσα τούτων ἕνεκα
ἀναγκαῖα ἡμῖν γίνεται εἰς οἰκονομίαν καὶ ἀνα-
στροφὴν τὴν ἐν τῷ βίῳ, ὡς βάρη τινὰ καὶ ἀνιαρὰ
καὶ ἄχρηστα ἀπορρῖψαι θέλωσιν καὶ ἀπελθεῖν
πρὸς τοὺς συγγενεῖς. καὶ τοῦτον ἔδει τὸν ἀγῶνα
ἀγωνίξεσθαι τὸν διδάσκαλον ὑ ὑμῶν καὶ παιδευτήν,
εἴ τις ἄρα ἦν" ὑμᾶς μὲν ἔρχεσθαι λέγοντας
“᾿Επίκτητε, οὐκέτι ἀνεχόμεθα μετὰ τοῦ σωματίου

1 Added by Elter.

* Referring to himself.
3 There is less need of his urging them to regard them-
selves as sons of God than of preventing them, if they are

66

a Mma i ai ia Ne ie i et

BOOK I. rm. 8-12

shall I be fed, asks one, if 1 have nothing >—And
how of slaves, how of runaways, on what do they
rely when they leave their masters? On their lands,
their slaves, or their vessels of silver? No, on
nothing but themselves; and nevertheless food does
not fail them. And shall it be necessary for our
philosopher, forsooth, when he goes abroad, to depend
upon others for his assurance and his refreshment,
instead of taking care of himself, and to be more
vile and craven than the irrational animals, every
one of which is sufficient to himself, and Jacks neither
its own proper food nor that way of life which is
appropriate to it and in harmony with nature?

As for me, I think that the elder man? ought not
to be sitting here devising how to keep you from
thinking too meanly of yourselves or from taking in
your debates a mean or ignoble position regarding
yourselves ;? he should rather be striving to prevent
there being among you any young men of such a
sort that, when once they have realized their
kinship to the gods and that we have these fetters
as it were fastened upon us,—the body and its
possessions, and whatever things on their account
are necessary to us for the management of life, and
our tarrying therein,—they may desire to throw
aside all these things as burdensome and vexatious
and unprofitable and depart to their kindred. And
this is the struggle in which your teacher and
trainer, if he really amounted to anything, ought to
be engaged ; you, for your part, would come to him
saying: “ Epictetus, we can no longer endure to be

convinced of this, from acting as if the life of the body were
a thing to throw aside, and so committing suicide,—a
practice which was defended by many Stoics.

67

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14

15

17

18
19

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ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

τούτου δεδεμένοι καὶ τοῦτο τρέφοντες καὶ ποτί-
ἕοντες καὶ ἀναπαύοντες καὶ καθαίροντες, εἶτα δι᾽
αὐτὸ συμπεριφερόμενοι τοῖσδε καὶ τοῖσδε. οὐκ
ἀδιάφορα ταῦτα καὶ οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς; καὶ ὁ
θάνατος οὐ κακόν ; καὶ συγγενεῖς τινες τοῦ θεοῦ
ἐσμεν κἀκεῖθεν ἐληλύθαμεν ; ; ἄφες ἡμᾶς ἀπελθεῖν
ὅθεν ἐληλύθαμεν, ἄφες λυθῆναί ποτε τῶν δεσμῶν
τούτων τῶν ἐξηρτημένων καὶ βαρούντων. ἐνταῦθα
λῃσταὶ καὶ κλέπται καὶ δικαστήρια καὶ οἱ καλού-
μενοι τύραννοι δοκοῦντες ἔχειν τινὰ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν
ἐξουσίαν διὰ τὸ σωμάτιον καὶ τὰ τούτου κτήματα.
ἄφες δείξωμεν αὐτοῖς, ὅτι οὐδενὸς ἔχουσιν ἐξου-
σίαν" ἐμὲ δ᾽ ἐνταῦθα " λέγειν. ὅτι “ ἄνθρωποι,
ἐκδέξασθε τὸν θεόν. ὅταν ἐκεῖνος σημήνῃ καὶ
ἀπολύσῃ ὑμᾶς ταύτης τῆς ὑπηρεσίας, τότ᾽ ἀπο-
λύεσθε πρὸς αὐτόν" ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ παρόντος ἀνά-
σχεσθε ἐνοικοῦντες ταύτην τὴν χώραν, εἰς, ἣν
ἐκεῖνος ὑμᾶς ἔταξεν. ὀλίγος ἄρα χρόνος οὗτος
ὁ τῆς οἰκήσεως καὶ ῥᾷδιος τοῖς οὕτω διακειμένοις.
ποῖος γὰρ ἔτι τύραννος ἢ ποῖος κλέπτης ἢ ποῖα
δικαστήρια φοβερὰ τοῖς οὕτως παρ᾽ οὐδὲν πε-
ποιημένοις τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὰ τούτου κτήματα;
μείνατε, μὴ ἀλογίστως ἀπέλθητε."

Τοιοῦτόν τι ἔδει γίνεσθαι παρὰ τοῦ παιδευτοῦ
πρὸς τοὺς εὐφυεῖς τῶν νέων. νῦν δὲ τί γίνεται ; F
νεκρὸς μὲν ὁ παιδευτής, νεκροὶ δ᾽ ὑμεῖς. ὅταν
χορτασθῆτε σήμερον, κάθησθε κλάοντες περὶ τῆς
αὔριον, πόθεν φάγητε. ἀνδράποδον, ἂν σχῆς,
ἕξεις" ἂν μὴ σχῇς, ἐξελεύσῃ: ἤνοικται ἡ θύρα.
τί πενθεῖς; ποῦ ἔτι τόπος δακρύοις ; τίς ἔτι

1 Reiske: κακὸς 8.
2 Capps: ἐν τῶι 8.
68

———————— π

BOOK I. rx. 12-20

imprisoned with this paltry body, giving it food and
drink, and resting and cleansing it, and, to crown
all, being on its account brought into contact with
these people and those. Are not these things
indifferent—indeed, nothing—to us? And is not
death no evil? And are we not in a manner akin
to God, and have we not come from Him? Suffer
us to go back whence we came; suffer us to be
freed at last from these fetters that are fastened to
us and weigh us down. Here are despoilers and
thieves, and courts of law, and those who are called
tyrants; they think that they have some power over
us because of the paltry body and its possessions.
Suffer us to show them that they have power over
no one.” And thereupon it were my part to say:
“Men, wait upon God. When He shall give the
signal and set you free from this service, then shall
you depart to Him; but for the present endure to
abide in this place, where He has stationed you.
Short indeed is this time of your abiding here, and
easy to bear for men of your convictions. For what
tyrant, or what thief, or what courts of law are any
longer formidable to those who have thus set at
naught the body and its possessions? Stay, nor be
so unrational as to depart.”

Some such instruction should be given by the
teacher to the youth of good natural parts. But
what happens now? A corpse is your teacher and
corpses are you. As soon as you have fed your fill
to-day, you sit lamenting about the morrow, where-
withal you shall be fed. Slave, if you get it, you
will have it; if you do not get it, you will depart;
the door stands open. Why grieve? Where is
there yet room for tears? What occasion longer

69

21

22

23

24

25
26

27

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

κολακείας ἀφορμή; διὰ τί ἄλλος ἄλλῳ φθονήσει;
διὰ τί πολλὰ κεκτημένους θαυμάσει ἢ τοὺς ἐν
δυνάμει “τεταγμένους, μάλιστ᾽ ἂν καὶ ἰσχυροὶ
ὦσιν καὶ ὀργίλοι ; ; "τί γὰρ ἡμῖν ποιήσουσιν ;
δύνανται ποιῆσαι, τούτων οὐκ ἐπιστρεψόμεθα:
ὧν ἡμῖν “μέλει, ταῦτα οὐ δύνανται. τίς οὖν ἔτι
ἄρξει τοῦ οὕτως διακειμένου ; j

Πῶς “Σωκράτης εἶχεν πρὸς ταῦτα; πῶς γὰρ
ἄλλως ἢ ὡς ἔδει τὸν πεπεισμένον. ὅτι ἐστὶ τῶν
θεῶν συγγενής ; ; “Ἂν μοι λέγητε," φησίν, " “νῦν
ὅτι ᾿ἀφίεμέν σε ἐπὶ τούτοις, ὅπως μηκέτι διαλέξῃ
τούτους τοὺς λόγους οὺς μέχρι νῦν διελέγου

μηδὲ παρενοχλήσεις ἡμῶν τοῖς νέοις μηδὲ τοῖς

γέρουσιν, ἀποκρινοῦμαι ὅτι γελοῖοί, ἐστε, οἵτινες
ἀξιοῦτε, εἰ μέν με ὁ στρατηγὸς ὁ ὑμέτερος ἔταξεν
εἴς τινα τάξιν, ὅτι ἔδει pe τηρεῖν αὐτὴν καὶ
φυλάττειν καὶ μυριάκις “πρότερον αἱρεῖσθαι
ἀποθνήσκειν ἢ ἐγκαταλιπεῖν αὐτήν, εἰ δ᾽ ὁ θεὸς
ἔν τινι χώρᾳ καὶ ἀναστροφῇ κατατέταχεν, ταύτην
δ᾽ ἐγκαταλιπεῖν δεῖ ἡ ἡμᾶς. τοῦτ᾽ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος
ταῖς ἀληθείαις συγγενὴς τῶν θεῶν. ἡμεῖς οὖν
ὡς κοιλίαι, ὡς ἔντερα, ὡς αἰδοῖα, οὕτω περὶ
αὑτῶν διανοούμεθα, ὅτι φοβούμεθα, ὅτι ἐπιθυ-
μοῦμεν: τοὺς εἰς ταῦτα συνεργεῖν δυναμένους
κολακεύομεν, τοὺς αὐτοὺς τούτους δεδοίκαμεν.
"Eye τις ἠξίωκεν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ γράψαι εἰς τὴν
Ρώμην ὡς ἐδόκει τοῖς πολλοῖς ἠτυχηκὼς καὶ
πρότερον μὲν ἐπιφανὴς ὧν καὶ πλούσιος, ὕστερον
ἐκπεπτωκὼς ἁπάντων καὶ διάγων ἐνταῦθα.

1 A very free paraphrase of Plato, Apology, 29 c and 28 Ε.
2 At Nicopolis.

7°

oes “πὰ νων

BOOK I. rx. 20-27

for flattery? Why shall one man envy another?
Why shall he admire those who have great posses-
sions, or those who are stationed in places of power,
especially if they be both strong and prone to anger?
For what will they do tous? As for what they have
power to do, we shall pay no heed thereto; as for
the things we care about, over them they have no
power. Who, then, will ever again be ruler over the
man who is thus disposed?

How did Socrates feel with regard to these matters?
Why, how else than as that man ought to feel who
has been convinced that he is akin to the gods?
“If you tell me now,” says he, “‘ We will acquit
you on these conditions, namely, that you will no
longer engage in these discussions which you have
conducted hitherto, nor trouble either the young or
the old among us,’ I will answer, ‘You make your-
selves ridiculous by thinking that, if your general
had stationed me at any post, I ought to hold and
maintain it and choose rather to die ten thousand
times than to desert it, but if God has stationed us
in some place and in some manner of life we ought
to desert ἐμαὶ. 1 This is what it means for a man
to be in very truth a kinsman of the gods. We,
however, think of ourselves as though we were mere
bellies, entrails, and genitals, just because we have
fear, because we have appetite, and we flatter those
who have power to help us in these matters, and these
same men we fear.

A certain man asked me to write to Rome in his
behalf. Now he had met with what most men
account misfortune: though he had formerly been
eminent and wealthy, he had afterwards lost every-
thing and was living μετα. And I wrote in humble

71

28

29

30

31

32

33

34

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

κἀγὼ ἔγραψα ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ ταπεινῶς. ὁ δ᾽ ἀνα-
γνοὺς τὴν ἐπιστολὴν ἀπέδωκέν μοι αὐτὴν καὶ ἔφη
ὅτε “᾿Εγὼ βοηθηθῆναί τι ὑπὸ σοῦ ἤθελον, οὐχὶ
ἐλεηθῆναι" κακὸν δέ μοι οὐθέν ἐστιν." οὕτως
καὶ “Ῥοῦφος πειράξων μ᾽ ᾿ εἰώθει λέγειν “Συμβήσε-
ταί σοι τοῦτο καὶ τοῦτο ὑπὸ τοῦ δεσπότου."
κἀμοῦ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀποκριναμένου ὅτι “᾿Ανθρώ-
mwa, “Ti οὖν ; ἔτι ἐκεῖνον παρακαλῶ παρὰ σοῦ
ταὐτὰ λαβεῖν δυνάμενος ; ἃ: τῷ γὰρ ὄντι, ὃ ἐξ
αὑτοῦ τις ἔχει, περισσὸς καὶ μάταιος map ἄλλου
λαμβάνων. ἐγὼ οὖν ἔχων ἐξ ἐ ἐμαυτοῦ λαβεῖν τὸ
μεγαλόψυχον καὶ γενναῖον, ἀγρὸν παρὰ σοῦ λάβω
καὶ ἀργύριον ἢ ἀρχήν τινα; μὴ γένοιτο. οὐχ
οὕτως ἀναίσθητος ἔσομαι τῶν ἐμῶν κτημάτων.
ἀλλ᾽ ὅταν. τις ἦ δειλὸς καὶ ταπεινός, ὑ ὑπὲρ τούτου
τί ἄλλο uv] ἀνάγκη γράφειν ἐπιστολὰς ὡς ὑπὲρ
νεκροῦ " τὸ πτῶμα ἡμῖν χάρισαι τοῦ δεῖνος καὶ
ξέστην αἱματίου᾽ ; τῷ γὰρ ὄντι πτῶμα ὁ τοιοῦτός
ἐστι καὶ ξέστης αἰμαρέδεη πλέον δ᾽ οὐδέν. εἰ δ᾽
ἣν πλέον τι, noOaver ἄν, ὅτι ἄλλος δι᾽ ἄλλον
οὐ δυστυχεῖ.

ι΄. Πρὸς τοὺς περὶ τὰς ἐν Ρώμῃ προαγωγὰς
ἐσπουδακότας

Εἰ οὕτως σφοδρῶς συνετετάμεθα περὶ τὸ ἔργον
τὸ ἑαυτῶν ὡς οἱ ἐν Ῥώμῃ γέροντες περὶ ἃ

1 Schweighiuser: αὐτὰ S.

1 In his youth Epictetus had been a slave.
2 The thought seems to be: If the punishment can be

72

tt ee ek Se ee ων

7

ae

BOOK L. 1x. 27-x. 1

terms in his behalf. But when he had read the
letter he handed it back to me, and said, “I wanted
your help, not your pity; my plight is not an evil
one.” So likewise Rufus was wont to say, to test
me, “ Your master! is going to do such-and-such a
thing to you.” And when I would say in answer.
«’Tis but the lot of man,” he would reply. “ What
then? Am I to go on and petition him, when I can
get the same result from you?”? For, in fact, it
is foolish and superfluous to try to obtain from
another that which one can get from oneself. Since,
therefore, I am able to get greatness of soul and
nobility of character from myself, am I to get a
farm, and money, or some office, from you? Far
from it! 1 will not be so unaware of what I myself
possess. But when a man is cowardly and abject,
what else can one possibly do but write letters in
his behalf as we do in behalf of a corpse: “ Please
to grant us the carcase of so-and-so and a pint of
paltry blood?’’ For really, such a person is buat
a carcase and a pint of paltry blood, and nothing
more. But if he were anything more he would per-
ceive that one man is not unfortunate because of
another.

CHAPTER X

To those who have set their hearts on preferment
at Rome

Ir we philosophers had applied ourselves to our
own work as zealously as the old men at Rome
humanly borne, I need not petition your master to remit
it, for you have within yourself the power to endure it.

5 As when a friend might ask for the body of an executed
criminal.

73

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

ἐσπουδάκασιν, τάχα av τε ἠνύομεν καὶ αὐτοί.
οἶδα ἐγὼ πρεσβύτερον ἄνθρωπον ἐμοῦ τὸν νῦν
» rn
ἐπὶ τοῦ σίτου ὄντα ἐν Ῥώμῃ, ὅτε ταύτῃ παρῆγεν
> \ a a > /
ἀπὸ τῆς φυγῆς ἀναστρέφων, ola εἶπέν μοι,
κατατρέχων τοῦ προτέρου ἑαυτοῦ βίου καὶ
περὶ τῶν ἑξῆς ἐπαγγελλόμενος, ὅτε ἄλλο οὐδὲν
ἀναβὰς σπουδάσει ἢ ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ καὶ ἀταραξίᾳ
δάσει ἢ ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ ραξίᾳ
“ Ν a f ΄
διεξαγαγεῖν τὸ λοιπὸν τοῦ βίου! “ Πόσον γὰρ
Μ > Ν > \ Ν ld ἐν» ’ ἂν a - 4 > fol
ἔτι ἐστὶν ἐμοὶ τὸ λοιπόν ;"---Κ ἀγὼ ἔλεγον αὐτῷ
ὅτι “Οὐ ποιήσεις, GAN ὀσφρανθεὶς μόνον τῆς
«ε La e , 4 > 7 » »
“Ῥώμης ἁπάντων τούτων ἐπιλήσῃ." ἂν δὲ καὶ εἰς
αὐλὴν πάροδός τις δίδωται, ὅτι χαίρων καὶ
a θ a > a ” «εὟ , ef 4»
τῷ θεῷ εὐχαριστῶν ὥὦσεται.--““Ἂν pw εὕρῃς,
” ες , \ , > \ ὅπ \
ἔφη, “᾿Επίκτητε, τὸν ἕτερον πόδα εἰς τὴν αὐλὴν
τιθέντα, ὃ βούλει ὑπολάμβανε." νῦν οὖν τί
> , \ > a > \ € ’ 2 /
ἐποίησεν; πρὶν ἐλθεῖν εἰς τὴν “Ῥώμην, ἀπήντη-
> n \ / , ς \ ‘
σαν αὐτῷ παρὰ Καίσαρος πινακίδες" ὁ δὲ λαβὼν
/ > / > / \ \ a > € Rd
πάντων ἐκείνων ἐξελάθετο Kal λοιπὸν ἕν ἐξ ἑνὸς
ἐπισεσώρευκεν. ἤθελον αὐτὸν νῦν παραστὰς
ὑπομνῆσαι τῶν λόγων, ods ἔλεγεν παρερχόμενος,
καὶ εἰπεῖν ὅτι “ πόσῳ σοῦ ἐγὼ κομψότερος μάντις
εἰμί."

Τί οὖν; ἐγὼ λέγω, ὅτε ἄπρακτόν ἐστι τὸ
an \ / > \ \ δου. “Ὁ > ? \
ζῷον ; μὴ γένοιτο. ἀλλὰ διὰ τί ἡμεῖς οὐκ ἐσμὲν
πρακτικοί; εὐθὺς ἐγὼ πρῶτος, ὅταν ἡμέρα
γένηται, μικρὰ ὑπομιμνήσκομαι, τίνα ἐπανα-

74

—_—

BOOK I. x. 1-8

have applied themselves to the matters on which
they have set their hearts, perhaps we too should
be accomplishing something. I know a man older
than myself who is now in charge of the grain
supply? at Rome. When he passed this place on
his way back from exile, I recall what a tale he told as
he inveighed against his former life and announced
for the future that, when he had returned to Rome,
he would devote himself solely to spending the
remainder of his life in peace and quiet, “For how
little is yet left to me!’—And I told him, “You
will not do it, but when once you have caught no
more than a whiff of Rome you will forget all this.”
And if also admission to court should be granted, I
added that he would rejoice, thank God and push
his way in.—“‘If you find me, Epictetus,” said he,
“ putting so much as one foot inside the court, think
of me what you will.” Well, now, what did he do?
Before he reached Rome, letters from Caesar met
him; and as soon as he received them, he forgot
all those resolutions of his, and ever since he has
been piling up one property after another. I wish
I could stand by his side now and remind him of
the words that he uttered as he passed by here, and
remark, “How much more clever a prophet I am
than you!”

What then? Do I say ‘that man is an animal
made for inactivity?* Far be itfrom me! But how
can you say that we philosophers are not active
in affairs? For example, to take myself first: as
soon as day breaks I call to mind briefly what author

τ Praefectus annonae, a very important official during the
Empire.

? As opposed in the ‘ active’ lives of business or politics.

75

10

11

12

13

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

γνῶναί pe δεῖ. εἶτα εὐθὺς ἐμαυτῷ" “ τί δέ μοι
καὶ μέλει πῶς ὁ δεῖνα ἀναγνῷ ; πρῶτόν ἐστιν,
ἵνα ἐγὼ κοιμηθῶ." καίτοι τί ὅμοια τὰ ἐκεί-
νων πράγματα τοῖς ἡμετέροις ; ἂν ἐπιστῆτε,
τί ἐκεῖνοι ποιοῦσιν, αἰσθήσεσθε. τί γὰρ ἄλλο
ἢ ὅλην τὴν ἡμέραν Ψψηφίζουσιν, συζητοῦσι,
συμβουλεύουσι περὶ σιταρίον, περὶ ἀγριδίου,
περί τινων προκοπῶν τοιούτων ; ὅμοιον οὖν

> > ’ ΄ , , ,
ἐστιν ἐντευξίδιον παρά τινος λαβόντα ἀναγιγνώ-.

oKew ““παρακαλῶ σε ἐπιτρέψαι μοι σιτάριον
ἐξαγαγεῖν" ἢ “παρακαλῶ σε παρὰ Χρυσίππου
ἐπισκέψασθαι τίς ἐστιν ἡ τοῦ κόσμου διοίκησις
καὶ ποίαν τινὰ χώραν ἐν αὐτῷ ἔχει τὸ λογικὸν
ζῷον: ἐπίσκεψαι δὲ καὶ τίς εἶ σὺ καὶ ποῖόν τι
σοῦ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν; ταῦτα ἐκείνοις
ὅμοιά ἐστιν ; ἀλλ᾽ ὁμοίας σπουδῆς χρείαν ἔχοντα ;
ἀλλ᾽ ὡσαύτως ἀμελεῖν αἰσχρὸν τούτων κἀκείνων ;
τί οὖν ; ἡμεῖς μόνοι ῥᾳθυμοῦμεν καὶ νυστάζομεν ;
οὔ: ἀλλὰ πολὺ πρότερον ὑμεῖς οἱ νέοι. ἐπεί
τοι καὶ ἡμεῖς οἱ γέροντες, ὅταν παίζοντας ὁρῶμεν
νέους, συμπροθυμούμεθα καὶ αὐτοὶ συμπαίζειν.
πολὺ δὲ πλέον, εἰ ἑώρων διεγηγερμένους καὶ
συμπροθυμουμένους, προεθυμούμην ἂν συσπου-
δάζειν καὶ αὐτός.

1 The passage is somewhat obscure, because the precise
expression employed here occurs elsewhere only in Hnch. 49.
Apparently Epictetus read over, or made special preparation
upon a certain text, before meeting his pupils. In class then
he would havea pupil read and interpret an assignment, some-

76

BOOK I. x. 8-13

I must read overt Then forthwith I say to myself:
“And yet what difference does it really make to
me how so-and-so reads? The first thing is that
I get my sleep.” Even so, in what are the oecupa-
tions of those other men comparable to ours? If
you observe what they do, you will see. For what
else do they do but all day long cast up accounts,
dispute, consult about a bit of grain, a bit of land,
or similar matters of profit? Is it, then, much the
same thing to receive a little petition from someone
and read: “I beseech you to allow me to export a
small quantity of grain,” and this one: “I beseech
you to learn from Chrysippus what is the administra-
tion of the universe, and what place therein the
rational animal has; and consider also who you are,
and what is the nature of your good and evil”?
Is this like that? And does it demand the like
kind of study? And is it in the same way shame-
ful to neglect the one and the other? What
then? Is it we philosophers alone who take things
easily and drowse? No, it is you young men far
sooner. For, look you, we old men, when we see
young men playing, are eager to join in the play our-
selves. And much more, if I saw them wide-awake
and eager to share in our studies, should I be eager
to join, myself, in their serious pursuits.

what as in our ‘‘recitation,” and follow that by a readin
and exposition of his own (ἐπαναγνῶναι), which was intend
to set everything straight and put on the finishing touches.
See Schweighauser’s note and especially Ivo Bruns, De Schola
Epicieti (1897), 8f. By changing μέ to μοί, as Capps suggests,
@ satisfactory sense is secured, i.c., ‘‘ what pupil must read
to me,” but the ἐπί in the compound verb would thus be
left without any particular meaning, and perhaps it is not
necessary to emend.

77

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

ta’. Περὶ φιλοστοργίας

1 ᾿Αφικομένου δέ τινος πρὸς αὐτὸν τῶν ἐν τέλει
πυθόμενος παρ᾽ αὐτοῦ τὰ ἐπὶ μέρους ἠρώτησεν,
2 εἰ καὶ τέκνα εἴη αὐτῷ καὶ γυνή. τοῦ δ᾽ ὁμο-
λογήσαντος προσεπύθετο' Ilas τι οὖν χρῇ τῷ
>
mpaypats; —'AOPXiws, ἔφη.---Καὶ ὅς: Τίνα
8 τρόπον; οὐ γὰρ δὴ τούτου γ᾽ ἕνεκα γαμοῦσιν
Μ \ fal “ Μ -
ἄνθρωποι καὶ παιδοποιοῦνται, ὅπως ἄθλιοι ὦσιν,
4 ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὅπως εὐδαίμονες.---Αλλ᾽ ἐγώ, ἔφη,
iA > / ΝΜ \ \ ΄ Ὁ ,
οὕτως ἀθλίως ἔχω περὶ τὰ παιδάρια, ὥστε πρῴην
νοδοῦντός μου τοῦ θυγατρίου καὶ δόξαντος
κινδυνεύειν οὐχ ὑπέμεινα οὐδὲ παρεῖναι αὐτῷ
νοσοῦντι, φυγὼν δ᾽ ὠχόμην, μέχρις οὗ προσήγ-
/ 7 ΝΜ n = bd a
γειλέ τις μοι OTL ἔχει Karta@s.—Ti οὖν ; ὀρθῶς
δ φαίνει σαυτῷ ταῦτα πεποιηκέναι ;---Φυυσικῶς,
ἔφη.---Αλλὰ μὴν τοῦτό με πεῖσον, ἔφη, σύ, διότι
φυσικῶς, καὶ ἐγώ σε πείσω, ὅτι πᾶν τὸ κατὰ
6 φύσιν γινόμενον ὀρθῶς γίνεται.---οῦτο, ἔφη,
πάντες ἢ οἵ γε πλεῖστοι πατέρες πάσχομεν .---
Οὐδ᾽ ἐγώ σοι ἀντιλέγω, ἔφη, ὅτι οὐ γίνεται, τὸ
δ᾽ ἀμφισβητούμενον ἡμῖν ἐκεῖνό ἐστιν, εἰ ὀρθῶς.
> \ ᾽ὔ ry 4 \ \ 7 a /
7 ἐπεὶ τούτου γ᾽ ἕνεκα καὶ τὰ φύματα δεῖ λέγειν
ἐπ᾿ ἀγαθῷ γίνεσθαι τοῦ σώματος, ὅτι γίνεται,

ee

nee a \ ς ΄ > N 4 “
καὶ ἁπλῶς τὸ ἁμαρτάνειν εἶναι κατὰ φύσιν, ὅτι

Ϊ»Ξ νων ee μμνα ννννν νιν

΄ Ἁ a [2 - ig /
πάντες σχεδὸν ἢ οἵ ye πλεῖστοι ἁμαρτάνομεν.

—

78

BOOK I. xt. 1-7

CHAPTER XI
Of family affection

Wuen an official came to see him, Epictetus, after
making some special enquiries about other matters,
asked him if he had children and a wife, and when
the other replied that he had, Epictetus asked the
further question, What, then, is your experience
with marriage?—Wretched, he said—To which
Epictetus, How so? For men do not marry and beget
children just for this surely, to be wretched, but
rather to be happy.—And yet, as for me, the other
replied, I feel so wretched about the little children,
that recently when my little daughter was sick and
was thought to be in danger, I could not bear even
to stay by her sick bed, but I up and ran away,
until someone brought me word that she was well
again.—What then, do you feel that you were acting
right in doing this?—I was acting naturally, he
said.—But really, you must first convince me of this,
that you were acting naturally, said he, and then
I will convince you that whatever is done in accord-
ance with nature is rightly done.—This is the way,
said the man, all, or at least most, of us fathers
feel.—And I do not contradict you either, answered
Epictetus, and say that it is not done, but the point
at issue between us is the other, whether it is rightly
done. For by your style of reasoning we should
have to say of tumours also that they are produced
for the good of the body, just because they occur, and
in brief, that to err is in accordance with nature, just
because prattically all of us, or at least most of us,
do err. Do you show me, therefore, how your

79

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

8 δεῖξον οὖν μοι σύ, πῶς κατὰ φύσιν ἐστίν.---Οὐ

δύναμαι, ἔφη: ἀλλὰ σύ μοι μᾶλλον δεῖξον, πῶς

9 οὐκ ἔστι κατὰ φύσιν οὐδ᾽ ὀρθῶς γίνεται.--- αἱ

10

ll

12

13

14

15

ds: ᾿Αλλ᾽ εἰ ἐζητοῦμεν, ἔφη, περὶ λευκῶν καὶ
μελάνων, ποῖον ἂν κριτήριον παρεκαλοῦμεν πρὸς
διάγνωσιν αὐτῶν;--- Τὴν ὅρασιν, ἔφη.----Τἰ δ᾽ εἰ
περὶ θερμῶν καὶ ψυχρῶν καὶ σκληρῶν καὶ μαλα-

κῶν, ποῖόν τι ;--- ὴν ἁφήν.---Οὐκοῦν, ἐπειδὴ περὶ

τῶν κατὰ φύσιν καὶ τῶν ὀρθῶς ἢ οὐκ ὀρθῶς γινο-
μένων ἀμφισβητοῦμεν, ποῖον θέλεις κριτήριον
παραλάβωμεν ; --- Οὐκ οἶδ᾽, ἔφη.---Καὶ μὴν τὸ

μὲν τῶν χρωμάτων καὶ ὀσμῶν, ἔτε δὲ χυλῶν

͵ὔ > lad Ν > / \
κριτήριον ἀγνοεῖν τυχὸν οὐ μεγάλη ζημία, τὸ
δὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν κακῶν καὶ τῶν κατὰ
φύσιν καὶ παρὰ φύσιν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ δοκεῖ σοι
μικρὰ ζημία εἶναι τῷ ἀγνοοῦντι ;—H μεγίστη
μὲν οὖν.-- Φέρε εἰπέ μοι, πάντα ἃ δοκεῖ τισιν
εἶναι καλὰ καὶ προσήκοντα, ὀρθῶς δοκεῖ; καὶ
νῦν ᾿Ιουδαίοις καὶ Σύροις καὶ Αἰγυπτίοις καὶ
Ῥωμαίοις οἷόν τε πάντα τὰ δοκοῦντα περὶ
τροφῆς ὀρθῶς δοκεῖν ;—Kal πῶς οἷόν τε ;---Αλλ᾽
3 a > , > 3 0 y > \ 1 Ag if
οἶμαι πᾶσα ἀνάγκη, εἰ ὀρθά ἐστι Ta’ Αἰγυπτίων,
Ν ? \ . nr ΝΜ > n ΝΜ ‘
μὴ ὀρθὰ εἶναι τὰ TOV ἄλλων, εἰ καλῶς ἔχει TA
Ιουδαίων, μὴ καλῶς ἔχειν τὰ τῶν ἄλλων.---Πῶς
\ LA “ δ᾽ ” > bal \ > θί ‘
yap ov ;—Orrov δ᾽ ἄγνοια, ἐκεῖ καὶ ἀμαθία Kai
ἡ περὶ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα ἀπαιδευσία.---Συνεχώρει.---
Σὺ οὖν, ἔφη, τούτων αἰσθόμενος οὐδὲν ἄλλο τοῦ

1 Added by Schweighauser.

ee

"τ ὦ.) ὦ “ὠὰ απ» ὍΝ τὰ

BOOK 1. xr. 7-15

conduct is in accordance with nature.—I cannot,
said the man; but do you rather show me how it is
not in accordance with nature, and not rightly done.
And Epictetus said: Well, if we were enquiring
about white and black objects, what sort of criterion
should we summon in order to distinguish between
them?—The sight, said the man.—And if about
hot and cold, and hard and soft objects, what
criterion?—The touch.—Very well, then, since we
are disputing about things which are in accordance
with nature and things which are rightly or not
rightly done, what criterion would you have us
take ?—I do not know, he said.—And yet, though
it is, perhaps, no great harm for one not to know
the criterion of colours and odours, and so, too, of
flavours, still do you think that it is a slight harm
for a man to be ignorant of the criterion of good
and evil things, and of those in accordance with
nature and those contrary to nature?—On the con-
trary, it is the very greatest harm. Come, tell me,
are all the things that certain persons regard as
good and fitting, rightly so regarded? And is it
possible at this present time that all the opinions
which Jews, and Syrians, and Egyptians and Romans
hold on the subject of food are rightly held >And
how can it be possible ?—But, I fancy, it is absolutely
necessary, if the views of the Egyptians are right,
that those of the others are not right; if those of
the Jews are well founded, that those of the others
are not.—Yes, certainly—Now where there is
ignorance, there is also lack of knowledge and the
lack of instruction in matters which are indispens-
able.—He agreed.—You, then, said he, now that
you perceive this, will henceforth study no other

81

16
17

18

19

20

21

22

23

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

λοιποῦ σπουδάσεις οὐδὲ πρὸς ἄλλῳ τινὶ THY
γνώμην ἕξεις ἢ ὅπως τὸ κριτήριον τῶν κατὰ
φύσιν καταμαθὼν τούτῳ προσχρώμενος διακρινεῖς
τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους ἕκαστον.
"Eri δὲ τοῦ παρόντος τὰ τοσαῦτα ἔχω σοὶ
πρὸς ὃ βούλει βοηθῆσαι. τὸ φιλόστοργον δοκεῖ
σοι κατὰ φύσιν τ᾽ εἶναι καὶ καλόν ;---Πῶς yap
οὔ ;---Τ δέ; τὸ μὲν φιλόστοργον κατὰ φύσιν τ᾽
ἐστὶ καὶ καλόν, τὸ δ᾽ εὐλόγιστον οὐ καλόν ;---
Οὐδαμῶς.---Μὴ τοίνυν μάχην ἔχει τῷ φιλο-
στόργῳ τὸ εὐλόγιστον ;---Οὐ δοκεῖ μοι.---Εἰ δὲ
μή, τῶν μαχομένων ἀνάγκη θατέρου κατὰ φύσιν
ὄντος θάτερον εἶναι παρὰ φύσιν ; ἢ γὰρ οὔ ;—
Οὕτως, ἔ η---Οὐκοῦν ὅ τι ἂν εὑρίσκωμεν ὁμοῦ
μὲν φιλόστοργον ὁμοῦ δ᾽ εὐλόγιστον, τοῦτο
θαρροῦντες ἀποφαινόμεθα ὀρθόν τε εἶναι καὶ
καλόν ;--ἰ ἔστω, ἔφη.--- Τί οὖν ; ἀφεῖναι νοσοῦν
τὸ παιδίον καὶ ἀφέντα ἀπελθεῖν ὅτι μὲν οὐκ
εὐλόγιστον οὐκ οἶμαί σ᾽ ἀντερεῖν. ὑπολείπεται δ᾽
ἡμᾶς σκοπεῖν εἰ φιλόστοργον.--- Σκοπῶμεν δή.---
ἾΑρ᾽ οὖν σὺ μὲν ἐπειδὴ φιλοστόργως διέκεισο πρὸς
τὸ παιδίον, ὀρθῶς ἐποίεις φεύγων καὶ ἀπολείπων
αὐτό; ἡ μήτηρ δ᾽ οὐ φιλοστοργεῖ τὸ παιδίον ;—
Φιλοστοργεῖ μὲν οὖν.--Οὐκοῦν ἔδει καὶ τὴν
/ > o > \ x > Μ > ” 7
μητέρα ἀφεῖναι αὐτὸ ἢ οὐκ ἔδει ;---Οὐκ &der.—Ti
δ᾽ ἡ τιτθή ; στέργει αὐτό ;---Στέργει, ἔφη.---Εδει
οὖν κἀκείνην ἀφεῖναι αὐτὸ ;---Οὐδαμῶς..---Τ δ᾽ ὁ
παιδαγωγός ; οὐ στέργει αὐτό ;--Στέργει.---" ἔδει

1 The course of thought is, ‘‘ You will have to do much
studying before you have mastered this subject; but for the
present,” etc. :

82

BOOK I. x1. 15-23

subject and will give heed to no other matter than

the problem of how, when you have learned the

criterion of what is in accordance with nature, you

shall apply that criterion and thus determine each
ial case.

But for the present! I can give you the following
assistance toward the attainment of what you desire.
Does family affection seem to you to be in accord-
ance with nature and good ?—Of course——What
then? Is it possible that, while family affection is
in accordance with nature and good, that which is
reasonable is not good ?—By no means.—That which
is reasonable is not, therefore, incompatible with
family affection?—It is not, I think.—Otherwise,
when two things are incompatible and one of them
is in accordance with nature, the other must be
contrary to nature, must it not >—Even so, said he.—
Whatever, therefore, we find to be at the same time
both affectionate and reasonable, this we confidently
assert to be both right and good?—Granted, said
he.—What then? I suppose you will not deny that
going away and leaving one’s child when it is sick is
at least not reasonable. But we have yet to consider
whether it is affectionate.—Yes, let us consider
that.—Were you, then, since you were affectionately
disposed to your child, doing right when you ran
away and left her? And has the mother no affection
for her child ?—On the contrary, she has affection.—
Ought then the mother also to have left her child,
or ought she not?—She ought not.—What of the
nurse? Does she love her child?—She does, he
said.— Ought, then, she also to have left her ?—By
no means.— What about the school attendant? Does
not he love the child >—He does.—Ought, then, he

83

24

25

26

27

28

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

οὖν κἀκεῖνον ἀφέντα ἀπελθεῖν, εἶθ᾽ οὕτως ἔρημον
καὶ ἀβοήθητον ἀπολειφθῆναι τὸ παιδίον διὰ τὴν

- πολλὴν φιλοστοργίαν τῶν γονέων ὑμῶν καὶ τῶν

περὶ αὐτὸ ἢ ἐν ταῖς χερσὶν τῶν οὔτε στεργόντων
οὔτε κηδομένων ἀποθανεῖν ;---Μὴ γένοιτο.---Καὶ
μὴν ἐκεῖνό γε ἄνισον καὶ ἄγνωμον, 6 τις αὑτῷ 1
προσῆκον οἴεται διὰ τὸ φιλόστοργος εἶναι, τοῦτο

τοῖς ὁμοίως φιλοστοργοῦσιν μὴ ἐφιέναι;---

“Atotrov.—Aye, σὺ δ᾽ ἂν νοσῶν ἠβούλου φιλο-
στόργους οὕτως ἔχειν τοὺς προσήκοντας τούς
τ᾽ ἄλλους καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ τέκνα καὶ τὴν γυναῖκα,
ὥστ᾽ ἀφεθῆναι μόνος ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν καὶ ἔρημος ;—
Οὐδαμῶς.---Εὔξαιο δ᾽ ἂν οὕτως στερχθῆναι ὑπὸ
τῶν σαυτοῦ, ὥστε διὰ τὴν ἄγαν αὐτῶν φιλο-
στοργίαν ἀεὶ μόνος ἀπολείπεσθαι ἐν ταῖς νόσοις,
ἢ τούτου γ᾽ ἕνεκα μᾶλλον ἂν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐχθρῶν,
εἰ δυνατὸν ἦν, φιλοστοργεῖσθαι ηὔχου, ὥστ᾽
ἀπολείπεσθαι ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν ; εἰ δὲ ταῦτα, ὑπολεί-
meTat μηδαμῶς ἔτι φιλόστοργον εἶναι τὸ πραχθέν.

Τί οὖν ; οὐδὲν ἦν τὸ κινῆσάν σε καὶ ἐξορμῆσαν
πρὸς τὸ ἀφεῖναι τὸ παιδίον; καὶ πῶς οἷόν τε;
ἀλλὰ τοιοῦτόν τι Hv,” οἷον καὶ ἐν Ῥώμῃ τινὰ
ἣν τὸ κινοῦν, ὥστ᾽ ἐγκαλύπτεσθαι τοῦ ἵππου
τρέχοντος ᾧ ὃ ἐσπουδάκει, εἶτα νικήσαντός ποτε
παραλόγως σπόγγων δεῆσαι αὐτῷ πρὸς τὸ
ἀναληφθῆναι λιποψυχοῦντα. τί οὖν τοῦτό ἐστιν;
τὸ μὲν ἀκριβὲς οὐ τοῦ παρόντος καιροῦ τυχόν:
ἐκεῖνο δ᾽ ἀπαρκεῖ πεισθῆναι, εἴπερ ὑγιές ἐστι τὸ
ὑπὸ τῶν φιλοσόφων λεγόμενον, ὅτι οὐκ ἔξω που

1 ὅτις ϑδ: αὑτῶι Sc: ὅτι σαντῶι S.

2 Bentley: ἄν S (ἦν or ἂν ἦν J. Β. Mayor).
3 Salmasius and Upton’s ‘ codex’: ὡς S.

A

BOOK I. x1. 23-28

as well to have gone away and left her, so that the
child would thus have been left alone and helpless
because of the great affection of you her parents and
of those in charge of her, or, perhaps, have died in
the arms of those who neither loved her nor cared for
her?—Far from it!—And yet is it not unfair and
unfeeling, when a man thinks certain conduct fitting
for himself because of his affection, that he should
not allow the same to others who have as much affec-
tion as he has ?>—That were absurd.—Come, if it had
been you who were sick, would you have wanted all
your relatives, your children and your wife included,
to show their affection in such a way that you would
be left all alone and deserted by them?—By no
means.—And would you pray to be so loved by your
own that, because of their excessive affection, you
would always be left alone in sickness? Or would you,
so far as this is concerned, have prayed to be loved
by your enemies rather, if that were possible, so as to
be left alone by them? And if this is what you
would have prayed for, the only conclusion left us is
that your conduct was, in the end, not an act of
affection at all.

What, then; was the motive nothing at all which
actuated you and induced you to leave your child?
And how can that be? But it was a motive like
that which impelled a certain man in Rome to cover
his head when the horse which he backed was
running,—and then, when it won unexpectedly, they
had to apply sponges to him to revive him from his
faint! What motive, then, is this? The scientific
explanation, perhaps, is not in place now ; but it is
enough for us to be convinced that, if what the
philosophers say is sound, we ought not to look

85

29

30

91

32

33

34

35

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

val a /
δεῖ ζητεῖν αὐτό, GAN ἕν καὶ ταὐτόν ἐστιν ἐπὶ
πάντων τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ ποιεῖν τι ἡμᾶς ἢ μὴ ποιεῖν,
τοῦ λέγειν τινὰ ἢ μὴ λέγειν, τοῦ ἐπαίρεσθαι ἢ
συστέλλεσθαι ἢ φεύγειν τινὰ ἢ διώκειν, τοῦθ᾽
ὅπερ καὶ νῦν ἐμοί τε καὶ σοὶ γέγονεν αἴτιον, σοὶ
μὲν τοῦ ἐλθεῖν πρὸς ἐμὲ καὶ «αθῆσθαι νῦν

᾿ a
ἀκούοντα, ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦ λέγειν ταῦτα. τί δ᾽ ἐστὶ
τοῦτο; apa γε ἄλλο ἢ ὅτι ἔδοξεν ἡμῖν ;---
a Υ͂
Οὐδέν.---Εἰὐ δ᾽ ἄλλως ἡμῖν ἐφάνη, τί ἂν ἄλλο ἢ
τὸ δόξαν ἐπράττομεν ; οὐκοῦν καὶ τῷ ᾿Αχιλλεῖ

fol ΝΜ lal a > e a ,
τοῦτο αἴτιον τοῦ πενθεῖν, οὐχ ὁ τοῦ Πατρόκλου

/ ” / > / rn rn
θάνατος (ἄλλος yap τις οὐ πάσχει ταῦτα τοῦ
ἑταίρου ἀποθανόντος), ἅλλ᾽ ὅτι ἔδοξεν αὐτῷ. καὶ

\ , 7 -“ Si Ὁ. ὦ ΝΜ / \
σοὶ τότε φεύγειν τοῦτο αὐτὸ ὅτι ἔδοξέν σοι" Kal

΄ > / μὴ Μ , \ a >
πάλιν, ἐὰν μείνῃς, ὅτε ἔδοξέν σοι. καὶ viv ἐν
“Ῥώμῃ avépyn, ὅτι δοκεῖ σοι" κἂν μεταδόξῃ, οὐκ
ἂν ἀπελεύσῃ. καὶ ἁπλῶς οὔτε θάνατος οὔτε

Ν » / » Ψ lal ’
φυγὴ οὔτε πόνος οὔτε ἄλλο TL τῶν τοιούτων
-“ ‘ cr
αἴτιόν ἐστι TOU πράττειν TL ἢ μὴ πράττειν ἡμᾶς,
ἀλλ᾽ ὑπολήψεις καὶ δόγματα.

Τοῦτό σε πείθω ἢ οὐχί ;---Πείθεις, ἔφη.---Οἷα
δὴ τὰ αἴτια ἐφ᾽ ἑκάστου, τοιαῦτα καὶ τὰ ἀποτε-
λούμενα. οὐκοῦν ὅταν μὴ ὀρθῶς τι πράττωμεν,
ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς ἡμέρας οὐδὲν ἄλλο αἰτιασόμεθα

ἢ τὸ δόγμα, ἀφ᾽ οὗ αὐτὸ ἐπράξαμεν, κἀκεῖνο

BOOK I. χι. 28-35

for the motive anywhere outside of ourselves, but
that in all cases it is one and the same thing that
is the cause of our doing a thing or of our not
doing it, of our saying things, or of our not saying
them, of our being elated, or of our being cast down,
of our avoiding things, or of our pursuing them—the
very thing, indeed, which has even now become a
cause of my action and of yours; yours in coming to
me and sitting here now listening, mine in saying
these things. And what is that? Is it, indeed,
anything else than that we wanted to do this ?—
Nothing.—And supposing that we had wanted to do
something else, what else would we be doing than
that which we wanted to do? Surely, then, in the
ease of Achilles also, it was this that was the cause
of his grief—not the death of Patroclus (for other
men do not act this way when their comrades die),
but that he wanted to grieve. And in your case
the other day, the cause of your running away was
just that you wanted to do so; and another time, if
you stay with her, it will be because you wanted to
stay. And now you are going back to Rome,
because you want to do so, and if you change your
mind and want something else, you will not go.
And, in brief, it is neither death, nor exile, nor toil,
nor any such thing that is the cause of our doing, or
of our not doing, anything, but only our opinions and
the decisions of our will.

Do I convince you of this, or not >You convince
me, said he.—Of such sort, then, as are the causes
in each case, such likewise are the effects. Very
well, then, whenever we do anything wrongly, from
this day forth we shall ascribe to this action no other
cause than the decision of our will which led us to

87

36

38

39

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

ἐξαίρειν καὶ ἐκτέμνειν πειρασόμεθα μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ
φύματα καὶ τὰ ἀποστήματα ἐκ τοῦ σώματος.
ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τῶν ὀρθῶς πραττομένων ταὐτὸν
τοῦτο αἴτιον ἀποφανοῦμεν. καὶ οὔτ᾽ οἰκέτην ἔτι
αἰτιασόμεθα οὔτε γείτονα οὔτε γυναῖκα οὔτε τέκνα
ὡς αἴτιά. τινων κακῶν ἡμῖν γινόμενα πεπεισμένοι
ὅτι, ἂν μὴ ἡμῖν δόξῃ τοιαῦτά τινα εἶναι, οὐ πράττο-
μεν τὰ ἀκόλουθα' τοῦ δόξαι δὲ ἢ μὴ δόξαι, ἡμεῖς
κύριοι καὶ οὐ τὰ ἐκτός.---Οὕτως, ἔφη.---Απὸ τῆς
σήμερον τοίνυν ἡμέρας οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐπισκοπήσομεν
οὐδ᾽ ἐξετάσομεν, ποῖόν τι ἐστὶν ἢ πῶς ἔχει, οὔτε
τὸν ἀγρὸν οὔτε τὰ ἀνδράποδα οὔτε τοὺς ἵππους
ἢ κύνας, ἀλλὰ τὰ δόγματα.---Ἐὔχομαι, épn.—
Ὁρᾷς οὖν, ὅτι σχολαστικόν σε δεῖ γενέσθαι,
τοῦτο τὸ ζῷον οὗ πάντες καταγελῶσιν, εἴπερ
ἄρα θέλεις ἐπίσκεψιν. τῶν σαυτοῦ δογμάτων
ποιεῖσθαι. τοῦτο δ᾽ ὅτι μιᾶς ὥρας ἢ ἡμέρας οὐκ
ἔστιν, ἐπινοεῖς καὶ αὐτός.

ιβ΄. Περὶ εὐαρεστήσεως

Περὶ θεῶν οἱ μέν τινές εἰσιν οἱ λέγοντες μηδ᾽
“ \ a « ᾽ “ / 3 \ ‘
εἶναι τὸ θεῖον, οἱ δ᾽ εἶναι μέν, ἀργὸν δὲ καὶ
ἀμελὲς καὶ μὴ προνοεῖν μηδενός" τρίτοι δ᾽ οἱ καὶ
εἶναι καὶ προνοεῖν, ἀλλὰ τῶν μεγάλων καὶ
cal fo) / /
οὐρανίων, τῶν δὲ ἐπὶ γῆς μηδενός" τέταρτοι δ᾽

1 As, for example, good, or pleasant.
2 So Epicurus ; see Usener, Epicurea, frg. 368.

88

---τ-

BOOK I. xr. 35-xn. 2

do it, and we shall endeavour to destroy and excise
that cause more earnestly than we try to destroy
and excise from the body its tumours and abscesses
And in the same way we shall declare the same thing
to be the cause of our good actions. And we shall
no longer blame either slave, or neighbour, or wife,
or children, as being the causes of any evils to us,
since we are persuaded that, unless we decide that
things are thus-and-so,1 we do not perform the corre-
sponding actions ; and of our decision, for or against
something, we ourselves, and not things outside of
ourselves, are the masters.—Even so, he said.—From
this very day, therefore, the thing whose nature or
condition we shall investigate and examine will be
neither our farm, nor our slaves, nor our horses, nor
our dogs, but only the decisions of our will.—I hope
so, he said._You see, then, that it is necessary for you
to become a frequenter of the schools,—that animal
at which all men laugh,—if you really desire to make
an examination of the decisions of your own will.
And that this is not the work of a single hour or day
you know as well as I do.

CHAPTER XII
Of contentment

Concernine gods there are some who say that the
divine does not so much as exist ; and others, that it
exists, indeed, but is inactive and indifferent, and
takes forethought for nothing; and a third set,
that it exists and takes forethought, though only
for great and heavenly things and in no case for
terrestrial things; and a fourth set, that it also takes

VOL. 1. E 89

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

οἱ; καὶ τῶν ἐπὶ γῆς καὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων, εἰς
κοινὸν δὲ μόνον καὶ οὐχὶ δὲ καὶ κατ᾽ ἰδίαν
ε / ͵ > e ν , ‘ ᾿
ἑκάστου" πέμπτοι δ᾽, ὧν ἐν καὶ ᾿Οδυσσεὺς καὶ
Σωκράτης, οἱ λέγοντες ὅτι

i)

ovdé ce AHOw
κινύμενος. ;

4 Πολὺ πρότερον οὖν ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι περὶ

ἑκάστου τούτων ἐπεσκέφθαι, πότερα ὑγιῶς ἢ
5 οὐχ ὑγιῶς λεγόμενόν ἐστιν. εἰ γὰρ μὴ εἰσὶν
θεοί, πῶς ἐστι τέλος ἕπεσθαι θεοῖς ; εἰ δ᾽ εἰσὶν
μέν, μηδενὸς δ᾽ ἐπιμελούμενοι, καὶ οὕτως πῶς
ὑγιὲς ἔσται ; ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ ὄντων καὶ ἐπιμέλο-
μένων εἰ μηδεμία διάδοσις εἰς ἀνθρώπους ἐστὶν
ἐξ αὐτῶν καὶ νὴ Δία γε καὶ εἰς ἐμέ, πῶς ἔτι
καὶ οὕτως ὑγιές ἐστιν; πάντα οὖν ταῦτα ὁ
καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς ἐπεσκεμμένος τὴν αὑτοῦ
γνώμην ὑποτέταχεν τῷ διοικοῦντι τὰ ὅλα
καθάπερ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ πολῖται τῷ νόμῳ τῆς.
πόλεως. ὁ δὲ παιδευόμενος ταύτην ὀφείλει τὴν
ἐπιβοχὴν ἔχων ἐλθεῖν ἐπὶ τὸ παιδεύεσθαι, “πῶς
ἂν ἑποίμην ἐγὼ ἐν παντὶ τοῖς θεοῖς καὶ πῶς ἂν
εὐαρεστοίην τῇ θείᾳ διοικήσει καὶ πῶς ἂν γε-
νοίμην ἐλεύθερος ;” ἐλεύθερος γάρ ἐστιν, ᾧ γίνεται
πάντα κατὰ προαίρεσιν καὶ ὃν οὐδεὶς δύναται
ι0 κωλῦσαι. τί οὖν ; ἀπόνοιά ἐστιν ἡ ἐλευθερία ;

μὴ γένοιτο. μανία γὰρ καὶ ἐλευθερία εἰς ταὐτὸν
ll οὐκ ἔρχεται. “ ἀλλ᾽ ἐγὼ θέλω πᾶν τὸ δοκοῦν μοι
12 ἀποβαίνειν, κἂν ὁπωσοῦν δοκῇ." μαινόμενος εἶ,

παραφρονεῖς. οὐκ οἶδας, ὅτι καλόν τι ἐλευθερία

for)

.1

ου

c

1 Schenk]: δὲ S, of Stobaeus.
go

'T BOOK I. χη. 2-12

forethought for things terrestrial and the affairs of
men, but only in a general way, and not for the
individual in particular; and a fifth set, to which
Odysseus and Socrates belonged, who say.

Nor when I move am I concealed from thee.+

_ We must, therefore, first of all enquire about each
of these statements, to see whether it is sound or
not sound. For if gods do not exist, how can it be
an end to follow the gods? And if they exist,
indeed, but care for nothing, how even thus will
that conclusion be sound? But if, indeed, they
both exist and exercise care, yet there is no com-
munication from them to men,—yes, and, by Zeus,
to me personally,—how even in this case can our
conclusion still be sound? The good and excellent.
man must, therefore, inquire into all these things,
before he subordinates his own will to him who ad-
ministers the universe, precisely as good citizens
submit to the law of the state. And he that is
being instructed ought to come to his instruction
with this aim, “ How may I follow the gods in every-
thing, and how may I be acceptable to the divine
administration, and how may I become free?”
Since he is free for whom all things happen accord-
ing to his moral purpose, and whom none can
restrain. What then? Is freedom insanity? Far
from it; for madness and freedom are not con-
sistent with one another. “ But I would have that
which seems best to me happen in every case, no
matter how it comes to seem so.’ You are mad;
you are beside yourself. Do you not know that

τ 1 Homer, Iliad, Χ. 279f.; compare Xenophon, Memorabilia,
1, 19.

gt

ARRIAN’S, DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

ἐστὶ καὶ ἀξιόλογον ; τὸ δ᾽ ὡς ἔτυχέν με βούλε-
σθαι τὰϊ ὡς ἔτυχεν δόξαντα γίνεσθαι, τοῦτο

4 > f > “ / 3 \
κινδυνεύει οὐ μόνον οὐκ εἶναι καλόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ
πάντων αἴσχιστον εἶναι. πῶς γὰρ ἐπὶ γραμμα-

13 τικῶν ποιοῦμεν; βούλομαι γράφειν ὡς θέλω

14

τὸ Δίωνος ὄνομα ; οὔ" ἀλλὰ διδάσκομαι θέλειν,
ὡς δεῖ γράφεσθαι. τί ἐπὶ μουσικῶν ; ὡσαύτως.
τί ἐν τῷ καθόλου, ὅπου τέχνη τις ἢ ἐπιστήμη
ἐστίν ; εἰ δὲ μή, οὐδενὸς ἦν ἄξιον τὸ ἐπίστασθαί
τι, εἰ ταῖς ἑκάστων βουλήσεσι προσηρμόζξετο.

15 ἐνταῦθα οὖν μόνον ἐπὶ τοῦ μεγίστου καὶ

κυριωτάτου, τῆς ἐλευθερίας, ὡς ἔτυχεν ἐφεῖταί
μοι θέλειν ; οὐδαμῶς, ἀλλὰ τὸ παιδεύεσθαι τοῦτ᾽
ἔστι μανθάνειν ἕκαστα οὕτω θέλειν ὡς γίνεται.
πῶς δὲ γίνεται; ὡς διέταξεν αὐτὰ ὁ διατάσσων.

16 διέταξε δὲ θέρος εἶναι καὶ χειμῶνα καὶ φορὰν καὶ
χειμῶ ρ

17

18

19

ἀφορίαν καὶ ἀρετὴν καὶ κακίαν καὶ πάσας τὰς
τοιαύτας ἐναντιότητας ὑπὲρ συμφωνίας τῶν ὅλων
ἡμῶν θ᾽ ἑκάστῳ σῶμα καὶ μέρη τοῦ σώματος καὶ
κτῆσιν καὶ κοινωνοὺς ἔδωκεν. [πη a
Ταύτης οὖν τῆς διατάξεως μεμνημένους ἔρ-
χεσθαι δεῖ ἐπὶ τὸ παιδεύεσθαι, οὐχ ἵν᾿ ἀλλά-
ξωμεν τὰς ὑποθέσεις (οὔτε γὰρ δίδοται ἡμῖν οὔτ᾽
ἄμεινον), ἀλλ᾽ ἵνα οὕτως ἐχόντων τῶν περὶ ἡμᾶς
ὡς ἔχει καὶ πέφυκεν αὐτοὶ τὴν γνώμην τὴν
αὑτῶν συνηρμοσμένην τοῖς γινομένοις ἔχωμεν.
τί γάρ; ἐνδέχεται φυγεῖν ἀνθρώπους ; καὶ πῶς
οἷόν τε; ἀλλὰ συνόντας αὐτοῖς ἐκείνους ἀλλάξαι;
καὶ τίς ἡμῖν δίδωσιν ; τί οὖν ἀπολείπεται ἢ τίς

1 Schweighiuser: τὰ δ᾽ S,

92

BOOK I. xu. 12-19

freedom is a noble and precious thing? But for me
to desire at haphazard that those things should
happen which have at haphazard seemed best to
me, is dangerously near being, not merely not noble,
but even in the highest degree shameful. For how
do we act in writing? Do I desire to write the
name “ Dio”’ as I choose? No, but I am taught to
desire to write it as it ought to be written. What
do we do in music? The same. And what in
general, where there is any art or science? The
same; otherwise knowledge of anything would be
useless, if it were accommodated to every individual's
whims. Is it, then, only in this matter of freedom,
the greatest and indeed the highest of all, that I
am permitted to desire at haphazard? By no means,
but instruction consists precisely in learning to desire
each thing exactly as it happens. And how do they
happen? As he that ordains them has ordained.
And he has ordained that there be summer and
winter, and abundance and dearth, and virtue and
vice, and all such opposites, for the harmony of
the whole, and he has given each of us a body,
and members of the body, and property and
companions.

Mindful, therefore, of this ordaining we should go
to receive instruction, not in order to change the con-
stitution of things,—for this is neither vouchsafed
us nor is it better that it should be,—but in order
that, things about us being as they are and as their
nature is, we may, for our own part, keep our wills
in harmony with what happens. For, look you, can
we escape from men? And howis it possible? But
can we, if they associate with us, change them ?
And who vouchsafes us that power? What alterna-

93

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

εὑρίσκεται μηχανὴ πρὸς τὴν χρῆσιν αὐτῶν;
τοιαύτη, δι᾿ ἧς ἐ ἐκεῖνοι μὲν ποιήσουσι τὰ φαινό-
μενα αὐτοῖς, ἡμεῖς δ᾽ οὐδὲν ἧττον κατὰ φύσιν
ἕξομεν. σὺ δ᾽ ἀταλαίπωρος εἶ καὶ δυσάρεστος
κἂν μὲν μόνος ἧς, ἐρημίαν καλεῖς τοῦτο, ἂν δὲ
μετὰ ἀνθρώπων, ἐπιβούλους λέγεις καὶ λῃστάς,
μέμφῃ δὲ καὶ γονεῖς τοὺς σεαυτοῦ καὶ τέκνα καὶ
ἀδελφοὺς καὶ γείτονας. ἔδει δὲ μόνον μένοντα
ἡσυχίαν καλεῖν αὐτὸ καὶ ἐλευθερίαν καὶ ὅμοιον
τοῖς θεοῖς ἡγεῖσθαι αὑτόν, μετὰ πολλῶν δ᾽ ὄντα
μὴ ὄχλον. καλεῖν μηδὲ θόρυβον μηδ᾽ ἀηδίαν, ἀλλ᾽
ἑορτὴν καὶ πανήγυριν καὶ οὕτως πάντα εὐαρέστως
δέχεσθαι.

Τίς οὖν ἡ κόλασις τοῖς οὐ προσδεχομένοις ; ;
τὸ οὕτως ἔχειν. ὡς ἔχουσιν. δυσαρεστεῖ τις τῷ
μόνος εἶναι ; ἔστω ἐν ἐρημίᾳ. δυσαρεστεῖ τις
τοῖς γονεῦσιν ; ἔστω κακὸς υἱὸς καὶ “πενθείτω.
δυσαρεστεῖ τοῖς τέκνοις ; ἔστω κακὸς πατήρ.
“βάλε αὐτὸν εἰς φυλακήν." ποίαν φυλακήν ;
ὅπου νῦν ἐστιν. ἄκων γάρ ἐστιν" ὅπου δέ τις
ἄκων ἐστίν, ἐκεῖνο φυλακὴ αὐτῷ ἐστιν. καθὸ
καὶ Σωκράτης οὐκ ἣν ἐν φυλακῇ, ἑκὼν γὰρ
ἣν. “σκέλος οὖν μοι γενέσθαι πεπηρωμένον."
ἀνδράποδον, εἶτα δι’ ἕν σκελύδριον τῷ κόσμῳ
ἐγκαλεῖς ; οὐκ ἐπιδώσεις αὐτὸ τοῖς ὅλοις ; οὐκ
ἀποστήσῃ; οὐ χαίρων παραχωρήσεις τῷ δε-
δωκότι ; ἀγανακτήσεις δὲ καὶ δυσαρεστήσεις τοῖς
ὑπὸ τοῦ Διὸς διατεταγμένοις, ἃ ἐκεῖνος μετὰ τῶν
Μοιρῶν παρουσῶν καὶ ἐπικλωθουσῶν σου τὴν
γένεσιν ὥρισεν καὶ διέταξεν ; οὐκ οἶσθα, ἡλίκον

94°

—————

ae

Βα τ

δὼ

Ts BOOK I. xu. ‘19-26

tive remains, then, or what method can we find for
living with them? Some such method as that, while
they will act as seems best to them, we shall none the
less be in a state comformable to nature. But you
are impatient.and peevish, and if you are alone, you
call it a solitude, but if you are in the company of
men, you call them schemers and brigands, and you
find fault even with your own parents and children
and brothers and neighbours. But you ought, when
staying alone, to call that peace and freedom, and
to look upon yourself as like the gods; and when
you are in the company of many, you ought not call
that a mob, nor a tumult, nor a disgusting thing,
but a feast and a festival, and so accept all things
contentedly.

What, then, is the punishment of those who do
not accept? Tobe just as they are. Is one peevish
because he is alone? Let him be in solitude! Is
he peevish with his parents? Let him be an evil
son and grieve! Is he peevish with his children?
Let him be a bad father! “Throw him into prison.”
What sort of prison? Where he now is. For he is
there against his will, and where a man is against his
will, that for him is a prison. Just as Socrates was
not in prison, for he was there willingly. “ Alas,
that I should be lame in my leg!” Slave, do you,
then, because of one paltry leg blame the universe ?
Will you not make a free gift of it to the whole?
Will you not relinquish it? Will you not gladly
yield it to the giver? And will you be angry and
peevish at the ordinances of Zeus, which he defined
and ordained together with the Fates who spun in
his presence the thread of your begetting? Do you
not know how small a part you are compared with

95

27
28

29

3

—

32

33

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

μέρος πρὸς τὰ ὅλα; τοῦτο δὲ κατὰ TO σῶμα,
« 7 Ν ’ > \ lel a
ὡς κατά ye τὸν λόγον οὐδὲν χείρων τῶν θεῶν
οὐδὲ μεκρότερος" λόγου γὰρ μέγεθος οὐ μήκει
οὐδ᾽ ὕψει κρίνεται, ἀλλὰ δόγμασιν.

Οὐ θέλεις οὖν, καθ᾽ ἃ ἴσος εἶ τοῖς θεοῖς, ἐκεῖ
που τίθεσθαι τὸ ἀγαθόν; “τάλας ἐγώ, τὸν
πατέρα ἔχω τοιοῦτον καὶ τὴν μητέρα." τί οὖν;
ἐδίδοτό σοι προελθόντι ἐκλέξασθαι καὶ εἰπεῖν
“ὁ δεῖνα τῇ δεῖνι συνελθέτω τῇδε τῇ ὥρᾳ, ἵνα
> Ν / ᾽ν > O77 > et 4
ἐγὼ γένωμαι; οὐκ ἐδίδοτο. ἀλλ’ ἔδει προυπο-
στῆναί σου τοὺς γονεῖς, εἶτα οὕτως γεννηθῆναι.
ἐκ ποίων τινῶν ; ἐκ τοιούτων, ὁποῖοι ἧσαν. τί

4 4 > an ΝΜ > / 43
οὖν ; τοιούτων αὐτῶν ὄντων οὐδεμία σοι δίδοται
μηχανή ; εἶτ᾽ εἰ μὲν τὴν ὁρατικὴν δύναμιν ἠγνόεις
πρὸς τί κέκτησαι, δυστυχὴς ἂν ἧς καὶ ἄθλιος,
εἰ κατέμυες, προσαγόντων σοι τῶν χρωμάτων τι"
ὅτι δὲ μεγαλοψυχίαν ἔχων καὶ γενναιότητα πρὸς
ἕκαστα τούτων ἀγνοεῖς, οὐ δυστυχέστερος εἶ καὶ
ἀθλιώτερος ; προσάγεταΐί σοι τὰ κατάλληλα τῇ
δυνάμει ἣν ἔχεις" σὺ δ᾽ αὐτὴν τότε μάλιστα
ἀποστρέφεις, ὁπότε ἠνοιγμένην καὶ βλέπουσαν
ἔχειν ἔδει. οὐ μᾶλλον εὐχαριστεῖς τοῖς θεοῖς,
“ » / 4 > lel ae > 7
ὅτι σε ἐπάνω τούτων ἀφῆκαν ὅσα μηδ᾽ ἐποίησαν
> / , , ig tA > , lal I. %
ἐπὶ σοί, μόνον δ᾽ ὑπεύθυνον ἀπέφηναν τῶν ἐπὶ

’ , “ > 7 > a >
σοί; γονέων ἕνεκα ἀνυπεύθυνον ἀφῆκαν" ἀδελ-

1 Added by Diels.
96

BOOK I. xu. 26-33

the whole? That is, as to the body; for as to the
reason you are not inferior to the gods, nor less than
they ; for the greatness of the reason is not deter-
mined by length nor by height, but by the decisions
of its will.

Will you not, therefore, set what is for you the
good in that wherein you are equal to the gods? >
*« Wretched man that I am; such a father and such
a mother asI have!” Well, was it permitted you
to step forward and make selection, saying, “ Let
such-and-such man have intercourse with such-and-
such woman at this hour, that I may be born”? It
was not permitted you; but your parents had to
exist first, then you had to be born as you were
born. Of what kind of parents? Of such as they
were. What then? Since they are such, is no
remedy given you? Again, supposing that you were
ignorant of the purpose for which you possess the
faculty of vision, you would be unfortunate and
wretched if you closed your eyes when men brought
some colour before them; but in that you have
greatness of mind and nobility for use for everyone
of the things may happen to you, and know it not, are
you not yet more unfortunate and wretched? Things
proportionate to the faculty which you possess are
brought before you, but you turn that faculty away
at the very moment when you ought to keep it wide
open and discerning. Do you not rather render
thanks to the gods that they have allowed you to
be superior to all the things that they did not put
under your control, and have rendered you account-
able only for what is under your control? As for
parents, the gods have released you from account-
ability; as for brothers, they have released you;

97

35

-~

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

φῶν ἕνεκα ἀφῆκαν, σώματος ἕνεκα ἀφῆκαν,
κτήσεως, θανάτου, ζωῆς. τίνος οὖν ὑπεύθυνόν
σε ἐποίησαν; τοῦ μόνου ὄντος ἐπὶ σοί, χρήσεως
οἵας δεῖ φαντασιῶν. τί οὖν ἐπισπᾷς σεαυτῷ
ταῦτα ὧν ἀνυπεύθυνος εἶ; τοῦτό ἐστιν ἑαυτῷ
παρέχειν πράγματα.

‘ n ΄ ΝΜ a 2 n pnt eT
ιγ΄. Πῶς ἕκαστα ἔστιν ποιεῖν ἀρεστῶς θεοῖς

Πυθομένου δέ τινος, πῶς ἔστιν ἐσθίειν ἀρεστῶς

a > , Μ ” \ > , QA
θεοῖς, Ei δικαίως ἔστιν, ἔφη, καὶ εὐγνωμόνως Kal
ἴσως καὶ ἐγκρατῶς καὶ κοσμίως, οὐκ ἔστι καὶ ἀρεσ-
τῶς τοῖς θεοῖς ; ὅταν δὲ θερμὸν αἰτήσαντός σοῦ
μὴ ὑπακούσῃ ὁ παῖς ἢ ὑπακούσας χλιαρώτερον
wor a why a? as ed \ \ ’
ἐνέγκῃ ἢ und εὑρεθῇ ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ, τὸ μὴ χαλεπαΐνειν
μηδὲ ῥήγνυσθαι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀρεστὸν τοῖς θεοῖς ;—
Πῶς οὖν τις ἀνάσχηται τῶν τοιούτων ;— Avdpa-
ποδον, οὖκ ἀνέξη τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ τοῦ σαυτοῦ, ὃς
ἔχει τὸν Δία πρόγονον, ὥσπερ υἱὸς ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν
σπερμάτων γέγονεν καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ἄνωθεν κατα-
βολῆς, GAN εἰ ἔν τινι τοιαύτῃ χώρᾳ κατετάγης
ὑπερεχούσῃ, εὐθὺς τύραννον καταστήσεις σεαυ-
τόν ; οὐ μεμνήσῃ τί εἶ καὶ τίνων ἄρχεις ; ὅτι

a “ 3 “ δ “ a \

συγγενῶν, ὅτι ἀδελφῶν φύσει, ὅτι τοῦ Atos
>? f ’ ’ 5 \ ? a 4 > » >
ἀπογόνων ;— AXA ὠνὴν αὐτῶν ἔχω, ἐκεῖνοι ὃ
ΕῚ a > ΝΜ c lol fal / bid , Ἁ
ἐμοῦ οὐκ ἔχουσιν.---.Ορᾷς ποῦ βλέπεις ; ὅτι εἰς τὴν
98

BOOK I. χη. 33-xu1 5

as for body, they have released you; and for
property, death, life. Well, for what have they
made you accountable? For the only thing that is
under your control—the proper use of impressions.
Why, then, do you draw upon yourself that for
which you are not responsible? This is to make
trouble for yourself.

CHAPTER XIII

How may each several thing be done acceptably
to the gods ?

Now when someone asked him how it is possible
to eat acceptably to the gods, he said, If it is done
justly and graciously and fairly and restrainedly and
decently, is it not also done acceptably to the gods?
And when you have asked for warm water and the
slave does not heed you; or if he does heed you but
brings in tepid water; or if he is not even to be
found in the house, then to refrain from anger and
not to explode, is not this acceptable to the gods ?>—
How, then, can a man bear with such persons ?—
Slave, will you not bear with your own brother, who
has Zeus as his progenitor and is, as it were, a son
born of the same seed as yourself and of the same
sowing from above ; but if you have been stationed
in a like position above others, will you forthwith set
yourself up as a tyrant? Do you not remember
what you are, and over whom you rule—that they
are kinsmen, that they are brothers by nature, that
they are the offspring of Zeus >—But I have a deed
of sale for them, and they have none for me.—Do
you see whither you bend your gaze, that it is to

99

-

~

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

γῆν, ὅτι eis τὸ βάραθρον, ὅτι eis τοὺς ταλαιπώρους
τούτους νόμους τοὺς τῶν νεκρῶν, εἰς δὲ τοὺς τῶν
θεῶν οὐ βλέπεις ; ,

εδ΄, “Ὅτι πάντας ἐφορᾷ τὸ θεῖον

Πυθομένου δέ τινος, πῶς ἄν τις πεισθείη, ὅτι
ἕκαστον τῶν ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ πραττομένων ἐφορᾶται
ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, Οὐ δοκεῖ σοι, ἔφη, ἡνῶσθαι τὰ
πάντα ;---Δοκεῖ, ἔφη.-- Τί δέ; συμπαθεῖν τὰ
ἐπίγεια τοῖς οὐρανίοις οὐ δοκεῖ σοι ;---Δοκεῖ,
ἔφη.---Πόθεν γὰρ οὕτω τεταγμένως καθάπερ ἐκ
προστάγματος τοῦ θεοῦ, ὅταν ἐκεῖνος εἴπῃ τοῖς
φυτοῖς ἀνθεῖν, ἀνθεῖ, ὅταν εἴπῃ βλαστάνειν, βλα-
στάνει, ὅταν ἐκφέρειν τὸν καρπόν, ἐκφέρει, ὅταν
πεπαίνειν, πεπαίνει, ὅταν πάλιν ἀποβάλλειν καὶ
φυλλορροεῖν καὶ αὐτὰ εἰς αὑτὰ συνειλούμενα
ἐφ᾽ ἡσυχίας μένειν καὶ ἀναπαύεσθαι, μένει
καὶ ἀναπαύεται; πόθεν δὲ πρὸς τὴν αὔξησιν
καὶ μείωσιν τῆς σελήνης καὶ τὴν τοῦ ἡλίου
πρόσοδον καὶ ἄφοδον τοσαύτη παραλλαγὴ καὶ
ἐπὶ τὰ ἐναντία μεταβολὴ τῶν ἐπιγείων θεωρεῖται;
ἀλλὰ τὰ φυτὰ μὲν καὶ τὰ ἡμέτερα σώματα
οὕτως ἐνδέδεται τοῖς ὅλοις καὶ συμπέπονθεν, αἱ

1 Stobaeus: φύλλα 8.

1 This is the famous principle οὗ συμπάθεια (συμπαθεῖν and
συμπέπονθεν in the text here), ὅ.6., the physical unity of
the cosmos in such a form that the experience of one part
necessarily affects every other. This doctrine, especially
popular with the Stoics, is essentially but a philosophic
formulation of the vague ideas that underlie the practices of

100

BOOK I, χει. 5-x1v. 5

the earth, that it is to the pit, that it is to these
wretched laws of ours, the laws of the dead, and
that it is not to the laws of the gods that you look?

CHAPTER XIV
That the Deity oversees all men

Now when someone asked him how a man could
be convinced that each thing which he does is under
the eye of God, Do you not think, he answered,
that all things are united in one ?—I do, said the
other.—Very well, do you not think that what is
on earth feels the influence? of that which is in
heaven ?—I do, he replied —For how else comes
it that so regularly, as if from God’s command, when
He bids the plants flower, they flower, when He
bids them put forth shoots, they put them forth,
when He bids them bear their fruit, they bear it,
when to ripen, they ripen; when again He bids
them drop their fruit and let fall their leaves and
gather themselves together and remain quiet and
take their rest, they remain quiet and take their
rest? And how else comes it that at the waxing and
waning of the moon and at the approach and
recession of the sun we see among the things that
are on earth so great an alteration and change to the
opposite? But are the plants and our own bodies so
closely bound up with the universe, and do they
so intimately share its affections,! and is not the

sympathetic magic. For the literature on this topic see

ease on Cicero's De Divinatione, ii. 34, where συμπάθεια is
defined by Cicero as a coniunetio naturae et quasi concentus et
consensus.

Io!

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

6 ψυχαι δ᾽ ai ἡμέτεραι οὐ πολὺ πλέον ; ἀλλ᾽ αἱ

10

ψυχαὶ μὲν οὕτως εἰσὶν ἐνδεδεμέναι καὶ συναφεῖς
a an ὋᾳἂὥἭρσν > n , = δ). Ὁ 4 :
τῷ θεῷ ἅτε αὐτοῦ μόρια οὖσαι Kal ἀποσπάσματα,
οὐ παντὸς δ᾽ αὐτῶν κινήματος ἅτε οἰκείου καὶ
συμφυοῦς ὁ θεὸς αἰσθάνεται; ἀλλὰ σὺ μὲν
\ , la e 4,
περὶ τὴς θείας διοικήσεως καὶ περὶ ἑκάστου
τῶν θείων, ὁμοῦ δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων πραγ-
᾽ὔ ᾿ a ͵, \ « Ν >
μάτων ἐνθυμεῖσθαι δύνασαι καὶ ἅμα μὲν αἰσθη-
τικῶς ἀπὸ μυρίων πραγμάτων κινεῖσθαι, ἅμα δὲ
a Ψ \ nr a >
διανοητικῶς, ἅμα δὲ συγκαταθετικῶς, τοῖς δ᾽ ava-
a x b] a 4 \ 4 φ-: δε αὶ
νευστικῶς ἢ ἐφεκτικῶς, τύπους δὲ τοσούτους ἀφ᾽
οὕτω πολλῶν καὶ ποικίλων πραγμάτων ἐν τῇ σαυ-
a a 5 Lert ts 7 A / >
Tov ψυχῇ φυλάττεις καὶ AT αὐτῶν κινούμενος εἰς
ἐπινοίας ὁμοειδεῖς ἐμπίπτεις τοῖς πρώτως τετυπω-
κόσι τέχνας τ᾽ ἄλλην ἐπ᾽ ἄλλῃ ' καὶ μνήμας ἀπὸ
, , , « |, hes > ar
μυρίων πραγμάτων διασῴζεις" ὁ δὲ θεὸς οὐχ olds
τ᾽ ἐστὶ πάντα ἐφορᾶν καὶ πᾶσιν συμπαρεῖναι
καὶ ἀπὸ πάντων τινὰ ἴσχειν διάδοσιν ; ἀλλὰ
φωτίζειν οἷός τ᾽ ἐστὶν ὁ ἥλιος τηλικοῦτον μέρος
fol , 3 / \ XN > , » nr
τοῦ παντός, ὀλίγον δὲ TO ἀφώτιστον ἀπολιπεῖν
ὅσον οἷόν 7 ἐπέχεσθαι ὑπὸ σκιᾶς, ἣν ἡ γῆ ποιεῖ"
€ \ \ Ν [4 > \ ‘ ‘ ,
ὁ δὲ καὶ τὸν ἥλιον αὐτὸν πεποιηκὼς καὶ περιάγων
4 ΝΜ ᾽ > “ \ e x \ φ' 2 δ᾽
μέρος ὄντ᾽ αὐτοῦ μικρὸν ὡς πρὸς τὸ ὅλον, οὗτος
> 7 4 > ,
ov δύναται πάντων αἰσθάνεσθαι ;

1 Schenkl : ἄλλην ἐπ᾽ ἄλλας 5.
ΙΟ2

BOOK I. xv. 5-10

same much more true of our own souls? But if our
souls are so bound up with God and joined together
with Him, as being parts and portions of His being,
does not God perceive their every motion as being
a motion of that which is His own and of one
body with Himself? And yet you have power to
think about the divine dispensation and about each
several item among things divine, and at the same
time also about human affairs, and you have the
faculty of being moved by myriads of matters at the
same time both in your senses and in your intelli-
gence, and at the same time you assent to some,
while you dissent from others, or suspend judgement
about them; and you guard in your own soul so
many impressions derived from so many and various
matters, and, on being moved by these impressions,
your mind falls upon notions corresponding to the
impressions first made, and so from myriads of matters
you derive and retain arts, one after the other, and
memories. All this you do, and is God not able
to oversee all things and to be present with all
and to have a certain communication from them all?
Yet the sun is capable of illuminating so large a
portion of the universe, and of leaving unilluminated
only the small space which is no larger than can
be covered by the shadow that the earth casts; and
is He who has created the sun, which is but a small
portion of Himself! in comparison with the whole,
and causes it to revolve, is He not able to perceive
all things?

1 Chrysippus identified the Universe, of which the sun
is Pye part, with God. See Cicero, De Natura Deorum,
ii. 38 f.

103

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

᾿Αλλ᾽ ἐγώ, φησίν, od δύναμαι πᾶσιν ἅμα τού-
τοῖς παρακολουθεῖν .---Τοῦτο δέ σοι καὶ λέγει τις,
ὅτι ἴσην ἔχεις δύναμιν τῷ Διί; ἀλλ᾽ οὖν οὐδὲν
ἧττον καὶ ἐπίτροπον ἑκάστῳ παρέστησεν τὸν
ἑκάστου δαίμονα καὶ παρέδωκεν φυλάσσειν αὐτὸν
αὐτῷ καὶ τοῦτον ἀκοίμητον καὶ ἀπαραλόγιστον.
tive γὰρ ἄλλῳ κρείττονι καὶ ἐπιμέλεστέρῳ φύ-
λακι παρέδωκεν ἂν ἡμῶν ἕκαστον ; ὥσθ᾽, ὅταν
κλείσητε τὰς θύρας καὶ σκότος ἔνδον ποιήσητε,
μέμνησθε μηδέποτε λέγειν ὅτι μόνοι ἐστέ: οὐ γὰρ
ἐστέ, ἀλλ᾽ ὁ θεὸς ἔνδον ἐστὶ καὶ ὁ ὑμέτερος Sat-
μων ἐστίν. καὶ τίς τούτοις χρεία φωτὸς εἰς τὸ
βλέπειν τί ποιεῖτε; τούτῳ τῷ θεῷ ἔδει καὶ ὑμᾶς
ὀμνύειν ὅρκον, οἷον οἱ στρατιῶται τῷ Καίσαρι.
ἀλλ᾽ ἐκεῖνοι μὲν τὴν μισθοφορίαν λαμϑάνοντες
ὀμνύουσιν πάντων προτιμήσειν τὴν τοῦ Καίσαρος
σωτηρίαν, ὑμεῖς δὲ δὴ 5 τοσούτων καὶ τηλικούτων
ἠξιωμένοι οὐκ ὀμόσετε ἢ ὀμόσαντες οὐκ ἐμμενεῖτε ;
καὶ τί ὀμόσετε; μὴ ἀπειθήσειν μηδέποτε μηδ᾽
ἐγκαλέσειν μηδὲ μέμψεσθαί τινι τῶν ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνου
δεδομένων μηδ᾽ ἄκοντες ποιήσειν Te ἢ πείσεσθαι
τῶν ἀναγκαίων. ὅμοιός γ᾽ ὁ ὃ ὅρκος οὗτος ἐκείνῳ;
ἐκεῖ μὲν ὀμνύουσιν αὐτοῦ μὴ προτιμήσειν ἕτερον,
ἐνταῦθα δ᾽ αὑτοὺς ἁπάντων.

μ Suggested by Upton (after yap Schweighiuser).

2 Schenkl (δὲ δὴ of von Wilamowitz): δὲ δέ δ΄.
3 yon Wilamowitz (ye ὁ Diels): ye ὅρκος S.

1 Compare Seneca, Epist. 41,2: sacer intra nos spiritus sedet,
malorum bonorumque nostrorum observator et custos, and

104

BOOK I. xiv. 11-17

And yet, says one, I cannot follow all these things
at one and the same time.—But does anyone go
so far as to tell you this, namely, that you possess
a faculty which is equal to that of Zeus? Yet
none the less He has stationed by each man’s
side as guardian his particular genius,—and has
committed the man to his care,—and that too a
guardian who never sleeps and is not to be beguiled.
For to what other guardian, better and more careful,
could He have committed each one of us? Where-
fore, when you close your doors and make darkness
within, remember never to say that you are alone,
for you are not alone; nay, God is within, and your
own genius is within. And what need have they
of light in order to see what you are doing? Yes,
and to this God you also ought to swear allegiance,
as the soldiers do to Caesar. They are but hirelings,
yet they swear that they will put the safety of
Caesar above everything ; and shall you, indeed, who
have been counted worthy of blessings so numerous
and so great be unwilling to swear, or, when you
have sworn, to abide by your oath? And what shall
you swear? Never to disobey under any circum-
stances, never to prefer charges, never to find fault
with anything that God has given, never to let your
will rebel when you have either to do or to suffer
something that is inevitable. Can the oath of the
soldiers in any way be compared with this of ours?
Out there men swear never to prefer another in
honour above Caesar; but here we swear to prefer
ourselves in honour above everything else.

especially Menander, Epitr. 881 ff., with Capps’s note.
Almost exactly the same idea appears also in Marcus
Aurelius, V. 27.

105

1
2

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

ιε΄. Td ἐπαγγέλλεται φιλοσοφία ;

Συμβουλευομένου, τινός, πῶς τὸν ἀδελφὸν πείσῃ

μηκέτι χαλεπῶς αὐτῷ ἔχειν, Οὐκ ἐπαγγέλλεται,
ἔφη, φιλοσοφία τῶν ἐκτός τι περιποιήσειν τῷ
ἀνθρώπῳ: εἰ δὲ μή, ἔξω τι τῆς ἰδίας ὕλης
ἀναδέξεται. ὡς γὰρ τέκτονος ὕλη τὰ ξύλα,
ἀνδριαντοποιοῦ ὁ χαλκός, οὕτως τῆς περὶ βίον
, CA € , > a ££ fs fi τῷ bd n
τέχνης ὕλη ὁ Bios αὐτοῦ ἑκάστου .---ἩἩί οὖν ὁ τοῦ
ἀδελφοῦ "Πάλιν τῆς αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου τέχνης ἐστίν,
πρὸς δὲ τὴν σὴν τῶν ἐκτός ἐστιν, ὅμοιον ἀγρῷ,
ὅμοιον ὑγείᾳ, ὅμοιον εὐδοξίᾳ. τούτων δ᾽ οὐδὲν
2 s / Prk , ,
ἐπαγγέλλεται φιλοσοφία. ““ἐν πάσῃ περιστάσει
/ \ 4 \ ΄ » ᾽ν» \
τηρήσω TO ἡγεμονικὸν κατὰ φύσιν ἔχον."---Τὸ
τίνος ;-- Τὸ ἐκείνου, ἐν ᾧ εἰμί," --Πῶς οὖν
ἐκεῖνός μοι μὴ ὀργίζηται ;--" Φέρε por ἐκεῖνον
κἀκείνῳ ἐρῶ, σοι δὲ, περὶ τῆς ἐκείνου ὀργῆς
0ν Μ / ”
οὐδὲν ἔχω λέγειν. ᾿
Εἰπόντος δὲ τοῦ συμβουλευομένου ὅτι Τοῦτο
ζητῶ, πῶς ἂν ἐκείνου καὶ μὴ διαλλασσομένου
7 ͵ ΕΣ > / wv n ἢ
κατὰ φύσιν ἔχοιμι, Οὐδέν, ἔφη, τῶν μέγάλων
” , “ γ0. ¢ ῇ IOV A
ἄφνω γίνεται, ὅπου ye οὐδ᾽ ὁ βότρυς οὐδὲ σῦκον.
ΝΜ rn / “ « [ a ”» » a ,
ἄν μοι νῦν λέγῃς ὅτι “ θέλω σῦκον, ἀποκρινοῦμαί

σοι ὅτι “ χρόνου δεῖ." ἄφες ἀνθήσῃ πρῶτον, εἶτα.

προβάλῃ τὸν καρπόν, εἶτα πεπανθῇ. εἶτα συκῆς

1 Reiske: ἀνέξεται S.

1 The soul of man, as feeling and thinking, often equivalent
to ‘‘ reason,” but not exclusively intellectual. See Bonhdéffer,
Epictet und die Stoa, i. 9 ff.

106

BOOK I. xv. 1-8

CHAPTER XV
What does philosophy profess ?

WHEN someone consulted Epictetus as to how he
could persuade his brother to cease being angry
with him, he replied, Philosophy does not profess
to secure for man any external possession. Other-
wise it would be undertaking something that lies
outside its proper subject-matter. For as wood
is the material of the carpenter, bronze that of
the statuary, just so each man’s own life is the
subject-matter of the art of living—Well, what
about my brother's life ?—That again is the subject-
matter of his own art of living, but with respect
to your art of living it comes under the category
of externals, like a farm, like health, like good
repute. Philosophy promises none of these things,
but rather, “In every circumstance I will keep
the governing principle? in a state of accord with
nature.”"—Whose governing principle?—“His in
whom I am.”—How, then, shall I keep my brother
from being angry at me ?—Bring him to me and I
will tell him, but I have nothing to say to you on

the subject of Ais anger.

_ And when the man who was consulting him said,
What I seek to know is this, how, even if my brother
refuses to be reconciled with me, I may yet be in
accord with nature, Epictetus replied : Nothing great
comes into being all at once; why, not even does the
bunch of grapes, or a fig. If you say to me now, “J
want a fig,” I shall answer, “That requires time.”
Let the tree blossom first, then put forth its fruit,
and finally let the fruit ripen. Now although the

107

ὑπο

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

‘ \ ” \ cal [4 > -“
μὲν καρπὸς ἄφνω καὶ μιᾷ ὥρᾳ οὐ τελειοῦται,

, “ον , Ν , LA >
γνώμης δ᾽ ἀνθρώπου καρπὸν θέλεις οὕτως δι
ὀλίγου καὶ εὐκόλως κτήσασθαι ; μηδ᾽ ἂν ἐ ἐγώ σοι
λέγω προσδόκα.

ts’. Περὶ προνοίας.

Μὴ θαυμάζετ᾽ εἰ τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις ζῴοις τὰ πρὸς
τὸ σῶμα ἕτοιμα γέγονεν, οὐ μόνὸν τροφαὶ καὶ
ῇ > \ \ \ Ν \ a e cA
πόμα, ἀλλὰ Kal κοίτη Kal τὸ μὴ δεῖσθαι ὑποδημά-
των, μὴ ὑποστρωμάτων, μὴ ἐσθῆτος, ἡμεῖς δὲ
πάντων τούτων προσδεόμεθα. τὰ γὰρ οὐκ αὐτῶν
ἕνεκα, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ὑπηρεσίαν γεγονότα οὐκ

, 7 Ψ' /
ἐχυσιτέλει προσδεόμενα ἄλλων πεποιηκέναι.
> \ Η a 1 4 c a / x \
ἐπεὶ ὅρα οἷον dv* ἦν ἡμᾶς φροντίζειν μὴ περὶ
αὑτῶν μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τῶν προβάτων καὶ
τῶν ὄνων, πῶς ἐνδύσηται καὶ πῶς ὑποδήσηται,
πῶς φάγῃ, πῶς πίῃ. ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ οἱ στρατιῶται
ἕτοιμοί εἰσι τῷ στρατηγῷ ὑποδεδεμένοι ἐνδεδυ-
μένοι ὡπλισμένοι, εἰ δ᾽ ἔδει περιερχόμενον τὸν

/ € tal a > cf \ / Ν
χιλίαρχον ὑποδεῖν ἢ ἐνδύειν τοὺς χιλίους, δεινὸν
ἂν ἦν, οὕτω καὶ ἡ φύσις πεποίηκε τὰ πρὸς
ὑπηρεσίαν γεγονότα ἕτοιμα παρεσκευασμένα
μηδεμιᾶς ἐπιμελείας ἔτι προσδεόμενα. οὕτως ὃν

παιδίον μικρὸν καὶ ῥάβδῳ ἐλαύνει τὰ πρόβατα.
Νῦν δ᾽ ἡμεῖς ἀφέντες ἐπὶ τούτοις εὐχαριστεῖν,
ὅτι μὴ καὶ αὐτῶν τὴν ἴσην ἐπιμέλειαν ἐπιμελού-
1 Added by von Wilamowitz. +

108

BOOK I. xv. 7-xv1. 6

fruit of even a fig-tree is not brought to perfection all
at once and in a single hour, would you still seek to
secure the fruit of a man’s mind in so short a while
and so easily? Do not expect it, not even if I should
tell you so myself.

CHAPTER XVI
Of providence

Marve not that the animals other than man have
furnished them, ready prepared by nature, what
pertains to their bodily needs—not merely food and
drink, but also a bed to lie on,—and that they have
no need of shoes, or bedding, or clothing, while we
are in need of all these things. For in the case of
animals, born not for their own sake, but for service,
to have created them in need of other things
was not beneficial. Why, consider what it would
be for us to have to take thought not for merely
ourselves, but also for our sheep and our asses,
how they are to be clothed and shod, how they are
to find food and drink. But just as soldiers appear
before their general, all ready for service, shod,
clothed and armed, and it would be shocking if the
colonel had to go around and equip his regiment
with shoes or uniforms; so also nature has made
animals, which are born for service, ready for use,
equipped, and in need of no further attention.
Consequently one small child with a rod can drive a
flock of sheep.

But as it is, we first forbear to give thanks for
these beasts, because we do not have to bestow upon
them the same care as we require for ourselves, and

109

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

7 μεθα, ἐφ᾽ αὑτοῖς ἐγκαλοῦμεν τῷ θεῷ. καίτοι νὴ

10

11

12

13

14

τὸν Δία καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ἐν τῶν γεγονότων ἀπήρκει
πρὸς τὸ αἰσθέσθαι τῆς προνοίας τῷ γε αἰδήμονι
καὶ εὐχαρίστῳ. καὶ μή μοι νῦν τὰ μεγάλα: αὐτὸ
τοῦτο τὸ ἐκ πόας γάλα γεννᾶσθαι καὶ ἐκ γάλα-
κτος τυρὸν καὶ ἐκ δέρματος ἔρια τίς ἐστιν ὁ
πεποιηκὼς ταῦτα ἢ ἐπινενοηκώς; “οὐδὲ Els” φησίν.
ὦ μεγάλης ἀναισθησίας καὶ ἀναισχυντίας.

"Aye ἀφῶμεν τὰ ἔργα τῆς φύσεως, τὰ πάρεργα
αὐτῆς θεασώμεθα. μή τι ἀχρηστότερον τριχῶν
τῶν ἐπὶ γενείου; τί οὖν; οὐ συνεχρήσατο καὶ
ταύταις ὡς μάλιστα πρεπόντως ἐδύνατο; οὐ
διέκρινεν δι’ αὐτῶν τὸ ἄρρεν καὶ τὸ θῆλυ ; οὐκ
εὐθὺς μακρόθεν κέκραγεν ἡμῶν ἑκάστου ἡ φύσις
“ἀνήρ εἰμι" οὕτω μοι προσέρχου, οὕτω μοι λάλει,
ἄλλο μηδὲν ζήτει" ἰδοὺ τὰ σύμβολα" ; πάλιν ἐπὶ
τῶν γυναικῶν ὥσπερ ἐν φωνῇ τι ἐγκατέμιξεν
ἁπαλώτερον, οὕτως καὶ τὰς τρίχας ἀφεῖλεν. οὔ"
ἀλλ᾽ ἀδιάκριτον ἔδει τὸ ζῷον ἀπολειφθῆναι καὶ
κηρύσσειν ἕκαστον ἡμῶν ὅτι “ ἀνήρ εἰμι." πῶς δὲ
καλὸν τὸ σύμβολον καὶ εὐπρεπὲς καὶ σεμνόν,
πόσῳ κάλλιον τοῦ τῶν ἀλεκτρυόνων λόφου, πόσῳ
μεγαλοπρεπέστερον τῆς χαίτης τῶν λεόντων. διὰ
τοῦτο ἔδει σῴζειν τὰ σύμβολα τοῦ θεοῦ, ἔδει αὐτὰ
μὴ καταπροίεσθαι, μὴ συγχεῖν ὅσον ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτοῖς
τὰ γένη τὰ διῃρημένα.

Ito

~ BOOK I. xvi. 6-14

then proceed to complain against God on our own
account! Yet, by Zeus and the gods, one single
gift of nature would suffice to make a man who is
reverent and grateful perceive the providence of God.
Do not talk to me now of great matters: take the
mere fact that milk is produced from grass, and
cheese from milk, and that wool grows from skin—
who is it that has created or devised these things?
“No one,” somebody says. Oh, the depth of man’s
stupidity and shamelessness !

Come, let us leave the chief works of nature, and
consider merely what she does in passing. Can
anything be more useless than the hairs on a chin?
Well, what then? Has not nature used even these
in the most suitable way possible? Has she not by
these means distinguished between the male and the
female? Does not the nature of each one among us
ery aloud forthwith from afar, “I am a man; on this
understanding approach me, on this understanding
talk with me; ask for nothing further; behold the
signs” ? Again, in the case of women, just as
nature has mingled in their voice a certain softer note,
so likewise she has taken the hair from their chins.
Not so, you say ; on the contrary the human animal
ought to have been left without distinguishing features,
and each of us ought to proclaim by word of mouth,
“1 am aman.” Nay, but how fair and becoming
and dignified the sign is! How much more fair than
the cock’s comb, how much more magnificent than the
lion’s mane! Wherefore, we ought to preserve the
signs which God has given; we ought not to throw
them away; we ought not, so far as in us lies, to
confuse the sexes which have been distinguished in
this fashion.

Ii!

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

---

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

Ταῦτα μόνα ἐστὶν ἔργα ἐφ᾽ ἡμῶν τῆς προνοίας ;
καὶ τίς ἐξαρκεῖ λόγος ὁμοίως αὐτὰ ἐπαινέσαι ἢ
παραστῆσαι ; εἰ γὰρ νοῦν εἴχομεν, ἄλλο τι ἔδει
ἡμᾶς ποιεῖν καὶ κοινῇ καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἢ ὑμνεῖν τὸ θεῖον
καὶ εὐφημεῖν καὶ ἐπεξέρχεσθαι τὰς χάριτας ; οὐκ
ἔδει καὶ σκάπτοντας καὶ ἀροῦντας καὶ ἐσθίοντας
ἄδειν τὸν ὕμνον τὸν εἰς τὸν θεόν ; “ μέγας ὁ θεός,
ὅτι ἡμῖν παρέσχεν ὄργανα ταῦτα δι’ ὧν τὴν γῆν
ἐργασόμεθα: μέγας ὁ θεός, ὅτι χεῖρας δέδωκεν, ὅτι
κατάποσιν, ὅτι κοιλίαν, ὅτε αὔξεσθαι λεληθότως,
ὅτι καθεύδοντας ἀναπνεῖν" ταῦτα ἐφ᾽ ἑκάστου
ἐφυμνεῖν ἔδει καὶ τὸν μέγιστον καὶ θειότατον
ὕμνον ἐφυμνεῖν, ὅτι τὴν δύναμιν ἔδωκεν τὴν παρα-
κολουθητικὴν τούτοις καὶ ὁδῷ χρηστικήν. τί
οὖν ; ἐπεὶ οἱ πολλοὶ ἀποτετύφλωσθε, οὐκ ἔδει
τινὰ εἶναι τὸν ταύτην ἐκπληροῦντα τὴν χώραν
καὶ ὑπὲρ πάντων ἄδοντα ' τὸν ὕμνον τὸν εἰς τὸν
θεόν ; τί γὰρ ἄλλο δύναμαι γέρων χωλὸς εἰ μὴ
ὑμνεῖν τὸν θεόν ; εἰ γοῦν ἀηδὼν ἤμην, ἐποίουν τὰ
τῆς ἀηδόνος, εἰ κύκνος, τὰ τοῦ κύκνου. νῦν δὲ
λογικός εἰμι ὑμνεῖν με δεῖ τὸν θεόν. τοῦτό μου
τὸ ἔργον ἐστίν, ποιῶ αὐτὸ οὐδ᾽ ἐγκαταλείψω τὴν
τάξιν ταύτην, ἐφ᾽ ὅσον ἂν διδῶται, καὶ ὑμᾶς ἐπὶ
τὴν αὐτὴν ταύτην ὠδὴν παρακαλῶ.

ιζ΄. “Ort ἀναγκαῖα τὰ λογικά
Ἐπειδὴ λόγος ἐστὶν ὁ διαρθρῶν καὶ ἐξεργαζό-
μενος τὰ λοιπά, ἔδει δ᾽ αὐτὸν μὴ ἀδιάρθρωτον

1 Schweighiuser: διαδόντα S.
12

es

BOOK I. xvi. 15—xvu. 1

Are these the only works of Providence in us?
Nay, what language is adequate to praise them all or
bring them home to our minds as they deserve ?
Why, if we had sense, ought we to be doing anything
else, publicly and privately, than hymning and
praising the Deity, and rehearsing His benefits?
Ought we not, as we dig and plough and eat, to sing
the hymn of praise to God? “ Great is God, that
He hath furnished us these instruments wherewith
we shall till the earth. Great is God, that He hath
given us hands, and power to swallow, and a belly,
and power to grow unconsciously, and to breathe
while asleep.” This is what we ought to sing on
every occasion, and above all to sing the greatest and
divinest hymn, that God has given us the faculty to
comprehend these things and to follow the path of
reason, What then? Since most of you have
become blind, ought there not to be someone to
fulfil this office for you, and in behalf of all sing the
hymn of praise to God? Why, what else can I, a
lame old man, do but sing hymns to God? If,
indeed, I were a nightingale, I should be singing as
a nightingale; if a swan, as aswan. But as it is, I
am a rational being, therefore [ must be singing
hymns of praise to God. This is my task ; I do it,
and will not desert this post, as long as it may be
given me to fill it; and I exhort you to join me in
this same song.

CHAPTER XVII
That the art of reasoning is indispensable —

Since it is reason that analyzes and perfects all else,
and reason itself ought not to remain unanalyzed,

113

2

i)

i.)

10

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

εἶναι, ὑπὸ τίνος διαρθρωθῇ ; δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι ἢ ὑφ᾽
αὑτοῦ ἢ ὑπ᾽ ἄλλου. ἤ τοι λόγος ἐστὶν ἐκεῖνος ἢ
lA n ΝΜ lal , cd ΣΟ.
ἄλλο τι κρεῖσσον ἔσται τοῦ λόγου, ὅπερ ἀδύνατον.
» / > -“ , ͵ ’ >
εἰ λόγος, ἐκεῖνον πάλιν τίς διαρθρώσει ; εἰ γὰρ
> \ c , 4 \ Φ ? ᾿
αὐτὸς ἑαυτόν, δύναται καὶ οὗτος. εἰ ἄλλου
δεησόμεθα, ἄπειρον ἔσται τοῦτο καὶ ἀκατάληκτον.
“ Nai,! ἀλλ᾽ ἐπείγει μᾶλλον θεραπεύειν " καὶ τὰ
ὅμοια. θέλεις οὖν περὶ ἐκείνων ἀκούειν ; ἄκουε.
ἀλλ᾽ ἄν μοι λέγῃς ὅτι “οὐκ οἷδα πότερον ἀληθῶς
ἢ ψευδῶς διαλέγῃ," κἄν τι κατ᾽ ἀμφίβολον φωνὴν
” Vy 2 fe , Di 9h τῷ y iby ,
εἴπω Kai λέγῃς μοι “ διάστιξον," οὐκ ἔτι ἀνέξομαί
σου, ἀλλ᾽ ἐρῶ σοι “ἀλλ᾽ ἐπείγει μᾶλλον." διὰ
τοῦτο γὰρ οἶμαι προτάσσουσιν τὰ λογικά,
καθάπερ τῆς μετρήσεως τοῦ σίτου προτάσσομεν
τὴν τοῦ μέτρου ἐπίσκεψιν. ἂν δὲ μὴ διαλάβωμεν
πρῶτον τί ἐστι μόδιος μηδὲ διαλάβωμεν πρῶτον
τί ἐστι ζυγός, πῶς ἔτι μετρῆσαί τι ἢ στῆσαι
, b] fal 5 Ν a ΝΜ a
δυνησόμεθα ; ἐνταῦθα οὖν τὸ τῶν ἄλλων κριτή-
ριον καὶ δ οὗ τἄλλα καταμανθάνεται μὴ
, δ᾽ > ΄ ὃ , θ 7
καταμεμαθηκότες μηδ᾽ ἠκριβωκότες δυνησόμεθά
τι τῶν ἄλλων ἀκριβῶσαι καὶ καταμαθεῖν ; καὶ
πῶς οἷόν Te; “ναί: ἀλλ᾽ ὁ μόδιος ξύλον ἐστὶ καὶ
ἄκαρπον. ἀλλὰ μετρητικὸν σίτου. “Kal τὰ

1 Upton: εἶναι S.

1 Reason, therefore, can be analyzed only by itself.

2 The course of the argument is highly condensed here,
but this is the plain sense of the passage.

? A Roman dry measure, slightly less than half a bushel.

14

παν νν ---.

BOOK 1. xvu. 1-10

wherewithal shall it be analyzed? Why, clearly,
either by itself, or by something else. This latter is
assuredly either reason, or it will prove to be some-
thing else superior toreason, which is impossible. If it
be reason, who again will analyze that reason? For
if it analyzes its own self, the reason with which we
started can do as much. If we are going to require
something else at each step, our process will be
endless and unceasing.*

“Yes,” says someone, “but the cure (of the
decisions of our will) is a much more pressing need
(than the study of logic),’”’? and the like. Do you
then wish to hear about this other matter? Very
well, listen. But if you say to me, “1 do not know
whether your argument is true or false,’ and, if I
use some ambiguous term, and you should then say,
Distinguish,” I shall bear with you no longer, but
shall tell you, “‘ Nay, but there is a much more
pressing need.””” This is the reason, I suppose, why
the Stoic philosphers put Logic first, just as in the
measuring of grain we put first the examination of
the measure. And if we do not define first what a
modius* is, and do not define first what a scale is,
how shall we be able to proceed with measuring
or weighing anything? So, in the field of our present
enquiry, if we have neglected the thorough know-
ledge and intellectual mastery of our standard of
judgement for all other things, whereby they come
to be known thoroughly, shall we ever be able to
attain intellectual mastery and thorough knowledge
of the rest of the world? And how could we
possibly? ‘ Yes,” we are told, “but the modius is
made out of wood and bears no fruit.” True, but it
is something with which we can measure grain.

115

11

13

14

15

16

17

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

λογικὰ ἄκαρπά ἐστι." καὶ περὶ τούτου μὲν
Ε ΄ > 7 φ a “ 9
ὀψόμεθα. εἰ δ᾽ οὖν καὶ τοῦτο δοίη τις, ἐκεῖνο
ἀπαρκεῖ ὅτι τῶν ἄλλων ἐστὶ διακριτικὰ καὶ
ἐπισκεπτικὰ καὶ ὡς ἄν τις εἴποι μετρητικὰ καὶ
στατικά. τίς λέγει ταῦτα ; μόνος Χρύσιππος καὶ
Ζήνων καὶ Κλεάνθης ; ᾿Αντισθένης δ᾽ οὐ λέγει;
καὶ τίς ἐστιν ὁ γεγραφὼς ὅτι “ ἀρχὴ παιδεύσεως ἡ
“ > , > , ” 4 > >
τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐπίσκεψις "; Σωκράτης δ᾽ ov λέγει ;
καὶ περὶ τίνος γράφει Ξενοφῶν, ὅτε ἤρχετο ἀπὸ
τῆς τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐπισκέψεως, τί σημαίνει
ἕκαστον ; j
με ? Φ fo) > Ἁ /, Ν ,
Ap οὖν τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ μέγα Kal τὸ θαυμαστόν,
νοῆσαι Χρύσιππον ἢ ἐξηγήσασθαι ; καὶ τίς λέγει
τοῦτο; τί οὖν τὸ θαυμαστόν ἐστιν; νοῆσαι τὸ
4 n 4 / i > Ν \
βούλημα τῆς φύσεως. τί οὖν; αὐτὸς διὰ
σεαυτοῦ παρακολουθεῖς ; καὶ τίνος ἔτι χρείαν
ἔχεις; εἰ γὰρ ἀληθές ἐστι τὸ πάντας ἄκοντας
ἁμαρτάνειν, σὺ δὲ καταμεμάθηκας τὴν ἀλήθειαν,
ἀνάγκη σε ἤδη κατορθοῦν. ἀλλὰ νὴ Δία οὐ
lol an ΄ n 4 ,’
παρακολουθῷ τῷ βουλήματι τῆς φύσεως. τίς
οὖν ἐξηγεῖται αὐτό; λέγουσιν ὅτι Χρύσιππος.
rn / / φ ε ‘
ἔρχομαι καὶ ἐπιζητῶ τί λέγει οὗτος ὁ ἐξηγητὴς
a a / / r
τῆς φύσεως. ἄρχομαι μὴ νοεῖν τί λέγει, ζητῶ
τὸν ἐξηγόύμενον. “ἴδε ἐπίσκεψαι, πῶς τοῦτο
λέγεται, καθάπερ εἰ ἹΡωμαϊστί. ποία οὖν ἐνθάδ᾽
’ \ r > , 5» 5 > lel ,
ὀφρὺς τοῦ ἐξηγουμένου ; οὐδ᾽ αὐτοῦ Χρυσίππου

1 See Xenophon, Memorabilia, IV. 6, τ.
2 The famous dictum of Socrates, formulated as, ‘* No
man errs voluntarily,’ in Plato, Protagoras, 345 Ὁ.

116

BOOK I. xvit. 10-17

*« Logie also bears no fruit.” Now as for this state-
ment we shall see later; but if one should grant
even this, it is enough to say in defence of Logic
that it has the power to discriminate and examine
everything else, and, as one might say, to measure
and weighthem. Who says this? Only Chrysippus
and Zeno and Cleanthes? Well, does not Antis-
thenes say it? And who is it that wrote, “The
beginning of education is the examination of terms ” ?
Does not Socrates,! too, say the same thing? And
of whom does Xenophon write, that he began with
the examination of terms, asking about each, “ What
does it mean?”

Is this, then, your great and admirable achieve-
ment—the ability to understand and to interpret
Chrysippus? And who says that? What, then, is
your admirable achievement? To understand the
will of nature. Very well; do you understand it all
by yourself? . And if that is the case, what more do
you need? For if it is true that “all men err
involuntarily,” 5 and you have learned the truth, it
must needs be that you are doing right already.
But, so help me Zeus, I do not comprehend the will
of nature. Who, then, interprets it? Men say,
Chrysippus. I go and try to find out what this
interpreter of nature says. I begin not to under-
stand what he says, and look for the man who can
interpret him. “Look and consider what this
passage means,” says the interpreter, “just as if it
were in Latin!’’? What place is there here, then,
for pride on the part of the interpreter? Why,

3 Epictetus seems to be placing himself in the position of
one of his Roman pupils, who would understand Chrysippus
more easily if translated into Latin.

117

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

,ὔ > / > lal \ 4 fol
δικαίως, εἰ μόνον ἐξηγεῖται τὸ βούλημα τῆς
΄ oe.) > > > » , lead,
φύσεως, αὐτὸς δ᾽ οὐκ ἀκολουθεῖ: πόσῳ πλέον
ὌΡΗ a b , ; ὑδὲ a xX , ‘
τοῦ ἐκεῖνον ἐξηγουμένου ; οὐδὲ yap Χρυσίππου
’ὔ Μ > > , > a ae
χρείαν ἔχομεν δι’ αὐτόν, GAN ἵνα παρακολου-
θήσωμεν τῇ φύσει. οὐδὲ γὰρ τοῦ θύτου δι᾽
> , > 2: “ΓΚ > > / 7 [2.4
αὐτόν, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι δι’ ἐκείνου κατανοήσειν οἰόμεθα
τὰ μέλλοντα καὶ σημαινόμενα ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν,
οὐδὲ τῶν σπλάγχνων δι’ αὐτά, ἀλλ’ ὅτε δι᾽
ἐκείνων σημαίνεται, οὐδὲ τὸν κόρακα θαυμάξομεν
ἢ τὴν κορώνην, ἀλλὰ τὸν θεὸν σημαίνοντα διὰ
τούτων.
ἕρχομαι τοίνυν ἐπὶ τὸν ἐξηγητὴν τοῦτον καὶ
΄ ν 2 “ 627 , Ν ΄
θύτην καὶ λέγω ὅτι ““ἐπίσκεψαί μοι τὰ σπλάγχνα,
τί μοι σημαίνεται." λαβὼν καὶ ἀναπτύξας ἐκεῖνος
ἐξηγεῖται ὅτι “ἄνθρωπε, προαίρεσιν ἔχεις ἀκώλυτον
φύσει καὶ ἀνανάγκαστον. τοῦτο ἐνταῦθα ἐ ἐν τοῖς
σπλάγχνοις γέγραπται. δείξω σοι αὐτὸ πρῶτον
ἐπὶ τοῦ συγκαταθετικοῦ τόπου. μή τές σε κωλῦσαι
Ud > a > a 2O\ /
δύναται ἐπινεῦσαι ἀληθεῖ; οὐδὲ εἷς. μή τίς σε
ἀναγκάσαι δύναται παραδέξασθαι τὸ ψεῦδος ; οὐδὲ
εἷς. ὁρᾷς ὅτι ἐν τούτῳ τῷ τόπῳ τὸ προαιρετικὸν
ἔχεις ἀκώλυτον ἀνανάγκαστον ἀπαραπόδιστον ;
Ν 4. Ν σ᾽ ἃ op n \ c nn Ύ,
ἄγε ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ ὀρεκτικοῦ Kai ὁρμητικοῦ ἄλλως
» / ς \ a 7 ax ε ΄
ἔχει ; καὶ τίς ὁρμὴν νικῆσαι δύναται ἢ ἄλλη ὁρμή ;
Ν
τίς δ᾽ ὄρεξιν καὶ ἔκκλισιν ἢ ἄλλη ὄρεξις καὶ ἔκκλι-
x ἐξ + ” 7, ἢ / , ,
ots; “av pot,” φησί, “ προσάγῃ θανάτου φόβον,
> ; aa tives UN , »,,} «“
ἀναγκάζει με. οὐ τὸ προσαγόμενον, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι
δοκεῖ σοι κρεῖττον εἶναι ποιῆσαί τι τούτων ἢ
118

tf
᾿

BOOK 1. xvu. 17-25

there is no just place for pride even on the part
of Chrysippus, if he merely interprets the will of
nature, but himself does not follow it; how much
less place for pride, then, in the case of his inter-
preter! For we have no need of Chrysippus on his
own account, but only to enable us to follow nature,
No more have we need of him who divines through
sacrifice, considered on his own account, but simply
because we think that through his instrumentality
we shall understand the future and the signs given
by the gods; nor do we need the entrails on their
own account, but only because through them the
signs are given ; nor do we admire the crow or the
raven, but God, who gives His signs through them.
Wherefore, I go to this interpreter and diviner
and say, “ Examine for me the entrails, and tell me
what signs they give.” The fellow takes and spreads
them out and then interprets: “Man, you have a
moral purpose free by nature from hindrances and
constraint. This stands written here in these en-
trails. I will prove you that first in the sphere of
assent. Can anyone prevent you from assenting to
truth? No one at all. Can anyone force you to
accept the false? No one at all. Do you see that
in this sphere you have a moral purpose free from
hindrance, constraint, obstruction? Come, in the
sphere of desire and choice is it otherwise? And
what can overcome one impulse but another impulse ?
And what can overcome one desire or aversion but
another desire or aversion?” ‘ But,” says someone,
“if a person subjects me to the fear of death, he com-
pelsme.” “No, it is not what you are subjected to that
impels you, but the fact that you decide it is better
for you to do something of the sort than to die.

119

26
27

28

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

ἀποθανεῖν. πάλιν οὖν τὸ σὸν δόγμα σε ἠνάγκα-
σεν, τοῦτ᾽ ἔστι προαίρεσιν προαίρεσις. εἰ γὰρ
τὸ ἴδιον μέρος, ὃ ἡμῖν ἔδωκεν ἀποσπάσας ὁ θεός,
ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ ἢ ὑπ᾽ ἄλλου Twos K@AUTOV ἢ avay-
καστὸν κατεσκευάκει, οὐκέτι ἂν ἦν θεὸς οὐδ᾽
ἐπεμελεῖτο ἡμῶν ὃν δεῖ τρόπον. ταῦτα εὑρίσκω,"
φησίν, “ ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς. ταῦτά σοι σημαίνεται.

. ἐὰν θέλῃς, ἐλεύθερος εἶ: ἐὰν θέλῃς, μέμψῃ

29

οὐδένα, ,ἐγκαλέσεις οὐδενί, πάντα κατὰ νώμην
ἔσται ἅμα τὴν σὴν καὶ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ." διὰ
ταύτην τὴν μαντείαν ἔρχομαι ἐπὶ τὸν θύτην
τοῦτον καὶ τὸν φιλόσοφον, οὐκ αὐτὸν θαυμάσας
ἕνεκά γε τῆς ἐξηγήσεως, ἀλλὰ ἐκεῖνα ἃ ἐξηγεῖται.

ιη΄. “Ore οὐ δεῖ χαλεπαίνειν τοῖς ἁμαρτανομένοις

Ri ἀληθές ἐστι τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν φιλοσόφων λεγό-
μενον ὅτι πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις μία ἀρχή, καθάπερ τοῦ
συγκαταθέσθαι τὸ παθεῖν ὅτι ὑπάρχει καὶ τοῦ
ἀνανεῦσαι τὸ παθεῖν ὅτι οὐχ ὑπάρχει, καὶ νὴ
Δία τοῦ ἐπισχεῖν τὸ παθεῖν ὅτι ἄδηλόν ἐστιν,
οὕτως καὶ τοῦ ὁρμῆσαι ἐπί τι τὸ παθεῖν ὅ ὅτι ἐμοὶ
συμφέρει, ἀμήχανον δ᾽ ἄλλο μὲν κρίνειν τὸ
συμφέρον, ἄλλου δ᾽ ὀρέγεσθαι καὶ ἄλλο μὲν
κρίνειν καθῆκον, ἐπ᾽ ἄλλο δὲ ὁρμᾶν, τί ἔτι τοῖς

1 Tt is not known just what persons are here referred to,
but the doctrine that feeling (wd@os) is a kind of judge-
ment (κρίσις) or opinion (δόξα) is common among the Stoics.
See Bonhiffer, Hpiktet und die Stoa, I. 265 ff., and on the
general τε τι δα in this chapter, p. 276 ἢ.

120

-_

OO ὦ Δ“ πἰἰνὰ

BOOK I. xvn. 25—xvit. 2

Once more, then, it is the decision of your own will
which compelled you, that is, moral purpose com-
pelled moral purpose. Forif God had so constructed
that part of His own being which He has taken
from Himself and bestowed upon us, that it could
be subjected to hindrance or constraint either from
Himself or from some other, He were no longer
God, nor would He be caring for us as He ought.
This is what I find,” says the diviner, “in the sacri-
fice. These are the signs vouchsafed you. If you
will, you are free; if you will, you will not have to
blame anyone, or complain against anyone ; every-
thing will be in accordance with what is not merely
your own will, but at the same time the will of God.”
This is the prophecy for the sake of which I go to
this diviner—in other words, the philosopher,—not
admiring fim because of his interpretation, but
rather the interpretation which he gives.

CHAPTER XVIII
That we ought not to be angry with the erring

Ir what the philosophers?! say is true, that in all
men thought and action start from a single source,
namely feeling—as in the case of assent the feeling
that a thing isso, and in the case of dissent the
feeling that it is not so, yes, and, by Zeus, in the case of
suspended judgement the feeling that it is uncertain,
so also in the case of impulse towards a thing, the
feeling that it is expedient for me and that it is impos-
sible to judge one thing expedient and yet desire
another, and again, to judge one thing fitting, and
yet be impelled to another—if all this be true, why

VOL. I. F 25

3

ao

.1

10

ll

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

πολλοῖς χαλεπαίνομεν ;--- Κλέπται, φησίν, εἰσὶ

‘ , * oF \ ΄ ,
καὶ λωποδύται.--- Τί ἐστι TO κλέπται καὶ λωπο-
δύται ; πεπλάνηνται περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν.
χαλεπαίνειν οὖν δεῖ αὐτοῖς ἢ ἐλεεῖν αὐτούς ; ἀλλὰ
δεῖξον τὴν πλάνην καὶ ὄψει πῶς ἀφίστανται τῶν
ἁμαρτημάτων. ἂν δὲ μὴ βλέπωσιν, οὐδὲν ἔχου-
σιν ἀνώτερον τοῦ δοκοῦντος αὐτοῖς.

Τοῦτον οὖν τὸν ληστὴν καὶ τοῦτον τὸν μοιχὸν
οὐκ ἔδει ἀπολωλέναι ;---Μηδαμῶς, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκεῖνο
μᾶλλον “ τοῦτον τὸν πεπλανημένον καὶ ἐξηπατη-
μένον περὶ τῶν μεγίστων καὶ ἀποτετυφλωμένον
οὐ τὴν ὄψιν τὴν διακριτικὴν τῶν λευκῶν καὶ

,ὔ ? \ , \ ‘ nw
μελάνων, ἀλλὰ τὴν γνώμην τὴν διακριτικὴν TOV
ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν κακῶν μὴ ἀπολλύναι ; " κἂν οὕτως
λέγῃς, γνώσῃ πῶς ἀπάνθρωπόν ἐστιν ὃ λέγεις καὶ
ὅτι ἐκείνῳ ὅμοιον “ τοῦτον οὖν τὸν τυφλὸν μὴ
ἀπολλύναι καὶ τὸν κωφόν ; εἰ γὰρ μεγίστη βλάβη
ἡ τῶν μεγίστων ἀπώλειά ἐστιν, μέγιστον ᾿ δ᾽ ἐν
ἑκάστῳ προαίρεσις οἵα δεῖ καὶ τούτου στέρεταί
τις, τί ἔτι χαλεπαίνεις αὐτῷ ; ἄνθρωπε, εἰ σὲ δεῖ

A ’ὔ ᾽ “ > 7, a ,
mapa φύσιν ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις κακοῖς διατί-
θεσθαι, ἐλέει αὐτὸν μᾶλλον ἢ μίσει: ἄφες τοῦτο τὸ
προσκοπτικὸν καὶ μισητικόν' μὴ εἰσενέγκῃς 2 τὰς
φωνὰς ταύτας ἃς οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν φιλοψογούντων 3
“τούτους οὖν τοὺς καταράτους καὶ μιαροὺς

, 4 ” ” : \ Lal Fe 70 ”
μωρούς. ἔστω" σὺ πῶς TOT ἀπεσοφώθης ἄφνω

1 ἀπώλειά ἐστιν, μέγιστον, supplied by Schenkl.

2 Mowat: €...... πῃ.

3 Schenkl: ¢ . .. τῶν 5.
4 Supplied by Capps for a lacuna of about five letters in S.

122

a ΩΝ

ΟΊ BOOK IL. xvui. 2-11

are we any longer angry with the multitude ?>—“They
are thieves,” says someone, “ and robbers.” —What do
you mean by “thievesand robbers?” They havesimply
gone astray in questions of good and evil. Ought
we, therefore, to be angry with them, or rather pity
them? Only show them their error and you will see
how quickly they will desist from their mistakes.
But if their eyes are not opened, they have nothing
superior to their mere opinion.

Ought not this brigand, then, and this adulterer to
be put to death? you ask. Not at all, but you should
ask rather, “Ought not this man to be put to death
who is in a state of error and delusion about the
greatest matters, and is in a state of blindness, not,
indeed, in the vision which distinguishes between
white and black, but in the judgement which dis-
tinguishes between the good and the evil?” And
if you put it this way, you will realize how inhuman
a sentiment it is that you are uttering, and that τὸ.
is just as if you should say, “ Ought not this blind
man, then, or this deaf man to be put to death?”
For if the loss of the greatest things is the greatest
harm that can befall a man, while the greatest thing
in each man is a right moral purpose, and if a man
is deprived of this very thing, what ground is left
for you to be angry at him? Why, man, if you
must needs be affected in a way that is contrary to
nature at the misfortunes of another, pity him rather,
but do not hate him ; drop this readiness to take
offence and this spirit of hatred ; do not introduce
those words which the multitude of the censorious
use: “Well, then, these accursed and abominable
fools!” Very well; but how is it that you have
so suddenly been converted to wisdom that you are

123

13

14

15

16

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

ὥστε ἄλλοις μωροῖς 1 χαλεπὸς εἶ ; διὰ τί οὖν χαλε-
παίνομεν ; ὅτι τὰς ὕλας θαυμάζομεν, ὧν ἡμᾶς
ἀφαιροῦνται. ἐπεί τοι μὴ θαύμαζέ σου τὰ ἱμάτια
καὶ τῷ κλέπτῃ οὐ χαλεπαίνεις" μὴ θαύμαζε τὸ
κάλλος τῆς γυναικὸς καὶ τῷ μοιχῷ οὐ χαλεπαίνεις.
γνῶθι ὅτι κλέπτης καὶ μοιχὸς ἐν τοῖς σοῖς τόπον
οὐκ ἔχει, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις καὶ τοῖς οὐκ ἐπὶ σοί.
ταῦτα ἂν ἀφῇς καὶ παρὰ μηδὲν ἡγήσῃ, τίνι ἔτι
χαλεπαίνεις ; μέχρι δ᾽ ἂν ταῦτα θαυμάξῃς, σεαυτῷ
χαλέπαινε μᾶλλον ἢ ἐκείνοις. σκόπει γάρ" ἔχεις
καλὰ ἱμάτια, ὁ γείτων σου οὐκ ἔχει" θυρίδα ἔχεις,
θέλεις αὐτὰ ψῦξαι. οὐκ oidev ἐκεῖνος τί τὸ
ἀγαθόν ἐστι τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ἀλλὰ φαντάζεται ὅτι
τὸ ἔχειν καλὰ ἱμάτια, τοῦτο ὃ καὶ σὺ φαντάζῃη.
εἶτα μὴ ἔλθῃ καὶ ἄρῃ αὐτά; ἀλλὰ σὺ πλακοῦντα
δεικνύων ἀνθρώποις λίχνοις καὶ μόνος αὐτὸν
καταπίνων οὐ θέλεις ἵνα αὐτὸν ἁρπάσωσι; μὴ
ἐρέθιζε αὐτούς, θυρίδα μὴ ἔχε, μὴ ψῦχέ σου τὰ
ἱμάτια.

Κἀγὼ πρῴην σιδηροῦν λύχνον ἔχων παρὰ τοῖς
θεοῖς ἀκούσας ψόφον τῆς θυρίδος κατέδραμον.
εὗρον ἡρπασμένον τὸν λύχνον. ἐπελογισάμην
ὅτι ἔπαθέν τι ὁ ἄρας οὐκ ἀπίθανον. τί οὖν ;
αὔριον, φημί, ὀστράκινον εὑρήσεις. ἐκεῖνα γὰρ
ἀπολλύει, ἃ ἔχει. ““ἀπώλεσά μου τὸ ἱμάτιον."
εἶχες γὰρ ἱμάτιον. " ἀλγῶ τὴν κεφαλήν." μὴ
τι κέρατα ἀλγεῖς ; τί οὖν ἀγανακτεῖς ; τούτων

1 ὥστε (Mowat) μωροῖς supplied by Capps for a lacuna of
about eleven letters in S.

1 An illustration of the famous principle, nil admirari
(Horace, Zpist. 1. 6, 1).

124

|
|

se ον

eile

BOOK IL. xvi. 11-16

angry at fools? Why, then, are we angry? Because
we admire the goods of which these men rob us.
For, mark you, stop admiring + your clothes,and you
are not angry at the man who steals them ; stop ad-
miring your wife’s beauty, and you are not angry at
her adulterer. Know that a thief or an adulterer
has no place among the things that are your own,
but only among the things that are another’s and
that are not under your control. If you give these
things up and count them as nothing, at whom have
you still ground to feel angry? But so long as you
admire these things, be angry at yourself and not at
the men that I have just mentioned. For consider ;
you have fine clothes and your neighbour does not;
you havea window and wishtoairthem. He doesnot
know wherein the true good of man consists, but
fancies that it consists in having fine clothes, the very
same fancy that you also entertain. Shall he not
come, then, and carry them off? Why, when you
show a cake to gluttonous men and then gulp it.
down all to yourself, are you not wanting them to
snatch it? Stop provoking them, stop having a
window, stop airing your clothes.

Something similar happened to me also the other
day. I keep an iron lamp by the side of my house-
hold gods, and, on hearing a noise at the window, I
ran down. I found that the lamp had been stolen.
I reflected that the man who stole it was moved by
no unreasonable motive, Whatthen? To-morrow,
I say, you will find one of earthenware. Indeed, aman
loses only that which he already has. “I have lost
my cloak.” Yes, for you had a cloak, “I have a
pain in my head.” You don’t have a pain in your
horns, do you? Why, then, are you indignant? For

«ἰ.

17

18

20

21

22

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

γὰρ αἱ ἀπώλειαι, τούτων οἱ πόνοι, ὧν καὶ αἱ
κτήσεις. ᾿
“᾿Αλλ᾽ ὁ τύραννος δήσει ᾿ς τί; τὸ σκέλος"
“ἀλλ᾽ ἀφελεῖ".---τί; τὸν τράχηλον. τί οὖν οὐ
δήσει οὐδ᾽ ἀφελεῖ; τὴν προαίρεσιν. διὰ τοῦτο παρ-
ἤγγελλον οἱ παλαιοὶ τὸ Γνῶθι σαυτόν. τί οὖν ;

ΝΜ \ \ \ a 72% a n ae:
ἔδει νὴ τοὺς θεοὺς μελετᾶν ἐπὶ τῶν μικρῶν Kal

Ε] να 9 / > / ’ a” % \
ἀπ᾽ ἐκείνων ἀρχομένους διαβαίνειν ἐπὶ τὰ μείζω.
“κεφαλὴν ἀλγῶ. “οἴμοι μὴ λέγε. “ὠτίον ἀλγῶ."
“οἴμοι μὴ λέγε. καὶ οὐ λέγω ὅτι οὐ δέδοται στε:
νάξαι, ἀλλὰ ἔσωθεν μὴ στενάξης. μηδ᾽ ἂν βραδέως
τὸν ἐπίδεσμον ὁ παῖς φέρῃ, κραύγαζε καὶ σπῶ καὶ
7, εἰ , a ” ΄ \ \ ,
λέγε “πάντες με μισοῦσιν." Tis γὰρ μὴ μισήσῃ
\ “ ’ὔ \
τὸν τοιοῦτον ; τούτοις TO λοιπὸν πεποιθὼς τοῖς
δόγμασιν ὀρθὸς περιπάτει, ἐλεύθερος, οὐχὶ τῷ
μεγέθει πεποιθὼς τοῦ σώματος ὥσπερ ἀθλητής"
οὐ γὰρ ὡς ὄνον ἀήττητον εἶναι δεῖ.
οὖν ὁ ant Tos 5 ὃν οὐκ ἐξίστ ὐ
Τίς τ ἐ σιν ὁ ἡδὲν
τῶν ἀπροαιρέτων. εἶτα λοιπὸν ἑκάστην τῶν
περιστάσεων ἐπερχόμενος καταμανθάνω ὡς ἐπὶ
a > nr ce Φ ᾽ / \ lal lol
Tov ἀθλητοῦ. “οὗτος ἐξεβίασε τὸν πρῶτον κλῆρον.
’ μὴ Ν i / > nv n ες / δ΄
τί οὖν τὸν δεύτερον ; τί δ᾽ ἂν καῦμα ἢ ; τί δ᾽ ἐν
? / 3) ν.9 n « ΄ A > ,
Odvupria;” καὶ ἐνταῦθα ὡσαύτως. ἂν apyupt-
διον προβάλῃς, καταφρονήσει. τί οὖν ἂν κορασί-
ld = x ? f , 3 x ,
diov ; τί οὖν ἂν ἐν σκότῳ ; τί οὖν ἂν δοξάριον ;

1 That is, a man should prove himself invincible by reason
and reflection, net by brute strength, or τὰν sheer obstinacy
of passive resistance.

126

BOOK 1. xvur. 16-22

our losses and our pains have to do only with the
things which we possess.

“But the tyrant will chain ” What? Your
leg. “But he will cut off- ” What? Your
neck. What, then, will he neither chain nor cut off?
Your moral purpose. This is why the ancients gave
us the injunction, “ Know thyself.” What follows,
then? Why, by the Gods, that one ought to practise
in small things, and beginning with them pass on to
the greater. “I have a head-ache.”” Well, do not
say “Alas!” “I have an ear-ache.” Do not say
* Alas!” And Iam not saying that it is not permiss-
ible to groan, only do not groan in the centre of your
being. And if your slave is slow in bringing your
bandage, do not cry out and make a wry face and
say, “ Everybody hates me.’ Why, who would not
hate such a person? For the future put your con-
fidence in these doctrines and walk about erect, free,
not putting your confidence in the size of your body,
like an athlete; for you ought not to be invincible
in the way an ass is invincible.+

Who, then, is the invincible man? He whom
nothing that is outside the sphere of his moral
purpose can dismay, I then proceed to consider the
circumstances one by one, as I would do in the case
of the athlete. “This fellow has won the first
round. What, then, will he do in the second?
What if -it be scorching hot? And what will he do
at Olympia?” It is the same way with the case
under consideration. If you put a bit of silver coin
in a man’s way, he will despise it. Yes, but if you
put a bit of a wench in his way, what then? Or if it be
in the dark, what then? Or if you throw a bit of
reputation in his way, what then? Or abuse, what

127

23

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

/

τί οὖν ἂν λοιδορίαν; τί οὖν ἂν ἔπαινον ; τί δ᾽ ἂν

θάνατον; δύναται ταῦτα πάντα νικῆσαι. τί οὖν

x A OM. aie a 3 nn a 1 / a

ἂν καῦμα ἢ, τοῦτό ἐστι" τί, ἂν olywpévos! ἦ ; τί ἂν
a e

μελαγχολῶν ; τί ἐν ὕπνοις ; οὗτός μοί ἐστιν ὁ

ἀνίκητος ἀθλητής.

ιθ΄. Πῶς ἔχειν δεῖ πρὸς τοὺς τυράννους ;

“ ΝΜ Ὁ / a fol
Ore ἄν τινι προσῇ Te πλεονέκτημα ἢ δοκῇ γε
“ a a 4

προσεῖναι μὴ προσόν, τοῦτον πᾶσα ἀνάγκη, ἐὰν
> / s n > ? / > ‘ ι Ὁ
ἀπαίδευτος ἢ, πεφυσῆσθαι δι αὐτό. εὐθὺς ὁ
”

τύραννος λέγει “ ἐγώ εἰμι ὁ πάντων κράτιστος.

a ,ὔ
καὶ τί μοι δύνασαι παρασχεῖν ; ὄρεξίν μοι
δύνασαι περιποιῆσαι ἀκώλυτον ; πόθεν σοι; σὺ
γὰρ ἔχεις; ἔκκλισιν ἀπερίπτωτον ; σὺ γὰρ
ἔχεις ; ὁρμὴν ἀναμάρτητον; καὶ ποῦ cot
μέτεστιν ; ἄγε, ἐν νηὶ δὲ σαυτῷ θαρρεῖς ἢ τῷ
3 / > \ ᾽ “ ᾽ὔ x a 207 ’ὔ >
εἰδότι ; ἐπὶ δ᾽ ἅρματος tive ἢ τῷ εἰδότι ; τί ὃ
» ’

ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις ; ὡσαύτως. τί οὖν
δύνασαι; “πάντες με θεραπεύουσιν. καὶ γὰρ
ἐγὼ τὸ πινάκιον θεραπεύω καὶ πλύνω αὐτὸ καὶ
ἐκμάσσω καὶ τῆς ληκύθου ἕνεκα πάσσαλον

1 Upton : οἰώμενος 8.

1 Under all ordinary circumstances the man who is being
tested will resist the temptations of money, a maid, secrecy,
reputation, and the like. But if, like the athlete, he
tested under abnormal conditions, as when drunk, or mad, or
asleep, will he hold out against these temptations even then?
If he can, he is indeed invincible.

128

a

— τῆν.

BOOK 1. xvi. 22—x1x. 4

then? Or praise, what then? Or death, what
then? All these things he can overcome. What,
then, if it be scorching hot—that is, what if he be
drunk? What if he be melancholy-mad?1 What
if asleep? The man who passes all these tests is
what I mean by the invincible athlete.

CHAPTER XIX
How ought we to bear ourselves toward tyrants ?

Ir a man possesses some superiority, or thinks at
least that he does, even though he does not, it is
quite unavoidable that this man, if he is uneducated,
becomes puffed up on account of it. For example,
the tyrant exclaims, “I am the mightiest in the
world.” Very well, what can you do forme? Can
you secure for me desire that is free from any
hindrance? How can you? Do you have it your-
self? Can you secure for me aversion proof against
encountering what it would avoid? Do you have it
yourself? Or infallible choice? And where can
you claim a share in that? Come, when you are on
board ship, do you feel confidence in yourself, or in
the skilled navigator? And when you are ina chariot,
in whom do you feel confidence other than the skilled
driver. And how is it in the other arts? The same
way. What does your power amount to, then? “ All
men pay attention? tome.” Yes, and I pay attention
to my little plate and wash it and wipe it out, and
for the sake of my oil-flask I drive a peg in the wall.

2 The whole passage turns on the various meanings of
θεραπεύω, which include serve, attend to, give medical care to,
pay attention to, pay court to, flatter, ete.

129

10

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

πήσσω. τί οὖν; ταῦτά μου κρείττονά ἐστιν ;
οὔ: ἀλλά χρείαν μοι παρέχει τινά. ταύτης οὖν
μά , > / 7 / Ν » >
ἕνεκα θεραπεύω αὐτά. τί dé; τὸν ὄνον οὐ θερα-
, a \ τ
Tevw ; οὐ νίπτω αὐτοῦ τοὺς πόδας ; οὐ περικα-
θαίρω; οὐκ οἶδας ὅτι πᾶς ἄνθρωπος ἑαυτὸν.
θεραπεύει, σὲ δ᾽ οὕτως ὡς τὸν ὄνον ; ἐπεὶ τίς σε
θεραπεύει ὡς ἄνθρωπον ; δείκνυε. τίς σοι θέλει
ὅμοιος γενέσθαι, τίς σου ζηλωτὴς γίνεται ὡς
Σωκράτους ; “ἀλλὰ δύναμαί σε τραχηλοκοπῆ-
gat.” καλῶς λέγεις. ἐξελαθόμην ὅτι σε δεῖ θερα-
πεύειν καὶ ὡς πυρετὸν καὶ ὡς χολέραν καὶ βωμὸν
στῆσαι, ὡς ἐν Ρώμῃ ἸΠυρετοῦ βωμός ἐστιν.
Tt οὖν ἐστι τὸ ταράσσον καὶ καταπλῆττον
\ 4 c f τ e Α
τοὺς πολλούς ; ὁ τύραννος καὶ οἱ δορυφόροι ;
πόθεν; μὴ γένοιτο’ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τὸ φύσει
ἐλεύθερον ὑπ᾽ ἄλλου τινὸς ταραχθῆναι ἢ κωλυ-
θῆναι πλὴν ὑφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ. ἀλλὰ τὰ δόγματα
αὐτὸν ταράσσει. ὅταν γὰρ ὁ τύραννος εἴπη τινὶ
DW, \ , 53) 5 x L
δήσω σου TO σκέλος, ὁ μὲν TO σκέλος τετιμη-
\ / “ ΄ » Δ 3. ἐς δὲ \ ,
κὼς λέγει “μή" ἐλέησον," ὁ δὲ τὴν προαίρεσιν
\ e a / ce ΟὟ , 7 f
τὴν ἑαυτοῦ λέγει “ εἰ TOL λυσιτελέστερον φαίνεται,
a 2? ςς ᾽ > ΄ 2Υ ἐς Ε > , ”
δῆσον. “οὐκ ἐπιστρέφῃ ; οὐκ ἐπιστρέφομαι.
ες » , ὃ ͵ ov ,ὔ , » %” “ec 10 / ,
ἐγώ σοι δείξω ὅτι κύριός εἰμι. “πόθεν σύ; ἐμὲ
ὁ Ζεὺς ἐλεύθερον ἀφῆκεν. ἢ δοκεῖς ὅτι ἔμελλεν
τὸν ἴδιον υἱὸν ἐᾶν καταδουλοῦσθαι ; τοῦ νεκροῦ
δέ μου κύριος εἶ, λάβε αὐτόν. “ὥσθ᾽ ὅταν μοι
΄ > \ > / ΕΣ] “ > 3 > 3
προσίῃς, ἐμὲ οὐ θεραπεύεις ; οὐ ἀλλ᾿ ἐμαυ-
130

BOOK I. xix, 4-10

What: follows, then? Are these things superior to
me? No, but they render me some service, and
therefore I pay attention to them. Again, do I not
pay attention to my donkey? Do I not wash his
feet?. Do 1 not curry him? Do you not know that
every man pays attention to himself, and to you just
as he does to his donkey? For who pays attention
to you as toa man? Point him out to me. Who
wishes to become like you? Who becomes a zealous
follower of yours as men did of Socrates? “ But I
can cut off your head.” Well said! I had forgotten
that I ought to pay attention to you, as to fever or
cholera, and set up an altar to you, just as in Rome
there is an altar to the God Fever.

What is it, then, that disturbs and bewilders the
multitude? Is it the tyrant and his bodyguards?
How is that possible? Nay, far from it! It is not
possible that that which is by nature free should. be
disturbed or thwarted by anything but itself. But
it is a man’s own judgements that disturb him. For
when the tyrant says to a man, “1 will chain your
leg,” the man who has set a high value on his leg
replies, “ Nay, have mercy upon me,” while the man
who has set a high value on his moral purpose replies,
“If it seems more profitable to you to do so, chain
it.” “Do you not care?” “No, I do not care.”
“1 will show you that I am master.” “How can
you be my master? Zeus has set me free. Or do
you really think that he was likely to let his own
son be made a slave? You are, however, master of
my dead body, take it.” “ You mean, then, that
when you approach me you will not pay attention
to me?” “No, I pay attention only to myself.
But if you wish me to say that I pay attention to

131

1]

12

13

16

17

18
19

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

τόν. εἰ δὲ θέλεις με λέγειν ὅτι Kal σέ, Néyw σοι
οὕτως ὡς τὴν χύτραν."

Τοῦτο οὐκ ἔστιν φίλαυτον" γέγονε γὰρ οὕτως
τὸ ἕῷον" αὑτοῦ ἕνεκα πάντα ποιεῖ. καὶ γὰρ ὁ
ἥλιος αὑτοῦ ἕνεκα πάντα ποιεῖ καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν
αὐτὸς ὁ Ζεύς. ἀλλ᾽ ὅταν θέλῃ εἶναι Ὑέτιος καὶ
᾿Επικάρπιος καὶ “πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε, ὁρᾷς
ὅτι τούτων τῶν ἔργων καὶ τῶν προσηγοριῶν οὐ
δύναται τυχεῖν, ἂν μὴ εἰς τὸ κοινὸν ὠφέλιμος ἧ.
καθόλου τε τοιαύτην τὴν + φύσιν. τοῦ λογικοῦ
ζῷου κατεσκεύασεν, ἵνα μηδενὸς τῶν ἰδίων aya-
θῶν δύνηται τυγχάνειν, ἂν" μή τι εἰς τὸ κοινὸν
ὠφέλιμον προσφέρηται. οὕτως οὐκέτι ἀκοινώνη-
τον γίνεται τὸ πάντα αὑτοῦ ἕνεκα ποιεῖν. ἐπεὶ
τί ἐκδέχῃ ; ; ἵνα τίς ἀποστῇ αὑτοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἰδίου
συμφέροντος ; ; καὶ πῶς ἔτι “μία καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρχὴ
πᾶσιν ἔσται ἡ πρὸς αὑτὰ οἰκείωσις;

Τί οὖν; ὅταν ὑπῇ δόγματα ἀλλόκοτα περὶ
τῶν ἀπροαιρέτων ὡς ὃ ὄντων ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν,
πᾶσα ἀνάγκη θεραπεύειν τοὺς τυράννους... ὄφε-
λον “γὰρ τοὺς τυράννους μόνον, τοὺς κοιτωνίτας
δ᾽ οὔ. πῶς δὲ καὶ φρόνιμος γίνεται ἐξαίφνης ὁ
ἄνθρωπος, ὅταν Καῖσαρ αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τοῦ λασάνου
ποιήσῃ. πῶς εὐθὺς λέγομεν “φρονίμως μοι λελά-
ληκεν Φηλικίων." ἤθελον αὐτὸν ἀποβληθῆναι
τοῦ κοπρῶνος, ἵνα πάλιν ἄφρων σοι δοκῇ. εἶχέν
τινα ᾿Επαφρόδιτος. σκυτέα, ὃν διὰ τὸ ὄχοηστον
εἶναι ἐπώχησεν. εἶτα ἐκεῖνος κατά τινα δαίμονα

1 Added by Koraes. 2 Added by Trincavelli.
3 Wolf: πῶς S.

1 That is, the whole order of nature requires every living
thing to appropriate, or make its own, whatever it needs in
order to maintain life,

132

Sn’

“νὰν σον

BOOK I. χιχ. 1ro-19

you too,I tell you that I do so, but only as I pay
attention to my pot.”

_ This is not mere self-love; such is the nature of
the animal man ; everything that he does is for him-
self. Why, even the sun does everything for its
own sake, and, for that matter, so does Zeus himself.
But when Zeus wishes to be “ Rain-bringer,” and
“‘ Fruit-giver,” and “Father of men and of gods,”
you can see for yourself that he cannot achieve these
works, or win these appellations, unless he proves
himself useful to the common interest ; and in general
he has so constituted the nature of the rational
animal man, that he can attain nothing of his own
proper goods unless he contributes something to the
common interest. Hence it follows that it can no
longer be regarded as unsocial for a man to do every-
thing for his own sake. For what do you expect?
That a man should neglect himself and his own
interest? And in that case how can there be room
for one and the same principle of action for all,
namely, that of appropriation? to their own
needs ?

What then? When men entertain absurd opinions
about what lies outside the province of the moral
purpose, counting it good or bad, it is altogether
unavoidable for them to pay attention to the tyrant.
Aye, would that it were merely the tyrants and not
their chamberlains too! And yet how can the man
suddenly become wise when Caesar puts him in
charge of his chamberpot? How can we forthwith
say “ Felicio has spoken wisely to me”? I would
that he were deposed from the superintendency of
the dunghill, that you may think him a fool again!
Epaphroditus owned a certain cobbler whom he sold
because he was useless; then by some chance the

133

20
21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

> = ‘ a , a lol
ayopacbels ὑπό τινός | τῶν Καισαριανῶν τοῦ
Καίσαρος σκυτεὺς ἐγένετο. εἶδες ἂν πῶς αὐτὸν
ἐτίμα ὁ ᾽Ἔ ὑπαφρόδιτος" aha πράσσει Φηλικίων ὁ a
ἀγαθός, φιλῶ σε; εἶτα εἴ τις ἡμῶν ἐπύθετο “Ti
ποιεῖ autos; ἐλέγετο ὅτι “μετὰ Φηλικίωνος
βουλεύεται περί τινος." οὐχὶ γὰρ πεπράκει

att ¢ Υ , Φ ὡς » ipa?
αὐτὸν ὡς ἄχρηστον ; Tis οὖν αὐτὸν ἄφνω φρό-
νιμον ἐποίησεν ; τοῦτ᾽ ἔστι τὸ τιμᾶν ἄλλο TE
ἢ τὰ προαιρετικά.

“᾿Ἤξίωται δημαρχίας." πάντες οἱ ἀπαντῶντες
συνήδονται" ἄλλος τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς καταφιλεῖ,
ἄλλος τὸν τράχηλον, οἱ δοῦλοι τὰς χεῖρας.
ἔρχεται εἰς οἶκον, εὑρίσκει λύχνους ἀπτρμέηομϑι
ἀναβαίνει εἰς τὸ Καπιτώλιον, ἐπιθύει. τίς οὖν
πώποτε ὑπὲρ τοῦ ὀρεχθῆνάι καλῶς ἔθυσεν ;
ὑπὲρ τοῦ ὁρμῆσαι κατὰ pore ἐκεῖ γὰρ καὶ
θεοῖς εὐχαριστοῦμεν, ὅπου τὸ ἀγαθὸν τιθέμεθα.

Σήμερόν τις ὑπὲρ ἱερωσύνης ἐλάλει μοι τοῦ
Αὐγούστου. λέγω αὐτῷ “ἄνθρωπε, ἄφες τὸ
πρᾶγμα: δαπανήσεις πολλὰ εἰς οὐδέν.".---“᾿Αλλ᾽

€ \ > ,» 5395:.09 ἈΠ εὖ , ΄ \
οἱ Tas wvas, * φησί, “γράφοντες γράψουσι τὸ
aie | ” ΠῚ <é , > \ a ᾽ ΄
ἐμὸν ὄνομα." -“ Μή τι οὖν σὺ τοῖς ἀναγιγνώ-
σκουσι λέγεις παρών" ἐμὲ γεγράφασιν ; εἰ δὲ καὶ
νῦν δύνασαι παρεῖναι πᾶσιν, ἐὰν ἀποθάνῃς, τί
ποιήσεις ;-- “ Mevet μου τὸ ὄνομα.᾽"---“ Γράψον
αὐτὸ εἰς λίθον καὶ μενεῖ. ἄγε ἔξω δὲ Νικο-

1 ὅπου τὸ Shaftesbury : of τοῦτο S.
3.0. Hirschfeld (γ᾽ avds Diels): φωνάς 8.
134

Tat BOOK I. xix. 19-28

fellow was bought by a member of Caesar’s household
and became cobbler to Caesar. You should have
seen how Epaphroditus honoured him! “ How is
my good Felicio, I pray you?” he used to say. And
then if someone asked us, “ What is your master!
doing ?”’ he was told, “ He is consulting Felicio about
something or other.” Why, had he not sold him as
being useless? Who, then, had suddenly made a
wise man out of him? This is what it means to
honour something else than what lies within the
province of the moral purpose.

“He has been honoured with a tribuneship,”
someone says. All who meet him offer their con-
gratulations; one man kisses him on the eyes, another
on the neck, his slaves kiss his hands. He goes
home ; he finds lamps being lighted. He climbs up
the Capitol and offers sacrifice. Now who ever sacri-
ficed as a thank-offering for having had right desire,
or for having exercised choice in accordance with
nature? For we give thanks to the gods for that
wherein we set the good.

To-day a man was talking to me about a priest-
hood of Augustus. I say to him, “ Man, drop the
matter; you will be spending a great deal to no
purpose.” “But,” says he, “those who draw up
deeds of sale will inscribe my name.” “Do you
really expect, then, to be present when the deeds
are read and say, ‘That is my name they have
written’? And even supposing you are now able
to be present whenever anyone reads them, what
will you do if you die?” ‘My name will remain
after me.” “ Inscribe it on a stone and it will remain
after you. Come now, who will remember you outside

- Epaphroditus once owned Epictetus.
135

29

wo =

o

59.

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

πόλεως τίς σου μνεία ;”— AAA χρυσοῦν στέ-
φανον φορήσω."---“ Εἰ ἅπαξ ἐπιθυμεῖς στεφάνου,
ῥόδινον λαβὼν περίθου: ὄψει γὰρ κομψότερον."

κ΄. Περὶ τοῦ λόγου πῶς αὑτοῦ θεωρητικός, —
» | ᾿
ἐστιν.

Πᾶσα τέχνη καὶ δύναμις προηγουμένων τινῶν
ἐστι θεωρητική. ὅταν μὲν οὖν ὁμοειδὴς τοῖς
θεωρουμένοις καὶ αὐτή, ἀναγκαίως καὶ αὑτῆς
γίνεται θεωρητική" ὅταν δ᾽ ἀνομογενής,ϊ οὐ δύνα-
tat θεωρεῖν ἑαυτήν. οἷον σκυτική περὶ δέρματα
ἀναστρέφεται, αὐτὴ δὲ παντελῶς ἀπήλλακται
τῆς ὕλης τῶν δερμάτων: διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἔστιν
αὑτῆς θεωρητική. γραμματικὴ πάλιν περὶ τὴν
ἐγγράμματον φωνήν. μή τι οὖν ἐστι καὶ αὐτὴ
ἐγγράμματος φωνή; οὐδαμῶς. διὰ τοῦτο οὐ
δύναται θεωρεῖν ἑαυτήν. ὁ οὖν λόγος πρὸς τί
ποτε ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως παρείληπται ; πρὸς χρῆσιν
φαντασιῶν οἵαν δεῖ. αὐτὸς οὖν τί ἐστιν ;
σύστημα ἐκ ποιῶν φαντασιῶν: οὕτως γίνεται
φύσει καὶ αὑτοῦ θεωρητικός. πάλιν ἡ φρόνησις
τίνα θεωρήσουσα παρελήλυθεν ; ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακὰ
καὶ οὐδέτερα. αὐτὴ 5 οὖν τί ἐστιν; ἀγαθόν.
ἡ δ᾽ ἀφροσύνη τί ἐστιν; κακόν. ὁρᾷς οὖν ὅτι

1 Meibom: ἂν enoyente 5.
2 Schegk : αὕτη S.

1 The city in which Epictetus taught during the latter
part of his life, and where the present conversation is clearly
thought of as taking place. Greek and Roman documents,

* instead of being attested, as most commonly among us, by a

136

ITS BOOK 1 xtx. 28-xx. 6

of Nicopolis?” 4 “ But I shall wear a crown of gold.”
“1 you desire a crown at all, take a crown of roses
and put it on; you will look much more elegant in
that.”

CHAPTER XX

How the reasoning faculty contemplates itself

Every art and faculty makes certain things the
special object of its contemplation. Now when the
art or faculty itself is of like kind with what it
contemplates, it becomes inevitably self-contem-
plative; but when it is of unlike kind, it cannot
contemplate itself. For example, the art of leather-
working has to do with hides, but the art itself is
altogether different from the material of hides, where-
fore it is not self-contemplative. Again, the art of
grammar has to do with written speech; it is not,
therefore, also itself written speech, is it? Not at
all.. For this reason it cannot contemplate itself.
Well then, for what purpose have we received reason
from nature? For the proper use of external impres-
sions. What, then, 15. reason itself? Something
composed out of a certain kind of external impres-
sions. Thus it comes naturally to be also self-
contemplative. Once more, what are the things that
wisdom has been given us to contemplate? Things
good, bad, and neither good nor bad. What, then,
is wisdom itself? A good. And whatisfolly? An
evil. Do you see, then, that wisdom inevitably comes

single notary, contained many names of witnesses, eponymous
magistrates, supervising officials, and the like. A priest of
Augustus would naturally be called in often to sign formal
documents in one capacity or another.

137

10

11

12

18

14

15

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

ἀναγκαίως καὶ αὑτῆς γίνεται καὶ τῆς ἐναντίας

θεωρητική; διὰ τοῦτο ἔργον τοῦ φιλοσόφου τὸ

μέγιστον καὶ πρῶτον δοκιμάζειν τὰς φαντασίας
καὶ διακρίνειν καὶ μηδεμίαν ἀδοκίμαστον προσφέ-
ρεσθαι. ὁρᾶτε ἐπὶ τοῦ νομίσματος, ὅπου δοκεῖ
τι εἶναι πρὸς ἡμᾶς, πῶς καὶ τέχνην ἐξευρήκαμεν
καὶ ὅσοις ὁ ἀργυρογνώμων προσχρῆται. πρὸς
δοκιμασίαν τοῦ νομίσματος, τῇ ὄψει, τῇ ἁφῇ,
τῇ ὀσφρασίᾳ, τὰ τελευταῖα τῇ ἀκοῇ: ῥίψας 1 τὸ
δηνάριον τῷ ψόφῳ προσέχει καὶ οὐχ ἅπαξ ἀρκεῖ-
ται ψοφήσαντος, ἀλλ᾽ ὑπὸ τῆς πολλῆς προσοχῆς
μουσικὸς γίνεται. οὕτως ὅπου διαφέρειν οἰόμεθα.

τὸ πλανᾶσθαι τοῦ μὴ πλανᾶσθαι, ἐνταῦθα πολ-

λὴν προσοχὴν εἰσφέρομεν εἰς διάκρισιν τῶν δια-
πλανᾶν δυναμένων, ἐπὶ δὲ ταλαιπώρου ἡγεμονικοῦ
χάσκοντες καὶ καθεύδοντες, πᾶσαν φαντασίαν
παραπροσδεχόμεθα: ἡ γὰρ ξημία οὐ προσπίπτει.

Ὅταν οὖν θέλῃς γνῶναι, πῶς ἔχεις περὶ μὲν
τἀγαθὰ καὶ κακὰ “ἀνειμένως, “περὶ τἀδιάφορα δ᾽
ἐσπευσμένως, ἐπίστησον πῶς ἔχεις πρὸς τὸ
ἐκτυφλωθῆναι καὶ πῶς “πρὸς τὸ ἐξαπατηθῆναι
καὶ γνώσῃ ὅτι μακρὰν εἶ τοῦ ὡς δεῖ πεπονθέναι
περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν. “ ἀλλὰ πολλῆς ἔχει
χρείαν παρασκευῆς καὶ πόνου πολλοῦ καὶ μαθη-
μάτων. τί οὖν; ἐλπίξεις ὅτι τὴν μεγίστην
τέχνην ἀπὸ ὀλίγων ἔστιν ἀναλαβεῖν ; καίτοι
αὐτὸς μὲν ὁ προηγούμενος λόγος τῶν φιλοσόφων
λίαν ἐστὶν ὀλίγος. εἰ θέλεις γνῶναι, ἀνάγνωθι
τὰ Ζήνωνος καὶ ὄψει. τί γὰρ ἔχει μακρὸν

1 Schegk: ῥήξας S.

1 i.e., in the sense of basing action upon only such im-
pressions as have been tested and found to be trustworthy.

138

Es

BOOK I. xx. 6-15

to contemplate both itself and its opposite? There-

fore, the first and greatest task of the philosopher is
to test the ἱκερέεμασον and discriminate between
them, and to apply? none that has not been tested.

You all see in the matter of coinage, in which it is
felt that we have some interest, how we have even in-
vented an art, and how many means the tester employs
to test the coinage—sight, touch, smell, finally hear-
ing; he throws the denarius down and then listens
to the sound, and is not satisfied with the sound it
makes on a single test, but, as a result-of his constant
attention to the matter, he catches the tune, like a
musician. Thus, where we feel that it makes a good
deal of difference to us whether we go wrong or do
not go wrong, there we apply any amount of attention
to discriminating between things that are capable of
making us go wrong, but in the case of our governing
principle, poor thing, we yawn and sleep and errone-
ously accept any and every external impression; for
here the loss that we suffer does not attract our
attention.

When, therefore, you wish to realize how careless
you are about the good and the evil, and how zealous
you are about that which is indifferent, observe how
you feel about physical blindness on the one hand,
and mental delusion on the other, and you will find
out that you are far from feeling as you ought
about things good and things evil. “Yes, but this
requires much preparation, and much hard work, and
learning many things.” Well, what then? Do you
expect it to be possible to acquire the greatest art
with a slight effort? And yet the chief doctrine of
the philosophers is extremely brief. If you would
know, read what Zeno has to say and you will see.

139

16

17

18

19

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

[1]

εἰπεῖν ὅτι “ τέλος ἐστὶ τὸ ἕπεσθαι θεοῖς, οὐσία
δ᾽ ἀγαθοῦ χρῆσις οἵα δεῖ φαντασιῶν"; λέγε “τί
οὖν ἐστι θεὸς καὶ τί φαντασία; καὶ τί ἐστι
φύσις ἡ ἐπὶ μέρους καὶ τί ἐστε φύσις ἡ τῶν
ὅλων ;” ἤδη μακρόν. ἂν οὖν ἐλθὼν ᾿Εἰπίκουρος
ν > X “ ea \ > 2 /
εἴπῃ, ὅτι ἐν σαρκὶ δεῖ εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθόν, πάλιν
μακρὸν γίνεται καὶ ἀνάγκη ἀκοῦσαι τί τὸ προη-
γούμενόν ἐστιν ἐφ᾽ ἡμῶν, τί τὸ ὑποστατικὸν καὶ
> a“ “ ἈΝ ,ὔ > > > x
οὐσιῶδες. ὅτε τὸ κοχλίου ἀγαθὸν οὐκ εἰκὸς
“ > a ,ὔ Ν 8 oie , > ,
εἶναι ἐν τῷ κελύφει, TO οὖν TOD ἀνθρώπου εἰκός ;
σὺ δ᾽ αὐτὸς τί κυριώτερον ἔχεις, ᾿Ε'πίκουρε ; τί
ἐστιν ἐν σοὶ τὸ βουλευόμενον, τὸ ἐπισκεπτό-
μενον ἕκαστα, τὸ περὶ τῆς σαρκὸς αὐτῆς ὅτι
τὸ προηγούμενόν ἐστιν' ἐπικρῖνον ; τί δὲ καὶ
λύχνον ἅπτεις καὶ πονεῖς ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν καὶ τηλι-

al / / “ \ > ΄
καῦτα βιβλία γράφεις ; ἵνα μὴ ἀγνοήσωμεν
ἡμεῖς τὴν ἀλήθειαν ; τίνες ἡμεῖς ; τί πρὸς σὲ
ὄντες ; οὕτω μακρὸς ὁ λόγος γίνεται.

κα΄. Πρὸς τοὺς θαυμάξεσθαι θέλοντας.

Ὅταν tis ἣν δεῖ στάσιν ἔχῃ ἐν τῷ βίῳ, ἔξω
> / ” / f 7
οὐ κέχηνεν. ἄνθρωπε, τί θέλεις σοι γενέσθαι;
ἐγὼ μὲν ἀρκοῦμαι, ἂν ὀρέγωμαι καὶ ἐκκλίνω
κατὰ φύσιν, ἂν ὁρμῇ καὶ ἀφορμῇ χρῶμαι ὡς
/ a θέ 2 x >? a x
πέφυκα, ἂν προθέσει,3 ἂν ἐπιβολῇ, ἂν avy-
1 +) after ἐστιν deleted by Usener.
2 Meibom (Wolf): προσθέσει S.
140

- Pe

BOOK χχ, 15—xx1 2

For what is there lengthy in his statement: “To
follow the gods-is man’s end, and the essence οὗ.

is the proper use of external impressions ” ὃ
Ask, “ What, then, is God, and what is an external
impression? And what is nature in the individual
and nature in the universe?” You already have
a lengthy statement. If Epicurus should come and
say that the good ought to be in the flesh, again the
explanation becomes lengthy, and you must be told
what is the principal faculty within us, and what our
substantial, and what our essential, nature is. Since
it is not probable that the good of a snail lies in its
shell, is it, then, probable that the good of man lies
in his flesh? But take your own case, Epicurus;
what more masterful faculty do you yourself possess ?
What is that thing within you which takes counsel,
which examines into all things severally, which, after
examining the flesh itself, decides that it is the
principal matter? And why do you light a lamp
and toil in our behalf, and write such quantities
of books? Is it that we may not fail to know the
truth? Whoare we? And what are we to you?
And so the argument becomes lengthy.

CHAPTER XXI
To those who would be admired

WueN a man has his proper station in life, he is not
all agape for things beyond it. Man, what is it you
want to have happen to you? As for myself, I am
content if 1 exercise desire and aversion in accord-
ance with nature, if I employ choice and refusal as my
nature is, and similarly employ purpose and design

141

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ow τῷ

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

καταθέσει. τί οὖν ἡμῖν ὀβελίσκον. καταπιὼν
περιπατεῖς ; “ἤθελον, ἵνα pe καὶ οἱ ἀπαντῶντες
θαυμάξωσιν. καὶ ἐπακολουθοῦντες ἐπικραυ-
γάξωσιν' ὦ μεγάλου φιλοσόφου." τίνες εἰσὶν

οὗτοι, ὑφ᾽ ὧν θαυμάξεσθαι θέλεις ; οὐχ οὗτοί,

εἰσι, περὶ ὧν εἴωθας λέγειν ὅτε μαίνονται; τί
οὖν ; ὑπὸ τῶν μαινομένων θαυμάξεσθαι θέλεις ;

κβ΄. Tlepi τῶν προλήψεων.

Ἡρολήψεις κοιναὶ πᾶσιν ᾿ ἀνθρώποις εἰσίν." καὶ
πρόληψις προλήψει οὐ μάχεται. τίς γὰρ ἡμῶν
οὐ τίθησιν, ὅτι τὸ “ἀγαθὸν συμφέρον, ἐστὶ καὶ
αἱρετὸν καὶ ἐκ πάσης αὐτὸ περιστάσεως, δεῖ
μετιέναι καὶ διώκειν ; - “τίς δ᾽ ἡμῶν οὐ τίθησιν,
ὅτι τὸ δίκαιον καλόν ἐστι καὶ πρέπον ; πότ᾽
οὖν ἡ μάχη γίνεται ; περὶ τὴν ἐφαρμογὴν τῶν
προλήψεων ταῖς ἐπὶ μέρους οὐσίαις, ὅταν ὁ μὲν
εἴπη “᾿καλῶς ἐποίησεν, ἀνδρεῖός ἐστιν"" “ οὔ,
ἀλλ᾽ ἀπονενοημένος." ἔνθεν ἡ μάχη γίνεται
τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πρὸς ἀλλήλους. αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ
᾿Ιουδαίων καὶ Σύρων καὶ Αἰγυπτίων καὶ Ρωμαίων
μάχη, οὐ περὶ τοῦ ὅτε τὸ ὅσιον πάντων προ.
τιμητέον καὶ ἐν παντὶ ἡ μεταδιωκτέον, ἀλλὰ πότερόν
ἐστιν ὅσιον τοῦτο τὸ χοιρείου φαγεῖν ἢ ἢ ἀνόσιον.
ταύτην τὴν μάχην εὑρήσετε, καὶ ᾿Αγαμέμνονος
καὶ ᾿Αχιλλέως. κάλει γὰρ αὐτοὺς εἰς τὸ μέσον.
τί λέγεις σύ, ὦ ᾿Αγάμεμνον ; οὐ δεῖ γενέσθαι

1 Of one with a stiff and self-important bearing. Our
equivalent phrase is “to swallow a ramrod.” :

142

——

BOOK I. xxi. 2-xx1. 5

and assent. | Why, then, do you walk around in our
presence as though you had swallowed a spit?! . “It
_ has always been my wish that those who meet me

should admire me and as they follow me: should
exclaim,‘O the great philosopher!’” Who are
those people by whom you wish to be admired?
Are they not these about whom you are in the habit
of saying that they are mad? Whatthen? Doyou
wish to be admired by the mad?

CHAPTER XXII
Of our preconceplions

PRECONCEPTIONS are common to all men, and one
preconception does not contradict another. For who
among us does not assume that the good is profitable
and something to be chosen, and that in every
circumstance we ought to seek and pursue it?) And
who among us does not assume that righteousness is
beautiful and becoming? When, then, does con-
tradiction arise? It arises in the application of our
preconceptions to the particular cases, when one
person says, “ He did nobly, he is brave”; another,
“No, but he is out of his mind.” Thence arises the
conflict of men with one another. This is the conflict
betweenJews and Syrians and Egyptians and Romans,
not over the question whether holiness should be put
before everything else and should be pursued in all
circumstances, but whether the particular act of
eating swine’s flesh is holy or unholy. This, you
will find, was also the cause of conflict between
Agamemnon and Achilles. Come, summon them
before us. Whatdo you say, Agamemnon? Ought

143

.1

10

ll

12

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS
τὰ δέοντα καὶ τὰ καλῶς ἔχοντα ; “ δεῖ μὲν οὖν."
σὺ δὲ τί λέγεις, ὦ ᾿Αχιλλεῦ ; οὐκ ἀρέσκει σοι
γίνεσθαι τὰ καλῶς ἔχοντα ; “ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν

΄ , way » > , i
πάντων μάλιστα ἀρέσκει. εφαρμόσατε οὖν

τὰς προλήψεις. ἐντεῦθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ μάχης. ὁ
μὲν λέγει “οὐ χρὴ ἀποδιδόναι με τὴν Χρυσηίδα
τῷ πατρί, ὁ δὲ λέγει “ δεῖ μὲν οὖν." πάντως
ἘΠ ΟΝ > A a > ld \ /

0 ἕτερος αὐτῶν κακῶς ἐφαρμόζει τὴν πρόληψιν
a , / «ς \ , “ > a νΝ
τοῦ δέοντος. πάλιν ὁ μὲν λέγει “οὐκοῦν, εἴ με
δεῖ ἀποδοῦναι τὴν Χρυσηίδα, δεῖ με λαβεῖν ὑμῶν
τινος τὸ yépas,” ὁ δέ “τὴν ἐμὴν οὖν λάβῃς
ἐρωμένην ; “τὴν σήν" φησίν. “ ἐγὼ οὖν
’ 9846 pia pea dg ity 1 εἴν \ » » Ὁ ,
μονος---; “ἀλλ᾿ ἐγὼ μόνος μὴ ἔχω; οὕτως μάχη

γίνεται.
Τί οὖν ἐστι τὸ παιδεύεσθαι; μανθάνειν τὰς
\ / > , al , A "4
φυσικὰς προλήψεις ἐφαρμόζειν ταῖς ἐπὶ μέρους
οὐσίαις καταλλήλως τῇ φύσει καὶ λοιπὸν διελεῖν,
ὅτι τῶν ὄντων τὰ μέν ἐστιν ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν, τὰ δὲ οὐκ
33? eT 34? AR \ / \ 4
ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν' ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν μὲν προαίρεσις καὶ πάντα
\ \ » > 27> tC A \ \ na ͵
τὰ προαιρετικὰ ἔργα, οὐκ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν δὲ τὸ σῶμα,
τὰ μέρη τοῦ σώματος, κτήσεις, γονεῖς, ἀδελφοί,
τέκνα, πατρίς, ἁπλῶς οἱ κοινωνοί. ποῦ οὖν
an ἈΝ > la / > > ἈΝ > /
θῶμεν τὸ ἀγαθόν; ποίᾳ οὐσίᾳ αὐτὸ ἐφαρμό-
lol >,? aa 3 » » > Ν
σομεν; τῇ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν;--Εἶτα οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθὸν
ὑγίεια καὶ ἀρτιότης καὶ Con, ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ τέκνα
144

— νας

BOOK I. xxu. 5-12

not that to be done which is proper, and that which
is noble? “Indeed it ought.” And what do you
say, Achilles? Do you not agree that what is noble
ought to be done? “As for me, I agree most
emphatically with that principle.” Very well, then,
apply your preconceptions to the particular cases.
It is just there the conflict starts. The one says, “1
ought not to be compelled to give back Chryseis to
her father,” while the other says, “Indeed you
ought.” Most certainly one of the two is making a
bad application of the preconception “ what one ought
to do.” Again, the one of them says, “ Very well,
if I ought to give back Chryseis, then I ought to take
from some one of you the prize he has won,” and the
other replies, ““ Would you, then, take the woman |
love?” “Yes, the woman you love,’ the first
answers. “Shall I, then, be the only one—?”
“ But shall I be the only one to have nothing?”
So a conflict arises.

What, then, does it mean to be getting an educa-
tion? It means to be learning how to apply the
natural preconceptions to particular cases, each to
the other in conformity with nature, and, further, to
make the distinction, that some things are under our
control while others are not under our control.
Under our control are moral purpose and all the
acts of moral purpose ; but not under our control are
the body, the parts of the body, possessions, parents,
brothers, children, country—in a word, all that with
which we associate. Where, then, shall we place
“the good”’? To what class of things are we going
to apply it? To the class of things that are under
our control ?—What, is not health, then, a good thing,
and a sound body, and life? Nay, and not even

145

13

14

15

16

17

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ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

οὐδὲ γονεῖς οὐδὲ πατρίς ;---Καὶ τίς σου ἀνέξεται ; c
μεταθῶμεν οὖν αὐτὸ πάλιν ἐνθάδε. ἐνδέχεται
οὖν βλαπτόμενον καὶ ἀποτυγχάνοντα τῶν ἀγαθῶν

εὐδαιμονεῖν s—OvK ἐνδέχεται.--- Καὶ τηρεῖν τὴν.

πρὸς τοὺς κοινωνοὺς οἵαν δεῖ ἀναστροφήν ; καὶ
πῶς ἐνδέχεται ; oe; yap πέφυκα πρὸς τὸ ἐμὸν

συμφέρον. εἰ συμφέ pet μοι ἀγρὸν ἔχειν, συμφέρει
μοι καὶ @ ελέσθαι αὐτὸν τοῦ πλησίον: εἰ συμ-

φέρει μοι ἱμάτιον ἔχειν, συμφέρει μοι καὶ κλέψαι

αὐτὸ ἐκ βαλανείου. ἔνθεν πόλεμοι, στάσεις,
τυραννίδες, ἐπιβουλαί. πῶς δ᾽ ἔτι δυνήσομαι
ἀποδιδόναι * τὸ πρὸς τὸν Δία καθῆκον ; εἰ γὰρ
βλάπτομαι καὶ ,ἀτυχῶ, οὐκ “ἐπιστρέφεταί μου.
καὶ “τί μοι. καὶ αὐτῷ, εἰ οὐ δύναταί μοι βοη-
θῆσαι ;᾽ γ καὶ πάλιν “πὰ μοι καὶ αὐτῷ, εἰ θέλει
μ᾽ ἐν τοιούτοις εἶναι ἐν οἷς εἰμι ; i ἄρχομαι λοιπὸν
μισεῖν αὐτόν. τί οὖν ναοὺς ποιοῦμεν, τί οὖν
ἀγάλματα, ὡς κακοῖς δαίμοσιν, ὡς πυρετῷ τῷ
Διί; καὶ πῶς ἔτι Σωτὴρ καὶ πῶς Ὕξέτιος καὶ
πῶς ᾿Ἐπικάρπιος ; καὶ μήν, ἂν ἐνταῦθά που
θῶμεν τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, πάντα ταῦτα
ἐξακολουθεῖ.

Ti οὖν ποιήσωμεν ;-- Αὕτη ἐστὶ ξήτησις τοῦ
φιλοσοφοῦντος τῷ ὄντι καὶ ὠδίνοντος" νῦν ἐγὼ
οὐχ ὁρῶ τί ἐστι τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν" οὐ
μαίνομαι; ναί: ἀλλ᾽ ἂν 8 ἐνταῦθά που θῶ τὸ
ἀγαθόν, ἐν τοῖς προαιρετικοῖς, πάντες μου κατα-
γελάσονται. ἥξει τις γέρων πολιὸς χρυσοῦς

1 Added by Kronenberg. 2 Suggested by Schenkl.
8 Added by Schenkl.

1 Of. I. 19, 6, an altar of Fever in Rome.
146

a

- BOOK I. xxu. 12-18

children, or parents, or country ?—And who will
tolerate you if you deny that? Therefore, let us
transfer the designation “good” to these things.
But is it possible, then, for a man to be happy if he
sustains injury and fails to get that which is good ?—It
is not possible.—And to maintain the proper relations
with his associates? And how can it be possible Ὁ
For it is my nature to look out for my own interest.
If it is my interest to have a farm, it is my interest
to take it away from my neighbour; if it is my
interest to have a cloak, it is my interest also to steal
it from a bath. This is the source of wars, seditions,
tyrannies, plots. And again, how shall I any longer
be able to perform my duty towards Zeus? For if 1
sustain injury and am unfortunate, he pays no heed
tome. And then we hear men saying,“ What have
I to do with him, if he is unable to help us?” And
again, “ What have I to do with him, if he wills that
I be in such a state as am now?” The next step
is that 1 begin to hate him. Why, then, do we
build temples to the gods, and make statues of them,
as for evil spirits—for Zeus as for a god of Fever ??
And how can he any longer be “ Saviour,” and
“ Rain-bringer,’ and “ Fruit-giver?”’ And, in truth,
if we set the nature of the good somewhere in this
sphere, all these things follow.

What, then, shall we do?—This is a subject of
enquiry for the man’ who truly philosophizes and is
in travail of thought. Says such a man to himself,
“1 do not now see what is the good and what is the
evil; am I not mad?” Yes, but suppose I set the
good somewhere here, among the things that the will
controls, all men will laugh at me. Some white-
haired old man with many a gold ring on his fingers

147

19

20

21

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ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

δακτυλίους ἔχων πολλούς, εἶτα ἐπισείσας τὴν
κεφαλὴν ἐρεῖ “ ἄκουσόν μου, τέκνον" δεῖ μὲν καὶ
φιλοσοφεῖν, δεῖ δὲ καὶ ἐγκέφαλον ἔχειν" ταῦτα
μωρά ἐστὶν. σὺ παρὰ τῶν φιλοσόφων μανθάνεις
συλλογισμόν, τί δέ σοι ποιητέον ἐστίν, σὺ
κάλλιον οἶδας ἢ οἱ φιλόσοφοι." ἄνθρωπε, τί
οὖν μοι ἐπιτιμᾷς, εἰ οἶδα ; τούτῳ τῷ ἀνδραπόδῳ
τί εἴπω ; ἂν σιωπῶ, ῥήγνυται ἐκεῖνος. ὡς δεῖ
λέγειν ὅτι “σύγγνωθί pot ὡς τοῖς ἐρῶσιν: οὐκ

εἰμὶ ἐμαυτοῦ, μαίνομαι."

κγ΄. Updos ᾿Επίκουρον.

Ἐπινοεῖ καὶ ᾿Επίκουρος 6 ὅτι φύσει ἐσμὲν κοι-
νωνικοί, ἀλλ᾽ ἅπαξ ἐν τῷ κελύφει θεὶς τὸ ἀγαθὸν
ἡμῶν οὐκέτι δύναται ἄλλο οὐδὲν εἰπεῖν. πάλιν
γὰρ ἐκείνου λίαν κρατεῖ, ὅτι οὐ δεῖ ἀπεσπασμένον
οὐδὲν τῆς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ οὐσίας οὔτε θαυμάζειν
οὔτ᾽ ἀποδέχεσθαι" καὶ καλῶς αὐτοῦ κρατεῖ...
πῶς οὖν ἔτι κοινωνικοί 1 ἐσμεν, οἷς μὴ φυσικὴ
ἔστι πρὸς τὰ ἔ ἔγγονα φιλοστοργία ; διὰ τί ἀπο-
συμβουλεύεις τῷ σοφῷ τεκνοτροφεῖν a τί φοβῇ
μὴ διὰ ταῦτα εἰς λύπας ἐμπέσῃ ; διὰ γὰρ τὸν
Μῦν τὸν ἔσω τρεφόμενον ἐμπίπτει; τί οὖν
αὐτῷ μέλει, ἂν Μυίδιον. μικρὸν ἔσω κατακλαίῃ
αὐτοῦ ; ἀλλ᾽ οἶδεν, ὅτι, ἂν ἅπαξ γένηται παιδίον,

Ἵ Wolf: ὑπονοητικοί S.
3 Bentley: μῦν S and the editions.

1 The reference here is clearly to Mys (‘‘Mouse”), a
favourite slave of Epicurus, who was brought up in his
house, and took an active part in his philosophical studies,

148

BOOK I. xxu. 18—xxu1. 5

will come along, and then he will shake his head and
say, “ Listen to me, my son ; one ought of course to
philosophize, but one ought also to keep one’s head ;
this is all nonsense, You learn a syllogism from the
philosophers, but you know better than the
philosophers what you ought to do.” Man, why,
then, do you censure me, if 1 know? What shall
I say to this slave? If I hold my peace, the fellow
bursts with indignation. So I must say, “ Forgive
me as you would lovers; I am not my own master ;
I am mad.”

CHAPTER XXIII
In answer to Epicurus

Even Epicurus understands that we are by nature
social beings, but having once set our good in the
husk which we wear, he cannot go on and say any-
thing inconsistent with this. For, he next insists
emphatically upon the principle that we ought
neither to admire nor to accept anything that is
detached from the nature of the good; and he is
right in so doing. But how, then, can we still be
social beings, if affection for our own children is not
a natural sentiment? Why do you dissuade the
wise man from bringing up children? Why are you
afraid that sorrow will come to him on their account ?
What, does sorrow come to him on account of his
house-slave Mouse?! Well, what does it matter
to him if his little Mouse in his home begins to
ery? Nay he knows, that if once a child is born,
as Bentley saw (cf. Trans. Amer. Philol. Assoc., LII., 451).

There is no evidence to support the common explanation
that Epicurus had compared children to mice.

149

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οὐκέτι ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν ἐστι μὴ στέργειν μηδὲ φροντίζειν
ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ. διὰ τοῦτο φησὶν οὐδὲ πολιτεύσεσθαι"
τὸν νοῦν ἔχοντα' οἶδεν γὰρ τίνα δεῖ ποιεῖν τὸν
πολιτευόμενον: ἐπείτοι εἰ ὡς ἐν μυΐαις μέλλεις
ἀναστρέφεσθαι, τί κωλύει; ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως 3 εἰδὼς
ταῦτα τολμᾷ λέγειν ὅτι “ μὴ ἀναιρώμεθα, τέκνα."
ἀλλὰ πρόβατον μὲν οὐκ ἀπολείπει τὸ αὑτοῦ
ἔγγονον οὐδὲ λύκος, ἄνθρωπος δ᾽ ἀπολείπει; τί
θέλεις ; ; μωροὺς ἡμᾶς εἶναι ὡς τὰ πρόβατα; δύδ'
ἐκεῖνα ἀπολείπει. θηριώδεις ὡς τοὺς λύκους ;
οὐδ᾽ ἐκεῖνοι ἀπολείπουσιν. ἄγε, τίς δέ σοι πεί-
θεται ἰδὼν παιδίον αὐτοῦ κλαῖον ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν
πεπτωκός ; ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι ὅτι εἰ καὶ ἐμαντεύσατο
ἡ μήτηρ σου καὶ ὁ πατήρ, ὅτε μέλλεις ταῦτα
λέγειν, οὐκ ἄν σε ἔρριψαν.

/ -“ Ν \ , > / :
κδ΄. Πῶς πρὸς τὰς περιστάσεις ἀγωνιστέον ;

Αἱ περιστάσεις εἰσὶν ai τοὺς ἄνδρας δεικνύου-
σαι. λοιπὸν ὅταν ἐμπέσῃ περίστασις, μέμνησο
ὅτι ὁ θεός σε ὡς ἀλείπτης τραχεῖ νεανίσκῳ συμβέ-
βληκεν. 8_"Ipa τί; φησίν.---“ Iva ᾿Ολυμπιονίκης
γένῃ" δίχα δ᾽ ἱδρῶτος οὐ γίγνεται. ἐμοὶ μὲν
οὐδεὶς δοκεῖ κρείσσονα ἐσχηκέναι περίστασιν ἧς σὺ
ἔσχηκας, ἂν θέλῃς ὡς ἀθλητὴς νεανίσκῳ χρῆσθαι.

1 Upton (after Schegk) : πολιτεύσασθαι S.
2 Kronenberg: 6 μὴ S. 5. Wolf: βέβληκεν S.

1 Since flies have no social organization or relationships,
and there is nothing to compel one to live like a man, and
not like an unsocial animal, except one’s own sense of fitness
of things.

150

~ BOOK I. χχπι. 5-Χχιν. 2

it is no longer in our power not to love it or to
care for it. For the same reason Epicurus says that
a man of sense does not engage in politics either;
for he knows what the man who engages in politics
has to do—since, of course, if you are going to live
among men as though you were a fly among flies,
what is to hinder you? Yet, despite the fact that
he knows this, he still has the audacity to say,
“Let us not bring up children.” But a sheep does
not abandon its own offspring, nor a wolf; and yet
does a man abandon his?) What do you wish us to
do? Would you have us be foolish as sheep? But
even they do not desert their offspring. Would you
have us be fierce as wolves? But even they do not
desert their offspring. Come now, who follows your
advice when he sees his child fallen on the ground
and crying? Why, in my opinion, your mother and
your father, even if they had divined that you were
going to say such things, would not have exposed
you!

CHAPTER XXIV
How should we struggle against di ies ?

[τ is difficulties that show what men are. Con-
sequently, when a difficulty befalls, remember that
God, like a physical trainer, has matched you with
a rugged young man. What for? some one says,
So that you may become an Olympic victer; but
that cannot be done without sweat. To my way of
thinking no one has got a finer difficulty than the
one which you have got, if only you are willing to
make use of it as an athlete makes use of a young

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10

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

καὶ νῦν ἡμεῖς ye eis τὴν Ῥώμην κατάσκοπον
πέμπομεν. οὐδεὶς δὲ δειλὸν κατάσκοπον πέμπει,
ἵν᾽, ἂν μόνον ἀκούσῃ ψόφου καὶ σκιάν ποθεν ἴδῃ,
τρέχων ἔλθῃ τεταραγμένος καὶ λέγων ἤδη παρεῖναι
τοὺς πολεμίους. οὕτως νῦν καὶ σὺ ἂν ἐλθὼν ἡμῖν
εἴπῃς “φοβερὰ τὰ ἐν Ρώμῃ πράγματα, δεινόν ἐστι
θάνατος, δεινόν ἐστι φυγή, δεινὸν λοιδορία, δεινὸν

, ΄ ” 2 € y ”
πενία: φεύγετε ἄνδρες, πάρεισιν οἱ πολέμιοι,
ἐροῦμέν σοι “ἄπελθε, σεαυτῷ μαντεύου" ἡμεῖς
τοῦτο μόνον ἡμάρτομεν, ὅτι τοιοῦτον κατάσκοπον
ἐπέμπομεν."

Πρὸ σοῦ κατάσκοπος ἀποσταλεὶς Διογένης
ἄλλα ἡμῖν ἀπήγγελκεν. λέγει ὅτι ὁ θάνατος οὐκ
Μ / > \ \ ’ , “ > ,
ἔστι κακόν, οὐδὲ γὰρ αἰσχρόν" λέγει ὅτι ἀδοξία
ψόφος ἐστὶ μαινομένων ἀνθρώπων. οἷα δὲ περὶ
πόνου, οἷα δὲ περὶ ἡδονῆς, οἷα περὶ πενίας εἴρηκεν
οὗτος ὁ κατάσκοπος. τὸ δὲ γυμνητεύειν + λέγει
ὅτι κρεῖσσόν ἐστι πάσης περιπορφύρου" τὸ δ᾽ ἐπ᾽
ἀστρώτῳ πέδῳ καθεύδειν λέγει ὅτε μαλακωτάτη
κοίτη ἐστίν. καὶ ἀπόδειξιν φέρει περὶ ἑκάστου

\ , μ ΄ a \ > “ \
τὸ θάρσος τὸ αὑτοῦ, τὴν ἀταραξίαν, τὴν ἐλευθε-
ριαν, εἶτα καὶ τὸ σωμάτιον στίλβον καὶ συνε-
, ζῶ ἌΓ. σον hi ne ΄ > ΄
στραμμένον. οὐδείς," φησίν, “ πολέμιος ἐγγύς
ἐστιν πάντα εἰρήνης γέμει." πῶς, ὦ Διόγενες ;
ἰδού," φησίν, “ μή τι βέβλημαι, μή Tt τέτρωμαι,
μή τινα πέφευγα ;᾽ τοῦτ᾽ ἔστιν οἷος δεῖ κατά-
σκοπος, σὺ δ᾽ ἡμῖν ἐλθὼν ἄλλα ἐξ ἄλλων λέγεις.

1 Bentley: γυμνάσιον εἶναι S: γυμνὸν εἶναι 8.

152

BOOK I. xxrv. 3-10

man to wrestle with. And now we are sending you
to Rome as a scout, to spy out the land.! But no
one sends a coward as a scout, that, if he merely
hears a noise and sees a shadow anywhere, he may
come running back in terror and report “ The enemy
is already upon us.” So now also, if you should
come and tell us, “ The state of things at Rome is
fearful; terrible is death, terrible is exile, terrible
is reviling, terrible is poverty; flee, sirs, the enemy
is upon us!” we shall say to you, “‘ Away, prophesy
to yourself! Our one mistake was that we sent a
man like you as a scout.”

Diogenes, who before you was sent forth as a scout,
has brought us back a different report. He says,
“Death is not an evil, since it is not dishonour-
able”; he says, “Ill repute is a noise made by
madmen.” And what a report this scout has made
us about toil and about pleasure and about poverty !
He says, “To be naked is better than any scarlet
robe; and to sleep on the bare ground,” he says,
“is the softest couch.” And he offers as a proof of
each statement his own courage, his tranquillity, his
freedom, and finally his body, radiant with health
and hardened. “There is no enemy near,” says
he; “all is full of peace.” How so, Diogenes?
“Why, look!” says he, “I have not been struck
with any missile, have I, or received any wound?
I have not fled from anyone, have I?” This is
what it means to be a proper scout, but you return
and tell us one thing after another. Will you not

1 Domitian had banished the philosophers from Rome ;
the young man is, therefore, being sent from Nicopolis to
learn what is going on there that might be of interest to the
cause of philosophy.

VOL. I. α Ὁ

ll

12

13

14

15

16

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

οὐκ ἀπελεύσῃ πάλιν καὶ ὄψει ἀκριβέστερον δίχα
τῆς δειλίας ; ᾿

Τί οὖν “ποιήσω ;—Ti ποιεῖς, ἐκ πλοίου ὅταν
ἐξίῃς ; μή τι τὸ πηδάλιον αἴρεις, μή τι τὰς
κώπας ; ; tb οὖν αἴρεις ; Ae Ta od, τὴν λήκυθον, τὴν
πήραν. καὶ νῦν ἂν ἧς μεμνημένος τῶν σῶν,
οὐδέποτε τῶν ἀχλοτρίων a ἀντιποιήσῃ. λέγει σοι
" θὲς τὴν πλατύσημον"" ἰδοὺ στενόσημος. “θὲς
καὶ ταύτην" ᾿ἰδοὺ i ἱμάτιον μόνον. ““θὲς τὸ ἱμάτιον""
ἰδοὺ γυμνός. “ ἀλλὰ φθόνον. μοι κινεῖς." λάβε
τοίνυν ὅλον τὸ σωμάτιον. ᾧ δύναμαι bias τὸ
σωμάτιον, ἔτι τοῦτον φοβοῦμαι; > an κληρο-
νόμον μ᾽ οὐκ ἀπολείψει. τί οὖν; ἐπελαθόμην
ὅτε τούτων οὐδὲν ἐμὸν ἦν; πῶς οὖν ἐμὰ αὐτὰ
λέγομεν ; ὡς τὸν κράβαττον ἐν τῷ πανδοκείῳ.
ἂν οὖν ὁ πανδοκεὺς ἀποθανὼν ἀπολίπῃ σοι τοὺς
κραβάττους' ἂν δ᾽ ἄλλῳ, ἐκεῖνος ἕξει, σὺ δ᾽ ἄλλον
ζητήσεις" ἂν οὖν μὴ εὕρῃς, χαμαὶ κοιμήσῃ μόνον
θαρρῶν καὶ ῥέγκων καὶ μεμνημένος ὅτι ἐν τοῖς
πλουσίοις καὶ βασιλεῦσι καὶ τυράννοις αἱ τραγῳ-
δίαι τόπον ἔχουσιν, οὐδεὶς δὲ πένης τραγῳδίαν
συμπληροῖ εἰ μὴ ὡς χορευτής. οἱ δὲ βασιλεῖς
ἄρχονται μὲν ἀπ᾿ ἀγαθῶν"

στέψατε δώματα"
“ \ 4 Ἅ , a
εἶτα περὶ τρίτον ἢ τέταρτον μέρος"

im Κιθαιρών, τί μ᾽ ἐδέχου ;

1 The reference must be to the Emperor Domitian, but
Epictetus discreetly uses no name.

2 Worn by senators. 3 Worn by knights.

4 Worn by ordinary citizens. ὃ From an unknown play.

154

BOOK I. χχιν. 10-16

go away again and observe more accurately, without
this cowardice ?

What am I to do, then?—What do you do when
you disembark from a ship? You donot pick up the
rudder, do you, or the oars? What do you pick
up, then? Your own luggage, your oil-flask, your
wallet. So now, if you are mindful of what is your
own property, you will never lay claim to that which
is another's. He? says to you, “Lay aside your
broad scarlet hem”? Behold, the narrow hem.?
“Lay aside this also.” Behold, the plain toga.4
“Lay aside your toga.” Behold, I am naked.
“ But you arouse my envy.” Well, then, take the
whole of my paltry body. Do I any longer fear
the man to whom I can throw my body? But he
will not leave me as his heir. What then? Did
1 forget that none of these things is my own?
How, then, do we call them “‘my own”? Merely
as we call the bed in the inn “my own.” If, then,
the inn-keeper dies and leaves you the beds, you
will have them; but if he leaves them to someone
else, he will have them, and you will look for another
bed. If, then, you do not find one, you will have
to sleep on the ground; only do so with good
courage, snoring and remembering that tragedies
find a place among the rich and among kings and
tyrants, but no poor man fills a tragic réle except
as a member of the chorus. Now the kings com-
mence in a state of prosperity:

“ Hang the palace with garlands” ;5
then, about the third or fourth act, comes—
* Alas, Cithaeron, why didst thou receive me?” &

5 Sophocles, Oedipus Rex, 1390. Cithaeron was the moun-
tain on which the infant Oedipus had been exposed to die.

155

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19

20

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ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

ἀνδράποδον, ποῦ οἱ στέφανοι, ποῦ τὸ διάδημα;
οὐδέν σε ὠφελοῦσιν οἱ i δορυφόροι; ὅ ὅταν οὗν ἐκείνων
τινὶ προσίῃς, τούτων μέμνησο, ὅτι τραγῳδῷ προσ-
ἔρχῃ, οὐ τῷ ὑποκριτῇ, GAN αὐτῷ τῷ Οἰδίποδι.
“ ἀλλὰ μακάριος ὁ δεῖνα" μετὰ πολλῶν γὰρ
περιπατεῖ. κἀγὼ συγκατατάττω ἐμαυτὸν σὺν
τοῖς πολλοῖς καὶ μετὰ πολλῶν ᾿“περιπατῶ. τὸ δὲ
κεφάλαιον" μέμνησο ὅτι ἡ θύρα ἤνοικται. μὴ γίνου
τῶν παιδίων δειλότερος, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἐκεῖνα, ὅταν
αὐτοῖς μὴ ἀρέσκῃ τὸ πρᾶγμα, λέγει “ οὐκέτι
παίξω," καὶ σύ, ὅταν σοι φαίνηταί τινα εἶναι
τοιαῦτα, εἰπὼν “οὐκέτι παίξω, ἀπαλλάσσου,
μένων δὲ μὴ θρήνει.

κε΄. IIpos τὸ αὐτό.

Ei ταῦτα ἀληθῆ ἐ ἐστι καὶ μὴ βλακεύομεν μηδ᾽
ὑποκρινόμεθα ὅτι τὸ ἀγαθὸν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐν
προαιρέσει. καὶ τὸ κακόν, τὰ δ᾽ ἄλλα πάντα οὐδὲν
πρὸς ἡμᾶς, τί ἔτι ταρασσόμεθα, τί ἔτι φοβούμεθα;
περὶ ἃ ἐσπουδάκαμεν, τούτων ἐξουσίαν οὐδεὶς ἔ ἔχει"
ὧν ἐξουσίαν οἱ ἄλλοι ἔχουσιν, τούτων οὐκ ἐπι-
στρεφόμεθα. ποῖον ἔτι πρᾶγμα ἔχομεν ---- ᾿Αλλὰ
ἔντειλαί μοι.--- { σοι ἐντείλωμαι ; ν᾽ ὁ Ζεύς σοι οὐκ
ἐντέταλται ; οὐ δέδωκέν σοι τὰ μὲν σὰ ἀκώλυτα
καὶ ἀπαραπόδιστα, τὰ δὲ μὴ σὰ κωλυτὰ καὶ
παραποδιστά; τίνα οὖν ἐντολὴν ἔχων ἐκεῖθεν

1 That is, rules of conduct which will guide the inquirer
in dealing with these two classes of things.

156

BOOK I. xxiv. 17-xxv. 4

Slave, where are your crowns, where your diadem?
Do your guards avail you not at all? When,
therefore, you approach one of those great men,
remember all this—that you are approaching a tragic
character, not the actor, but Oedipus himself.
“Nay, but so-and-so is blessed; for he has many
companions to walk with.” So have I; I fall in line
with the multitude and have many companions to
‘walk with. But, to sum it all up: remember that
the door has been thrown open. Do not become a
greater coward than the children, but just as they
say, “I won't play any longer,” when the thing
does not please them, so do you also, when things
seem to you to have reached that stage, merely say,
“1 won’t play any longer,’ and take your departure ;
but if you stay, stop lamenting.

CHAPTER XXV
Upon the same theme

Ir all this is true and we are not silly nor merely
playing a part when we say, “Man’s good and
man’s evil lies in moral choice, and all other things
are nothing to us,” why are we still distressed and
afraid? Over the things that we seriously care for
no one has authority; and the things over which
other men have authority do not concern us. What
kind of thing have we left to discuss >—“ Nay, give
me directions.” 1—What directions shall I give you ?
Has not Zeus given you directions? Has he not
given you that which is your own, unhindered and
unrestrained, while that which is not your own is
subject to hindrance and restraint? What direc-

157

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ἐλήλυθας, ποῖον διάταγμα ; τὰ σὰ τήρει ἐκ παντὸς
τρόπου, τῶν ἀλλοτρίων μὴ ἐφίεσο. τὸ πιστὸν
σόν, τὸ αἰδῆμον σόν" τίς οὖν ἀφελέσθαι δύναταί
σου ταῦτα ὃ τίς κωλύσει χρῆσθαι αὐτοῖς ἄλλος
εἰ μὴ σύ; σὺ δὲ πῶς ; ὅταν περὶ τὰ μὴ σαυτοῦ
σπουδάσῃς, τὰ σαυτοῦ ἀπώλεσας. τοιαύτας
ἔχων ὑποθήκας καὶ ἐντολὰς παρὰ τοῦ Διὸς ποίας
ἔτι παρ᾽ ἐμοῦ θέλεις ; κρείσσων εἰμὶ ἐκείνου, ἀξιο-
πιστότερος ; ἀλλὰ ταύτας τηρῶν ἄλλων τινῶν
προσδέῃ ; ἀλλ᾽ ἐκεῖνος οὐκ ἐντέταλται ταῦτα ;
φέρε τὰς προλήψεις, φέρε τὰς ἀποδείξεις τὰς
τῶν φιλοσόφων, φέρε ἃ πολλάκις ἤκουσας, φέρε
δ᾽ ἃ εἶπας αὐτός, φέρε ἃ ἀνέγνως, pepe ἃ
ἐμελέτησας.

Μέχρις οὖν τίνος ταῦτα τηρεῖν καλῶς ἔχει καὶ
τὴν παιδιὰν μὴ λύειν ; μέχρις ἂν κομψῶς διεξά-
γηται. ἐν Σατορναλίοις λέλογχεν βασιλεύς"
ἔδοξε γὰρ παῖξαι ταύτην τὴν παιδιάν. προστάσσει
“ov πίε, σὺ κέρασον, σὺ σον, σὺ ἄπελθε, σὺ
ἐλθέ." ὑπακούω, ἵνα μὴ Tap ἐμὲ λύηται ἡ παιδιά.
“ἀλλὰ σὺ ὑπολάμβανε ὅτι ἐν κακοῖς εἶ. οὐχ
ὑπολαμβάνω: καὶ τίς μ᾽ ἀναγκάσει ὑπολαμβά-
ΜΕΙΨ ; πάλιν συνεθέμεθα παῖξαι τὰ περὶ ᾿Αγα-
μέμνονα καὶ ᾿Αχιλλέα. καταταγεὶς ᾿Αγαμέμνων
λέγει μοι “ πορεύου πρὸς τὸν ᾿Αχιλλέα καὶ
ἀπόσπασον τὴν Βρισηίδα." πορεύομαι. "ἔρχου."
ἔρχομαι. ὡς γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν ὑποθετικῶν λόγων

1 τὺ αἰδῆμον σόν supplied by Upton from his ‘codex.’

1 The idea seems to be that all these preconceptions,
demonstrations, efc., will be found to be based upon the
‘* promptings and directions” of Zeus.

158

BOOK I, xxv. 4-11

tions, then, did you bring with you when you came
from him into this world, what kind of an order?
Guard by every means that which is your own, but
do not grasp at that which is another’s. Your
faithfulness is your own, your self-respect is your
own ; who, then, can take these things from you?
Who but yourself will prevent you from using them?
But you, how do you act? When you seek earnestly
that which is not your own, you lose that which is
your own. Since you have such promptings and
directions from Zeus, what kind do you still want
from me? Am I greater than he, or more trust-
worthy? But if you keep these commands of his,
do you need any others besides? But has he not
given you these directions? Produce your pre-
conceptions, produce the demonstrations of the
philosophers, produce what you have often heard,
and produce what you have said yourself, produce
what you have read, produce what you have
practised.?

How long, then, is it well to keep these precepts
and not to break up the game? As long as it is
played pleasantly. At the Saturnalia a king is
chosen by lot; for it has been decided to play this
game. The king gives his commands: “ You drink,
you mix wine, you sing, you go, you come.” 1
obey, so as not to be the one to break up the game.
«Come, suppose that you arein an evil plight.” Ido
not so suppose; and who is there to compel me so to
suppose? Again, we have agreed to play the story
of Agamemnon and Achilles. The one who has
been appointed to play the part of Agamemnon says
to me, ‘‘Go to Achilles, and drag away Briseis.” 1
go. He says, “Come,” and I come. For as we

159

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

ἀναστρεφόμεθα, οὕτως δεῖ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ βίου.

ἐς ¥ δῶ. 291 2 « «οι ¢ , ᾽ν»
ἔστω νύξ. ἔστω. “τί οὖν ; ἡμέρα ἐστίν;

οὔ: ἔλαβον γὰρ ὑπόθεσιν τοῦ νύκτα εἶναι. “ἔστω

ε , Ψ se 2 2 ἐὰν ow 2 \
σε ὑπολαμβάνειν ὅτι νύξ ἐστιν. ἔστω. “ar

nse , σ ΄ > ” > > lal lel
καὶ ὑπόλαβε ὅτι νύξ ἐστιν. οὐκ ἀκολουθεῖ τῇ
ὑποθέσει. οὕτως καὶ ἐνταῦθα. “ἔστω σε εἶναι
ὃ a Μ ἐς Φ , s by \ Ϊ ΕἸ] , a4 ’

υστυχῆ." ἔστω. “ap οὖν ἀτυχὴς εἶ ;" ναί. “τί
οὖν ; κακοδαιμονεῖς ;” ναί. “ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπόλαβε
Ὁ > a 40» > > » “ἙΝ ΄
ὅτε ἐν κακοῖς εἶ οὐκ ἀκολουθεῖ τῇ ὑποθέσει"
καὶ ἄλλος με κωλύει.

Μέχρι πόσου οὖν ὑπακουστέον τοῖς τοιούτοις ;
μέχρις ἂν οὗ λυσιτελῇ, τοῦτο δ᾽ ἔστιν μέχρις ἂν
οὗ σῴζω τὸ πρέπον καὶ κατάλληλον. λοιπὸν οἱ
μέν εἰσι κακαύστηροιϊ καὶ κακοστόμαχοι καὶ
λέγουσιν “ ἐγὼ οὐ δύναμαι παρὰ τούτῳ δειπνεῖν,
ἵν᾽ αὐτοῦ ἀνέχομαι καθ᾽ ἡμέραν διηγουμένου, πῶς
ἐν Μυσίᾳ ἐπολέμησεν. ‘ διηγησάμην σοι, ἀδελφέ,
πῶς ἐπὶ τὸν - λόφον ἀνέβην' πάλιν ἄρχομαι
πολιορκεῖσθαι." ἄλλος λέγει “ἐγὼ δειπνῆσαι
θέλω μᾶλλον καὶ ἀκούειν αὐτοῦ ὅσα θέλει ἀδολε-
σχοῦντος.᾽ καὶ σὺ σύγκρινε ταύτας τὰς ἀξίας"

x ,
μόνον μηδὲν Bapovdpevos ποίει, μὴ θλιβόμενος μηδ᾽
ὑπολαμβάνων ἐν κακοῖς εἶναι" τοῦτο γὰρ οὐδείς σε
ἀναγκάζει. καπνὸν πεποίηκεν ἐν τῷ οἰκήματι;

1 Wendland: καταύστηροι 8.

1 That is, we accept our hypothesis as long as we can do
so in reason ; so in life we must be guided by reason.

2 A reverent form of reference to Zeus. See also I. 30, 1.

3 The course of argument seems to be: I can assume that
it is night and reason in a manner consistent with that
assumption ; but if it really is day, I cannot assume that it

160

BOOK I. xxv. rr-18

behave in the matter of hypothetical proposals, so
we ought to behave in life also “Let it be-
night.” So be it. “What then? Is it day?”
No, for I have accepted the assumption that it is
night. “Let us suppose that you assume it to be
night.” So be it. “ But go on and assume that it is
night.” That is not consistent with the hypothesis.
So also in the present case. “Let us suppose that
you are unhappy.” So be it. “Are you, then,
unfortunate?” Yes. “What then? Are you
troubled with ill-fortune?”” Yes. “But go on and
assume that you are in a wretched plight.” That
is not consistent with the hypothesis; moreover,
there is Another? who forbids me so to think.

How long, then, should we obey such commands?
As long as it is beneficial, and that means, as long
as I preserve what is becoming and consistent.
Further, some men are unduly crabbed and have too
sharp tongues and say, “I cannot dine at this
fellow’s house, where I have to put up with his
telling every day how he fought in Moesia:‘I have
told you, brother, how I climbed up to the crest of
the hill; well now, I begin to be besieged again.’”
But another says, “I would rather dine and hear
him babble all he pleases.” And it is for you to
compare these estimates; only do nothing as one
burdened, or afflicted, or thinking that he is in a
wretched plight; for no one forces you to this.
Has some one made a smoke in the house? If he

really is night, for that is no longer a mere hypothesis, but
the statement of a falsehood. Isimply “‘ play the game” as
long as we are dealing with hypotheses, but must ‘“‘ break
up the game” if required to make a false statement about
actual facts,

161

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

ἂν μέτριον, μενῶ: ἂν λίαν πολύν, ἐξέρχομαι. τού-
του γὰρ μεμνῆσθαι καὶ κρατεῖν, ὅτι ἡ θύρα ἤ ἤνοι-
κται. ἄλλα “ μὴ οἴκει ἐν Νικοπόλει." οὐκ οἰκῶ.
“μηδ᾽ ἐν ᾿Αθήναις. οὐδ᾽ ἐν ᾿Αθήναις. “μηδ᾽ ἐν
Ῥώμῃ." οὐδ᾽ ἐν Ῥώ “ἐν Γυάροις οἴκει. οἰκῶ
Ῥώμῃ." οἱ μῃ. ᾿Ῥυάροις οἴκει." οἰκῶ.
ἀλλὰ πολύς μοι καπνὸς φαίνεται τὸ ἐν Γυάροις
οἰκεῖν. ἀποχωρῶ, ὅπου μ᾽ οὐδεὶς κωλύσει οἰκεῖν"
X\
ἐκείνη yap ἡ οἴκησις παντὶ ἤνοικται. καὶ τὸ τελευ-
ταῖον χιτωνάριον, τοῦτ᾽ ἔστι τὸ σωμάτιον, τούτου
> / ἠδ \ ὑδὲ > > Ν Μ ὃ ὰ -“
ἀνωτέρω οὐδενὶ οὐδὲν εἰς ἐμὲ ἔξεστιν. διὰ τοῦτο
ὁ Δημήτριος εἶπεν τῷ Νέρωνι “ἀπειλεῖς μοι
θάνατον, σοὶ δ᾽ ἡ φύσις." ἂν δὲ τὸ σωμάτιον
, “ > \ f \
θαυμάσω, δοῦλον ἐμαυτὸν παραδέδωκα" ἂν τὸ
κτησείδιον, δοῦλον. εὐθὺς γὰρ αὐτὸς κατ᾽ ἐμαυτοῦ
rn , ε la > ¢ cw > a \
δηλῶ, τίνι ἁλωτός εἶμι. ὡς ὁ ὄφις ἐὰν συσπᾷ τὴν
κεφαλήν, λέγω “ἐκεῖνο αὐτοῦ τύπτε ὃ φυλάσσει."
\ \ , bid a ἃ / bd , >
Kal σὺ γίγνωσκε, ὅτε ὃ ἂν φυλάσσειν ἐθέλῃς, KAT
ἐκεῖνο ἐπιβήσεταί σοι ὁ κύριος. τούτων μεμνη-
μένος τίνα ἔτι κολακεύσεις ἢ φοβήσῃ;
᾿Αλλὰ θέλω καθῆσθαι ὅπου οἱ συγκλητικοί.---
ec nr “ \ - ’ὔ A
Ορᾷς ὅτε od σαυτῷ στενοχωρίαν παρέχεις, σὺ
’ lal A /
σαυτὸν θλίβεις ;---Πῶς οὖν ἄλλως θεωρήσω
a ? a b / » - \ \
καλῶς ἐν TO ἀμφιθεάτρῳ ;--Ξ Ανθρωπε, Kai μὴ
[4 \ > \ a , 4 ΝΜ
θεώρει καὶ οὐ μὴ θλιβῆῇς. τί πράγματα ἔχεις ;
ἢ μικρὸν ἔκδεξαι καὶ ἀχθείσης τῆς θεωρίας
κάθισον εἰς τοὺς τῶν συγκλητικῶν τόπους καὶ

1 A small island off Attica in the Aegean, used as a place
of exile during the Empire. The ordinary form is Γύαρος.
2 He refers to the grave.

162

BOOK I. xxv. 18-27

has made a moderate amount of smoke I shall stay;
if too much, 1 go outside. For one ought to
remember and hold fast to this, that the door
stands open. But some one says, ‘“ Do not dwell in
Nicopolis.” I agree not to dwell there. “Nor in
Athens.” I agree not to dwell in Athens, either.
“Nor in Rome.” 1 agree not to dwell in Rome,
either. “Dwell in Gyara.”1 I agree to dwell
there. But to dwell in Gyara seems to me to be
like a great quantity of smoke in the house. I
leave for a place where no one will prevent me from
dwelling; for that dwelling-place stands open to
every man.* And as for the last inner tunic, that
is, my paltry body, beyond that no one has any
authority over me. That is why Demetrius said to
Nero, “ You threaten me with death, but nature
threatens you.” If I admire my paltry body, I have
given myself away as a slave; if 1 admire my paltry
property, I have given myself away as a slave; for
at once I show thereby to my own hurt what I can
be caught with. Just as when the snake draws in
his head, I say, “ Strike that part of him which he is
protecting”; so do you be assured that your master
will attack you at that point which you particularly
wish to protect. If you remember all this, whom
will you flatter or fear any more?

But I wish to sit where the senators do.—Do you
realize that you are making close quarters for
yourself, that you are crowding yourself?—How
else, then; shall I have a good view in the
amphitheatre >—Man, do not become spectator and
you will not be crowded. Why do you make
trouble for yourself? Or else wait a little while,
and when the show is over sit down among the seats

163

28

29

30

31

32

33

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

ἡλιάξου. καθόλου γὰρ ἐκείνου μέμνησο, ὅτι
ἑαυτοὺς θλίβομεν, ἑ ἑαυτοὺς στενοχωροῦμεν, τοῦτ᾽
ἔστιν τὰ δόγματα, ἡμᾶς θλίβει καὶ στενοχωρεῖ.
ἐπεὶ τί ἐστιν αὐτὸ τὸ λοιδορεῖσθαι ; : παραστὰς

λίθον λοιδόρει" καὶ τί ποιήσεις ; ἂν οὖν τις ὡς
λίθος ἀκούῃ, τί ὄφελος τῷ λοιδοροῦντί ; ἂν δ᾽
ἔχῃ τὴν ἀσθένειαν τοῦ λοιδορουμένου ὁ ο λοιδορῶν
ἐπιβάθραν, τότε ἀνύει τι. “περίσχισον αὐτόν.
τί λέγεις αὐτόν; τὸ ἱμάτιον λάβε, περίσχισον.

“ὕβριν σοι πεποίηκα. καλῶς σοι γένοιτο. ταῦ-
τα ἐμελέτα Σωκράτης, διὰ τοῦτο ν ἔχων
προσώπον ἀεὶ διετέλει. ἡμεῖς, δὲ θέλομεν πάντα
μᾶχλον ἀσκεῖν καὶ μελετᾶν ἢ ὅπως ἀπαραπό-
δίστοι καὶ ἐλεύθεροι ἐσόμεθα. “παράδοξα λέ-
γουσιν οἱ φιλόσοφοι." ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις
οὐκ ἔστι παράδοξα; καὶ τί παραδοξότερόν ἐ ἐστιν
ἢ κεντεῖν τινος. τὸν ὀφθαλμόν, ἵνα ἴδῃ; εἴ τις
ἀπείρῳ τῶν ἰατρικῶν τοῦτο εἶπεν, οὐκ ἂν κατε-
γέλα τοῦ λέγοντος ; τί οὖν θαυμαστὸν εἰ καὶ ἐν
φιλοσοφίᾳ πολλὰ τῶν Sr παράδοξα φαίνεται
τοῖς ἀπείροις ;

κς΄. Τίς ὁ βιωτικὸς νόμος ;

> , δὲ \ e θ \ 4
Αναγιγνώσκοντος δὲ τοὺς ὑποθετικοὺς ἔφη"
‘
Νόμος ὑποθετικός ἐστι καὶ οὗτος TO ἀκόλουθον
ol ,
τῇ ὑποθέσει παραδέχεσθαι. πολὺ πρότερον δὲ

τ One of the typical forms of argumentation upon which
the Stoics laid great stress. The subject is treated at
considerable length in I. 7.

164

BOOK I. xxv. 27—xxvi. 1

of the senators and sun yourself. For in general
remember this—that we-crowd ourselves, we make
close quarters for ourselves, that is to say, the
decisions of our will crowd us and make us close
quarters, Why, what is this matter of being
reviled? Take your stand by a stone and revile it;
and what effect will you produce? If, then, a man
listens like a stone, what profit is there to the
reviler? But if the reviler has the weakness of the
reviled as a point of vantage, then he does
accomplish something. “Strip him.” Why do you
say ‘him’? Take his cloak and strip that off. “I
have outraged you.” Much good may it do you!
This is what Socrates practised, and that is why he
always wore the same expression on his face. But
we prefer to practise and rehearse anything rather
than how to be untrammelled and free. “The
philosophers talk paradoxes,” you say. But are
there not paradoxes in the other arts? And what
is more paradoxical than to lance a man in the eye in
order that he may see? If anyone said this to a
man who was inexperienced in the art of surgery,
would he not laugh at the speaker? What is there
to be surprised at, then, if in philosophy also many
things which are true appear paradoxical to the
inexperienced ?
®

CHAPTER XXVI
What is the rule of life ?

As some one was reading the hypothetical argu-
ments,! Epictetus said, This also is a law governing
hypotheses—that we must accept what the hypothesis
or premiss demands. But much more important is

165

νῷ.

5»

.1

ῷ οὦ

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

νόμος βιωτικός ἐστιν οὗτος τὸ ἀκόλουθον τῇ
φύσει πράττειν. εἰ γὰρ ἐπὶ πάσης ὕλης καὶ περι-
στάσεως βουλόμεθα τηρῆσαι" τὸ κατὰ φύσιν, δῆλον
ὅτι ἐν παντὶ στοχαστέον τοῦ μήτε τὸ ἀκόλουθον
ἡμᾶς ἐκφυγεῖν μήτε παραδέξασθαι τὸ μαχόμενον.
πρῶτον οὖν ἐπὶ τῆς θεωρίας γυμνάξουσιν ἡμᾶς
φιλόσοφοι ὅπου ῥᾷον, εἶτα. οὕτως ἐπὶ τὰ
χαλφηώτέρα ἄγουσιν' ἐνταῦθα γὰρ οὐδέν ἐστι τὸ
ἀνθέλκον ὡς πρὸς τὸ ἀκολουθῆσαι τοῖς διδασκο-
μένοις, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν βιωτικῶν πολλὰ τὰ περισπῶντα.
γελοῖος οὖν ὁ λέγων πρῶτον βούλεσθαι ἐ ἐπ᾽ ἐκεί-
νων" οὐ γὰρ ῥάδιον ἄρχεσθαι ἀπὸ τῶν χαλεπω-
τέρων. καὶ τοῦτον ἀπολογισμὸν ἔδει φέρειν πρὸς
το ὺς γονεῖς. τοὺς ἀγανακτοῦντας ἐπὶ τῷ φιλοσοφεῖν
τὰ τέκνα. “ οὐκοῦν ἁμαρτάνω, πάτερ, καὶ οὐκ οἶδα
τὸ ἐπιβάλλον ἐμαυτῷ καὶ προσῆκον" εἰ μὲν οὐδὲ
μαθητόν ἐστιν οὐδὲ διδακτόν, τί μοι ἐγκαλεῖς ;
εἰ δὲ διδακτόν, δίδασκε: εἰ δὲ σὺ μὴ δύνασαι,
ἄφες pe μαθεῖν παρὰ τῶν λεγόντων εἰδέναι.
ἐπεὶ τί δοκεῖς ; ὅτι θέλων περιπίπτω κακῷ καὶ
ἀποτυγχάνω τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ; μὴ γένοιτο. τί οὖν
ἐστι τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ ἁμαρτάνειν με; ἡ ἄγνοια. οὐ
θέλεις οὖν ἀποθῶμαι τὴν ἄγνοιαν ; τίνα πώποτε
ὀργὴ ἐδίδαξε τὰ κυβερνητικά, τὰ μουσικά; τὰ
βιωτικὰ οὖν διὰ τὴν ὀργήν σου δοκεῖφ ὅτι
μαθήσομαι; oi
Ταῦτα ἐκείνῳ μόνῳ λέγειν ἔξεστι τῷ τοιαύτην
ἐπιβολὴν ἐνηνοχότι. εἰ δέ τις μόνον ᾿ἐπιδείκνυ-
σθαι θέλων ἐν συμποσίῳ ὅτι οἶδεν τοὺς ὑπο-
θετικοὺς ἀναγιγνώσκει ταῦτα καὶ προσέρχεται

166

BOOK I. xxvi. 1-9

the following law of life—that we must do what
nature demands. For if we wish in every matter and
circumstance to observe what is in accordance with
nature, it is manifest that in everything we should
make it our aim neither to avoid that which nature
demands, nor to accept that which is in conflict with
nature. The philosophers, therefore, exercise us
first in the theory where there is less difficulty, and
then after that lead us to the more difficult matters ;
for in theory there is nothing which holds us back
from following what we are taught, but in the
affairs of life there are many things which draw us
away. He is ridiculous, then, who says that he
wishes to begin with the latter; for it is not easy to

in with the more difficult things. And this is
the defence that we ought to present to such parents
as are angry because their children study philosophy.
“Very well then, father, I go astray, not knowing
what is incumbent upon me or what my duty is.
Now if this is a thing that can neither be taught nor
learned, why do you reproach me? But if it can be
taught, teach me; and if you cannot do this, allow
me to learn from those who profess to know.
Really, what is your idea? That I intentionally fall
into evil and miss the good? Far from it! What,
then, is the cause of my going astray? Ignorance.
Very well, do you not want me to put away my
ignorance? Whom did anger ever teach the art of
steering, or music? Do you think, then, that your
anger will make me learn the art of living?”

Only he can so speak who has applied himself
to philosophy in such a spirit. But if a man reads
upon the subject and resorts to the philosophers
merely because he wants to make a display at a

167

10

11

12

18

14

15

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

τοῖς φιλοσόφοις, οὗτος ἄλλο τι πράσσει ἢ iva
αὐτὸν συγκλητικὸς παρακατακείμενος θαυμάσῃ;
ἐκεῖ γὰρ τῷ ὄντι αἱ μεγάλαι Ural εἰσι καὶ οἱ
ἐνθάδε πλοῦτοι ἐκεῖ παίγνια δοκοῦσιν. διὰ τοῦ-
το ἐκεῖ δύσκολον κρατῆσαι τῶν αὑτοῦ φαντασιῶν,
ὅπου τὰ ἐκσείοντα! μεγάλα. ἐγώ τινα οἶδα
κλαίοντα ᾿Επαφροδίτου τῶν γονάτων ἁπτόμενον
καὶ λέγοντα ταλαιπωρεῖν’ ἀπολελεῖφθαι yap
αὐτῷ μηδέν, εἰ μὴ ἑκατὸν πεντήκοντα μυριάδας.
τί οὖν ὁ ᾿Επαφρόδιτος ; κατεγέλασεν ὡς ὑμεῖς ;
οὔ: ἀλλ᾽ ἐπιθαυμάσας λέγει “τάλας, πῶς οὖν
ἐσιώπας, πῶς ἐκαρτέρεις ;””

Ταράξας 5 δὲ τὸν ἀναγιγνώσκοντα τοὺς ὑποθε-
τικοὺς καὶ γελάσαντος τοῦ ὑποθεμένου αὐτῷ τὴν
ἀνάγνωσιν Σεαυτοῦ, ἔφη, καταγελᾷς" οὐ προεγύ-
μνασας τὸν νεανίσκον οὐδ᾽ ἔγνως εἰ δύναται τού-
τοῖς παρακολουθεῖν, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἀναγνώστῃ αὐτῷ
χρῇ." τί οὖν, ἔφη, μὴ δυναμένῃ διανοίᾳ συμ-
πεπλεγμένου ἐπικρίσει παρακολουθεῖν ἔπαινον
πιστεύομεν, Ψόγον πιστεύομεν, ἐπίκρισιν περὶ
τῶν καλῶς ἢ κακῶς γινομένων ; κἄν τινα κακῶς
λέγῃ, οὗτος ἐπιστρέφεται, κἂν ἐπαινῇ τινα, ἐπαί-
ρεται; ἐν τοῖς οὕτως μικροῖς μὴ εὑρίσκων τὸ
ἑξῆς; αὕτη οὖν ἀρχὴ τοῦ φιλοσοφεῖν, αἴσθησις
τοῦ ἰδίου ἡγεμονικοῦ πῶς ἔχει: μετὰ γὰρ τὸ

1 Schweighduser: ἐκεῖ ὄντα S. 3. Schenkl: . . ράξας 8.

3 Upton: xpa 8. 4 Schweighiuser: τῆι S.

1 4.e,, in the simple life of Nicopolis it is easy to use philo-
sophic doctrines to live by; in Rome the temptation is strong
to use them for achieving social distinction.

3. That is, the reason ; compare note on I. 16, 4.

168

BOOK 1. xxvr. 9-15

banquet of his knowledge of hypothetical arguments,
what else is he doing but trying to win the admiration
of some senator sitting by his side? For there in
Rome are found in truth the great resources, while
the riches of Nicopolis look to them like mere
child’s-play.4_ Hence it is difficult there for a man
to control his own external impressions, since the
distracting influences at Rome are great. I know a
certain man who clung in tears to the knees of
Epaphroditus and said that he was-in misery ; for he
had nothing left but a million and a half sesterces.
What, then, did Epaphroditus do? Did he laugh at
him as you are laughing? No; he only said, in a
tone of amazement, “ Poor man, how, then, did you
manage to keep silence? How did you endure it?”

Once when he had disconcerted the student who
was reading the hypothetical arguments, and the one
who had set the other the passage to read laughed
at him, Epictetus said to the latter, “You are
laughing at yourself. You did not give the young
man a preliminary training, nor discover whether he
was able to follow these arguments, but you treat
him merely as a reader. Why is it, then,” he added,
“that to a mind unable to follow a judgement upon
a complex argument we entrust the assigning of
praise or blame, or the passing of a judgement upon
what is done well or ill? - If such a person speaks ill
of another, does the man in question pay any attention
to him, or if he praises another, is the latter elated?
when the one who is dispensing praise or blame is
unable, in matters as trivial as these, to find the
logical consequence? This, then, is a starting point
in philosophy—a perception of the state of one’s own
governing principile*; for when once a man realizes

169

16

17

18

wo

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

γνῶναι ὅτι ἀσθενῶς οὐκ ἔτι θελήσει χρῆσθαι
αὐτῷ πρὸς τὰ μεγάλα. νῦν δὲ μὴ δυνάμενοί
τινες τὸν ψωμὸν καταπίνειν σύνταξιν ἀγορά-
σαντες ἐπιβάλλονται ἐσθίειν. διὰ τοῦτο ἐμοῦσιν
ἢ ἀπεπτοῦσιν' εἶτα στρόφοι καὶ κατάρροιαι καὶ
πυρετοί. ἔδει δ᾽ ἐφιστάνειν, εἰ δύνανται. ἀλλ᾽
ἐν μὲν θεωρίᾳ ῥάδιον ἐξελέγξαι τὸν οὐκ εἰδότα,
ἐν δὲ τοῖς κατὰ τὸν βίον οὔτε παρέχει ἑαυτόν
τις ἐλέγχῳ, τόν τ᾽ ἐξελέγξαντα μισοῦμεν. ὁ δὲ
Σωκράτης ἔλεγεν ἀνεξέταστον βίον μὴ ζῆν.

κζ΄. Ποσαχῶς αἱ φαντασίαι γίνονται καὶ τίνα
πρόχειρα πρὸς αὐτὰς βοηθήματα. παρα-
σκευαστέον;

Τετραχῶς αἱ φαντασίαι γίνονται, ἡμῖν: ἢ γὰρ
ἔστι τινὰ καὶ οὕτως φαίνεται ἢ ἢ οὐκ ὄντα. οὐδὲ φαί-
νεται ὅτι ἔστιν ἢ ἔστι καὶ οὐ φαίνεται ἢ ἢ οὐκ ἔστι.
καὶ φαίνεται. λοιπὸν ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις εὐστοχεῖν
ἔργον ἐστὶ τοῦ πεπαιδευμένου. ὅ τι δ᾽ ἂν ἡ τὸ
θλῖβον, ἐκείνῳ δεῖ προσάγειν τὴν βοήθειαν. εἰ
σοφίσματα ἡμᾶς Πυρρώνεια καὶ ᾿Ακαδημαικὰ
τὰ θλίβοντά ἐστιν, ἐκείνοις ,“προσάγωμεν τὴν
βοήθειαν" εἰ αἱ τῶν πραγμάτων “πιθανότητες,
καθ᾽ ἃς φαίνεταί τινα ἀγαθὰ οὐκ ὄντα, ἐκεῖ τὴν
βοήθειαν ξητῶμεν" εἰ ἔθος ἐστὶ τὸ θλῖβον, πρὸς

1 Meibom (after Wolf): αὐτὰ S.

1 of. Plato, Apology, 38 A: ὁ δὲ ἀνεξέταστος βίος ob Biwrds
ἀνθρώπῳ.

170

BOOK I. xxvi. 15-xxvil. 3

that it is weak, he will no longer wish to employ it
upon great matters. But as it is, some who are
unable to swallow the morsel buy a whole treatise
and set to work to eat that. Consequently they
throw up, or have indigestion ; after that come colics
and fluxes and fevers. But they ought first to have
considered whether they have the requisite capacity.
However, in a matter of theory it is easy enough to
confute the man who does not know, but in the affairs
of life a man does not submit himself to confutation,
and we hate the person who has confuted us. But
Socrates used to tell us not to live a life ———
to examination.!

CHAPTER XXVII.

In how many ways do the external impressions arise, and
what aids should we have ready ai hand to deal
with them ?

Tue external impressions come to us in four ways;
for either things are, and seem so to be; or they are
not, and do not seem to be, either; or they are, and
do not seem to be ; or they are not, dnd yetseem to be.
Consequently, in all these cases it is the business of
the educated mantohitthemark. But whatever be
the thing that distresses us, against that we ought
to bring up our reinforcements. If the things that
distress us are sophisms of Pyrrho and the Academy,
let us bring up our reinforcements against them;
if they are the plausibilities of things, whereby we
are led to think that certain things are good when
they are not, let us seek reinforcements at that
point; if the thing that distresses us is a habit,

171

4

for)

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

> ~ \ / > , / 7,
ἐκεῖνο τὴν βοήθειαν ἀνευρίσκειν πειρατέον. τί
2 \ ig ” tem 4 , Ν
οὖν πρὸς ἔθος ἔστιν εὑρίσκειν βοήθημα; τὸ
> , κ a
ἐναντίον ἔθος. ἀκούεις τῶν ἰδιωτῶν λεγόντων
ΟΣ 2 A ya peer ε A
τάλας ἐκεῖνος, ἀπέθανεν: ἀπώλετο ὁ πατὴρ
> Lol 4 / ᾽ Ld > ΝΜ ᾿
αὐτοῦ, ἡ μήτηρ' ἐξεκόπη, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄωρος καὶ
» > -“
ἐπὶ ξένης. ἄκουσον τῶν ἐναντίων λόγων, ἀπό-
σπασον σεαυτὸν τούτων τῶν φωνῶν, ἀντίθες τῷ
Μ Ν BJ , ”, Ν \ \
ἔθει τὸ ἐναντίον ἔθος. πρὸς τοὺς σοφιστικοὺς
΄
λόγους τὰ λογικὰ καὶ τὴν ἐν τούτοις γυμνασίαν
καὶ τριβήν, πρὸς τὰς τῶν πραγμάτων πιθανό-
a 4
τητᾶς τὰς προλήψεις ἐναργεῖς ἐσμηγμένας καὶ
Α a“
προχείρους ἔχειν δεῖ.
“ /
Οταν θάνατος φαίνηται κακόν, πρόχειρον
» Ψ \ τ & ΄ ΄, Vio
ἔχειν OTL τὰ κακὰ ἐκκλίνειν καθήκει Kal ἀν-
αγκαῖον ὁ θάνατος. τί γὰρ ποιήσω; ποῦ γὰρ
ἊΝ , ” ge 3 4 Ὰ
αὐτὸν φύγω; ἔστω ἐμὲ εἶναι Σαρπηδόνα τὸν
τοῦ Διός, ἵν’ οὕτως γενναίως εἴπω “ ἀπελθὼν
ἢ αὐτὸς ἀριστεῦσαι θέλω ἢ ἄλλῳ παρασχεῖν
ἀφορμὴν τοῦ ἀριστεῦσαι: εἰ μὴ δύναμαι κατορ-
“ ’ δὲ τὰ > , Υ -“ a ,
θῶσαί τι αὐτός, οὐ φθονήσω ἄλλῳ TOD ποιῆσαί
τι γενναῖον" ἔστω ταῦτα ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς, ἐκεῖνο οὐ
πίπτει εἰς ἡμᾶς ; καὶ ποῦ φύγω τὸν θάνατον ;
’
μηνύσατέ μοι τὴν χώραν, μηνύσατε ἀνθρώπους,
4
εἰς ods ἀπέλθω, εἰς οὺς οὐ παραβάλλει, μηνύσατε

1 Meibom (after Wolf): καλὸν S.

1 And therefore not an evil.
2 A paraphrase of Homer, Jiiad, XII. 328.

172

BOOK I. χχυπ. 3-9

we should try to hunt up the reinforcements with
which to oppose that. What reinforcements, then,
is it possible to find with which to oppose habit?
Why, the contrary habit. You hear the common
folk saying, “That poor man! He is dead; his
father perished, and his mother ; he was cut off, yes,
and before his time, and in a foreign land.” Listen
to the arguments on the other side, tear yourself
away from these expressions, set over against one
habit the contrary habit. To meet sophistic argu-
ments we must have the processes of logic and the
exercise and the familiarity with these ; against the
plausibilities of things we must have our precon-
ceptions clear, polished like weapons, and ready at
hand.

When death appears to be an evil, we must have
ready at hand the argument that it is our duty to
avoid evils, and that death is an inevitable thing.}
For what can Ido? Where shall I go to escape
it? Suppose that I am Sarpedon the son of Zeus,
in order that I may nobly say, as he did: “ Seeing
that I have left my home for the war, I wish either
to win the prize of valour myself, or else to give
someone else the chance to win it; if I am unable
to succeed in something myself, I shall not begrudge
another the achievement of some noble deed.’’?
Granted that such an act as Sarpedon’s is beyond us,
does not the other alternative fall within the
compass of our powers?* And where can I go to
escape death? Show me the country, show me the
people to whom I may go, upon whom death does
not come; show me a magic charm against it. If

3 i.e., if we cannot act as nobly as Sarpedon, we can
at least think rationally about death, counting it no evil.

173

10

1]

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

> / > \ »” , le - >
ἐπαοιδήν: εἰ μὴ ἔχω, τί με θέλετε ποιεῖν ; οὐ
δύναμαι τὸν θάνατον ἀποφυγεῖν: τὸ φοβεῖσθαι
αὐτὸν μὴ ἀποφύγω, ἀλλ’ ἀποθάνω πενθῶν καὶ
τρέμων ; αὕτη γὰρ γένεσις πάθους θέλειν τι καὶ
A , Ν \ , A > Ν
μὴ γίνεσθαι. ἔνθεν ἂν μὲν δύνωμαι τὰ ἐκτὸς
μετατιθέναι πρὸς τὴν βούλησιν τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ,
μετατίθημι: εἰ δὲ μή, τὸν ἐμποδίζοντα ἐκτυ-
φλῶσαι θέλω. πέφυκε γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος μὴ ὕπο-
μένειν ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, μὴ ὑπομένειν
περιπίπτειν τῷ κακῷ. εἶτα τὸ τελευταῖον, ὅταν
μήτε τὰ πράγματα μεταθεῖναι δυνηθῶ μήτε τὸν
ἐμποδίζοντα ἐκτυφλῶσαι, κάθημαι καὶ στένω καὶ
a , nr \ , \ \ ‘ \
ὃν δύναμαι λοιδορῶ, Tov Δία καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς τοὺς
m” > \ A Σ 7 ’ ‘go \ \
ἄλλους" εἰ yap μὴ ἐπιστρέφονταί μου, τί ἐμοὶ καὶ
ὑτοῖς; “ναί: GAN ἀσεβὴς ἔση. τί οὖν μοι
αὐτοῖς; adn ns on. τί οὖν μ
χεῖρον ἔσται, ὧν ἔστι μοὶ νῦν; τὸ σύνολον
ἐκείνου μεμνῆσθαι, ὅτι, ἐὰν μὴ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἢ τὸ
εὐσεβὲς καὶ συμφέρον, οὐ δύναται σωθῆναι τὸ
εὐσεβὲς ἔν τινι. ταῦτα οὐ δοκεῖ ἐπείγοντα ;
> , > / [4 Ν᾽
Ερχέσθω καὶ ἀπαντάτω ἸΠυρρώνειος καὶ ᾿Ακα-
δημαικός. ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἐμὸν μέρος οὐκ ἄγω
σχολὴν πρὸς ταῦτα οὐδὲ δύναμαι συνηγορῆσαι
τῇ συνηθείᾳ. εἰ καὶ περὶ ἀγριδίου πραγμάτιον
εἶχον, ἄλλον ἂν παρεκάλεσα τὸν συνηγορήσοντα.
τίνι οὖν ἀρκοῦμαι; τῷ κατὰ τὸν τόπον. πῶς
\ » ’ , > ef. a > Ἁ
μὲν αἴσθησις γίνεται, πότερον δι’ ὅλων ἢ ἀπὸ
μέρους, ἴσως οὐκ οἶδα ἀπολογίσασθαι, ταράσσει
δέ με ἀμφότερα. ὅτι δ᾽ ἐγὼ καὶ σὺ οὐκ ἐσμὲν οἱ
αὐτοί, λίαν ἀκριβῶς οἶδα. πόθεν τοῦτο ; οὐδέ-

174

BOOK I. xxvi. 9-18

I have none, what do you wish me to do? I cannot
avoid death. Instead of avoiding the fear of it, shall
I die in lamentation and trembling? For the origin
of sorrow is this—to wish for something that does not
come to pass. Therefore, if I can change externals
according to my own wish, I change them ; but if I
cannot, I am ready to tear out the eyes of the man
who stands in my way. For it is man’s nature not
to endure to be deprived of the good, not to endure
to fall into the evil. Then, finally, when I can
neither change the circumstances, nor tear out the
eyes of the man who stands in my way, I sit down
and groan, and revile whom I can—Zeus and the
rest of the gods; for if they do not care for me,
what are they to me? “Yes,” you say, “but that
will be impious of you.” What, then, shall I get that
is worse than what I have now? In short, we must
remember this—that unless piety and self-interest
be conjoined, piety cannot be maintained in any
man. Do not these considerations seem urgent?
Let the follower of Pyrrho or of the Academy
come and oppose us. Indeed I, for my part, have
no leisure for such matters, nor can I act as advocate
to the commonly received opinion. If I had a petty
suit about a mere bit of land, I should have called in
some one else to be my advocate. With what evi-
dence, then, am I satisfied? With that which
belongs to the matter in hand. To the question
how perception arises, whether through the whole
body, or from some particular part, perhaps I do not
know how to give a reasonable answer, and both
views perplex me. But that you and | are not the
same persons, I know very certainly. Whence do I
get this knowledge? When I want to swallow

175

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

ποτε καταπίνειν TL θέλων ἐ ἐκεῖ φέρω τὸν ψωμόν,
ἀλλ᾽ ὧδε: οὐδέποτ᾽ ἄρτον θέλων λαβεῖν τὸ σάρον
ἔλαβον, ἀλλ᾽ ἀεὶ ἐπὶ τὸν ἄρτον ἔρχομαι ὡς πρὸς

19 σκοπόν. ὑμεῖς δ᾽ αὐτοὶ οἱ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἀναι-
ροῦντες ἄλλο τι ποιεῖτε ; τίς ὑμῶν εἰς βαλανεῖον

20 ἀπελθεῖν θέλων εἰς μυλῶνα ἀπῆλθεν ;—Ti οὖν ;
οὐ δεῖ κατὰ δύναμιν καὶ τούτων ἀντέχεσθαι, τοῦ
τηρῆσαι τὴν συνήθειαν, τοῦ πεφράχθαι πρὸς τὰ

21 κατ᾿ αὐτῆς ;—Kal τίς ἀντιλέγει ; ; ἀλλὰ τὸν
δυνάμενον, τὸν σχολάζοντα" τὸν δὲ τρέμοντα καὶ
ταρασσύόμενον καὶ ῥηγνύμενον ἔσωθεν τὴν καρδίαν
ἄλλῳ τινὶ δεῖ προσευκαιρεῖν.

κη΄ . Ὅτι οὐ δεῖ χαλεπαίνειν ἀνθρώποις, καὶ
τίνα τὰ μικρὰ καὶ μεγάλα ἐν ἀνθρώποις ;

1 Τί ἐστιν αἴτιον τοῦ συγκατατίθεσθαί τινε; τὸ
2 φαίνεσθαι ὅτε ὑπάρχει. τῷ οὖν φαινομένῳ ὅτι
οὐχ ὑπάρχει συγκατατίθεσθαι οὐχ οἷόν τε. διὰ
τί ; ὅτε ἡ φύσις αὕτη " ἐστὶ τῆς διανοίας, τοῖς
μὲν. ἀληθέσιν ἐ ἐπινεύειν, τοῖς δὲ ψευδέσι δυσαρε-
8 στεῖν, πρὸς δὲ τὰ ἄδηλα ἐπέχειν. τίς τούτου
πίστις ; ; “πάθε, εἰ δύνασαι, νῦν ὅτι νύξ ἐστιν."
οὐχ οἷόν τε. “ ἀπόπαθε ὅτι ἡμέρα ἐστίν." οὐχ
οἷόν τε. “ πάθε ἢ ἀπόπαθε ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀρτίους
4 εἶναι τοὺς ἀστέρας." οὐχ οἷόν τε. ὅταν οὖν τις

' Schweighiauser: προκόπτων S. 2 Wolf: aire 8.

1 The accompanying gesture explained the allusion, which
was probably to the eye and the mouth, as in II. 20, 28.
A Cynic like Diogenes would very likely have illustrated
his point in a somewhat coarser fashion; and this is not
impossible in the present instance,

2 The Pyrrhonists, or Sceptics.

176

BOOK I. xxvu. 18--ΧΧΥΠΙ. 4

something, I never take the morse] to that place
but to this!; when I wish to take bread I never
take sweepings, but I always go after the bread as to
a mark. And do you yourselves,? who take away
the evidence of the senses, do anything else? Who
among you when he wishes to go to a bath goes to
a mill instead ?—-What then? Ought we not to the
best of our ability hold fast also to this—maintain,
that is, the commonly received opinion, and be
on our guard against the arguments that seek to
overthrow it?—And who disputes that? But only
the man who has the power and the leisure should
devote himself to these studies ; while the man who
is trembling and perplexed and whose heart is
broken within him, ought to devote his leisure to
something else.

CHAPTER XXVIII

That we ought not to be angry with men ; and what are
the little things and the great among men ?

Wuat is the reason that we assent to anything?
The fact that it appears to us to be so. It is
impossible, therefore, to assent to the thing that
appears not to be so. Why? Because this is the
nature of the intellect—to agree to what is true, to
be dissatisfied with what is false, and to withhold
judgement regarding what is uncertain. What is
the proof of this? “Feel, if you can, that it is now
night.” That is impossible. “ Put away the feeling
that it is day.” That is impossible. “Either feel
or put away the feeling that the stars are even
in number.” That is impossible. When, therefore,

177

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

συγκατατίθηται τῷ ψεύδει, ἴσθι ὅτι οὐκ ἤθελεν
ψεύδει συγκαταθέσθαι: πᾶσα γὰρ ψυχὴ ἄκουσα
ὅ στέρεται τῆς ἀληθείας, ὡς λέγει Πλάτων: ἀλλὰ
ἔδοξεν αὐτῷ τὸ ψεῦδος ἀληθές. ἄγε ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν
πράξεων τί ἔχομεν τοιοῦτον οἷον ἐνθάδε τὸ
ἀληθὲς ἢ τὸ ψεῦδος ; τὸ καθῆκον καὶ παρὰ τὸ
καθῆκον, τὸ συμφέρον καὶ τὸ ἀσύμφορον, τὸ κατ᾽
- 6 ἐμὲ καὶ οὐ κατ᾽ ἐμὲ καὶ ὅσα τούτοις ὅμοια. “ οὐ
δύναται οὖν τις δοκεῖν μέν, ὅτι συμφέρει αὐτῷ,
7 μὴ αἱρεῖσθαι δ᾽ adto;” οὐ δύναται. πῶς ἡ
λέγουσα

καὶ μανθάνω μὲν οἷα δρᾶν μέλλω κακά,
θυμὸς δὲ κρείσσων τῶν ἐμῶν βουλευμάτων ;

ὅτε αὐτὸ τοῦτο, τῷ θυμῷ χαρίσασθαι καὶ
τιμωρήσασθαι τὸν ἄνδρα, συμφορώτερον ἡγεῖται
8 τοῦ σῶσαι τὰ τέκνα. “ναί: ἀλλ᾽ ἐξηπάτηται."
δεῖξον αὐτῇ ἐναργῶς ὅτι ἐξηπάτηται καὶ οὐ
ποιήσει" μέχρι δ᾽ ἂν οὗ μὴ δεικνύης, τίνι ἔχει
9 ἀκολουθῆσαι ἢ τῷ φαινομένῳ ; οὐδενί. τί οὖν
χαλεπαίνεις αὐτῇ, ὅτι πεπλάνηται ἡ ταλαίπωρος
περὶ τῶν μεγίστων καὶ ἔχις ἀντὶ ἀνθρώπου γέ-
γονεν ; οὐχὶ δ᾽, εἴπερ ἄρα, μᾶλλον ἐλεεῖς, ὡς
τοὺς τυφλοὺς ἐλεοῦμεν, ὡς τοὺς χωλούς, οὕτως
τοὺς τὰ κυριώτατα τετυφλωμένους καὶ ἀποκεχω-
λωμένους ;
7 io 4 / nr “
10 Ὅστις οὖν τούτου μέμνηται καθαρῶς ὅτι
ἀνθρώπῳ μέτρον πάσης πράξεως τὸ φαινόμενον
(λοιπὸν ἢ καλῶς φαίνεται ἢ κακῶς" εἰ καλῶς,

1 A rather free paraphrase of Plato, Sophistes, 228 o.
2 Euripides, Medea, 1078-1079 ; translated by Way.

178

BOOK I, χχυπι. 4-10

a man assents to a falsehood, rest assured that it
was not his wish to assent to it as false; “for every
soul is unwillingly deprived of the truth,” as Plato
says}; it only seemed to him that the false was true.
Well now, in the sphere of actions what have we
corresponding to the true and the false here in
the sphere of perceptions? Duty and what is con-
trary to duty, the profitable and the unprofitable,
that which is appropriate to me and that which is
not appropriate to me, and whatever is similar to
these. “Cannot a man, then, think that something
is profitable to him, and yet not choose it?” He
cannot. How of her who says,

Now, now, I learn what horrors I intend:
But passion overmastereth sober thought? ?

It is because the very gratification of her passion and
the taking of vengeance on her husband she regards
as more profitable than the saving of her children.
“Yes, but she is deceived.” Show her clearly that
she is deceived, and she will not do it; but so
long as you do not show it, what else has she to
follow but that which appears to her to be true?
Nothing. Why, then, are you angry with her,
because the poor woman has gone astray in the
greatest matters, and has been transformed from
a human being into a viper? Why do you not, if
anything, rather pity her? As we pity the blind
and the halt, why do we not pity those who have
been made blind and halt in their governing
faculties?

Whoever, then, bears this clearly in mind, that
the measure of man’s every action is the impression
of his senses (now this impression may be formed

179

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

ἀνέγκλητός ἐστιν" εἰ κακῶς, αὐτὸς ἐξημίωται"
οὐ δύναται γὰρ ἄλλος μὲν εἶναι ὁ πεπλανημένος,
ἄλλος δ᾽ ὁ βλαπτόμενος), οὐδενὶ ὀργισθήσεται,
οὐδενὶ χαλεπανεῖ, οὐδένα λοιδορήσει, οὐδένα
μέμψεται, οὐ μισήσει, οὐ “προσκόψει οὐδενί.
11 ὥστε καὶ τὰ οὕτω μεγάλα καὶ δεινὰ ἔ ἔργα ταύτην
ἔχει τὴν “ἀρχήν, τὸ φαινόμενον ; ς ταύτην οὐδ᾽
12 ἄλλην. ἡ ᾿Ιλιὰς οὐδέν ἐστιν ἢ φαντασία καὶ
χρῆσις φαντασιῶν. ἐφάνη τῷ ᾿Αλεξάνδρῳ ἀπά-
yew τοῦ Μενελάου τὴν γυναῖκα, ἐφάνη τῇ
13 “Ελένῃ ἀκολουθῆσαι αὐτῷ. εἰ οὖν ἐφάνη τῷ
Μενελάῳ παθεῖν ὅτι κέρδος ἐστὶ τοιαύτης γυναι-
Kos στερηθῆναι, τ ἂν ἐγένετο; ἀπολώλει ἡ
14 Ἰλιὰς οὐ μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ Ὀδύσσεια.--᾿ Ex
τοιούτου οὖν μικροῦ πράγματος ἤρτηται τὰ
τηλικαῦτα ;—Tiva δὲ καὶ λέγεις τὰ τηλικαῦτα ;
πολέμους καὶ. στάσεις καὶ ἀπωλείας πολλῶν
ἀνθρώπων καὶ κατασκαφὰς πόλεων ; καὶ τί μέγα
15 ἔχει ταῦτα ;---Οὐδέν ;—Ti δ᾽ ἔχει μέγα πολλοὺς
βοῦς ἀποθανεῖν καὶ πολλὰ πρόβατα καὶ πολλὰς
καλιὰς χελιδόνων ἢ ἢ πελαργῶν ἐμπρησθῆναι καὶ
16 κατασκαφῆναι "Ὅμοια οὖν ἐστι ταῦτα ἐκεί-
νοις ;---Ομοιότατα. σώματα ἀπώλετο ἀνθρώ-
πων: καὶ βοῶν καὶ προβάτων. οἰκημάτια
17 ἐνεπρήσθη ἀνθρώπων' καὶ πελαργῶν νεοσσιαί.
τί μέγα ἢ δεινόν ; ἢ δεῖξόν μοι τί διαφέρει οἰκία

1 7.e., not merely does suffering always follow error, but
it is also morally unthinkable that one man’s error can cause
another ‘‘suffering,” in the Stoic sense; or, in other words,
no man can be injured (as Socrates believed ; ef. I. 29, 18)
or made to ‘‘suffer” except by his own act (cf. § 23). It is
this fundamental moral postulate of the Stoics which led
them to classify so many of the ills of life which one person

180

BOOK 1. χχυπι. 10-17

rightly or wrongly ; if rightly, the man is blameless;
if wrongly, the man himself pays the penalty; for it
is impossible that the man who has gone astray, is
one person, while the man who suffers is another *),—
whoever remembers this, I say, will not be enraged
at anyone, will not be angry with anyone, will not
revile anyone, will not blame, nor hate, nor take
offence at anyone. So you conclude that such great
and terrible things have their origin in this—the
impression of one’s senses? In this and nothing
else. The Iliad is nothing but a sense-impression
and a poet's use of sense-impressions. There came
to Alexander an impression to carry off the wife of
Menelaus, and an impression came to Helen to
follow him. Now if an impression had led Menelaus
to feel that it was a gain to be deprived of such a
wife, what would have happened? We should have
lost not merely the Jliad, but the Odyssey as well.—
Then do matters of such great import depend upon
one that is so small?—But what do you mean by
* matters of such great import”? Wars and factions
and deaths of many men and destructions of cities?
And what is there great in all this?—What, nothing
great in this?—-Why, what is there great in the
death of many oxen and many sheep and the
burning and destruction of many nests of swallows
or storks ?—Is there any similarity between this and
that?—A great similarity. Men’s bodies perished
in the one case, and bodies of oxen and sheep in the
other. Petty dwellings of men were burned, and so
were nests of storks. What is there great or
dreadful about that? Or else show me in what

does actually cause to another as not real evils (cf. §§ 26-8),
" but ἀδιάφορα, ‘‘ things indifferent.” cf. 1. 9,13; 1. 30, 2, ete.
181

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

> 8 lA \ \ a ς ν
ἀνθρώπου καὶ νεοσσιὰ πελαργοῦ ὡς οἴκησις.---
Ὅμοιον οὖν ἐστι πελαργὸς καὶ ἄνθρωπος ;—Ti

, n
λέγεις; KATA TO σῶμα ὁμοιότατον" πλὴν OTL μὲν
ἐκ δοκῶν καὶ κεραμίδων καὶ πλίνθων οἰκοδομεῖται
τὰ οἰκίδια, ἡ δ᾽ ἐκ ῥάβδων καὶ πηλοῦ.

Οὐδενὶ οὖν διαφέρει ἄνθρωπος πελαργοῦ ;—
Μὴ γένοιτο’ ἀλλὰ τούτοις οὐ Siadhéper.—Tim
οὖν διαφέρει ;—Znre καὶ εὑρήσεις, ὅτε ἄλλῳ
διαφέρει. ὅρα μὴ τῷ παρακολουθεῖν οἷς ποιεῖ,

\ lol n \ n lal fol
ὅρα μὴ TO κοινωνικῷ, μὴ TO πιστῷ, TO αἰδήμονι,
τῷ ἀσφαλεῖ, τῷ συνετῷ. ποῦ οὖν τὸ μέγα ἐν
» 7 Ἀ \ > , iA e [2
ἀνθρώποις κακὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν; ὅπου ἡ διαφορά.
ἂν σῴζηται τοῦτο καὶ περιτετειχισμένον μένῃ

Gilt , Yona AM i X
καὶ μὴ διαφθείρηται τὸ αἰδῆμον μηδὲ τὸ πιστὸν

\ Ν ‘ / , \ 3 ‘
μηδὲ τὸ συνετόν, τότε σῴζεται Kal αὐτός: ἂν δ᾽
ἀπολλύηταί τι τούτων καὶ ἐκπολιορκῆται, τότε
καὶ αὐτὸς ἀπόλλυται. καὶ τὰ μεγώλα πράγ-
> , > 7 v 4 e7 ΄
ματα ἐν τούτῳ ἐστίν. ἔπταισεν μεγάλα ὁ ᾿Αλέ-
ἕανδρος, ὅτ᾽ ἐπῆλθον ναυσὶν" οἱ “λληνες καὶ
ὅτε ἐπόρθουν τὴν Τροίαν καὶ ὅτε οἱ ἀδελφοὶ
αὐτοῦ ἀπώλλυντο ; οὐδαμῶς" δι’ ἀλλότριον γὰρ

ΝΜ / > / > \ / a
ἔργον πταίει οὐδείς: ἀλλὰ τότε πελαργῶν νεοσ-

Ἀγ) le] -“ > 4 “ > ,
σιαὶ ἐπορθοῦντο. πταῖσμα δ᾽ ἦν, ὅτε ἀπώλεσε
Ν > / Ν ‘ \ , Ν f
τὸν αἰδήμονα, τὸν πιστόν, τὸν φιλόξενον, τὸν κό-

get bs c-> ΄ a > ,
σμιον. wor ἔπταισεν ὁ ᾿Αχιλλεύς ; ὅτε ἀπέθανεν

1 ©, Schenk]: ἐπῆλθα" φασιν 8.
182

BOOK 1. xxvit. 17-24

respect a man’s house and a stork’s nest differ as a
place of habitation.—ls there any similarity between
a stork and a man?—What is that you say? As far
as the body is concerned, a great similarity ; except
that the petty houses of men are made of beams and
tiles and bricks, but the nest of a stork is made of
sticks and clay.

Does a man, then, differ in no wise from a stork ?
—Far from it; but in these matters he does not
differ.—In what wise, then, does he differ ?—Seek
and you will find that he differs in some other
respect. See whether it be not in his under-
standing what he does, see whether it be not in his
capacity for social action, in his faithfulness, his self-
respect, his steadfastness, his security from error, his
intelligence. Where, then, is the great evil and
the great good among men? Just where the
difference is ; and if that element wherein the differ-
ence lies be preserved and stands firm and well
fortified on every side, and neither his self-respect,
nor his faithfulness, nor his intelligence be destroyed,
then the man also is preserved; but if any of these
qualities be destroyed or taken by storm, then the
man also is destroyed. And it is in this sphere that
the great things are. Did Alexander come to his
great fall when the Hellenes assailed Troy wita
their ships, and when they were devastating the
land, and when his brothers were dying? Not at
all; for no one comes to his fall because of another’s
deed; but what went on then was merely the
destruction of storks’ nests. Nay, he came to his
fall when he lost his self-respect, his faithfulness,
his respect for the laws of hospitality, his decency
of behaviour. When did Achilles come to his fall ?

183

25

26

27

28

29

30

91

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

ὁ Πάτροκλος ; μὴ γένοιτο" ἀλλ᾽ ὅτε ὠργίζετο, ὅτε
(ὃ ΝΜ “΄5»"» > / “ /
κορασίδιον ἔκλαεν, OT ἐπελάθετο ὅτι πάρεστιν

> > \ ae / na ᾽ 7 2. \
οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ ἐρωμένας κτᾶσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ τὸ πολε-
μεῖν. ταῦτ᾽ ἐστὶ τὰ ἀνθρωπικὰ πταίσματα, τοῦτό
ἐστιν ἡ πολιορκία, τοῦτό ἐστι κατασκαφή, ὅταν
Ν δό ὰ » θὰ θ n ae 5 -“
τὰ δόγματα τὰ ὀρθὰ καθαιρῆται, ὅταν ἐκεῖνα
“ a
διαφθείρηται.--“Οταν οὖν γυναῖκες ἄγωνται καὶ
’ὔ » ’ ΄ > /
παιδία αἰχμαλωτίζηται καὶ ὅταν αὐτοὶ κατασφά-
ζωνται, ταῦτα οὐκ ἔστι κακά ;---Τόθεν τοῦτο
προσδοξάζεις ; κἀμὲ δίδαξον.---Οὔ: ἀλλὰ πόθεν
σὺ λέγεις ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι κακά ;--ἴ ἔλθωμεν ἐπὶ
᾿Ὶ ’ ͵ /
τοὺς κανόνας, φέρε τὰς προλήψεις.
Διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἱκανῶς θαυμάσαι τὸ
, ΄ / al / > > Ὁ
γινόμενον. ὅπου βάρη κρῖναι θέλομεν, οὐκ εἰκῇ
/, “ \ > / A ’ὔὕ » » -“
κρίνομεν: ὅπου τὰ εὐθέα καὶ στρεβλά, οὐκ εἰκῇ.
ε n “ , ς nr n A Ν
ἁπλῶς ὅπου διαφέρει ἡμῖν γνῶναι τὸ κατὰ τὸν
, > 7 φίδι ν' ": p ox - > \ γῸ ΣΧ ote
τόπον ἀληθές, οὐδέποθ᾽ ἡμῶν οὐδεὶς οὐδὲν εἰκῇ
ποιήσει. ὅπου δὲ τὸ πρῶτον καὶ μόνον αἴτιόν
ἐστι τοῦ κατορθοῦν ἢ ἁμαρτάνειν, τοῦ εὐροεῖν ἢ
δυσροεῖν, τοῦ ἀτυχεῖν ἢ εὐτυχεῖν, ἐνθάδε μόνον
εἰκαῖοι καὶ προπετεῖς. οὐδαμοῦ ὅμοιόν τι ζυγῷ,
» Led “ , δ > 4 > 2
οὐδαμοῦ ὅμοιόν τι κανόνι, ἀλλά TL ἐφάνη καὶ
εὐθὺς ποιῶ τὸ φανέν. κρείσσων γάρ εἰμι τοῦ
᾿Αγαμέμνονος ἢ τοῦ ᾿Αχιλλέως, ἵν᾿ ἐκεῖνοι μὲν
fol -“ ,ὕ lal
διὰ τὸ ἀκολουθῆσαι τοῖς φαινομένοις τοιαῦτα
κακὰ ποιήσωσι καὶ πάθωσιν, ἐμοὶ δὲ ἀρκῇ" τὸ
* μὴ before ἀρκῇ deleted by Schweighauser.
184

ΟΠ BOOK I. xxvii. 24-31

When Patroclus died? Far from it; but when
Achilles himself was enraged, when he was crying
about a paltry damsel, when he forgot that he was
there, not to get sweethearts, but to make war.
These are the falls that come to mankind, this is
the siege of their city, this is the razing of it—when
their correct judgements are torn down, when these
are destroyed._—Then when women are driven off
into captivity, and children are enslaved, and when
the men themselves are slaughtered, are not all
these things evils?—-Where do you get the justi-
fication for adding this opinion? Let me know
also.—No, on the contrary, do you let me know
where you get the justification for saying that
they are not evils?—Let us turn to our standards,
produce your preconceptions.

For this is why 1 cannot be sufficiently astonished
at what men do. Ina case where we wish to judge
of weights, we do not judge at haphazard; where
we wish to judge what is straight and what is
crooked, we do not judge at haphazard; in short,
where it makes any difference to us to know the
truth in the case, no one of us will do anything at
haphazard. Yet where there is involved the first
and only cause of acting aright or erring, of
prosperity or adversity, of failure or success, there
alone are we haphazard and headlong. There I
have nothing like a balance, there nothing like a
standard, but some sense-impression comes and
immediately I go and act upon it. What, am 1
any better than Agamemnon or Achilles—are they
because of following the impressions of their senses
to do and suffer such evils, while I am to be
satisfied with the impression of my senses? And

VOL. I. H 185

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

32 φαινόμενον ; > καὶ ποία τραγῳδία ἄλλην ἀρχὴν
ἔχει ; ᾿Ατρεὺς Εὐριπίδου τί ἐστιν; : τὸ αινόμε-
νον. Οἰδίπους Σοφοκλέους τί ἐστιν; τὸ φαινό-

38 μενου. Φοῖνιξ; τὸ φαινόμενον. Ἱππόλυτος;
τὸ φαινομενον. τούτου οὖν μηδεμίαν ἐπιμέλειαν
ποιεῖσθαι τίνος ὑμῖν δοκεῖ; τίνες δὲ λέγονται οἱ
παντὶ τῷ φαινομένῳ ἀκολουθοῦντες ;---Μαινό-
μενοι.---- “Ἡμεῖς οὖν ἄλλο τι ποιοῦμεν ;

κθ΄. Περὶ εὐσταθείας ;

1 Οὐσία τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ προαίρεσις ποιά, τοῦ κακοῦ
2 προαίρεσις ποιά. τί οὖν τὰ ἐκτός ; ὗλαι Th
προαιρέσει, περὶ ἃς ᾿ἀναστρεφομένη τεύξεται τοῦ
8 ἰδίου ἀγαθοῦ ἢ ἢ κακοῦ. πῶς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τεύξεται;
ἂν τὰς ὕλας μὴ θαυμάσῃ. τὰ γὰρ περὶ τῶν
ὑλῶν ,»δόγματα ὀρθὰ μὲν ὄντα ἀγαθὴν ποιεῖ τὴν
προαίρεσιν, στρεβλὰ δὲ καὶ διεστραμμένα κακήν.
4 τοῦτον τὸν νόμον ὁ θεὸς τέθεικεν καὶ φησίν 5 εἴ
τι ἀγαθὸν θέλεις, παρὰ σεαυτοῦ "λάβε." σὺ
λέγεις “οὔ: ἀλλὰ Tap ἄλλου." «μή, ἀλλὰ παρὰ
ὅ σεαυτοῦ. λοιπὸν ὅταν ἀπειλῇ ὁ τύραννος καί
pe! καλῇ, λέγω “ τίνι ἀπειλεῖ; ;” ἂν λέγῃ “ δήσω
σε," φημὶ ὅτι ταῖς χερσὶν ἀπειλεῖ καὶ τοῖς
6 ποσίν." ἂν λέγῃ ‘ ᾿τραχηλοκοπήσω σε," λέγω
“τῷ τραχήλῳ ἀπειλεῖ." ἂν λέγῃ “eis φυλακήν

1 Wolf: καὶ μὴ 8.

1 j.¢., the proper control to exercise over one’s haphazard
sense-impressions.

186

BOOK I. xxvm. 21 ΧΧΙΧ. 6

what tragedy has any other source than this? What
is the Atreus of Euripides? His sense-impression.
The Oedipus of Sophocles? His sense-impression.
The Phoenix? His sense-impression. The Hippo-

? His sense-impression. What kind of a man,
then, do you think he is who pays no attention to
this matter!? What are those men called who
follow every impression of their senses ?—Mad-
men.—Are we, then, acting differently ?

CHAPTER XXIX
Of steadfastness

Tue essence of the good is a certain kind of moral
purpose, and that of the evil is a certain kind of
moral purpose. What, then, are the external
things? They are materials for the moral purpose,
in dealing with which it will find its own proper
good or evil. How will it find the good? If it
does not admire the materials, For the judgements
about the materials, if they be correct, make the
moral purpose good, but if they be crooked and
awry, they make it evil. This is the law which God
has ordained, and He says, “If you wish any good
thing, get it from yourself.” You say, “No, but
from someone else.’ Do not so, but get it from
yourself. For the rest, when the tyrant threatens
and summons me, I answer “Whom are you
threatening?” If he says, “I will put you in
chains,” I reply, “ He is threatening my hands and
my feet.” If he says, “I will behead you,” I
answer, “ He is threatening my neck.” If he says,

187

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

a” a ΕΣ]
σε Baro,” “ὅλῳ τῷ σαρκιδίῳ:" κἂν ἐξορισμὸν
1 ἀπειλῇ, τὸ αὐτό.---Σοὶ οὖν οὐδὲν ἀπειλεῖ ;--- Εἰ
, a an > , > \ > , >
πέπονθα ὅτι ταῦτα οὐδέν ἐστι πρὸς ἐμέ, οὐδέν"
fal , i
8 εἰ δὲ φοβοῦμαί τι τούτων, ἐμοὶ ἀπειλεῖ. τίνα
\ / 4 fal
λοιπὸν δέδοικα ; τὸν τίνων ὄντα κύριον ; τῶν ἐπ᾽
ae IO 2 a > 29 ΄ Sard
ἐμοί; οὐδὲ εἷς ἐστιν. τῶν οὐκ ἐπ᾽ ἐμοί ; Kal τί
μοι αὐτῶν μέλει ; pot
9 Ὑμεῖς οὖν οἱ φιλόσοφοι διδάσκετε καταφρονεῖν
lal / \ ͵ ’ e a ,
τῶν βασιλέων ;--- Μὴ γένοιτο... τίς ἡμῶν διδάσκει
ἀντιποιεῖσθαι πρὸς αὐτούς, ὧν ἐκεῖνοι ἔχουσιν"
Ν \ lol
10 ἐξουσίαν ; TO σωμάτιον λάβε, τὴν κτῆσιν λάβε,
\ , 4 \ be ee | / ”
τὴν φήμην λάβε, τοὺς περὶ ἐμὲ λάβε. ἄν τινας
τούτων ἀναπείθω ἀντιποιεῖσθαι, τῷ ὄντι ἐγκα-
7 a
ll λείτω μοι. “ναί: ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν δογμάτων
Ν / ” \ , ¢ \ Le /
ἄρχειν θέλω." καὶ τίς σοι ταύτην THY ἐξουσίαν .
δέδωκεν ; ποῦ δύνασαι νικῆσαι δόγμα ἀλλότριον;
Ψ, , ” , Pras See ΄ , »
12 “προσάγων, φησίν, “αὐτῷ φόβον νικήσω.
» Lal “ 3 \ ΄ Ν > 7 > ΄ > ”
ἀγνοεῖς ὅτε αὐτὸ αὑτὸ ἐνίκησεν, οὐχ UT’ ἄλλου
5 / / \ OX ΝΜ fol
ἐνικήθη: προαίρεσιν δὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλο νικῆσαι
4 \ > Ἁ e / \ fal e
13 δύναται, πλὴν αὐτὴ ἑαυτήν. διὰ τοῦτο Kal ὁ
τοῦ θεοῦ νόμος κράτιστός ἐστι καὶ δικαιότατος"
cal / -“
τὸ κρεῖσσον ἀεὶ περιγινέσθω τοῦ χείρονος.
Ω n , > ‘ 7
14 ““κρείττονές εἰσιν of δέκα τοῦ ἑνός." πρὸς τί;
rn Ν a \
πρὸς τὸ δῆσαι, πρὸς τὸ ἀποκτεῖναι, πρὸς τὸ
> a “ ͵ \ en 9 ΄
ἀπαγαγεῖν ὅπου θέλουσιν, πρὸς τὸ ἀφελέσθαι
τὰ ὄντα. νικῶσιν τοίνυν οἱ δέκα τὸν ἕνα ἐν
15 τούτῳ, ἐν ᾧ κρείσσονές εἰσιν. ἐν τίνι οὖν χείρονές
᾽ . x ε \ ” ὃ Υ > fal / e δὲ ,
εἰσιν; ἂν ὁ μὲν ἔχῃ δόγματα ὀρθά, οἱ δὲ μή.
1 Schweighauser: τῶν ἐκείνων S,

188

"BOOK 5: xnx6215

“1 will throw you into prison,’ I say, “He is
threatening my whole paltry body”; and if he
threatens me with exile, I give the same answer.—
Does he, then, threaten you not at all?—If I feel
that all this is nothing to me,—not at all; but if
I am afraid of any of these threats, it is I whom he
threatens. Who is there left, then, for me to fear?
The man who is master of what? The things that
are under my control? But there is no such man.
The man who is master of the things that are not
under my control? And what do 1 care for them?
Do you philosophers, then, teach us to despise
our kings?—Far from it. Who among us teaches
you to dispute their claim to the things over which
they have authority? Take my paltry body, take
my property, take my reputation, take those who
are about me. If I persuade any to lay claim to
these things, let some man truly accuse me. “ Yes,
but I wish to control your judgements also.” And
who has given you this authority? How can you
have the power to overcome another's judgement?
“By bringing fear to bear upon him,” he says, “I
shall overcome him.” You fail to realize that the
judgement overcame itself, it was not overcome by
something else; and nothing else can overcome
moral purpose, but it overcomes itself. For this
reason too the law of God is most good and most
just: “Let the better always prevail over the
worse.” “Ten are better than one,” you say. For
what? For putting in chains, for killing, for
dragging away where they will, for taking away a
man’s property. Ten overcome one, therefore, in
the point in which they are better. In what, then,
are they worse? If the one has correct judge-

189

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

τί οὖν ; ἐν τούτῳ δύνανται νικῆσαι; πόθεν; εἰ
δ᾽ ἱστάμεθα ἐπὶ ζυγοῦ, οὐκ ἔδει τὸν βαρύτερον
καθελκύσαι;

16 Σωκράτης οὖν ἵνα πάθῃ ταῦτα ὑπ᾽ ᾿Αθηναίων ; :
— ἀνδράποδον, τί λέγεις τὸ "Σωκράτης ; ; ὡς ἔχει
τὸ πρᾶγμα λέγε: ἵν᾽ οὖν τὸ Σωκράτους πραγ-
μάτιονἷ ἀπαχθῇ καὶ συρῇ ὑπὸ τῶν ἰσχυροτέρων
εἰς δεσμωτήριον καὶ κώιειόν τις δῷ τῷ σωματίῳ

11 τῷ Σωκράτους κἀκεῖνο ἀποψυγῇ " ; ταῦτά σοι
φαίνεται θαυμαστά, ταῦτα ἄδικα, Ἂν) τούτοις
ἐγκαλεῖς τῷ θεῷ; ; οὐδὲν οὖν εἶχε Σωκράτης ἀντὶ

18 τούτων ; ποῦ ἦν ἡ οὐσία αὐτῷ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ; τίνι
προσσχῶμεν; σοὶ ἢ αὐτῷ; ; καὶ τί λέγει ἐ ἐκεῖνος ; ;
“ἐμὲ δ᾽ “Avutos καὶ Μέλητος ἀποκτεῖναι μὲν
δύνανται, βλάψαι δ᾽ οὔ." καὶ πάλιν “el ταύτῃ

19 τῷ θεῷ φίλον, ταύτῃ γινέσθω." ἀλλὰ “δεῖξον
ὅτι χείρονα ἔχων δόγματα κρατεῖ τοῦ κρείττονος
ἐν δόγμασιν. οὐ δείξεις" οὐδ᾽ ἐγγύς. νόμος γὰρ
τῆς φύσεως καὶ τοῦ θεοῦ οὗτος" τὸ κρεῖσσον ἀεὶ
περιγινέσθω τοῦ χείρονος. ἐν τίνι ; ; ἐν ᾧ κρεῖσσόν

20 ἐστιν. σῶμα σώματος ἰσχυρότερον, οἱ πλείονες

21 τοῦ ἑνός, ὁ ὁ κλέπτης τοῦ μὴ κλέπτου. διὰ τοῦτο
κἀγὼ τὸν λύχνον ἀπώλεσα, ὅτι ἐν τῷ ἀγρυπνεῖν
μου κρείσσων ἢν ὁ κλέπτης. ἄλλ᾽ ἐκεῖνος

1 σωμάτιον the edition of Salamanca: Bentley also seems
to have questioned the word, but compare 11. i. 16.

2 Koraes: ἀποφύγηι δ΄.

3 Schweighauser after Schegk : προσχῶμεν 8.

1 The interlocutor takes the case of Socrates as proving
that a question of right cannot be settled by weighing
judgements in the ordinary fashion, 7.e., by counting votes.

2 Plato, Apology, 30.

190

~ BOOK L. xxix. 15-21

ments, and the ten have not. What then? Can
they overcome in this point? Howcan they? But
if we are weighed in the balance, must not the
heavier draw down the scales?

So that a Socrates may suffer what he did at the
hands of the Athenians? 4—Slave, why do you say
“Socrates”? Speak of the matter as it really is
and say: That the paltry body of Socrates may
be carried off and dragged to prison by those who
were stronger than he, and that some one may
give hemlock to the paltry body of Socrates, and
that it may grow cold and die? Does this seem
marvellous to you, does this seem unjust, for this
do you blame God? Did Socrates, then, have no
compensation for this? In what did the essence
of the ae consist for him? To whom shall we
listen, to you or to Socrates himself? And what
does he say? “Anytus and Meletus can kill me,
but they cannot hurt me.”? And again, “If so it
is pleasing to God, so let it be.’ But do you
prove that one who holds inferior judgements pre-
vails over the man who is superior in point of
judgements. You will not be able to prove this;
no, nor even come near proving it. For this is a
law of nature and of God: “Let the better always
prevail over the worse.” Prevail in what? In that
in which it is better. One body is stronger than
another body; several persons are stronger than
one; the thief is stronger than the man who is not
a thief. That is why I lost my lamp,‘ because in
the matter of keeping awake the thief was better
than I was, However, he bought a lamp for a very

3 Plato, Crito, 43 νυ.
4 See I. 18, 15.
191

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

τοσούτου ὠνήσατο λύχνον" ἀντὶ λύχνου κλέπτης
ἐγένετο, ἀντὶ λύχνου ἄπιστος, ἀντὶ λύχνου
θηριώδης. τοῦτο ἔδοξεν αὐτῷ λυσιτελεῖν.
Ἔστω" ἀλλ᾽ εἴληπταί μού τις τοῦ ἱματίου
καὶ ἕλκει μ᾽ εἰς τὴν ἀγοράν, εἶτα ἐπικραυγάζουσιν
ἄλλοι “φιλόσοφε, τί σε ὠφέληκε τὰ δόγματα;
ἰδοὺ σύρῃ εἰς τὸ δεσμωτήριον, ἰδοὺ μέλλεις
τραχηλοκοπεῖσθαι.᾽" καὶ ποίαν ἔπραξα ἂν εἰσα-
γωγήν, ἵν᾽, ἂν ὦ ἰσχυρότερος ἐπιλάβηταί μου τοῦ
ἱματίου, δὴ σύρωμαι; ἵνα, ἄν με δέκα περι-
σπάσαντες εἰς τὸ δεσμωτήριον ἐμβάλωσιν, μὴ
ἐμβληθῶ ; ἄλλο οὖν οὐδὲν ἔμαθον ; ἔμαθον, ἵνα
πᾶν τὸ γινόμενον ἴδω ὅτι, ἂν ἀπροαίρετον HE
οὐδέν ἐστι πρὸς ἐμέ.---πρὸς τοῦτο οὖν οὐκ
ὠφέλησαι ; τί οὖν ἐν ἄλλῳ ξητεῖς τὴν ὠφέλειαν
ἢ ἐν ᾧ ἔμαθες »-τκαθήμενος λοιπὸν ἐν τῇ φυλακῇ
λέγω “οὗτος ὁ ταῦτα κραυγάξων οὔτε τοῦ
σημαινομένου ἀκούει οὔτε τῷ λεγομένῳ παρα-
κολουθεῖ οὔτε ὅλως μεμέληκεν αὐτῷ εἰδέναι
περὶ τῶν φιλοσόφων τί λέγουσιν ἢ τί ποιοῦσιν.
ἄφες αὐτόν. “ ἀλλ᾽ ἔξελθε “πάλιν ἀπὸ τῆς
φυλακῆς." εἰ μηκέτι χρείαν ἔχητέ μου ἐν τῇ
φυλακῇ, ἐξέρχομαι" ἂν πάλιν σχῆτε, εἰσε-
λεύσομαι. μέχρι τίνος ; μέχρις ἂν οὗ λόγος
αἱρῇ συνεῖναί με τῷ σωματίῳ: ὅταν δὲ μὴ αἱρῇ,
λάβετε αὐτὸ καὶ ὑγιαίνετε. μόνον μὴ ἀλογίστως,
μόνον μὴ μαλακῶς, μὴ ἐκ τῆς τυχούσης προ-

Epictetus seems to stop and address himself somewhat
abruptly, but the connection of this and the next sentence is
not entirely clear. Schweighiuser thought that they were
addressed to some one οὗ his pupils.

192

‘BOOK I. xxx. 21-29

high price; for a lamp he became a thief, for a
lamp he became faithless, for a lamp he became
beast-like.. This seemed to him to be profitable!
Very well; but now someone has taken hold of
me by my cloak and pulls me into the market-place,
and then others shout at me, “Philosopher, what
good have your judgements done you? See, you
are being dragged off to prison; see, you are going
to have your head cut off.” And what kind of
Introduction to Philosophy could I have studied, which
would prevent me from being dragged off,ifa man who
-is stronger than I am should take hold of my cloak ?
Or would prevent me from being thrown into the
prison, if ten men should hustle me and throw
me unto it? Have I, then, learned nothing else?
I have learned tosee that everything which happens,
if it be outside the realm of my moral purpose, is
nothing to me.—Have you, then, derived no benefit
from this principle for the present case?+_~Why,
then, do you seek your benefit in something other
than that in which you have learned that it is?—
Well, as I sit in the prison I say, “The fellow who
shouts this at me neither understands what is meant,
nor follows what is said, nor has he taken any pains
at all to know what philosophers say, or what they
do. Don’t mindhim.” ‘‘ But come out of the prison
again.”” If you have no further need of me in the
prison, I shall come out; if you ever need me there
again, I shall go back in. For how long? For so
long as reason chooses that I remain with my paltry
body; but when reason does not so choose, take it
and good health to you! Only let me not give up
my life irrationally, only let me not give up my life
faintheartedly, or from some casual pretext. For

193

30
31

32

33

34

35

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

φάσεως. πάλιν γὰρ ὁ θεὸς οὐ βούλεται" χρείαν
γὰρ ἔχει κόσμου τοιούτου, τῶν ἐπὶ γῆς ἀνα-
στρεφομένων τοιούτων. ἐὰν δὲ σημήνῃ τὸ ἀνα-
κλητικὸν ὡς τῷ Σωκράτει, πείθεσθαι δεῖ τῷ
σημαίνοντι ὡς στρατηγῷ.

Τί οὖν ; ; λέγειν. δεῖ ταῦτα πρὸς τοὺς πολλούς ;
—"Iva τί; οὐ γὰρ ἀρκεῖ τὸ αὐτὸν πείθεσθαι ;
τοῖς γὰρ παιδίοις, ὅ ὅταν προσελθόντα “κροτῇ καὶ
λέγῃ “σήμερον Σατορνάλια ἀγαθά," λέγομεν

“οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθὰ ταῦτα, ; οὐδαμῶς" ἀλλὰ καὶ
αὐτοὶ ἐπικροτοῦμεν. καὶ σὺ τοίνυν, ὅταν μετα-
πεῖσαί τινα μὴ δύνῃ, γίγνωσκε ὅτι παιδίον ἐστὶ
καὶ ἐπικρότει αὐτῷ: ἂν δὲ μὴ τοῦτο θέλῃς,"
σιώπα λοιπόν.

Τούτων δεῖ μεμνῆσθαι καὶ κληθέντα εἴς τινα
τοιαύτην περίστασιν εἰδέναι, ὅτι ἐλήλυθεν ὁ
καιρὸς τοῦ ἀποδεῖξαι, εἰ πεπαιδεύμεθα. νέος
γὰρ ἀπὸ σχολῆς ἀπιὼν εἰς περίστασιν ὅμοιός
ἐστι τῷ μεμελετηκότι συλλογισμοὺς ἀναλύειν, κἄν
τις εὔλυτον 3 αὐτῷ προτείνῃ, λέγει “μᾶλλόν μοι
πεπλεγμένον κομψῶς προτείνατε, ἵνα γυμνασθῶ."
καὶ οἱ ἀθληταὶ τοῖς κούφοις νεανίσκοις δυσ-
αρεστοῦσιν" τ οὐ βαστάξει με; ᾿ φησίν. Ὗ οὗτός
ἐστιν εὐφυὴς νέος." οὔ ἀλλὰ καλέσαντος τοῦ
καιροῦ κλάειν δεῖ καὶ λέγειν “ἤθελον ἔτι
μανθάνειν." τίνα; εἰ ταῦτα οὐκ ἔμαθες ὥστ᾽ 8

1 Wolf after Schegk: θέληι 8. 3 Reiske: εὔλογον S.
3 Meibom: οὐχ ὥστ᾽ S.

1 Equivalent to our greeting, ‘‘ Merry Christmas!” In
what follows it would appear that the clapping of hands
upon this occasion was a kind of salutation, somewhat like
the kiss at Easter among Greek Orthodox Christians.

194

~ BOOK I, xxix. 29-35

again, God does not so desire; for He has need of
such a universe, and of such men who go to and
fro upon earth. But if He gives the signal to
retreat, as He did to Socrates, I must obey Him
who gives the signal, as I would a general.

What then? Must I say these things to the
multitude? For what purpose? [5 it not sufficient
for a man himself to believe them? For example,
when the children come up to us and clap their
hands and say, “To-day is the good Saturnalia,” }
do we say to them, “ All this is not good”? Not
at all; but we too clap our hands tothem. And
do you too, therefore, when you are unable to make
a man change his opinion, realize that he is a child
and clap your hands to him; but if you do not want
to do this, you have merely to hold your peace.

All this a man ought to remember, and when he
is summoned to meet some such difficulty, he ought
to know that the time has come to show whether
we are educated. For a young man leaving school
and facing a difficulty is like one who has practised
the analysis of syllogisms, and if someone propounds
him one that is easy to solve, he says, “ Nay, rather
propound me one that is cunningly involved, so that
I may get exercise from it.” Also the athletes are
displeased with the youths of light weight: ‘He
cannot lift me,’’saysone. “ Yonder is asturdy young
man.” Ohno; but when the crisis calls,2 he has to
weep and say, “I wanted to keep on learning.”
Learning what? If you do not learn these things
so as to be able to manifest them in action, what did

2 That is, when, instead of an exercise for practice, he

has to meet an actual contestant, or a practical difficulty
in life.

195

36

37

39

40

41

42

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

ἔργῳ δεῖξαι, πρὸς τί αὐτὰ ἔμαθες ; ἐγώ τινα
οἶμαι τῶν καθημένων ἐνταῦθα ὠδίνειν αὐτὸν
ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ λέγειν “ἐμοὶ νῦν περίστασιν μὴ
ἔρχεσθαι τοιαύτην, ὁποία τούτῳ ἐλήλυθεν ; ἐμὲ
νῦν κατατριβῆναι καθήμενον ἐν γωνίᾳ δυνάμενον
στεφανωθῆναι ᾿Ολύμπια ; πότε τις ἐμοὶ καταγ-
γελεῖ τοιοῦτον ἀγῶνα; 3” οὕτως ἔχειν ἔδει πάντας
ὑμᾶς. ἀλλ᾽ ἐν μὲν τοῖς Καίσαρος μονομάχοις
εἰσί τινες οἱ ἀγανακτοῦντες ὅτι οὐδεὶς αὐτοὺς
προάγει οὐδὲ ξευγνύει καὶ εὔχονται τῷ θεῷ καὶ
προσέρχονται τοῖς ἐπιτρόποις δεόμενοι μονο-
μαχῆσαι, ἐξ ὑ ὑμῶν δ᾽ οὐδεὶς φανήσεται τοιοῦτος ; :
ἤθελον πλεῦσαι ἐπ᾽ αὐτὸ τοῦτο καὶ ἰδεῖν, τί μου
ποιεῖ ὁ ἀθλητής, πῶς μελετᾷ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν. “οὐ
θέλω, φησίν, “ τοιαύτην. ἐπὶ σοὶ γάρ ἐστι
λαβεῖν ἣν θέλεις ὑπόθεσιν; δέδοταί σοι σῶμα
τοιοῦτον, γονεῖς τοιοῦτοι, ἀδελφοὶ τοιοῦτοι, πατρὶς
τοιαύτη, τάξις ἐν αὐτῇ τοιαύτη: εἶτά μοι λέγεις
ἐλθὼν ¥ adrakov μοι τὴν ὑπόθεσιν." εἶτα οὐκ
ἔχεις ἀφορμὰς πρὸς τὸ χρήσασθαι τοῖς * δοθεῖσιν ; 3
σόν ἐστι προτεῖναι, ἐμὸν μελετῆσαι καλῶς. οὔ"
ἀλλὰ “ μὴ τοιοῦτό μοι προβάλῃς τροπικόν, ἀλλὰ
τοιοῦτον" μὴ τοιαύτην ἐπενέγκῃς τὴν ἐπιφορών,
ἀλλὰ τοιαύτην. ἔσται χρόνος τάχα, ἐν ᾧ οἱ
τραγῳδοὶ οἰήσονται, ἑαυτοὺς εἶναι προσωπεῖα καὶ
ἐμβάδας καὶ τὸ σύρμα. ἄνθρωπε, ταῦτα ὕλην
ἔχεις καὶ ὑπόθεσιν. ,φθέγξαι τι, ἵνα εἰδῶμεν
πότερον τραγῳδὸς εἶ ἢ γελωτοποιός: κοινὰ γὰρ

1 Supplied by Schenkl.

1 Objecting, that is, to a hypothetical syllogism of a par-
ticular kind and proposing another, more to his own liking.

196

BOOK I. χχιχ. 35-42

you learn them for? _I fancy that someone among
these who are sitting here is in travail within his
own soul: and is saying, “ Alas, that such a difficulty
does not come to me now as that which has come
to this fellow! Alas, that now I must be worn
out sitting in a corner, when I might be crowned
at Olympia! When will someone bring me word
of such a contest?” You ought all to be thus
minded. But among the gladiators of Caesar there
are some who complain because no one brings them
out, or matches them with an antagonist, and they
pray God and go to their managers, begging to fight
in single combat; and yet will no one of you display
a like spirit? I wanted to sail to Rome for this very
purpose and to see what my athlete is doing, what
practice he is following in his task. “I do not
want,” says he, “this kind of a task.’’ What, is it
in your power to take any task you want? You
have been given such a body, such parents, such
brothers, such a country, such a position in it; and
then do you come to me and say, “Change the task
for me”? What, do you not possess resources to
enable you to utilize that which has been given? You
ought to say, “It is yours to set the task, mine to
practise it well.” No, but you do say, “ Do not propose
to me such-and-such a hypothetical syllogism, but
rather such-and-such a one;! do not urge upon me
such-and-such a conclusion, but rather such-and-such
a one.” A time will soon come when the tragic
actors will think that their masks and buskins and
the long robe are themselves. Man, all these things
you have as a subject-matter and a task. Say some-
thing, so that we may know whether you are a
tragic actor or a buffoon; for both of these have

197

43

44

46 “ec

47

49

5]

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

»
ἔχουσι τὰ ἄλλα ἀμφότεροι. διὰ τοῦτο ἂν ἀφέλῃ
τις αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰς ἐμβάδας καὶ τὸ προσωπεῖον

ὶ > ἰὃ or > X ΄ ’ af ©
καὶ ἐν εἰδώλῳ αὐτὸν προαγάγῃ, ἀπώλετο ὁ
τραγῳδὸς ἢ μένει ; ἂν φωνὴν ἔχῃ, μένει.

Καὶ ἐνθάδε. “λάβε ἡγεμονίαν. λαμβάνω
καὶ λαβὼν δεικνύω, πῶς ἄνθρωπος ἀναστρέφεται
πεπαιδευμένος. ““θὲς τὴν πλατύσημον καὶ ἀνα-
λαβὼν ῥάκη πρόσελθε ἐν προσώπῳ τοιούτῳ."

/ = ἃ > δέδ , A \ > Lal
τί οὖν ; ov δέδοταί wor καλὴν φωνὴν εἰσενεγκεῖν ;
πῶς οὖν ἀναβαίνεις viv;” ὡς μάρτυς ὑπὸ τοῦ
θεοῦ κεκλημένος. “ἔρχου σὺ καὶ μαρτύρησόν
μοι" σὺ γὰρ ἄξιος εἶ προαχθῆναι μάρτυς ὑπ᾽
ἐμοῦ. μή τι τῶν ἐκτὸς τῆς προαιρέσεως ἀγαθόν
ἐστιν ἢ κακόν; μή τινα βλάπτω; μή τι ἐπ᾽
” \ > » > , \ ς ΄ Xx 3
ἄλλῳ τὴν ὠφέλειαν ἐποίησα τὴν ἑκάστου ἢ ἐπ

> a. ” 4 / δίδ “ θ ὦ} aa >
αὐτῷ ;" τίνα μαρτυρίαν δίδως τῷ θεῷ; “ἐν
δεινοῖς εἰμι, κύριε, καὶ δυστυχῶ; οὐδείς μου ἐπι-

/ > , ’ > / ,ὔ
στρέφεται, οὐδείς μοι δίδωσιν οὐδέν, πάντες
ψέγουσιν, Kaxodoyotow.” ταῦτα μέλλεις μαρ-
τυρεῖν καὶ καταισχύνειν τὴν κλῆσιν ἣν κέκληκεν,
ὅτι σε ἐτίμησεν ταύτην τὴν τιμὴν καὶ ἄξιον
ἡγήσατο προσαγαγεῖν εἰς μαρτυρίαν τηλικαύτην; .

"AW ἀπεφήνατο ὁ ἔχων τὴν ἐξουσίαν “ κρίνω
σε ἀσεβῆ καὶ ἀνόσιον εἶναι. τί σοι γέγονεν ;
ch es ’ \ \ fe 3 ” ” >

ἐκρίθην ἀσεβὴς καὶ ἀνόσιος εἶναι." ἄλλο οὐ-
δέν ; “ οὐδέν." εἰ δὲ περὶ συνημμένου τινὸς ἐπι-

| \ 25 Ψ > , « Ν > ε ἴα
κεκρίκει καὶ ἐδεδώκει ἀπόφασιν “TO εἰ ἡμέρα

1 The toga with a broad stripe of red which was worn
by men of senatorial rank.

198

BOOK I. xxix. 42-51

but their linesin common. Therefore, if
one should take away from him both his buskins and
hts mask, and bring him on the stage as a mere
shade of an actor, is the tragic actor lost, or does
he abide? If he has a voice, he abides.

And so it is in actual life. “Take a governor-
ship.” I take it and having done so I show how
an educated man comports himself. “Lay aside
the laticlave,1 and having put on rags come for-
ward in a character to correspond.” What then?
Has it not been given me to display a fine voice.
“In what réle, then, do you mount the stage now?”
As a witness summoned by God. God says, “ Go
you and bear witness for Me; for you are worthy
to be produced by me as a witness. Is any of those
things which lie outside the range of the moral
purpose either good.or evil? Do I injure any man?
Have | put each man’s advantage under the control
of any but himself?’’ What kind of witness do
you bear for God? “I am in sore straits, O Lord,
and in misfortune ; no one regards me, no one gives
me anything, all blame me and speak ill of me.’
Is this the witness that you are going to bear, and
is this the way in which you are going to disgrace the
summons which He gave you, in that He bestowed
this honour upon you and deemed you worthy to be
brought forward in order to bear testimony so im-
portant ?

But the one who has authority over you declares,
“1 pronounce you impious and profane.” What has
happened to you? “1 have been pronounced im-
pious and profane.” Nothing else? “Nothing.” But
if he had passed judgement upon some hypothetical
syllogism and had made a declaration, “I judge

199

52

53

54

55

56

57

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

> / nt 3 , lal ” 43 la
ἐστίν, φῶς ἐστιν κρίνω ψεῦδος εἶναι," Ti ἐγεγόνει
TO συνημμένῳ ; τίς ἐνθάδε κρίνεται, τίς κατα-
‘
κέκριται; TO συνημμένον ἢ ὁ ἐξαπατηθεὶς περὶ
αὐτοῦ; οὗτος οὖν τίς ποτε ὁ ἔχων ἐξουσίαν τοῦ
᾽ , ΄ \ a 2 , 3 \
ἀποφήνασθαί τι περὶ cov; oidev τί ἐστι. τὸ
> \ A \ > / / > Ll /
εὐσεβὲς ἢ TO ἀσεβές ; μεμελέτηκεν αὐτό; μεμά-
θηκεν; ποῦ; παρὰ tiv; εἶτα μουσικὸς μὲν οὐκ
ἐπιστρέφεται αὐτοῦ ἀποφαινομένου περὶ τῆς
νήτης ὅτι ἐστὶν ὑπάτη οὐδὲ γεωμετρικός, ἂν
ἐπικρίνῃ τὰς ἀπὸ κέντρου πρὸς τὸν κύκλον
προσπιπτούσας μὴ εἶναι ἴσας" ὁ δὲ ταῖς ἀλη-
θείαις πεπαιδευμένος ἀνθρώπου ἀπαιδεύτου ἐπι-
στραφήσεται ἐπικρίνοντός TL περὶ ὁσίου καὶ
ἀνοσίου καὶ ἀδίκου καὶ δικαίου ;
Ὦ πολλῆς ἀδικίας τῶν πεπαιδευμένων. ταῦτα
οὖν ἔμαθες ἐνταῦθα ; οὐ θέλεις τὰ μὲν λογάρια
\ ’ ” ἣν al > ΄
τὰ περὶ τούτων ἄλλοις ἀφεῖναι, ἀταλαιπώροις
ἀνθρωπαρίοις, tv’ ἐν γωνίᾳ καθεζόμενοι μισθάρια
᾽ὔ 4 “ > > Lad ΓΝ
λαμβάνωσιν ἢ γογγύζωσιν, ὅτι οὐδεὶς αὐτοῖς παρέ-
χει οὐδέν, σὺ δὲ χρῆσθαι παρελθὼν οἷς ἔμαθες ;
> \ 4, Ψ 4 \ , Lo > \ /
ov yap Aoyapla ἐστι τὰ λείποντα νῦν, ἀλλὰ γέμει
“ - 5"
Ta βιβλία τῶν Στωικῶν λογαρίων. τί οὖν τὸ
λεῖπόν ἐστιν ; ὁ χρησόμενος, ὁ ἔργῳ μαρτυρήσων
τοῖς λόγοις. τοῦτό μοι τὸ πρόσωπον ἀνάλαβε,
n a na ,
ἵνα μηκέτι παλαιοῖς ἐν τῇ σχολῇ παραδείγμασι
, 0 ; \ » 7 \ θ᾽ « a 4
χρώμεθα, ἀλλὰ ἐχωμέν TL καὶ καῦ ἡμᾶς Tapa-

1 The lowest string had, however, the highest note in
pitch, and vice versa.

200

BOOK I. xxix. 51-57

the statement, ‘If it is day, there is light, to be
false,’ what has happened to the hypothetical
syllogism? Who is being judged in this case, who
has been condemned? The hypothetical syllogism,
or the man who has been deceived in his judgement
about it? Who in the world, then, is this man who
has authority to make any declaration about you?
Does he know what piety or impiety is? Has he
pondered the matter? Has he learned it? Where?
Under whose instruction? And yet a musician pays
no attention to him, if he declares that the lowest
string is the highest,? nor does a geometrician, if the
man decides that the lines extending from the
centre to the circumference of a circle are not
equal; but shall the truly educated man pay
attention to an uninstructed person when he passes
judgement on what is holy and unholy, and on
what is just and unjust?

How great is the injustice committed by the
educated in so doing! Is this, then, what you
have learned here? Will you not leave to others,
mannikins incapable of taking pains, the petty
quibbles about these things, so that they may sit in
a corner and gather in their petty fees, or grumble
because nobody gives them anything, and will you
not yourself come forward and make use of what
you have learned? For what is lacking now is
not quibbles; nay, the books of the Stoies are full
of quibbles. What, then, is the thing lacking
now? The man to make use of them, the man
to bear witness to the arguments by his acts.
This is the character I would have you assume, that
we may no longer use old examples in the school,
but may have some example from our own time

201

58

59

61

62

63

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

Sevypa. ταῦτα οὖν Tivos ἐστὶ θεωρεῖν ; τοῦ
σχολάζοντος. ἔστι γὰρ Pro Ewpov τι ξῷον ὁ
ἄνθρωπος. ἀλλ᾽ αἰσχρόν ἐστι θεωρεῖν ταῦτα
οὕτως ὡς οἱ "δραπέται" ἀλλ᾽ ἀπερισπάστως
καθῆσθαι καὶ ἀκούειν νῦν μὲν τραγῳδοῦ νῦν “Ἢ
κιθαρῳδοῦ, οὐχ ὡς ἐκεῖνοι ποιοῦσιν. ἅμα
ἐπέστη καὶ ἐπήνεσεν τὸν τραγῳδόν, ἅ ἅμα δὲ ei:
εβλέψατο' εἶτα ἄν τις φθέγξηται κύριον, εὐθὺς
σεσόβηνται, ταράσσονται. αἰσχρόν ἐστιν οὕτως
καὶ τοὺς φιλοσόφους θεωρεῖν τὰ ἔργα τῆς φύσεως.
τί γάρ ἐστι κύριος ; ἄνθρωπος ἀνθρώπου κύριος
οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ θάνατος καὶ ζωὴ καὶ ἡδονὴ καὶ
πόνος. ἐπεὶ χωρὶς τούτων ἄγαγέ μοι τὸν Kai-
σαρα καὶ ὄψει πῶς εὐσταθῶ. ὅταν δὲ μετὰ
τούτων ἔλθῃ βροντῶν καὶ ἀστράπτων, ἐγὼ δὲ
ταῦτα φοβῶμαι, τί ἄλλο ἢ ἐπέγνωκα τὸν κύριον
ὡς ὁ δραπέτης ; μέχρι δ᾽ ἂν οὗ τινα ἀνοχὴν ἀπὸ
τούτων ἔχω, ὡς δραπέτης ἐφίσταται θεάτρῳ
οὕτως κἀγώ: λούομαι, πίνω, ἄδω, πάντα δὲ μετὰ
φόβου καὶ ταλαιπωρίας. ἐὰν δ᾽ ἐμαυτὸν ἀπο-
λύσω τῶν δεσποτῶν, τοῦτ᾽ ἔστιν ἐκείνων, δι ἃ
οἱ δεσπόται εἰσὶ φοβεροί, ποῖον ἔτι πρᾶγμα ἔχω,
ποῖον ἔτι κύριον ;

Τί οὖν ; κηρύσσειν δεῖ ταῦτα πρὸς πάντας ;—
Οὔ, ἀχλὰ τοῖς ἰδιώταις συμπεριφέρεσθαι καὶ
λέγειν “οὗτος ὃ αὑτῷ ἀγαθὸν οἴεται, “τοῦτο κἀμοὶ
συμβουλεύει: συγγιγνώσκω αὐτῷ. καὶ γὰρ

1 The runaway slave, always apprehensive that his master
may suddenly appear, is nervous and distraught, giving only
half his mind to the spectacle before him.

2 One who sang to his own accompaniment upon the
cithara or harp.

202

BOOK LI. xxix. 57-65

also. Whose part is it, then, to contemplate these
matters? The part of him who devotes him-
self to learning; for man is a kind of animal that
loves contemplation. But it is disgraceful to con-
template these things like runaway slaves ;! nay, sit
rather free from distractions and listen, now to
tragic actor and now to the citharoede,? and not
as those runaways do, For at the very moment
when one of them is paying attention and praising
the tragic actor, he takes a glance around, and then
if someone mentions the word “ master,” they are
instantly all in a flutter and upset. It is disgraceful
for men who are philosophers to contemplate the
works of nature in this spirit. For what is a
“master”? One man is not master of another man,
but death and life and pleasure and hardship are his
masters. So bring Caesar to me, if he be without
these things, and you shall see how steadfast I am.
But when he comes mith them, thundering and lighten-
ing, and I am afraid of them, what else have I done
but recognized my master, like the runaway slave?
But so long as I have, as it were, only a respite
from these threats, I too am acting like a runaway
slave who is a spectator in a theatre; I bathe, I
drink, I sing, but I do it all in fear and misery.
But if I emancipate myself from my masters, that is,
from those things which render masters terrifying,
what further trouble do 1 have, what master any
more?

What then? Must I proclaim this to all men?
No, but I must treat with consideration those who
are not philosophers by profession, and say, ‘‘ This
man advises for me that which he thinks good in
his own case ; therefore I excuse him.” For Socrates

203

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

Σωκράτης συνεγίγνωσκεν τῷ ἐπὶ τῆς φυλακῆς
κλάοντι, ὅτε ἔμελλεν πίνειν τὸ φάρμακον, καὶ

66 λέγει “ὡς γενναίως ἡμᾶς ἀποδεδάκρυκεν." μή
τι οὖν ἐκείνῳ λέγει ὅτι “ διὰ τοῦτο τὰς γυναῖκας
ἀπελύσαμεν᾽" ; ἀλλὰ τοῖς γνωρίμοις, τοῖς δυνα-
μένοις αὐτὰ ἀκοῦσαι" ἐκείνῳ δὲ συμπεριφέρεται
ὡς παιδίῳ.

a / a
λ΄. Τί δεῖ πρόχειρον ἔχειν ἐν ταῖς
περιστάσεσιν ;

Ι ὍὭΌὍταν εἰσίῃς πρός τινα τῶν ὑπερεχόντων,
μέμνησο ὅτι καὶ ἄλλος ἄνωθεν βλέπει τὰ γιγνό-
μενα καὶ ὅτι ἐκείνῳ σε δεῖ μᾶλλον ἀρέσκειν ἢ

2 τούτῳ. ἐκεῖνος οὖν σου πυνθάνεται “ φυγὴν καὶ
φυλακὴν καὶ δεσμὰ καὶ θάνατον καὶ ἀδοξίαν τί

8 ἔλεγες ἐν τῇ σχολῇ; “ἐγὼ ἀδιάφορα." “ viv
οὖν τίνα αὐτὰ λέγεις ; μή τι ἐκεῖνα ἠλλάγη ;”
“οὔ. “σὺ οὖν ἠλλάγης 3” “οὔ. “λέγε οὖν
τίνα ἐστὶν ἀδιάφορα." “τὰ ἀπροαίρετα." 1 “ λέγε
καὶ τὰ ἑξῆς. ““ἀπροαίρετα οὐδὲν πρὸς ἐμέ."

4 “λέγε καὶ τὰ ἀγαθὰ τίνα ὑμῖν ἐδόκει ;” “ mpoat-
ρεσις οἵα δεῖ καὶ χρῆσις φαντασιῶν." “τέλος

ὅ δὲ τέ; “τὸ σοὶ ἀκολουθεῖν." “ταῦτα καὶ νῦν
λέγεις; “ταὐτὰ καὶ νῦν λέγω." ἄπιθι λοιπὸν
ἔσω θαρρῶν καὶ μεμνημένος τούτων καὶ ὄψει

1 τὰ ἀπροαίρετα supplied by Upton from his ‘‘ codex.”

1 Slightly modified from Plato, Phaedo, 110}.
2 Slightly modified from Plato, Phaedo, 117}.

204

BOOK I. χχιχ. 65-XXX. 5

excused the jailor who wept for him when he
was about to drink the poison, and said, “ How
generously he has wept for us!”2 Does he, then,
say to the jailor, “ This is why we sent the women
away”?? No, but he makes this latter remark to
his intimate friends, to those who were fit to hear
it; but the jailor he treats with consideration like
a child,

CHAPTER XXX
What aid ought we to have ready at hand in difficulties ?

Wuen you come into the presence of some pro-
minent man, remember that Another® looks from
above on what is taking place, and that you must
please Him rather than this man. He, then, who
is above asks of you, “In your school what did you
call exile and imprisonment and bonds and death and
disrepute?” “I called them ‘ things indifferent.’ ”
“What, then, do you call them now? Have
they changed at all?’ “No.” “Have you, then,
changed?”” “No.” “Tell me, then, what things
are ‘indifferent.’”’ “Those that are independent of
the moral purpose.” ‘Tell me also what follows.”
“Things independent of the moral purpose are
nothing to me.” “Tell me also what you thought
were ‘the good things.’’’ “ A proper moral purpose
and a proper use of external impressions.” ‘“ And
what was the ‘end’?” “To follow Thee.” “Do
you say all that even now?” “TI say the same
things even now.” Then enter in, full of con-
fidence and mindful of all this, and you shall see

3 That is, God. Compare note on I. 25, 13.
205

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

τί ἐστι νέος μεμελετηκῶς ἃ δεῖ ἐν ἀνθρώποις

6 ἀμελετήτοις. ἐγὼ μὲν νὴ τοὺς θεοὺς φαντάζομαι
ὅτι πείσῃ τὸ τοιοῦτον “τί οὕτως μεγάλα καὶ

7 πολλὰ παρασκευαξόμεθα πρὸς τὸ μηδέν ; τοῦτο
ἦν ἡ ἐξουσία ; ; τοῦτο τὰ πρόθυρα, οἱ κοιτωνῖται,
οἱ ἐπὶ τῆς μαχαίρας ; τούτων ἕνεκα τοὺς πολλοὺς
λόγους ἤκουον; ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἣν, ἐγὼ δ᾽ ὡς μεγάλα
παρεσκευαζόμην."

206

BOOK I. xxx. 5-7

what it means to be a young man who has studied
what he ought, when he is in the presence of men
who have not studied. As for me, by the gods, I
fancy that you will feel somewhat like this: “ Why
do we make such great and elaborate preparations
to meet what amounts to nothing? Was this what
authority amounted to? Was this what the vesti-
bule, the chamberlains, the armed guards amounted
to? Was it for all this that I listened to those long
discourses? Why, all this never amounted to any-
thing, but I was preparing for it as though it were
something great.”

207

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Ὅτι ob μάχεται τὸ θαρρεῖν τῷ εὐλαβεῖσθαι.
Περὶ ἀταραξίας.

. Πρὸς τοὺς συνιστάντας τινὰς τοῖς φιλοσόφοις.
- Πρὸς τὸν ἐπὶ μοιχείᾳ ποτὲ κατειλημμένον.

Πῶς συνυπάρχει μεγαλοφροσύνη καὶ ἐπιμέλεια;
Περὶ ἀδιαφορίας.
Πῶς μαντευτέον ;

. Τίς οὐσία τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ;

Ὅτι οὐ δυνάμενοι τὴν ἀνθρώπου ἐπαγγελίαν πληρῶσαι τὴν
φιλοσόφου προσλαμβάνομεν.
Πῶς ἀπὸ τῶν ὀνομάτων τὰ καθήκοντα ἔστιν εὑρίσκειν ;

. Τίς ἀρχὴ φιλοσοφίας ;
. Περὶ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι.
. Περὶ τοῦ ἀγωνιᾶν.

. Πρὸς Νάσωνα.

Πρὸς τοὺς σκλη.ὥῶς τινων ὧν ἔκριναν ἐμμένοντας.

΄. Ὅτι οὐ μελετῶμεν χρῆσθαι τοῖς περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν

δόγμασιν.

. Πῶς ἐφαρμοστέον τὰς πρηυλήψεις τοῖς ἐπὶ μέρους ;
. Πῶς ἀγωνιστέον πρὸς τὰς φαντατίας.

Πρὸς τοὺς μέχρι λόγου μόνο’ ἀναλαμβάνοντας τὰ τῶν
φιλοσόφων.

. Πρὸς ᾿Επικουρείους καὶ ᾿Ακαδημαικούς.
. Περὶ ἀνομολογίας.

. Περὶ φιλίας.

, Περὶ τῆς τοῦ λέγειν δυνάμεως.

Tl és τινα τῶν οὐκ ἠξιωμένων ὑπ᾿ αὐτοῦ.

Τί τὸ ἴδιον rod? ἁμαρτήματος.

1 Upton: λίγων S.
3 Supplied by Schweighauser.

BOOK Il

Chapters of the Second Book

That confidence does not conflict with caution.

On

Tothose who etl persons to the phil ponperes,

To the man who had once been caught in adultery.

How are magnanimity and carefulness compatible?

Of indifference in things.

How should one employ divination ?

What is the true nature of the good?

That although we are unable to fulfil the profession
of a man we adopt that of a philosopher.

How from the designation that he bears is it
possible to discover a man’s duties ?

What is the beginning of philosophy ?

Upon the art of argumentation.

Of anxiety.

To Naso.

To those who cling obstinately to the judgements
which they have once formed.

That we do not practise the application of our
judgements about things good and evil.

How ought we adjust our preconceptions to in-
dividual instances ?

How must we struggle against our external im-

pressions ?
To those who take up the teachings of the philoso-
phers only to talk about them?

Against Epicureans and Academics.

Of inconsistency.

Of friendship.

Of the faculty of expression.

To one of those whom he did not deem worthy.

How is logic necessary ?

What is the distinctive characteristic of error?
21:1

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ἐστι τὰ πολλάκις μὲν εἰρημένα, πολλάκις δ᾽
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1 +d δεῖν Elter: τόδε. ἵν᾽ 8.

CHAPTER I
That confidence does not conflict nith caution

Peruaps the following contention of the philoso-
phers appears paradoxical to some, but nevertheless
let us to the best of our ability consider whether it is
true that “‘ we ought to do everything both cautiously
and confidently at the same time.” For caution
seems to be in a way contrary to confidence, and
contraries are by no means consistent. But that
which appears to many to be paradoxical in the
matter under discussion seems to me to involve
something of this sort: If we demanded that a man
should employ both caution and confidence in regard
to the same things, then we would be justly charged
with uniting qualities that are not to be united.
But, as a matter of fact, what is there strange about
the saying? For if the statements which have often
been made and often proved are sound, namely that
“the nature of the good as well as of the evil lies in
a use of the impressions of the senses, but the things
which lie outside the province of the moral purpose
admit neither the nature of the evil, nor the nature
of the good”; what is there paradoxical about the
contention of the philosophers, if they say, “ Where
the things that lie outside the province of the moral
purpose are involved, there show confidence, but
where the things that lie within the province of the
moral purpose are involved, there show caution” ?
For if the evil lies in an evil exercise of the moral

213

10

11

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

κακόν, πρὸς μόνα ταῦτα χρῆσθαι ἄξιον εὐλαβείᾳ"
εἰ δὲ τὰ ἀπροαίρετα καὶ μὴ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν οὐδὲν πρὸς
ἡμᾶς, πρὸς ταῦτα τῷ θάρσει χρηστέον. καὶ
οὕτως ἅμα μὲν εὐλαβεῖς ἅμα δὲ θαρραλέοι ἐσόμεθα
καὶ νὴ Δία διὰ τὴν εὐλάβειαν θαρραλέοι. διὰ γὰρ
τὸ εὐλαβεῖσθαι τὰ ὄντως κακὰ συμβήσεται
θαρρεῖν ἡμῖν πρὸς τὰ μὴ οὕτως ἔχοντα. )
Λοιπὸν ἡμεῖς τὸ τῶν ἐλάφων πάσχομεν" ὅτε
φοβοῦνται καὶ φεύγουσιν αἱ ἔλαφοι τὰ πτερά, ποῦ
τρέπονται καὶ πρὸς τίνα ἀναχωροῦσιν ὡς ἀσφαλῆ;
πρὸς τὰ δίκτυα: καὶ οὕτως ἀπόλλυνται ἐναλ-
λάξασαι τὰ φοβερὰ καὶ τὰ θαρραλέα. οὕτως
καὶ ἡμεῖς ποῦ χρώμεθα τῷ φόβῳ; πρὸς τὰ ἀπροαί-
ρετα. ἐν τίσιν πάλιν θαρροῦντες ἀναστρεφόμεθα
ὡς οὐδενὸς ὄντος δεινοῦ ; ἐν τοῖς προαιρετικοῖς.
ἐξαπατηθῆναι ἢ προπεσεῖν ἢ ἀναίσχυντόν τι
ποιῆσαι ἢ μετ᾽ ἐπιθυμίας αἰσχρᾶς ὀρεχθῆναί
τινος οὐδὲν διαφέρει ἡμῖν, ἂν μόνον ἐν τοῖς ἀπροαι-
ρέτοις' εὐστοχῶμεν. ὅπου δὲ θάνατος ἢ φυγὴ ἢ
πόνος ἢ ἀδοξία, ἐκεῖ τὸ ἀναχωρητικόν, ἐκεῖ τὸ
σεσοβημένον. τοιγαροῦν ὥσπερ εἰκὸς τοὺς
περὶ τὰ μέγιστα διαμαρτάνοντας τὸ μὲν φύσει θαρ-
ραλέον θρασὺ κατασκευάζομεν, ἀπονενοημένον,
ἰταμόν, ἀναίσχυντον, τὸ δ᾽ εὐλαβὲς φύσει καὶ

1 Upton from his “‘ codex”: ἀπροαιρετικοῖς 8.

1 The beaters used to frighten deer into the nets by
stretching a cord, with brightly coloured feathers on it, across
the safe openings in the wood. Compare Vergil, Georgics, III.
872; ef. Aen., XII. 750., “(In Scythia) men drive them (stags)
not (into nets, as they do here) with the terrors of the
crimson feather.”

214

BOOK II. 1 6-11

purpose, it is only in regard to matters of this kind
that it is right to employ caution ; but if the things
which lie outside the province of the moral purpose
and are not under our control are nothing to us, we
ought to employ confidence in regard to them. And
so we shall be at one and the same time both
cautious and confident, yes, and, by Zeus, confident
because of our caution. For because we are cautious
about the things which are really evil, the result
will be that we shall have confidence in regard to
the things which are not of that nature.

However, we act like deer: when the hinds are
frightened by the feathers? and run away from them,
where do they turn, and to what do they fly for
refuge as a safe retreat? Why, to the nets; and so
they perish because they have confused the objects
of fear with the objects of confidence. So it is
with us also; where do we show fear? About
the things which lie outside the province of the
moral purpose. Again,in what do we behave with
confidence as if there were no danger? In the
things which lie within the province of the moral

To be deceived, or to act impetuously, or
to do something shameless, or with base passion to
desire something, makes no difference to us, if only
in the matters which lie outside the province of the
will we succeed in our aim. But where death, or
exile, or hardship, or ignominy faces us, there we show
the spirit of running away, there we show violent
agitation. Therefore, as might be expected of those
men who err in matters of the greatest concern, we
transform our natural confidence into boldness,
desperateness, recklessness, shamelessness, while our
natural caution and self-respect we transform into

215

12

14

15

16

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

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ἐστράφθαι, πρὸς δὲ τὸν φόβον τοῦ θανάτου τὴν
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τικόν. ταῦτα δ᾽ ὁ Σωκράτης καλῶς ποιῶν
μορμολύκεια ἐκάλει. ὡς γὰρ τοῖς παιδίοις τὰ
προσωπεῖα φαίνεται δεινὰ καὶ φοβερὰ dv ἀπειρίαν,
τοιοῦτόν τι καὶ ἡμεῖς πάσχομεν πρὸς τὰ πράγματα
δι᾿ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ παιδία πρὸς τὰς
μορμολυκείας. τί γάρ ἐστι παιδίον; ἄγνοια. τί
ἐστι παιδίον ; ἀμαθία. ἐπεὶ ὅπου οἶδεν, κἀκεῖνα
οὐδὲν ἡμῶν ἔλαττον ἔχει: θάνατος τί ἐστιν;
μορμολύκειον. στρέψας αὐτὸ κατάμαθε: ἰδοῦ,

1 Kronenberg: ἀφειδὲς 8,

1 From an unknown tragic poet (Nauck, Fragm. Trag-.
Adesp., 88); included also among the Monostichs of
Menander, 504.

2 Plato, Phaedo 77E; compare Crito 46c. Epictetus seems

216

- BOOK IL. 1. II-1I,

cowardice and abjectness, full of fears and perturba-
tions: For if a man should transfer his caution to
the sphere of the moral purpose and the deeds of
the moral purpose, then along with the desire to
be cautious he will also at once have under his
control the will to avoid; whereas, if he should
transfer his caution to those matters which are not
under our control and lie outside the province of the
moral purpose, inasmuch as he is applying his will
to avoid towards those things which are under the
control of others, he will necessarily be subject to
fear, instability, and perturbation. For it is not
death or hardship that is a fearful thing, but the fear
of hardship or death. That is why we praise the
man who said

Not death is dreadful, but a shameful death.

Our confidence ought, therefore, to be turned
toward death, and our caution toward the fear ot
death; whereas we do just the opposite—in the face
of death we turn to flight, but about the formation
of a judgement on death we show carelessness,
disregard, and unconcern. But Socrates did well to
call all such things “ bugbears.”’? For just as masks
appear fearful and terrible to children because of
inexperience, in some such manner we also are
affected by events, and this for the same reason that
children are affected by bugbears. For what is a
child? Ignorance. What is a child? Want of
instruction. For where a child has knowledge, he
is no worse than we are. What is death? A
bugbear. Turn it about and learn what it is; see,

to use μορμολύκειον and μορμολυκεία in the unusual sense of a
terrifying form of mask.

VOL. I. I 217

18

19

21

22

23

24

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

πῶς οὐ δάκνει: τὸ σωμάτιον δεῖ χωρισθῆναι τοῦ
πνευματίου, ὡς πρότερον ἐκεχώριστο, ἢ νῦν ἢ
/ -“ a
ὕστερον. τί οὖν ἀγανακτεῖς, εἰ viv; εἰ yap μὴ
νῦν, ὕστερον. διὰ τί; ἵνα ἡ περίοδος ἀνύηται τοῦ
κόσμου" χρείαν γὰρ ἔχει τῶν μὲν ἐνισταμένων,
- / fal
τῶν δὲ μελλόντων, τῶν δ᾽ ἠνυσμένων. πόνος Ti
ἐστιν; μορμολύκειον. στρέψον αὐτὸ καὶ κατά-
pale. τραχέως κινεῖται τὸ σαρκίδιον, εἶτα πάλιν
λείως. ἄν σοι μὴ λυσιτελῇ, ἡ θύρα ἤνοικται"
ἂν λυσιτελῇ, φέρε. πρὸς πάντα γὰρ ἠνοῖχθαι
δεῖ τὴν θύραν, καὶ πρᾶγμα οὐκ ἔχομεν.
Τίς οὖν τούτων τῶν δογμάτων καρπός ; ὅνπερ
δεῖ κάλλιστόν τ᾽ εἶναι καὶ πρεπωδέστατον τοῖς
A ΝΜ l4 > / > /
τῷ ὄντι παιδευομένοις, ἀταραξία ἀφοβία édev-
θερία. οὐ γὰρ τοῖς πολλοῖς περὶ τούτων πιστευ-
? ’ a ΄ a
τέον, Of λέγουσιν μόνοις ἐξεῖναι παιδεύεσθαι τοῖς
ἐλευθέροις, ἀλλὰ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις μᾶλλον, οἱ
λέγουσι μόνους τοὺς παιδευθέντας ἐλευθέρους εἶναι.
rn κ “ ls ΝΜ , >
-,Πῶς τοῦτο ;--Οὕτως: viv ἄλλο Ti ἐστιν
ἐλευθερία ἢ τὸ ἐξεῖναι ὡς βουλόμεθα διεξάγειν ;
“οὐδέν. λέγετε δή μοι, ὦ ἄνθρωποι, βούλεσθε
a ¢ , cea 4 , » >o \
ζῆν ἁμαρτάνοντες; “οὐ βουλόμεθα. οὐδεὶς
’ὔ € / 4 , 3 ΄
τοίνυν ἁμαρτάνων ἐλεύθερός ἐστιν. βούλεσθε
ζῆν φοβούμενοι, βούλεσθε λυπούμενοι, βούλεσθε
ταρασσόμενοι; “ οὐδαμῶς. οὐδεὶς ἄρα οὔτε

1 A favourite idea of the Stoics (Zeno in Diog. Laert. VII.
137; Marcus Aurelius V. 13 and 32; X. 7, 2; XI. 2).
Briefly expressed, it is a theory of ‘‘ cyclical regeneration ”
(Mare. Aur. XI. 2), i.¢., that all things repeat themselves
in periodic cycles. Cf. Norden, Geburt des Kindes (1924), 31.

2 “Freedom” in the days of the older Greek philosophers
connoted primarily the exercise of political rights, but in

218

BOOK Il. 1. 17-24

it does not bite. The paltry body must be
separated from the bit of spirit, either now or later,
just as it existed apart from it before. Why are you
grieved, then, if it be separated now? For if it be
not separated now, it will be later. Why? So that
the revolution of the universe may be accomplished ;
for it has need of the things that are now coming into
being, and the things that shall be, and the things
that have beenaccomplished. Whatishardship? A
bugbear. Turn it about and learn what it is. The
poor flesh is subjected to rough treatment, and then
again to smooth. If you do not find this profitable,
the door stands open; if you do find it profitable,
bear it. For the door must be standing open for
every emergency, and then we have no trouble.
What, then, is the fruit of these doctrines?
Precisely that which must needs be both the fairest
and the most becoming for those who are being
truly educated—tranquillity, fearlessness, freedom.
For on these matters we should not trust the
multitude, who say, “Only the free can θὲ
educated,” but rather the philosophers, who say,
“Only the educated are free.’—How is that ?—
Thus: At this time? is freedom anything but the
right to live as we wish? “Nothing else.” Tell
me, then, O men, do you wish to live in error?
* We do not.” Well, no one who lives in error is
free. Do you wish to live in fear, in sorrow, in
turmoil? “By nomeans.” Well then, no man who

the time of Epictetus, under the Roman rule, it meant

nothing more than the privilege to live the kind of life that

one pleased under the authority of the Imperial government.

There is a play also on the double meaning of free, i.¢., in a
ial and in a moral sense.

219

25

26

27

28

29

30
31

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

φοβούμενος, οὔτε λυπούμενος οὔτε ταρασσόμενος
ἐλεύθερός ἐστιν, ὅστις δ᾽ ἀπήλλακται. λυπῶν
καὶ φόβων καὶ ταραχῶν, οὗτος τῇ αὐτῇ ὁδῷ
καὶ τοῦ δουλεύειν ἀπήλλακται. πῶς οὖν ἔτι
ὑμῖν πιστεύσομεν, ὦ φίλτατοι νομοθέται; οὐκ
ἐπιτρέπομεν παιδεύεσθαι, εἰ ἰ μὴ τοῖς ἐλευθέροις;
οἱ φιλόσοφοι yap. λέγουσιν ὅτι οὐκ ἐπιτρέπομεν
ἐλευθέροις εἶναι εἰ μὴ τοῖς πεπαιδευμένοις, τοῦτο
ἐστιν ὁ θεὸς οὐκ ἐπιτρέπει. -- “Ὅταν οὖν στρέψη τις
ἐπὶ στρατηγοῦ τὸν αὑτοῦ δοῦλον, οὐδὲν ἐποίησεν;
τος ᾿Εποίησεν.---Τί; "π᾿ ἔστρεψεν τὸν αὑτοῦ δοῦλον
ἐπὶ στρατηγοῦ.---[Αλλο οὐδέν "- Ναί: καὶ εἶκο-
στὴν αὐτοῦ δοῦναι ὀφείλει.---Τί οὖν; ὁ ταῦτα.
παθὼν οὐ γέγονεν ἐλεύθερος ;--Οὐ μᾶλλον ἢ
ἀτάραχος. ἐπεὶ σὺ ὁ ἄλλους στρέφειν δυνάμενος
οὐδένα ἔ ἔχεις κύριον; οὐκ ἀργύριον, οὐ κοράσιον,
οὐ παιδάριον, οὐ τὸν τύραννον, οὐ φίλον τινὰ τοῦ
τυράννου ; τί οὖν τρέμεις ἐπί τινα τοιαύτην ἀπιὼν
περίστασιν;

Διὰ τοῦτο λέγω πολλάκις “ταῦτα μελετᾶτε καὶ
ταῦτα πρόχειρα ἔχετε, πρὸς τίνα δεῖ τεθαρρηκέναι
καὶ πρὸς τίνα εὐλαβῶς διακεῖσθαι, ὅ ὅτι πρὸς τὰ
ἀπροαίρετα θαρρεῖν, εὐλαβεῖσθαι τὰ προαιρετικά."
— Αλλ᾽ οὐκ ἀνέγνων σοι οὐδ᾽ ἔγνως τί ποιῶ ;--

Ἔν τίνι; ἐν λεξειδίοις. ἔχε σου τὰ λεξείδια"
δεῖξον, πῶς ἔχεις πρὸς ὄρεξιν καὶ ἔκκλισιν, εἰ μὴ

1 Part of the ceremony of manumission in Roman law.
The tax of ‘‘ five per cent.” mentioned just below is the fee
that had to be paid to the State.

3 The words of a pupil who has read and correctly
interpreted some passage set him, or has read aloud to
Epictetus some essay of his own composition.

220

BOOK II. τ. 24-31

is in fear, or sorrow, or turmoil, is free, but whoever
is rid of sorrows and fears and turmoils, this man is
by the self-same course rid also of slavery. How,
then, shall we any longer trust you, O dearest
lawgivers? Do we allow none but the free to get
an education? For the philosophers say, ‘We do
not allow any but the educated to be free’’; that is,
God does not allow it.—When, therefore, in the
presence of the praetor a man turns his own slave
about, has he done nothing?4—He has done
something.— What ?—He has turned his slave about
in the presence of the praetor.—Nothing more ?—
Yes, he is bound to pay a tax of five per cent. of the
slave’s value.—What then? Has not the man to
whom this has been done become free?— He has no
more become: free than he has acquired peace of
mind. You, for example, who are able to turn
others about, have you no master? Have you not
as your master money, or a mistress, or a boy
favourite, or the tyrant, or some friend of the tyrant?
_ If not, why do you tremble when you goto face some
circumstance involving those things?

That is why I say over and over again, “ Practise
these things and have them ready at hand, that is,
the knowledge of what you ought to face with
confidence, and what you ought to face with
caution—that you ought to face with confidence
that which is outside the province of the moral
purpose, with caution that which is within the
province of the moral purpose.”—But have I not
read to you, and do you not know what 1 am
doing ?2—What have you been engaged upon?
Trifling phrases! Keep your trifling phrases!
Show me rather how you stand in regard to desire

221

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33

34

35

36

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

ἀποτυγχάνεις ὧν θέλεις, εἰ μὴ περιπίπτεις οἷς οὐ
θέλεις. ἐκεῖνα δὲ τὰ περιόδια, ἂν νοῦν ἔχῃς, ἄρας
πού ποτε ἀπαλείψεις.-- -Τί οὖν; Σωκράτης οὐκ
ἔγραφεν ;---Καὶ τίς τοσαῦτα; ἀλλὰ πῶς; ἐπεὶ
μὴ ἐδύνατο ἔχειν ἀεὶ τὸν ἐλέγχοντα αὐτοῦ τὰ
δόγματα ἢ ἐλεγχθησόμενον ἐν τῷ μέρει, αὐτὸς
ἑαυτὸν ἤλεγχεν καὶ ἐξήταζεν καὶ ἀεὶ μίαν γέ τινα
πρόληψιν ἐγύμναζεν χρηστικῶς. ταῦτα γράφει
φιλόσοφος" λεξείδια δὲ καὶ “ ἦ δ᾽ ὅς," “ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ,"
ἄλλοις ἀφίησι, τοῖς ἀναισθήτοις ἢ τοῖς μακαρίοις,
τοῖς σχολὴν ἄγουσιν ὑπὸ ἀταραξίας ἢ τοῖς μηδὲν
τῶν ἑξῆς ὑπολογιζομένοις διὰ μωρίαν.

Καὶ νῦν καιροῦ καλοῦντος ἐκεῖνα δείξεις ἀπ-
ελθὼν καὶ ἀναγνώσῃ καὶ ἐμπερπερεύσῃ ; “ἰδοῦ,
πῶς διαλόγους συντίθημι." μή, ἄνθρωπε, ἀλλ᾽
ἐκεῖνα μᾶλλον “ἰδοῦ, πῶς ὀρεγόμενος οὐκ ἀπο-
τυγχάνω. ἰδοῦ, πῶς ἐκκλίνων οὐ περιπίπτω.
φέρε θάνατον καὶ γνώσῃ: φέρε πόνους, φέρε
δεσμωτήριον, φέρε ἀδοξίαν, φέρε καταδίκην."
αὕτη ἐπίδειξις νέου ἐκ σχολῆς ἐληλυθότος. τἄλ-
λα δ᾽ ἄλλοις ἄφες, μηδὲ φωνήν τις ἀκούσῃ σου
περὶ αὐτῶν ποτε μηδ᾽, ἂν ἐπαινέσῃ τις ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῖς,
ἀνέχου, δόξον δὲ μηδεὶς εἶναι καὶ εἰδέναι μηδέν.

1 Kronenberg: ἡ ὁδὸς ἣν Aéy** S (λέγω Se).

1 A very strange passage, for it was generally believed
that Socrates did not write. Still there seems to have been
some doubt on the question (Diog. Laert. I. 16 makes the
statement that he did not write as resting ‘‘on the
authority of some”), and the style of writing which
Epictetus here describes seems not to have been intended for

publication, so that it may be possible that Socrates wrote
copiously, but only as a philosophical exercise, and not for
others to read.

222

BOOK II. 1. 31-36

and aversion, whether you do not fail to get what
you wish, or do not fall into what you do not wish.
As for those trifling periods of yours, if you are wise,
you will take them away somewhere and blot them
out.—What then? Did not Socrates write ?—Yes,
who wrote as much as he?1 But how? Since he
could not have always at hand someone to test his
judgements, or to be tested by him in turn, he was
in the habit of testing and examining himself, and
was always in a practical way trying out some
particular primary conception. That is what a
philosopher writes; but trifling phrases, and “said
he,” “said I” * he leaves to others, to the stupid or
the blessed, those who by virtue of their tranquillity
live at leisure, or those who by virtue of their folly
take no account of logical conclusions.

And now, when the crisis calls, will you go off and
make an exhibition of your compositions, and give
a reading from them, and boast, “See, how I write
dialogues”? Do not so, man, but rather boast as
follews : “See how in my desire I do not fail to get
what I wish. See how in my aversions I do not
fall into things that I would avoid. Bring on death
and you shall know; bring on hardships, bring on
imprisonment, bring on disrepute, bring on con-
demnation.”” This is the proper exhibition of a
young man come from school. Leave other things
to other people; neither let anyone ever hear a word
from you about them, nor, if anyone praises you for
them, do you tolerate it, but let yourself be ac-
counted a no-body and a know-nothing. Show

3 Characteristic expressions in dial an i
popular type of Goan poaitidel for pitiosophy Which pars yl
a refined literary form; compare the critical note.

223

37
38

39

40

ws

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

[ rn ON / lol 4 29 > ,
μόνον τοῦτο εἰδὼς φαίνου, πῶς μήτ᾽ ἀποτύχης
ποτὲ μήτε περιπέσῃς. ἄλλοι μελετάτωσαν

,
δίκας, ἄλλοι προβλήματα, ἄλλοι συλλογισμούς"
σὺ ἀποθνήσκειν, σὺ δεδέσθαι, σὺ στρεβλοῦσθαι,
σὺ ἐξορίζεσθαι. πάντα ταῦτα θαρρούντως, πε-
ποιθότως τῷ κεκληκότι σε ἐπ᾽ αὐτά, τῷ ἄξιον
τῆς χώρας ταύτης κεκρικότι, ἐν ἣ καταταχθεὶς
ἐπιδείξεις, τίνα δύναται λογικὸν ἡγεμονικὸν πρὸς
τὰς ἀπροαιρέτους δυνάμεις ἀντιταξάμενον. καὶ

ef \ 4, ? tad ᾽ / vw > 9 φᾷ
οὕτως τὸ παράδοξον ἐκεῖνο οὐκέτι οὔτ᾽ ἀδύνατον

tal ” / Ὁ “ \ > “a
φανεῖται οὔτε παράδοξον, ὅτι ἅμα μὲν εὐλαβεῖ-
σθαι δεῖ ἅμα δὲ θαρρεῖν, πρὸς μὲν τὰ ἀπροαίρετα
θαρρεῖν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς προαιρετικοῖς εὐλαβεῖσθαι.

β΄. Περὶ ἀταραξίας.

Ὅρα σὺ ὁ ἀπιὼν ἐπὶ τὴν δίκην, τί θέλεις
τηρῆσαι καὶ ποῦ θέλεις ἀνύσαι. εἰ γὰρ Tpoat-
ρεσιν θέλεις τηρῆσαι κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσαν, πᾶσά
σοι ἀσφάλεια, πᾶσά σοι εὐμάρεια, πρᾶγμα οὐκ
ἔχεις. τὰ γὰρ ἐπὶ σοὶ αὐτεξούσια καὶ φύσει
ἐλεύθερα θέλων τηρῆσαι καὶ τούτοις ἀρκούμενος
τίνος ἔτι ἐπιστρέφῃ ; τίς γὰρ αὐτῶν κύριος, τίς
αὐτὰ δύναται ἀφελέσθαι; εἰ θέλεις αἰδήμων
εἶναι καὶ πιστός, τίς οὐκ ἐάσει σε; εἰ θέλεις μὴ

224

——

ee a

BOOK II. 1. 37-11. 4

that you know this only—how you may never either
fail to get what you desire or fall into what you
avoid. Let others practise lawsuits, others problems,
others syllogisms; do you practise how to die, how
to be enchained, how to be racked, how to be exiled.
Do all these things with confidence, with trust in Him
who has called you to face them and deemed you
worthy of this position, in which having once been
placed you shall exhibit what can be achieved by a
rational governing principle when arrayed against
the forces that lie outside the province of the moral
purpose. And thus the paradox of which we were
speaking will no longer appear either impossible or
paradoxical, namely, that at the same time we ought
to be both cautious and confident, confident in regard
to those things that lie outside the province of the
moral purpose, and cautious in regard to those
things that lie within the province of the moral

purpose.
CHAPTER II
On tranquillity
ConsipER, you who are going to court, what you
wish to maintain and wherein you wish to succeed ;
for if you wish to maintain freedom of moral purpose
in its natural condition, all security is yours, every
facility yours, you have no trouble. For if you are
willing to keep guard over those things which are
under your direct authority and by nature free, and
if you are satisfied with them, what else do you care
about? . For whois master ofthem, who can take them

away from you? If you wish to be self-respecting
and honourable, who is it that will not allow you?

225

10

1

eel

12

13

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

κωλύεσθαι μηδ᾽ ἀναγκάξεσθαι, τίς σε ἀναγκάσει
ὀρέγεσθαι ὧν οὐ δοκεῖ σοι, τίς ἐκκλίνειν ἃ μὴ
φαίνεταί σοι; ἀλλὰ τί; ; πράξει μέν σοί τινα ἃ
δοκεῖ φοβερὰ εἶναι" ἵνα δὲ καὶ ἐκκλίνων αὐτὰ
πάθης, πῶς δύναται ποιῆσαι ; ὅταν οὖν ἐπὶ σοὶ
ἦ τὸ ὀρέγεσθαι καὶ ἐκκλίνειν, τίνος ἔτι ἐπι-
στρέφῃ; τοῦτό σοι προοίμιον, τοῦτο διήγησις,
τοῦτο πίστις, τοῦτο νίκη, τοῦτο ἐπίλογος, τοῦτο
εὐδοκίμησις.

Διὰ τοῦτο ὁ Σωκράτης πρὸς τὸν ὑπομιμνή-
σκοντα, ἵνα παρασκευάζηται πρὸς τὴν δίκην,
ἔφη “οὐ δοκῶ οὖν σοι ἅπαντι τῷ βίῳ πρὸς τοῦτο
παρασκευάζεσθαι ;"-“ Ποίαν παρασκευήν ; "--
““Τετήρηκα,᾽ φησίν, “τὸ ἐπ᾽ ἐμοί."---" Πῶς
οὖν ;” “ Οὐδὲν οὐδέποτ᾽ ἄδικον οὔτ᾽ ἰδίᾳ οὔτε
δημοσίᾳ ἔπραξα." εἰ δὲ θέλεις καὶ τὰ ἐκτὸς
τηρῆσαι, τὸ σωμάτιον καὶ τὸ οὐσίδιον καὶ τὸ ἀξιω-
μάτιον, λέγω σοι" ἤδη αὐτόθεν παρασκευάζου τὴν
δυνατὴν παρασκευὴν πᾶσαν καὶ λοιπὸν σκέπτου
καὶ τὴν φύσιν τοῦ δικαστοῦ καὶ τὸν ἀντίδικον. εἰ
γονάτων ἅψασθαι δεῖ, γονάτων ἅψαι" εἰ κλαῦ-
σαι, κλαῦσον" εἰ οἰμῶξαι, οἴμωξον. ὅταν γὰρ
ὑποθῇς τὰ σὰ τοῖς ἐκτός, δούλευε τὸ λοιπὸν καὶ
μὴ ἀντισπῶ καὶ ποτὲ μὲν θέλε δουλεύειν, ποτὲ
δὲ μὴ θέλε, ἀλλ᾽ ἁπλῶς καὶ ἐξ ὅλης τῆς § διανοίας
ἢ ταῦτα ἢ ἐκεῖνα: ἢ ἐλεύθερος ἢ ἢ δοῦλος, ἢ ἢ πεπαι-
δευμένος ἢ ἀπαίδευτος, ἢ γενναῖος ἀλεκτρυὼν ἢ

ἀγεννής, ἢ ὑπόμενε τυπτόμενος, μέχρις ἂν ἀπο-

1 A somewhat free version of what Xenophon records in
his Apology, 2f.

226

BOOK IL. π΄. 4-13

If you wish not to be hindered nor compelled, what
man will compel you to desire what does not seem
to you to be desirable, to avoid what you do not feel
should be avoided? Well, what then? The judge
will do some things to you which are thought to be
terrifying ; but how can he make you try to avoid
what you suffer? When, therefore, desire and
aversion are under your own control, what more do
you care for? This is your introduction, this the
setting forth of your case, this your proof, this your
victory, this your peroration, this your approbation.

That is why Socrates, in reply to thé man who
was reminding him to make preparation for his trial,
said, “ Do you not feel, then, that with my whole
life I am making preparation for this ?”—“ What
kind of preparation ?’’—“ I have maintained,” says
he, “that which is under my control.’’"—“ How
then?’’—“I have never done anything that was
wrong either in my private or in my public life.’”"}
But if you wish to maintain also what is external,
your paltry body and your petty estate and your
small reputation, I have this to say to you: Begin
this very moment to make all possible preparation,
and furthermore study the character of your judge
and your antagonist. If you must clasp men’s
knees, clasp them; if you must wail, then wail;
if you must groan, then groan. For when you sub-
ject what is your own to externals, then from
henceforth be a slave, and stop letting yourself be
drawn this way and that, at one moment wishing
to be a slave, at another not, but be either this or
that simply and with all your mind, either a free
man or a slave, either educated or uneducated,
either a spirited fighting cock or a spiritless one,

227

15

16

17

18

19
20

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

θάνῃς, ἢ ἀπαγόρευσον εὐθύς. μή σοι γένοιτο
πληγὰς πολλὰς λαβεῖν καὶ ὕστερον ἀπαγορεῦ-
σαι. εἰ δ᾽ αἰσχρὰ ταῦτα, αὐτόθεν ἤδη δίελε “ ποῦ
φύσις κακῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν ; οὗ καὶ ἀλήθεια. ὅπου
ἀλήθεια καὶ οὗ 1 φύσις, ἐκεῖ: τὸ εὐλαβές: ὅπου ἡ
ἀλήθεια, ἐκεῖ τὸ θαρρ αλέον, ὅπου ἡ φύσις."

’Ezred τοι δοκεῖς, ὅ ὅτι τὰ ἐκτος τηρῆσαι, θέλων
Σωκράτης παρελθὼν ἂν ἔλεγε “ ἐμὲ δ᾽ “Avutos
καὶ Μέλητος ἀποκτεῖναι μὲν δύνανται, βλάψαι
δ᾽ οὔ"; οὕτω μωρὸς ἦν, ἵνα μὴ ἴδῃ ὅ ὅτι αὕτη ἡ
ὁδὸς ἐνταῦθα οὐ φέρει, ἀλλ᾽ ἄλλῃ ; τέ οὖν ἐστιν,
ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει λόγον καὶ προσερεθίζειν 3 ; ὡς ὁ
ἐμὸς Ἡράκλειτος περὶ ἀγριδίου πραγμάτιον
ἔχων ἐν “Ῥόδῳ καὶ ἀποδείξας τοῖς δικασταῖς ὅ ὅτι
δίκαια λέγει ἐχθὼν ἐπὶ τὸν ἐπίλογον ἔφη ὅτι
“ἀλλ᾽ οὔτε δεήσομαι ὑ ὑμῶν οὔτ᾽ ἐπιστρέφομαι, τί
μέλλετε κρίνειν' ὑμεῖς τε μᾶλλον οἱ κρινόμενοί
ἐστε ἢ ἐγώ." καὶ οὕτως κατέστρεψε τὸ πραγμά-
τιον. τίς χρεία; μόνον μὴ δέου, μὴ προστίθει

ὅτι “καὶ οὐ δέομαι; εἰ μή τι καιρός ἐστιν
ἐπίτηδες ἐρεθίσαι τοὺς δικαστὰς ὡς Σωκράτει.
καὶ σὺ εἰ τοιοῦτον ἐπίλογον παρασκευάζῃ, τί
ἀναβαίνεις, τί ὑπακούεις ; εἰ γὰρ σταυρωθῆναι

1 Schegk: οὐ 8.
2 Bentley: προσερεθίζει 8.

1 These last three sentences make no satisfactory sense in
themselves, and none of the numerous emendations which
have been offered seem convincing, while at the same time
they interrupt the course of the argument where they stand.
It would appear, as Schenk] suggests, that they constitute
a seriously mutilated section. of the preceding chapter
(possibly from the very end), which by some accident has
become imbedded in an alien context.

228

BOOK ILI. π. 13-20

either endure to be beaten until you die, or give in
at once. Far be it from you to receive many blows
and yet at the last give in! But if that is dis-
graceful, begin this very moment to decide the
question, “ Where is the nature of good and evil
to be found? Where truth also is. Where truth
and where nature are, there is caution ; where truth
is, there is confidence, where nature is.” Ὁ

Why, do you think that if Socrates had wished
to maintain his external possessions he would have
come forward and said, “ Anytus and Meletus are
able indeed to kill me, but they cannot harm me ”?
Was he so foolish as not to see that this course does
not lead to that goal, but elsewhere? Why is it
unreasonable, then, to add also a word of provoca-
tion? Just as my friend Heracleitus, who had. an
unimportant lawsuit about a small piece of land in
Rhodes ; after he had pointed out the justice of his
claim he went on to the peroration in which he said,
* But neither will I entreat you, nor do I care what
your decision is going to be, and it is you who are
on trial rather than I.” And so he ruined his case.
What is the use of acting like that? Merely make
no entreaties, but do not add the words “ Yes, and
I make no entreaties,” unless the right time has
come for you, as it did for Socrates, deliberately to
provoke your judges. If you, for your part, are
preparing a peroration of that sort, why do you
mount the platform at all, why answer the summons ὃ 3
For if you wish to be crucified, wait and the cross

? That is, it is a sheer waste of effort to speak in so
provocative a manner as to invite condemnation. If that is
what you wish, simply do nothing at all and you will gain

your end.

229

21

25

26

1

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

θέλεις, ἔκδεξαι καὶ ἥξει ὁ σταυρός" εἰ δ᾽ ὑπα-
κοῦσαι λόγος αἱρεῖ καὶ πεῖσαι τό γε παρ᾽ αὐτόν,
τὰ ἑξῆς τούτῳ ποιητέον τηροῦντι μέντοι τὰ ἴδια.

, Ταύτῃ καὶ γελοῖόν ἐστι τὸ λέγειν “ “ὑπόθου pow.”
τί σοι ὑποθῶμαι ; > ἀλλὰ ‘ ‘ ποΐησόν μου τὴν διά-
νοιαν ὅ τι ἂν ἀποβαίνῃ πρὸς τοῦτο ᾿ ἁρμόσασθαι."
ἐπεὶ ἐκεῖνό γε ὅμοιόν ἐστιν οἷον εἰ ἀγράμματος
λέγοι “εἰπέ poe τί γράψω, ὅταν μοι προβληθῇ
τί ὄνομα." ἂν γὰρ εἴπω ὅτι Δίων, εἶτα παρελθὼν
ἐκεῖνος αὐτῷ προβάλῃ μὴ τὸ Δίωνος ὄνομα,
ἀλλὰ τὸ Θέωνος, τί γένηται; ; τί i γράψῃ ; > ἀλλ᾽ εἰ
μὲν μεμελέτηκας γράφειν, ἔχεις καὶ παρασκευά-
σασθαι πρὸς πάντα τὰ ὑπαγορευόμενα" εἰ δὲ
μή, τί σοι ἐγὼ νῦν ὑποθῶμαι ; > ἂν γὰρ ἄλλο τι
ὑπαγορεύῃ τὰ πράγματα, τί ἐρεῖς ἢ τί πράξεις ;
τούτου οὖν τοῦ καθολικοῦ μέμνησο καὶ ὑποθήκης
οὐκ ἀπορήσεις. ἐὰν δὲ πρὸς τὰ ἔξω χάσκῃς,
ἀνάγκη σε ἄνω καὶ κάτω κυλίεσθαι πρὸς τὸ
βούλημα τοῦ κυρίου. τίς δ᾽ ἐστὶ κύριος ; ; ὁ τῶν
ὑπὸ σοῦ τινος σπουδαζομένων ἢ ἐκκλινομένων
ἔχων ἐξουσίαν.

γ΄. Πρὸς τοὺς συνιστάντας τινὰς τοῖς
φιλοσόφοις
Καλῶς ὁ Διογένης πρὸς τὸν ἀξιοῦντα γράμ-
ματα παρ᾽ αὐτοῦ λαβεῖν συστατικὰ “ὅτι μὲν
ἄνθρωπος," φησίν, “ εἶ, καὶ ἰδὼν γνώσεται" εἰ δ᾽

1 Upton from his ‘“‘codex” παρασκευάσαι S.
230

BOOK II. u. 20-10. 1

will come; but if reason decides that you should
answer the summons and do your best to have what
you say carry conviction, you must act in accordance
therewith, but always maintaining what is your own
proper character.

Looked at in this way it is also absurd to say,
“ Advise me.” What advice am I to give you?
Nay, say rather, “Enable my mind to adapt itself
to whatever comes.” Since the other expression is
just as if an illiterate should say, “Tell me what to
write when some name is set me to write.” For if
I say, “Write Dio,” and then his teacher comes
along and sets him not the name “ Dio,’ but
Theo,” what will happen? What will he write?
But if you have practised writing, you are able also
to prepare yourself for everything that is dictated
to you ; if you have not practised, what advice can
I now offeryou? For if circumstances dictate some-
thing different, what will you say or what will you
do? Bear in mind, therefore, this general principle
and you will not be at a loss for a suggestion. But
if you gape open-mouthed at externals, you must
needs be tossed up and down according to the will
of your master. And who is your master? He
who has authority over any of the things upon
which you set your heart or which you wish to
avoid.

CHAPTER ΠῚ
To those who recommend persons to the philosophers

Tuat is an excellent answer of Diogenes to the
man who asked for a letter of recommendation from
him: ‘That you are a man,” he says, “he will

231

cr

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

ἀγαθὸς ἢ κακός, εἰ μὲν ἔμπειρός ἐστι διαγνῶναι
τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς καὶ κακούς, γνώσεται, εἰ δ᾽ ἄπειρος,
οὐδ᾽ ἂν μυριάκις γράψω αὐτῷ." ὅμοιον γὰρ
ὥσπερ εἰ δραχμὴ συσταθῆναί τινὶ ἠξίου, ἵνα
δοκιμασθῇ. εἰ ἀργυρογνωμονικός ἐστιν, σὺ σαυ-
τὴν συστήσεις. ἔδει οὖν τοιοῦτόν τι ἔχειν ἡμᾶς
καὶ ἐν τῷ βίῳ οἷον ἐπ᾽ ἀργυρίου, ἵν᾽ εἰπεῖν δύνω-
μαι καθάπερ ὁ ἀργυρογνώμων λέγει “ φέρε ἣν
θέλεις δραχμὴν καὶ διαγνώσομαι." ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ
συλλογισμῶν “φέρε ὃν θέλεις καὶ διακρινῶ σοι
τὸν ἀναλυτικόν τε καὶ μή." διὰ τί; οἷδα γὰρ
ἀναλύειν συλλογισμούς: ἔχω τὴν δύναμιν, ἣν
ἔχειν δεῖ τὸν ἐπιγνωστικὸν τῶν περὶ συλλο-
γισμοὺς κατορθούντων. ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ βίου τί ποιῶ ;
νῦν μὲν λέγω ἀγαθόν, νῦν δὲ κακόν. τί τὸ αἴτιον ;
τὸ ἐναντίον ἢ ἐπὶ τῶν συλλογισμῶν, ἀμαθία καὶ
ἀπειρία.

δ΄ Tl Ν Ν > , ἈΝ “2
. Πρὸς τὸν ἐπὶ μοιχείᾳ ποτὲ κατειλημμένον

Λέγοντος αὐτοῦ ὅτι .ὋὋ ἄνθρωπος πρὸς πίστιν
γέγονεν καὶ τοῦτο ὁ ἀνατρέπων ἀνατρέπει τὸ
ἴδιον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ἐπεισῆλθέν τις τῶν δοκούν-
των φιλολόγων, ὃς κατείληπτό ποτε μοιχὸς ἐν

1 This is Wolf's interpretation of the rare word ἀναλυτικός,
i.e., as referring to a syllogism. But Upton, Schweighiuser,
and others take it in the sense of ‘‘a person who is capable of
analyzing syllogisms.” The former interpretation fits the
preceding sentence better, the latter the following sentence.
As in § 3 the assayer of silver and the assayer of character
are blended, so here apparently the transition from the
syllogism to those who handle it is made somewhat abruptly.

232

ee

BOOK IL. m. 1-1. 1

know at a glance ; but whether you are a good or
a bad man he will discover if he has the skill to
distinguish between good and bad, and if he is with-
out that skill he will not discover the facts, even
though I write him thousands of times.” For it is
just as though a drachma asked to be recommended
to someone, in order to be tested. If the man in
question is an assayer of silver, you will recommend
yourself. We ought, therefore, to have also in
everyday life the sort of thing that we have in the
case of silver, so that I may be able to say, as the
assayer of silver says, “ Bring me any drachma you
please, and I will appraise it.” Now in the case of
syllogisms I say, “ Bring me any you please and I
will distinguish for you between the one that is
capable of analysis and the one that is not.”! How
so? -Because, I know how to analyze syllogisms
myself; I have the faculty which the man must have
who is going to appraise those who handle syllogisms
properly. But in everyday life what do 1 do?
Sometimes I call a thing good, and sometimes bad.
What is the reason? The opposite of what was true
in the case of syllogisms, namely, ignorance and
inexperience.

CHAPTER IV
To the man who had once been caught in adultery

As Epictetus was remarking that man is born to
fidelity, and that the man who overthrows this is
overthrowing the. characteristic quality of man, there
entered one who had the reputation of being a
scholar, and who had once been caught in the city

233

~

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

τῇ πόλει. ὁ δ ᾿Αλλ᾽ ἄν, φησίν, ἀφέντες τοῦτο
τὸ πιστόν, πρὸς ὃ πεφύκαμεν, ἐπιβουλεύωμεν τῇ
γυναικὶ τοῦ γείτονος, τί “ποιοῦμεν ; τί γὰρ ἄλλο
ἢ “ἀπόλλυμεν καὶ ἀναιροῦμεν ; τίνα ; τὸν πιστόν,
τὸν αἰδήμονα, τὸν ὅσιον. ταῦτα μόνα ; γειτνί-
ασιν δ᾽ οὐκ ἀναιροῦμεν, φιλίαν δ᾽ οὔ, πόλιν δ᾽
οὔ; εἰς τίνα δὲ χώραν αὑτοὺς κατατάσσομεν ;
ὡς τίνι σοι χρῶμαι, ἄνθρωπε; ὡς ὡς γείτονι, ὡς
φίλῳ; ποίῳ τινί; ὡς πολίτῃ ; ; τί σοι πιστεύσω ; ὃ
εἶτα σκευάριον μὲν εἰ ἧς οὕτως σαπρόν, ὥστε
σοι πρὸς μηδὲν “δύνασθαι χρῆσθαι, ἔξω ἂν ἐπὶ
τὰς κοπρίας ἐρρίπτου καὶ οὐδ᾽ ἐκεῖθεν ἄν τίς σε
ἀνῃρεῖτο: εἰ & ἄνθρωπος ὧν οὐδεμίαν χώραν
δύνασαι ἀποπληρῶσαι ἀνθρωπικήν, τί σε ποιή-
σομεν ; ἔστω γάρ, φίλου οὐ δύνασαι τόπον ἔχειν.
δούχου δύνασαι ; : καὶ τίς σοι πιστεύσει ; ; ob
θέλεις οὖν ῥιφῆναί που καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπὶ κοπρίαν
ὡς σκεῦος ἄχρηστον, ὡς κόπριον ; ; εἶτα ἐρεῖς

“οὐδείς μου ἐπιστρέφεται, ἀνθρώπου φιλολό-
you”; κακὸς γὰρ εἶ καὶ ἄχρηστος. οἷον εἰ οἱ
σφῆκες ἠγανάκτουν, ὅτι οὐδεὶς αὐτῶν ἐπιστρέ-
φεται, ἀλλὰ φεύγουσι πάντες κἄν τις δύνηται,
πλήξας κατέβαλεν. σὺ κέντρον ἔχεις τοιοῦτον,
ὥστε ὃν ἂν πλήξῃς εἰς πράγματα καὶ ὀδύνας
ἐμβάλλειν. τί σε θέχεις ποιήσωμεν ; οὐκ ἔχεις
ποῦ τεθῇς.

Τί οὖν; οὐκ εἰσὶν αἱ γυναῖκες κοιναὶ φύσει;
κἀγὼ λέγω. καὶ γὰρ τὸ χοιρίδιον κοινὸν τῶν

1 Upton: σκώληκες S.

1 A not uncommon social theory in antiquity, to which the
Stoics also subscribed (Diog. Laert. VII. 33 and 131); but

234

BOOK II. tv. 1-8

in the act of adultery. But, goes on Epictetus,
if we abandon this fidelity to which we are by
nature born, and make designs against our neigh-
bour’s wife, what are we doing? Why, what but
ruining and destroying? Whom? The man of
fidelity, of self-respect, of piety. Is that all? Are
we not overthrowing also neighbourly feeling,
friendship, the state? In what position are we
placing ourselves? As what am I to treat you,
fellow? As a neighbour, as a friend? Of what
kind? As a citizen? What confidence am I to
place in you? If you were a vessel so cracked that
it was impossible to use you for anything, you would
be cast forth upon the dunghills and even from
there no one would pick you up; but if, although a
man, you cannot fill a man’s place, what are we
going to do with you? For, assuming that you can-
not hold the place of a friend, can you hold that ofa
slave? And who is going to trust you? Are you
not willing, therefore, that you too should be cast
forth upon some dunghill as a useless vessel, as a
piece of dung? For all that will you say, “‘ Nobody
eares for me,ascholar!”? No, for you are an evil man,
and useless. It is just as if the wasps complained
that nobody cares for them, but all run away from
them, and, if anyone can, he strikes them and
knocks them down. You have such a sting that you
involve in trouble and pain whomever you strike.
What do you want us to do with you? There is no
place where you can be put.

What then, you say; are not women by nature
common property?! I agree. And the little pig is
Epictetus accepts the doctrine only with such limitations as

make it compatible with ordinary matrimonal institutions.
Compare also frag. 15, where he recurs to the topic.

235

10

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

f
κεκλημένων: ἀλλ᾽ Grav μέρη γένηται, ἂν σοι
φανῇ, ἀνάρπασον ἀνελθὼν τὸ τοῦ παρακατα-
κειμένου μέρος, λάθρᾳ κλέψον ἢ παρακαθεὶς τὴ
μένου μέρον Alas παν ae ΝΕΟ
χεῖρα λίχνευε, κἂν μὴ δύνῃ τοῦ κρέως ἀποσπά-
’,
σαι, λίπαινε τοὺς δακτύλους καὶ περίλειχε.
καλὸς συμπότης καὶ σύνδειπνος Σωκρατικός.
ἄγε, τὸ δὲ θέατρον οὐκ ἔστι κοινὸν τῶν πολιτῶν ;
ὅταν οὖν καθίσωσιν, ἐλθών, ἄν σοι φανῇ, ἔκβαλέ
τινα αὐτῶν. οὕτως καὶ αἱ γυναῖκες φύσει κοιναί.
“ x ¢ / id 4 ὔ / > : >
ὅταν δ᾽ ὁ νομοθέτης ὡς ἑστιάτωρ διέλῃ αὐτάς, ov
θέλεις καὶ αὐτὸς ἴδιον μέρος ζητεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὸ
ἀλλότριον ὑφαρπάζεις καὶ λιχνεύεις; “ἀλλὰ
φιλόλογός εἰμι καὶ ᾿Αρχέδημον νοῶ." ᾿Αρχέδη-
μον τοίνυν νοῶν μοιχὸς ἴσθι καὶ ἄπιστος καὶ
> \ > , 4 a , , \
ἀντὶ ἀνθρώπου λύκος ἢ πίθηκος. τί γὰρ
κωλύει;

Ul a 4, 4 \
ε΄. Πῶς συνυπάρχει μεγαλοφροσύνη καὶ
ἐπιμέλεια ;

Αἱ ὗλαι ἀδιάφοροι, ἡ δὲ χρῆσις αὐτῶν οὐκ
ἀδιάφορος. πῶς οὖν τηρήσῃ τις ἅμα μὲν τὸ
> \ ᾽ ΄ Ψ \ \ > \ \
εὐσταθὲς καὶ ἀτάραχον, ἅμα δὲ τὸ ἐπιμελὲς καὶ
μὴ εἰκαῖον pnd ἐπισεσυρμένον; ἂν μιμῆται

1 ἐλθὼν Upton: ἀπελθὼν Schenkl.

1 The reference is probably to the Symposia by Plato and
Xenophon.

2 Possibly the Stoic philosopher of Tarsus (Plut. de Zzil.14),
but more likely the rhetorician who commented upon a portion

236

ΣΝ al

BOOK IL. rv. 8-v. 2

the common property of the invited guests; but
when portions have been assigned, if it so pleases
you, approach and snatch up the portion of the guest
who reclines at your side, steal it secretly, or slip in
your hand and glut your greed, and if you cannot
tear off a piece of the meat, get your fingers greasy
and lick them. A fine companion you would make
at a feast, and a dinner-guest worthy of Socrates! 1
Come now, is not the theatre the common property
of the citizens? When, therefore, they are seated
there, go, if it so pleases you, and throw someone of
them out of his seat. In the same way women also
are by nature common property. But when the law-
giver, like a host at a banquet, has apportioned them,
are you not willing like the rest to look for your own
portion instead of filching away and glutting your
greed upon that which is another's? ‘But lama
scholar and understand Archedemus.”? Very well
then, understand Archedemus and be an adulterer
and faithless and a wolf or an ape instead of a man ;
for what is there to prevent you?

CHAPTER V
How are magnanimity and carefulness compatible ?

Materials are indifferent, but the use which we
make of them is not a matter of indifference. How,
therefore, shall a man maintain steadfastness and
peace of mind, and at the same time the careful
spirit and that which is neither reckless nor
negligent? If he imitates those who play at dice.

of Aristotle’s Rhetoric (Quintilian, 111. 6. 31 and 33), if these
be really different persons, which is not entirely certain.

237

10

11

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES ΟΕ EPICTETUS

τοὺς KuBevovtas. ai ψῆφοι ἀδιάφοροι, οἱ κύβοι
ἀδιάφοροι: πόθεν οἶδα, τί μέλλει πίπτειν ; τῷ

, > a fal -" -
πεσόντι δ᾽ ἐπιμελῶς καὶ τεχνικῶς χρῆσθαι, τοῦτο
ἤδη ἐμὸν ἔργον ἐστίν. οὕτως τοίνυν τὸ μὲν
προηγούμενον καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ βίου ἔργον ἐκεῖνο"
δί \ / \ ὃ , ὶ > «
ίελε τὰ πράγματα καὶ διάστησον καὶ εἰπὲ “ τὰ
4 > 2.39 ? / , 8 > 19 4 n
ἔξω οὐκ ἐπ᾽ ἐμοί: προαίρεσις ἐπ᾽ ἐμοί. ποῦ
ζητήσω τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν; ἔσω ἐν τοῖς
> a.” > \ » bd , / ΓΑΕ,
ἐμοῖς." ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις μηδέποτε μήτ
» \ > 4 7 Ν | a Pe ΄. /
ἀγαθὸν ὀνομάσῃς μήτε κακὸν μήτ᾽ ὠφέλειαν μήτε
βλάβην μήτ᾽ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων.

Ti οὖν; ἀμελῶς τούτοις χρηστέον ; οὐδαμῶς.
τοῦτο γὰρ πάλιν τῇ προαιρέσει κακόν ἐστι καὶ
΄ 1 > 4 > > “ \ > fal
ταύτῃ παρὰ φύσιν. arr ἅμα μὲν ἐπιμελῶς,

“ « fol > 2 ΄ ΄ ᾽ » -
ὅτι ἡ χρῆσις οὐκ ἀδιάφορον, ἅμα δ᾽ εὐσταθῶς καὶ
> ‘ “ e ef > “
ἀταράχως, ὅτι ἡ ὕλη οὐ διαφέρουσα. ὅπου yap
Ν / > - Ν rn 4 , 7
τὸ διαφέρον, ἐκεῖ οὔτε κωλῦσαίΐί μέ Tis δύναται
οὔτ᾽ ἀναγκάσαι. ὅπου κωλυτὸς καὶ ἀναγκαστός
> > / ς \ “Ὁ > > , > \ >>
εἶμι, ἐκείνων ἡ μὲν τεῦξις οὐκ ἐπ᾽ ἐμοὶ οὐδ
> \ xa Lj ΄ fal > ἃ \ x > ,
ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν, ἡ χρῆσις δ᾽ ἢ κακὸν ἢ ἀγαθόν,
> > 3 > > / , ἈΝ “ A -
ἀλλ᾽ ἐπ᾽ ἐμοί. δύσκολον δὲ μῖξαι καὶ συναγαγεῖν
ταῦτα, ἐπιμέλειαν τοῦ προσπεπονθότος ταῖς ὕλαις
καὶ εὐστάθειαν τοῦ ἀνεπιστρεπτοῦντος, πλὴν οὐκ
ἀδύνατον. εἰ δὲ μή, ἀδύνατον τὸ εὐδαιμονῆσαι.
. > ar > \ rn fol cal ,
αλλ οἷον TL ἐπὶ τοῦ πλοῦ ποιοῦμεν. TL μοι
δύναται; τὸ ἐκλέξασθαι τὸν κυβερνήτην, τοὺς
ναύτας, τὴν ἡμέραν, τὸν καιρόν. εἶτα χειμὼν

1 χαύτην τὴν S: ταύτῃ 8: τὴν deleted by Schenkl.
238

BOOK II. v. 2-11

The counters are indifferent, the dice are indifferent ;
how am I to know what is going to fall? But to
make a careful and skilful use of what has fallen,
that is now my task.! In like manner, therefore,
-the principal task in life is this: distinguish matters
and weigh them one against another, and say to
yourself, “‘Externals are not under my control ;
moral choice is under my control. Where am I to
look for the good and the evil? Within me, in that
which is my own.” But in that which is another's
never employ the words “good” or “evil,” or
“benefit”’ or “injury,” or anything of the sort.
What then? Are these externals to be used
carelessly? Not at all. For this again is to the
moral purpose an evil and thus unnatural to it.
They must be used carefully, because their use is
not a matter of indifference, and at the same time
with steadfastness and peace of mind, because the
material is indifferent. For in whatever really con-
cerns us, there no man can either hinder or compel
me. The attainment of those things in which I can
- behindered or compelled is not under my control and
is neither good nor bad, but the use which I make
of them is either good or bad, and that is under my
control. It is, indeed, difficult to unite and combine
these two things—the carefulness of the man who is
devoted to material things and the steadfastness
of the man who disregards them, but it is not im-
possible. Otherwise happiness were impossible.
But we act very much as though we were on a
voyage, What is possible for me? To select the |
helmsman, the sailors, the day, the moment. Then

1 Cf. Menander in the Ade/phoe of Terence, 740 f. :

Si illud quod maxume opus est iactu non cadit,
Iilnd quod cecidit forte, id arte ut corrigas,

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»

ἐμπέπτωκεν. τί οὖν ἔτι μοι μέλει ; ; τὰ yap ἐμὰ
ἐκπεπλήρωται. ἄλλου ἐστὶν ἡ ὑπόθεσις, τοῦ
κυβερνήτου. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ ναῦς καταδύεται. τί
οὖν ἔχω ποιῆσαι; ὃ δύναμαι, τοῦτο μόνον ποιῶ"
μὴ φοβούμενος ἀποπνίγομαι οὐδὲ κεκραγὼς οὐδ᾽
ἐγκαλῶν τῷ θεῷ, ἀλλ᾽ εἰδώς, ὅτι τὸ γενόμενον
καὶ φθαρῆναι δεῖ. οὐ γάρ εἰμι αἰών, ἀλλ᾽
ἄνθρωπος, μέρος τῶν πάντων ὡς ὥρα ἡμέρας.
ἐνστῆναί, με δεῖ ὡς τὴν ὥραν καὶ παρελθεῖν ὡς
ὥραν. τί οὖν μοι διαφέρει πῶς παρέλθω, πότερον
πνιγεὶς ἢ πυρέξας ; διὰ γὰρ τοιούτου τινὸς δεῖ
παρελθεῖν με.

“Τοῦτο ὄψει ποιοῦντας καὶ τοῦς σφαιρίζοντας
ἐμπείρως. οὐδεὶς αὐτῶν διαφέρεται “περὶ τοῦ
ἁρπαστοῦ ὡς περὶ ἀγαθοῦ ἢ κακοῦ, περὶ δὲ τοῦ
βάλλειν καὶ δέχεσθαι. λοιπὸν ἐν τούτῳ ἡ εὐ-
ρυθμία, ἐν τούτῳ ἡ re τὸ τάχος, ἡ εὐγνω-
μοσύνη, ἵν᾿ ἐγώ, μηδ᾽ ν τὸν κόλπον ἐκτείνω,
δύναμαι λαβεῖν αὐτό, ὁ δέ, ἂν βάλω, λαμβά-
vel. ἂν δὲ μετὰ ταραχῆς καὶ φόβου δεχώμεθα
ἢ βάλλωμεν αὐτό, ποία ἔτι παιδιά, ποῦ δέ τίς
εὐσταθήσει, ποῦ δέ τις τὸ ἑξῆς ὄψεται ἐν αὐτῇ;
ἀλλ᾽ ὁ μὲν ἐρεῖ “βάλε, "ὁ be? “μὴ βάλῃς," ὁ
δὲ “ μὴ ἀναβάλῃς." 8 τοῦτο δὴ μάχη ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ
παιδιά.

1 Koraes : δύνωμαι 8.

2 ὃ δὲ added by Upton after Wolf.

3 Oldfather-Capps: ἀνέβαλες 8 : μίαν ἔβαλες Sc: ἀνάλάβῃς
Richards.

1 A variety of ball-playing among the Greeks consisted in
tossing the ball back and forth between partners or team-
mates (often in response to a call, Plutarch, Alex. 39, 3),
while their opponents tried to get the ball away (Galen,
de Parvae Pilae Hxrercitio, 2), somewhat as in the American

240

ὙΠ i Ρ ΒΝ

BOOK IL. v. 11-17

a storm comes down upon us. Very well, what
further concern have 1? For my part has been
fulfilled.. The business belongs to someone else,
that is, the helmsman. But, more than that, the
ship goes down. What, then, have 1 todo? What
I can; that is the only thing I do; I drown without™
fear, neither shrieking nor crying out against God,
but recognizing that what is born must also perish.
For I am not eternal, but a man; a part of the
whole, as an hour is part of a day. I must come
on as the hour and like an hour pass away. What
difference, then, is it tome howI pass away, whether
by drowning or by a fever? For by something of
the sort I must needs pass away.

This is what you will see skilful ball players doing
also. None of them is concerned about the ball as
being something good or bad, but about throwing
and catching it. Accordingly, form has to do with
that, skill with that, and speed, and grace; where
I cannot catch the ball even if I spread out my
cloak, the expert catches it if I throw. Yet if we
catch or throw the ball in a flurry or in fear, what
fun is there left, and how can a man be steady, or
see what comes next in the game? But one player
will say “ Throw!” another, “ Don’t throw!” and yet
another, “Don’t throw it up!” That, indeed,
would be a strife and not a game.

games Keep-away and Basket-ball. An interesting series of
calls used in the game is given by Antiphanes in Athenaeus,
1. 15a, one of which, ἄνω, ‘‘Up!”, may be the short form
of the positive of the call given in the text here. On the
ball-teams at Sparta see M. N. Tod, Annual of the British
School at Athens, 1903-4, 63ff. Possibly one might read
ἀναθάλῃ, ‘‘ Don’t wait!” or ‘‘ Don’t stall!” which would fit
the context admirably, although the useof βάλλω in different
senses within the same sentence would appear rather strange.

241

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ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

Τοιγαροῦν Σωκράτης ἤδει σφαιρίζειν. πῶς;
παίζειν ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ. “λέγε μοι," φησίν,
»” lal
““Avute, πῶς με φῇς θεὸν ov νομίζειν ; οἱ δαί-
μονές σοι τίνες εἶναι δοκοῦσιν ; οὐχὶ ἤτοι θεῶν
παῖδές εἰσιν ἢ ἐξ ἀνθρώπων καὶ θεῶν μεμιγμένοι
> -
τινές ;᾿ ὁμολογήσαντος δὲ “τίς οὖν σοι δοκεῖ
δύνασθαι ἡμιόνους μὲν ἡγεῖσθαι εἶναι, ὄνους δὲ
>
μή; @s ἁρπαστίῳ παίζων. καὶ τί ἐκεῖ ἐν μέσῳ
ἁρπάστιον τότ᾽ ἦν"; τὸ δεδέσθαι, τὸ φυγαδευ-
a \ a ΄ ‘ \ ᾽
θῆναι, τὸ πιεῖν φάρμακον, τὸ γυναικὸς ἀφαιρε-
θῆναι, τὸ τέκνα ὀρφανὰ καταλιπεῖν. ταῦτα ἦν
> / ΝΜ > ᾽ 29O\ 2 ”
ἐν μέσῳ ols ἔπαιζεν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲν ἧττον ἔπαιζεν
καὶ ἐσφαίριζεν εὐρύθμως. οὕτως καὶ ἡμεῖς τὴν
μὲν ἐπιμέλειαν σφαιριστικωτάτην, τὴν δ᾽ ἀδια-
φορίαν ὡς ὑπὲρ ἁρπαστίου. δεῖ γὰρ πάντως
ca nr > Ν ig a “" ᾽ > ?
πεῤι τινα τῶν ἐκτὸς ὑλῶν φιλοτεχνεῖν, GAN οὐκ
ἐκείνην ἀποδεχόμενον, ἀλλ᾽ οἵα ἂν ἦ ἐκείνη, τὴν
περὶ αὐτὴν φιλοτεχνίαν ἐπιδεικνύοντα. οὕτως κα
ee / > a tal > > xn /
ὁ ὑφάντης οὐκ ἔρια ποιεῖ, ἀλλ᾽ ola ἂν παραλάβῃ
\ > Ν -“ Ν δίδ \
περὶ αὐτὰ φιλοτεχνεῖ. ἄλλος σοι δίδωσι τροφὰς
καὶ κτῆσιν καὶ αὐτὰ ταῦτα δύναται ἀφελέσθαι
’
καὶ TO σωμάτιον αὐτό. σὺ λοιπὸν παραλαβὼν
τὴν ὕλην ἐργάζου. εἶτα ἂν ἐξέλθῃς μηδὲν παθών,

1 Elter: ἁρπάστιον τὸ (ζῆν 8.

1 A term originally used of any spiritual power, and in
early Greek often of the greatest gods, but in classical and
Hellenistic times coming generally to be restricted to spiritual
essences of a lower rank. There is no adequate English word
which can be used in translation.

2 A free paraphrase of the argument in Plato’s Apology,
268 ff., obviously from memory, for the questions were put
by Socrates, not to Anytus, but to Meletus.—Socrates had

242

BOOK II. v. 18-23

In that sense, then, Socrates knew how to play
ball. How so? He knew how to play in the law-
court. “Tell me,” says he, “ Anytus, what do you
mean when you say that I do not believe in God.
In your opinion who are the daemones?1 Are they
not either the offspring of the gods or a hybrid race,
the offspring of men and gods?” And when Anytus
had agreed to that statement Socrates went on,
«Who, then, do you think, can believe that mules
exist, but not asses?” In so speaking he was like
a man playing ball. And at that place and time
what was the ball that he was playing with? Im-
prisonment, exile, drinking poison, being deprived
of wife, leaving children orphans. These were the
things with which he was playing, but none the
less he played and handled the ball in good form.
So ought we also to act, exhibiting the ball-player’s
earefulness about the game, but the same indiffer-
ence about the object played with, as being a mere
ball. For a man ought by all means to strive to
show his skill in regard to some of the external
materials, yet without making the material a part
of himself, but merely lavishing his skill in regard
to it, whatever it may be. So also the weaver does
not make wool, but he lavishes his skill on whatever
wool he receives. Another? gives you sustenance
and property and can likewise take them away, yes,
and your paltry body itself. Do you accordingly
accept the material and work it up. Then if you
come forth without having suffered any harm, the
been charged with denying the existence of the gods, but at
the same time introducing new daemones. If, however,
daemones are merely offspring of gods, then it is impossible
that both charges could be true of any sane man.

3 That is, God.

243

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ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι ἀπαντῶντές σοι συγχαρήσονται ὅτι
ἐσώθης, ὁ δ᾽ εἰδὼς βλέπειν τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἂν μὲν
ἴδῃ ὅτι εὐσχημόνως ἀνεστράφης ἐν τούτῳ, ἐπαι-
νέσει καὶ συνησθήσεται: ἂν δὲ δ ἀσχημοσύνην
τινὰ διασεσωσμένον, τὰ ἐναντία. ὅπου γὰρ τὸ
χαίρειν εὐλόγως, ἐκεῖ καὶ τὸ συγχαίρειν.

Πῶς οὖν λέγεται τῶν ἐκτός τινα κατὰ φύσιν
καὶ παρὰ φύσιν ; ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἀπόλυτοι ἦμεν.
τῷ γὰρ ποδὶ κατὰ φύσιν εἶναι ἐρῶ τὸ καθαρῷ
εἶναι, ἀλλ᾽, ἂν αὐτὸν ὡς πόδα λάβῃς καὶ ὡς μὴ
ἀπόλυτον, καθήξει αὐτὸν καὶ εἰς πηλὸν ἐμβαίνειν
καὶ ἀκάνθας πατῆσαι καὶ ἔστιν ὅτε ἀποκοπῆναι
ὑπὲρ τοῦ ὅλου: εἰ δὲ μή, οὐκετι ἔσται πούς.
τοιοῦτόν τι καὶ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῶν ὑπολαβεῖν δεῖ. τί εἶ;
ἄνθρωπος. εἰ μὲν ὡς ἀπόλυτον σκοπεῖς, κατὰ
φύσιν ἐστὶ ζῆσαι μέχρι γήρως, πλουτεῖν, ὑγιαί-
νειν. εἰ δ᾽ ὡς ἄνθρωπον σκοπεῖς καὶ μέρος ὅλου
τινός, δι’ ἐκεῖνο τὸ ὅλον νῦν μέν σοι νοσῆσαι
καθήκει, νῦν δὲ πλεῦσαι καὶ κινδυνεῦσαι, νῦν δ᾽
ἀπορηθῆναι, πρὸ ὥρας δ᾽ ἔστιν ὅτ᾽ ἀποθανεῖν.
τί οὖν ἀγανακτεῖς ; οὐκ οἶδας ὅτι ὡς ἐκεῖνος
οὐκέτι ἔσται πούς, οὕτως οὐδὲ σὺ ἄνθρωπος ; τί
γάρ ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος ; μέρος πόλεως, πρώτης μὲν
τῆς ἐκ θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων, μετὰ ταῦτα δὲ τῆς
ὡς ἔγγιστα λεγομένης, ἥ τί ἐστι μικρὸν τῆς ὅλης
μίμημα. “νῦν οὖν ἐμὲ κρίνεσθαι ;" νῦν οὖν
ἄλλον πυρέσσειν, ἄλλον πλεῖν, ἄλλον ἀποθνή-

1 That is, things which are natural for the part of a whole
to endure, appear unnatural, if that same part regards itself
as a separate and independent entity.

2 That is, existing separate and per se.

244

BOOK II. v. 23-27

others who meet you will congratulate you on your
escape, but the man who knows how to observe
such matters, if he sees that you have exhibited
good form in this affair, will praise you and rejoice
with you; but if he sees that you owe your escape
to some dishonourable action, he will do the opposite.
For where a man may rejoice with good reason,
there others may rejoice with him.

How, then, can it be said that some externals are
natural, and others unnatural? It is just as if we
were detached from them. For I will assert of the
foot as such that it is natural for it to be clean, but
if you take it as a foot, and not 85 ἃ thing detached,?
it will be appropriate for it to step into mud and
trample on thorns and sometimes to be cut off for
the sake of the whole body; otherwise it will no
longer be a foot. We ought to hold some such view
also about ourselves. What are you? A man.
Now if you regard yourself as a thing detached, it
is natural for you to live to old age, to be rich, to
enjoy health. But if you regard yourself as a man
and as a part of some whole, on account of that
whole it is fitting for you now to be sick, and now
to make a voyage and run risks, and now to be in
want, and on occasion to die before your time.
Why, then, are you vexed? Do you not know thatas
the foot, if detached, will no longer be a foot, so
you too, if detached, will no longer be a man? For
what is a man? A part of a state; first of that
siate which is made up of gods and men, and then ©
of that which is said to be very close to the other,
the state that is a small copy of the universal state.
* Must I, then, be put on trial now?” Well, would
you have someone else be sick of a fever now, some-

245

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σκειν, ἄλλον κατακεκρίσθαι; ἀδύνατον yap ἐν
4 , > "4 rn /
τοιούτῳ σώματι, ἐν τούτῳ τῷ περιέχοντι, τούτοις
τοῖς συζῶσιν μὴ συμπίπτειν ἄλλοις ἄλλα τοιαῦ-
Ἁ Φ » / > a -

τα. σὸν οὖν ἔργον ἐλθόντα εἰπεῖν ἃ δεῖ, δια-
θέσθαι ταῦτα ὡς ἐπιβάλλει. εἶτα ἐκεῖνος λέγει
“κρίνω ᾿ σε ἀδικεῖν." “ed σοι γένοιτο. ἐποίησα
ἈΦ ΝΟ Ψ > δὲ ὶ \ x x > ’,

ἐγὼ τὸ ἐμόν, εἰ δὲ καὶ σὺ τὸ σὸν ἐποίησας, ὄψει
αὐτός." ἔστι γάρ τις κἀκείνου κίνδυνος, μή σε
λανθανέτω.

ς΄. Περὶ ἀδιαφορίας.

Τὸ συνημμένον ἀδιάφορον: ἡ κρίσις ἡ περὶ
αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἀδιάφορος, ἀλλ᾽ ἢ ἐπιστήμη ἢ δόξα ἢ
ἀπάτη. οὕτως τὸ ζῆν ἀδιάφορον, ἡ χρῆσις οὐκ
ἀδιάφορος. μή ποτ᾽ οὖν, ὅταν εἴπῃ τις ὑμῖν
ἀδιαφορεῖν καὶ ταῦτα, ἀμελεῖς γίνεσθε, μήθ᾽
ὅταν εἰς ἐπιμέλειάν τις ὑμᾶς παρακαλῇ, ταπεινοὶ
καὶ τὰς ὕλας τεθαυμακότες. καλὸν δὲ καὶ τὸ
εἰδέναι τὴν αὑτοῦ παρασκευὴν καὶ δύναμιν, ἵν᾽ ἐν
οἷς μὴ παρεσκεύασαι, ἡσυχίαν ἄγῃς μηδ᾽ ἀγα-
νακτῇς, εἴ τινες ἄλλοι πλεῖόν σου ἔχουσιν ἐν
ἐκείνοις. καὶ γὰρ σὺ ἐν συλλογισμοῖς πλεῖον
ἀξιώσεις σεαυτὸν ἔχειν κἂν ἀγανακτῶσιν ἐπὶ
τούτῳ, παραμυθήσῃ αὐτούς" “ἐγὼ ἔμαθον, ὑμεῖς

1 Blass: κρινῶ 8.
246

“BOOK 11 v. 27-v1. 4

one else go on a voyage, someone else die, someone
else be condemned? For it is impossible in such a
body as ours, in this universe that envelops us,
among these fellow-creatures of ours, that such
things should not happen, some to one man and
some to another. It is your task, therefore, to step
forward and say what you should, to arrange these
matters as is fitting. Then the judge says, “I
adjudge you guilty.” I reply, “May it be well
with you. I have done my part; and it is for you
to see whether you have done yours.” For the
judge too runs a risk, do not forget that.

CHAPTER VI
Of indifference in things

Tue hypothetical syllogism in itself is a matter of
indifference; yet the judgement about it is not
indifferent, but is either knowledge, or opinion, or
delusion. In like manner, although life is a matter
of indifference, the use which you make of it is not
a matter of indifference. Therefore, when someone
tells you, “ These things also are indifferent,” do not
become careless, and when someone exhorts you to
be careful, do not become abject and overawed by
material things. It is good also to know one’s own
training and capacity, so that where you have had
no training you may keep quiet and not be annoyed
if some other persons outshine you in those matters.
For you in your turn will expect to outshine them
in syllogisms, and if they are annoyed at that, you
will console them by saying, “I have learned this,

247

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δ᾽ ov.” οὕτως καί, ὅπου τινὸς χρεία τριβῆς, μὴ
ξήτει τὸ ἀπ᾽ αὐτῆς } περιγινόμενον, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκείνου
μὲν παραχώρει τοῖς περιτετριμμένοις, σοὶ δ᾽
ἀρκείτω τὸ εὐσταθεῖν.

“Ἄπελθε καὶ ἄσπασαι τὸν δεῖνα. “ ἀσπά-
Copas.” 2 “mas 3” “ov ταπεινῶς." “ἀλλ᾽ ἐξε-
κλείσθης." > “διὰ θυρίδος γὰρ οὐκ ἔμαθον
εἰσέρχεσθαι: ὅταν δὲ κεκλειμένην «εὕρω τὴν
θύραν, ἀνάγκη μ᾽ ἣ ἀποχωρῆσαι ἢ διὰ τῆς
θυρίδος εἰσελθεῖν." “ἀλλὰ καὶ λάλησον αὐτῷ."

8 “λαλῶ. “τίνα τρόπον"; “οὐ ταπεινῶς." “ἀλλ᾽

> > , ” \ Ν a \ ym»
οὐκ ἐπέτυχες." μὴ γὰρ σὸν τοῦτο TO ἔργον ἦν;
ἀλλ᾽ ἐκείνου. τί οὖν ἀντιποιῇ τοῦ ἀλλοτρίου;
,
ἀεὶ μεμνημένος ὅ τι σὸν καὶ τί ἀλλότριον οὐ

9 ταραχθήσῃ. διὰ τοῦτο καλῶς ὁ Χρύσιππος

10

11

12

λέγει ὅτε": μέχρις ἂν ἄδηλά μοι ἡ τὰ ἑξῆς, ἀεὶ
τῶν εὐφυεστέρων EXOMAL πρὸς τὸ τυγχάνειν
τῶν κατὰ φύσιν. αὐτὸς γάρ μ᾽ ὁ θεὸς ἐποίησεν
τούτων ἐκλεκτικόν. εἰ δέ γε ἤδειν ὅ ὅτι νοσεῖν μοι
καθείμαρται νῦν, καὶ ὥρμων ἂν ἐπ’ αὐτό" καὶ
γὰρ ὁ πούς, εἰ φρένας εἶχεν, ὥρμα ἂν ἐπὶ τὸ
πηλοῦσθαι."

Ἔπεί τοι τίνος ἕνεκα γίνονται στάχνες ᾿ οὐχ
ἵνα καὶ ξηρανθῶσιν ; ἀλλὰ ξηραίνονται μέν, οὐχ
ἵνα δὲ καὶ ,θερισθῶσιν ; ᾿ οὐ γὰρ ἀπόλυτοι γίνον-
ται. εἰ οὖν αἴσθησιν εἶχον, εὔχεσθαι αὐτοὺς

1 Elter: ἀπὸ τῆς χρείας S. 2 Added by Schenkl.
3 Schenkl; ἐξεκλείσθην 5.

1 Compare Stoic. Vet. Fragm. III. 46, frag. 191. Von Arnim
thinks that only the last few words are a literal quotation
from Chrysippus.

248

BOOK Il. vi. 4-12

and you have not.’ So also in a case where some
acquired skill is needed, do not seek that which
only practice can give, but leave that to those who
have acquired the knack, and be content yourself to
remain steadfast.

“Go and salute so-and-so.” “I salute him.”
“How?” “In no abject spirit.” “But the door
was shut in your face.” “Yes, for I have not
learned how to crawl in at the window; but when
I find the door closed, I must either go away or
crawl in at the window.” “But go and do speak
to him.’”” “I do so speak.” “In what manner?”
“In no abject spirit.””. “But you did not get what
you wanted.” Surely that was not your business,
was it? Nay, it was his. Why, then, lay claim to
that which is another's? If you always bear in
mind what is your own and what is another's, you
will never be disturbed. Therefore Chrysippus?
well says, “As long as the consequences are not
clear to me, I cleave ever to what is better adapted
to secure those things that are in accordance with
nature; for God himself has created me with the
faculty of choosing things. But if I really knew
that it was ordained for me to be ill at this present
moment, I would even seek illness; for the foot
also, if it had a mind, would seek to be covered with
mud.” 2

For example, why do heads of grain grow? Is it
net that they may also become dry? But when
they become dry, is it not that they may also be
harvested? Since they do not grow for themselves
alone. If, therefore, they had feeling, ought they

3 That is, if the owner of it found it necessary to step into
the mud ; τ΄. I. 5, 24. of

VOL. I. κ 249

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15

16

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ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

ἔδει, ἵνα μὴ θερισθῶσιν μηδέποτε ; τοῦτο δὲ
κατάρα ἐστὶν ἐπὶ σταχύων τὸ μηδέποτε θερι-
σθῆναι. οὕτως ἴστε ὅτε καὶ ἐπ᾿ ἀνθρώπων
κατάρα ἐστὶ τὸ μὴ ἀποθανεῖν' ὅμοιον τῷ μὴ
πεπανθῆναι, μὴ θερισθῆναι. ἡμεῖς δ᾽ ἐπειδὴ οἱ
αὐτοί ἐσμεν, ἅμα μὲν ods δεῖ θερισθῆναι, ἅ ἅμα δὲ
καὶ αὐτῷ τούτῳ παρακολουθοῦντες ὅτι Geprto-
μεθα, διὰ τοῦτο ἀγανακτοῦμεν. οὔτε γὰρ ἴσμεν
τίνες ἐσμὲν οὔτε μεμελετήκαμεν τὰ ἀνθρωπικὰ
ὡς ἱππικοὶ τὰ ἱππικά. ἀλλὰ Χρυσάντας μὲν
παίειν μέλλων τὸν πολέμιον, ἐπειδὴ τῆς σάλ-
πίγγος ἤκουσεν ἀνακαλούσης, _ ἀνέσχεν" οὕτως
προυργιαίτερον ἔδοξεν αὐτῷ τὸ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ
πρόσταγμα ἢ τὸ ἴδιον ποιεῖν" ἡμῶν δ᾽ οὐδεὶς
θέλει οὐδὲ τῆς ἀνάγκης καλούσης εὐλύτως
ὑπακοῦσαι αὐτῇ, ἀλλὰ κλάοντες καὶ στένοντες
πάσχομεν ἃ πάσχομεν καὶ περιστάσεις αὐτὰ
καλοῦντες. ποίας περιστάσεις, ἄνθρωπε; εἰ
περιστάσεις λέγεις τὰ περιεστηκότα, πάντα
περιστάσεις εἰσίν. εἰ δ᾽ ὡς δύσκολα καλεῖς,
ποίαν δυσκολίαν ἔ , ἔχει τὸ γενόμενον. φθαρῆναι ;
τὸ δὲ φθεῖρον ἢ μάχαιρά ἐστιν ἢ τροχὸς ἢ
θάλασσα ἢ κεραμὶς ἢ τύραννος. τί σοι “μέλει,
ποίᾳ ὁδῷ καταβῇς εἰς “Αἰδου ; ἴσαι πᾶσαί εἰσιν.
εἰ δὲ θέλεις ἀκοῦσαι τἀληθῆ, συντομωτέρα ἣν
πέμπει ὁ τύραννος. οὐδέποτ' οὐδεὶς τύραννος ἐξ
μησίν τινα ἔσφαξεν, πυρετὸς δὲ καὶ “ἐνιαυτῷ
πολλάκις. ψόφος ἐστὶ πάντα ταῦτα καὶ κόμπος
κενῶν ὀνομάτων.

1 Xenophon, Cyropaedeia, IV. 1, 3.
2 2,6., the rack.

250

BOOK II. vi. 12-19

to pray that they should never at all be harvested?
But never to be harvested at all is a curse for heads
of grain. In like manner I would have you know
that in the case of men as well it is a curse never
to die; it is like never growing ripe, never being
harvested. But, since we are ourselves those who
must both be harvested and also be aware of the
very fact that we are being harvested, we are angry
on that account. For we neither know who we are,
nor have we studied what belongs to man, as horse-
men study what belongs to horses. But Chrysantas,
when he was on the point of striking the foe,
refrained because he heard the bugle sounding the
recall;! it seemed so much more profitable to him
to do the bidding of his general than to follow his
own inclination. Yet no one of us is willing, even
when necessity calls, to obey her readily, but what
we suffer we suffer with fears and groans, and call it
“circumstances.” What do you mean by “ circum-
stances,’ man? If you call “ circumstances” your
surroundings, all things are “circumstances” ; but if
you use the word of hardships, what hardship is in-
volved when that which has come into being is
destroyed? The instrument of destruction is a
sword, or a wheel,? or the sea, or a tile, or a tyrant.
What concern is it to you by what road you descend
to the House of Hades? They are all equal. But
if you care to hear the truth, the road by which the
tyrant sends you is the shorter. No tyrant ever
took six months to cut a man’s throat, but a fever
often takes more than a year. All these things are
a mere noise and a vaunting of empty names.
* A popular saying variously ascribed to Anaxagoras,
Aristippus, Diogenes, and others.
251

20

21

22

23

24

25

26
27

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

“TH κεφαλῇ κινδυνεύω ἐπὶ Καίσαρος. ἐγὼ δ᾽
οὐ κινδυνεύω, ὃς οἰκῶ ἐν Νικοπόλει, ὅπου σεισμοὶ
τοσοῦτοι; σὺ δ᾽ αὐτὸς ὅταν διαπλέης τὸν ᾿Αδρίαν,
τί κινδυνεύεις ; οὐ τῇ κεφαλῇ ; “ ἀλλὰ καὶ τῇ
ὑπολήψει κινδυνεύω." τῇ σῇ; πῶς; τίς γάρ σε
ἀναγκάσαι δύναται ὑπολαβεῖν τι ὧν οὐ θέλεις ;
ἀλλὰ τῇ ἀλλοτρίᾳ ; καὶ ποῖός ἐστε κίνδυνος σὸς
ἄλλους τὰ ψεύδη ὑπολαβεῖν ; “arr ἐξορισθῆ-
ναι κινδυνεύω. τί ἐστιν ἐξορισθῆναι; ἀλ-
λαχοῦ εἶναι ἢ ἐν Ῥώμῃ ; “vai.” τί οὖν ; “ἂν εἰς
Γύαρα πεμφθῶ ;" ἄν σοι ποιῇ, ἀπελεύσῃ" εἰ
δὲ μή, ἔχεις ποῦ ἀντὶ Γνάρων ἀπέλθῃς, ὅπου
κἀκεῖνος ἐλεύσεται, ἄν τε θέλῃ ἄν τε μή, ὁ
πέμπων σε εἰς Γύαρα. τί λοιπὸν ὡς ἐπὶ μεγάλα
ἀνέρχῃ ; μικρότερά ἐστι τῆς παρασκευῆς, ἵν᾽
εἴπη νέος εὐφυὴς ote “οὐκ ἣν τοσούτου τοσούτων
μὲν ἀκηκοέναι, τοσαῦτα δὲ γεγραφέναι, τοσούτῳ
δὲ χρόνῳ παρακεκαθικέναι γεροντίῳ οὐ πολλοῦ
ἀξίῳ." μόνον ἐκείνης τῆς διαιρέσεως μέμνησο,
καθ᾽ ἣν διορίζεται τὰ σὰ καὶ οὐ τὰ σά. μή TOT
ἀντιποιήσῃ τινὸς τῶν ἀλλοτρίων. βῆμα καὶ φυ-
λακὴ τόπος ἐστὶν ἑκάτερον, ὁ μὲν ὑψηλός, ὁ δὲ
ταπεινός" ἡ προαίρεσις δ᾽ ἴση, ἂν ἴσην αὐτὴν ev}
ἑκατέρῳ φυλάξαι θέλῃς, δύναται φυλαχθῆναι.
καὶ τότ᾽ ἐσόμεθα ζηλωταὶ Σωκράτους, ὅταν ἐν
φυλακῇ δυνώμεθα παιᾶνας γράφειν. μέχρι δὲ
νῦν ὡς ἔχομεν, ὅρα εἰ ἠνεσχόμεθ᾽ ἂν ἐν τῇ φυ-
λακῇ ἄλλου τινὸς ἡμῖν λέγοντος “θέλεις ἀναγνῶ

1 Supplied by Schweighauser.

1 Gyara or Gyaros was a little island east of Attica, used
as a place of banishment in the early empire. Compare
1. 25, 19f., ete.

252

BOOK II. vi. 20-27

“1 run the risk of my life in Caesar’s presence.”’
But do I not run a risk by living in Nicopolis, where
there are so many earthquakes? And what risk do
you yourself take when you cross the Adriatic?
Do you not risk your life? “But I also risk my
opinion at court.” Your own opinion? How so?
Why, who can compel you to opine anything against
your will? But do you mean some other man’s
opinion? And what kind of risk is it of yours that
others should entertain false opinions? “But I run
the risk of banishment.” What is banishment? To
be somewhere else than in Rome? ‘‘ Yes.” What
then? ‘Suppose I am sent to Gyara.”! If it is to
your good, you will go; if not, you have a place to
which you may go instead of Gyara—where he too
will go, whether he will or no, who is sending you
to Gyara. Then why do you go up to Rome as
though it were some great thing? It amounts to
less than your preparation for it; so that a young
man of parts may say, “ It was not worth so much
to have listened to so many lectures, and to have
written so many exercises, and to have sat so long
at the side of a little old man, who was not worth
very much himself.’ Only remember that dis-
tinction which is drawn between what is yours and
what is not yours. Never lay claim to anything that
is not yourown. A platform and a prison is each a
place, the one high, and the other low; but your
moral purpose can be kept the same, if you wish to
keep it the same, in either place. And then we
shall be emulating Socrates, when we are able to
write paeans in prison. But considering what has
been our state hitherto, I wonder if we should have
endured it, had some one else said to us in prison,

253

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

- ᾽ ’ ᾿
σοι παιᾶνας "; “τί μοι πράγματα παρέχεις ; οὐκ
οἷδας τὰ ἔχοντά με Kaxd ; ἐν τούτοις γάρ μοι
" 5 , 4 gels , , »
ἔστιν--- ἐν τίσιν οὖν ; “ἀποθνήσκειν μέλλω.
ΝΥ ᾽ν > , ΕΣ
ἄνθρωποι δ᾽ ἄλλοι ἀθάνατοι ἔσονται ;

ζ΄. Πῶς μαντευτέον ;

Διὰ τὸ ἀκαίρως μαντεύεσθαι πολλοὶ καθήκοντα
2 πολλὰ παραλείπομεν. τί γὰρ ὁ μάντις δύναται
πλέον ἰδεῖν θανάτου ἢ κινδύνου ἢ νόσου ἢ ὅλως
τῶν τοιούτων ; ἂν οὖν δέῃ κινδυνεῦσαι ὑπὲρ τοῦ
φίλου, ἂν δὲ καὶ ἀποθανεῖν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ καθήκῃ,
ποῦ μοι καιρὸς ἔτι μαντεύεσθαι; οὐκ ἔχω τὸν
μάντιν ἔσω τὸν εἰρηκότα μοι τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ
ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τοῦ κακοῦ, τὸν ἐξηγημένον τὰ σημεῖα
ἀμφοτέρων ; τί οὖν ἔτι χρείαν ἔχω τῶν σπλάγ-
χνων ἢ τῶν οἰωνῶν; ἀλλ᾽ ἀνέχομαι λέγοντος.
ἐκείνου “ συμφέρει σοι ; τί γάρ ἐστι συμφέρον
οἶδεν ; τί ἐστιν ἀγαθὸν οἷδεν ; μεμάθηκεν ὥσπερ
τὰ σημεῖα τῶν σπλάγχνων οὕτως σημεῖα τίνα
ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν ; εἰ γὰρ τούτων οἶδεν σημεῖα,
καὶ καλῶν καὶ αἰσχρῶν οἶδεν καὶ δικαίων καὶ
ἀδίκων. ἄνθρωπε, σύ μοι λέγε τί σημαίνεται,
ζωὴ ἢ θάνατος, πενία ἢ πλοῦτος" πότερον δὲ

1 The idea seems to be: We go to ἃ diviner in order to
find out what acts to avoid if we would escape evils to
ourselves. But the things in life that are accounted our chief
ills are death, danger, illness, and the like. These evils one
must sometimes, in self-respect, accept, and they are in fact,

254

BOOK II. vi. 27—vn. 6

‘Would you like to have me read you paeans?”
“Why bother me? Do you not know the trouble
that I am in? What, is it possible for me in this
condition ?” In what condition, then? “Iam
about to die.” But will other men be immortal ὃ

CHAPTER VII
How should one employ Divination ?

Because we employ divination when there is no
occasion for it, many of us neglect many of the
duties of life. For what can the diviner see that is
of greater import than death,' or danger, or illness,
or in general such things as these? If, then, it
becomes necessary for me to risk my life for my
triend, and if it becomes my duty even to die for
him, where do I find beyond that any occasion to
employ divination? Have I not within me the
diviner that has told me the true nature of good and
of evil, that has set forth the signs characteristic of
both of them? What further use have I, then, ot
entrails, or of birds? But when he says, “ It is
expedient for you,’ do I accept it? Why, does
he know what is expedient? Does he know what
is good? Has he learned the signs characteristic of
things good and things evil, as he has the signs
characteristic of entrails? For if he knows the
signs characteristic of these, he knows also those of
things honourable and base, and right and wrong.
Man, it is for you to tell me what is indicated by
signs—life οἱ death, poverty or wealth ; but whether

not evils at all. Hence the petty things about which men
consult the diviner fall into insignificance.

255

~]

10

ll

12

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS
συμφέρει ταῦτα ἢ ἀσύμφορά ἐστιν, σοῦ μέλλω
πυνθάνεσθαι ; διὰ τί ἐν γραμματικοῖς οὐ λέγεις ;

Ὁ» ,
ἐνθάδ᾽ οὗν, ὅπου πάντες ἄνθρωποι πλανώμεθα
καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους μαχόμεθα ; διὰ τοῦτο ἡ

\ lat ϑ an
γυνὴ καλῶς εἶπεν ἣ πέμψαι θέλουσα TH

, a n
Γρατίλλῃ ἐξωρισμένῃ τὸ πλοῖον τῶν ἐπιμηνίων
κατὰ τὸν εἰπόντα ὅτι “᾿Αφαιρήσεται αὐτὰ
Δομιτιανός, “Μᾶλλον θέλω, φησίν, “ἵν
5] a > A > , δ ἡ Ae > \ \ / »
ἐκεῖνος αὐτὰ ἀφέληται ἢ ἵν ἐγὼ μὴ πέμψω.

7 - n ‘

Τί οὖν ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ τὸ obtw! συνεχῶς μαντεύεσθαι
» ς , \ -“ \ 3 / \
ayer; ἡ δειλία, τὸ φοβεῖσθαι τὰς ἐκβάσεις. διὰ
τοῦτο κολακεύομεν τοὺς μάντεις" “κληρονομήσω,
κύριε, τὸν πατέρα ;" “ἴδωμεν: ἐπεκθυσώμεθα.᾽"
‘ce , ΄ e ς ΄ θέ ” ψ δι es DB ν

val, κύριε, ὡς. ἡ τύχη θέλει." εἶτ᾽ av? εἴπη
“ κληρονομήσεις," ὡς παρ᾽ αὐτοῦ τὴν κληρονομίαν
εἰληφότες εὐχαριστοῦμεν αὐτῷ. διὰ τοῦτο κἀ-
κεῖνοι λοιπὸν ἐμπαίζουσιν ἡμῖν. τί οὖν ; δεῖ δίχα
ὀρέξεως ἔρχεσθαι καὶ ἐκκλίσεως, ὡς ὁ ὁδοιπόρος
πυνθάνεται παρὰ τοῦ ἀπαντήσαντος, ποτέρα τῶν

55 a , > ” ¥ Ν \3 \ ὃ \
ὁδῶν φέρει, οὐκ ἔχων ὄρεξιν πρὸς τὸ 3 τὴν δεξιὰν
μᾶλλον φέρειν ἢ τὴν ἀριστεράν: οὐ γὰρ τούτων

τ “ , ᾽ \ \ 4 “
τινὰ ἀπελθεῖν θέλει ἀλλὰ τὴν φέρουσαν. οὕτως
Μ τ» ΚΑ" ὌΝ Ν » t e ld € “
ἔδει καὶ ἐπὶ τὸν θεὸν ἔρχεσθαι ὡς ὁδηγόν, ὡς τοῖς
ὀφθαλμοῖς χρώμεθα, οὐ παρακαλοῦντες αὐτοὺς
ἵνα τὰ τοιαῦτα μᾶλλον ἡμῖν δεικνύωσιν, aX οἷα

,ὔ ,
ἐνδείκνυνται τούτων τὰς φαντασίας δεχόμενοι.
νῦν δὲ τρέμοντες τὸν ὀρνιθάριον κρατοῦμεν καὶ

1 Schenkl: τούτ αὶ αὶ 3. 2 Kronenberg: ἐπὰν 8.

3 Supplied by Upton.

1 That is, on a subject about which you do not profess to
know anything.

256

BOOK II, vu. 6-12

these things are expedient or inexpedient, am I going
to ask of you? Why don’t you speak on points
of grammar? Well then, on ¢his matter, in which
we mortals are all astray and in conflict with one
another, you do speak? Wherefore, that was an
admirable answer which the woman gave who wished
to send a boatload of supplies to Gratilla after she
had been exiled. To a man who said, “ Domitian
will confiscate them,” she replies, ‘I should rather
have him confiscate them than myself fail to send
them.”

What, then, induces us to employ divination so
constantly? Cowardice, fear of the consequences.
This is why we flatter the diviners, saying: “ Master,
shall I inherit my father’s property?” “ Let us see;
let us offer a sacrifice about that matter.” “Yes,
master, as fortune wills.” Then if the diviner says,
** You will inherit the property,” we thank him as
though we had received the inheritance from him.
That is why they in their turn go on making mock
of us. Well, what then? We ought to go to them
without either desire or aversion, just as the wayfarer
asks the man who meets him which of two roads
leads to his destination, without any desire to have
the right-hand road lead there any more than the
left-hand road; for he does not care to travel one
particular road of the two, but merely the one that
leads to his destination. So also we ought to go to
God as a guide, making use of Him as we make use
of our eyes; we do not call upon them to show us
such-and-such things by preference, but we accept
the impressions of precisely such things as they
reveal to us. But as it is, we tremble before the
bird-augur, lay hold upon him, and appealing to him

257

13

14

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

ὡς θεὸν ἐπικαλούμενοι δεόμεθα αὐτοῦ" “κύριε,
ἐλέησον" ἐπίτρεψόν μοι ἐξελθεῖν. ἀνδράποδον,
ἄλλο γάρ τι θέλεις ἢ τὸ ἄμεινον ; ἄλλο οὖν τι
ἄμεινον ἢ τὸ τῷ θεῷ δοκοῦν ; τί τὸ ὅσον ἐπὶ σοὶ

διαφθείρεις τὸν κριτήν, παράγεις τὸν σύμβουλον ;

΄ / > / n 3 a
η΄. Tis οὐσία τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ;

Ὁ θεὸς ὠφέλιμος: ἀλλὰ καὶ τἀγαθὸν ὠφέλιμον.
ΨΑ͂ "δὲ Ψ μὰ 3 > , r fal > » 4 \
εἰκὸς οὖν, ὅπου ἡ οὐσία τοῦ θεοῦ, ἐκεῖ εἶναι Kal
\ fal > - , φ » / nm , ] A
τὴν TOD ἀγαθοῦ. τίς οὖν οὐσία θεοῦ; σάρξ; μὴ
γένοιτο. ἀγρός ; μὴ γένοιτο. φήμη ; μὴ γένοιτο.
νοῦς, ἐπιστήμη, λόγος ὀρθός. ἐνταῦθα τοίνυν
e n , \ > / “ > nr ? ,
ἁπλῶς ζήτει τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. ἐπεί τοι

la ΒΑ Ὁ ΤΆ, > “ a ” , >
μή τι αὐτὴν ἐν φυτῷ ζητεῖς; ov. μή τι ἐν
ἀλόγῳ ; οὔ. ἐν λογικῷ οὖν ζητῶν τί ἔτε ἀλλαχοῦ

a > - a an \ \ ΝΜ

ζητεῖς ἢ ἐν τῇ παραλλαγῇ τῇ πρὸς τὰ ἄλογα;
τὰ φυτὰ οὐδὲ φαντασίαις χρηστικά ἐστιν. διὰ

a 3 f , > a \ > , a
τοῦτο ov λέγεις ἐπ᾿ αὐτῶν TO ἀγαθόν. δεῖται
3 Χ 5 \ , a 5 δ
οὖν τὸ ἀγαθὸν χρήσεως φαντασιῶν. apa ye

3 \ , / Ἁ 3 “ Ν
μονῆς ; εἰ yap μόνης, λέγε καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις
ἕῴοις τὰ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι καὶ εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ κακο-

/ lel > > / \ lal -“ >
δαιμονίαν. νῶν δ᾽ ov λέγεις καὶ καλῶς ποιεῖς" εἰ

Elter: τὸν 8.
258

- BOOK II. vu. r2—vit1. 6

as if he were a god, we beg of him, saying: “ Master,
have mercy; grant that I come off safe.” Youslave!
What, do you want anything but what is best for
you? Isanything else best for you than what pleases
God? Why do you do all that in you lies to corrupt
your judge, to mislead your counsellor?

CHAPTER VIII
What is the true nature of the good ?

Gop is helpful; but the good also is helpful. It
would seem, therefore, that the true nature of the
good will be found to be where we find that of God
to be. What, then, is the true nature of God?
Flesh? Far fromit! Land? Farfromit! Fame?
Far from it! It is intelligence, knowledge, right
reason. Here, therefore, and only here, shall you
seek the true nature of the good. Surely you do
not seek it at all ina plant,do you? No. Nor in
an irrational creature? No. If, then, you seek it
in that which is rational, why do you keep on seeking
it somewhere else than in that which differentiates
the rational from the irrational? Plants are in-
capable of dealing even with external impressions ;
for that reason you do not speak of the “good” in
referring to them. The good requires, therefore, the
faculty of using external impressions. Can that be
all that it requires? For, if that be all, then you
must assert that things good, and happiness and
unhappiness, are to be found in the other animals as
well asin man. But, as a matter of fact, you do not
so assert, and you are right; for even if they have in

259

~1

10

12

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

yap καὶ τὰ μάλιστα χρῆσιν φαντασιῶν ἔχει,
ἀλλὰ παρακολούθησίν γε τῇ χρήσει τῶν φαντα-
σιῶν οὐκ ἔχει. καὶ εἰκότως: ὑπηρετικὰ γὰρ
γέγονεν ἄλλοις, οὐκ αὐτὰ προηγούμενα. ὁ ὄνος
ἐπεὶ γέγονεν μή τι προηγουμένως ; οὔ" ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι
νώτου χρείαν εἴχομεν βαστάζειν τι δυναμένου.
ἀλλὰ νὴ Δία καὶ περιπατοῦντος αὐτοῦ χρείαν
εἴχομεν: διὰ τοῦτο προσείληφε καὶ τὸ χρῆσθαι
φαντασίαις: ἄλλως γὰρ περιπατεῖν οὐκ ἐδύνατο.
καὶ λοιπὸν αὐτοῦ που πέπαυται. εἰ δὲ καὶ αὐτός
που προσειλήφει παρακολούθησιν; τῇ χρήσει
τῶν φαντασιῶν, καὶ δῆλον ὅτε κατὰ λόγον οὐκέτ᾽
ἂν ἡμῖν ὑπετέτακτο οὐδὲ τὰς χρείας ταύτας
παρεῖχεν, ἀλλ᾽ ἦν ἂν ἴσος ἡμῖν καὶ ὅμοιος.

Οὐ θέλεις οὖν ἐκεῖ ζητεῖν τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ
ἀγαθοῦ, οὗ μὴ παρόντος ἐπ᾽ οὐδενὸς τῶν ἄλλων
θέλεις λέγειν τὸ ἀγαθόν; “Ti? οὖν; οὐκ ἔστι
θεῶν ἔργα κἀκεῖνα ;" ἔστιν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ προηγού-
μενα οὐδὲ μέρη θεῶν. σὺ δὲ προηγούμενον εἶ,
σὺ ἀπόσπασμα εἶ τοῦ θεοῦ" ἔχεις τι ἐν σεαυτῷ

Α Σ
μέρος ἐκείνου. τί οὖν ἀγνοεῖς σου τὴν συγγέ-
νειαν; τί οὐκ οἶδας, πόθεν ἐλήλυθας ; οὐ θέλεις
μεμνῆσθαι, ὅταν ἐσθίης, τίς ὧν ἐσθίεις καὶ τίνα
τρέφεις ; ὅταν συνουσίᾳ χρῇ, τίς ὧν χρῇ ; ὅταν
ὁμιλίᾳ; ὅταν γυμνάξζῃ, ὅταν διαλέγῃ, οὐκ οἶδας

1 Schenkl: παρακολουθὴ 8.
3 Upton: εἰ 8.

1 That is, things that are an end in themselves, like man,
in the characteristic Svoic anthropocentric view. Cf. also IL.

10, 3.
2 That is, the ass went no further in the development of

its faculties.
260

BOOK II. vim. 6-12

the highest degree the faculty of using external
impressions, still they do not have the faculty of
understanding, at all events, their use of the external
impressions, And with good reason; for they are
born to serve others, and are not themselves of
primary importance.'! The ass, for example, is not
born to be of primary importance, is it? No; but
because we had need of a back that was able to
carry something. But, by Zeus, we had need that
it should be able also to walk around; therefore it
has further received the faculty of using external
impressions ; for otherwise it would not be able to
walk around. And at about that stage there was
an end.? But if it, like man, had somehow received
the faculty of understanding the use of its external
impressions, it is also clear that consequently it would
no longer be subject to us, nor would it be performing
these services, but would be our equal and our peer.

Will you not, therefore, seek the true nature of
the good in that quality the lack of which in all
creatures other than man prevents you from using
the term “good” of any of these? “But what
then? — Are not those creatures also works of God?”
_ They are, but they are not of primary importance, nor
portions of Divinity. But you area being of primary
importance ; you are a fragment of God; you have
within you a part of Him. Why, then, are you
ignorant of your own kinship? Why do you not
know the source from which you have sprung? Will
you not bear in mind, whenever you eat, who you
are that eat, and whom you are nourishing? When-
ever you indulge in intercourse with women, who
you are that do this? Whenever you mix in society,
whenever you take physical exercise, whenever you

261

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14

15

16

17
18

19

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

ὅτι θεὸν τρέφεις, θεὸν γυμνάξεις ; θεὸν περιφέρεις,
τάλας, καὶ ἀγνοεῖς. δοκεῖς με λέγειν ἀργυροῦν
τινα ἢ χρυσοῦν ἔξωθεν ; ἐν σαυτῷ φέρεις αὐτὸν
καὶ μολύνων οὐκ αἰσθάνῃ ἀκαθάρτοις μὲν δια-
νοήμασι, ῥυπαραῖς δὲ πράξεσι. καὶ ἀγάλματος
μὲν τοῦ θεοῦ παρόντος οὐκ ἂν τολμήσαις τι τού-
των ποιεῖν ὧν ποιεῖς. αὐτοῦ δὲ τοῦ θεοῦ παρ-
όντος ἔσωθεν καὶ ἐφορῶντος πάντα καὶ ἐπακού-
οντος οὐκ αἰσχύνῃ ταῦτα ἐνθυμούμενος καὶ ποιῶν,
ἀναίσθητε τῆς αὑτοῦ φύσεως καὶ θεοχόλωτε;
Λοιπὸν ἡμεῖς τί φοβούμεθα ἐκπέμποντες νέον
ἐπί τινας πράξεις ἐκ τῆς σχολῆς, μὴ ἄλλως
ποιήσῃ τι, μὴ ἄλλως hayn, μὴ ἄλλως συνου-
σιάσῃ, μὴ ταπεινώσῃ αὐτὸν ῥάκη περιτεθέντα,1}
μὴ ἐπάρῃ" κομψὰ ἱμάτια; οὗτος οὐκ οἶδεν
αὑτοῦ θεόν, οὗτος οὐκ οἶδεν, μετὰ τίνος ἀπέρ-
χεται. ἀλλ᾽’ ἀνεχόμεθα λέγοντος “αὐτοῦ σὲ
ἤθελον ἔχειν᾽᾽ ; ἐκεῖ τὸν θεὸν οὐκ Exes; εἶτ᾽
ἄλλον τινὰ ζητεῖς ἐκεῖνον ἔγων; ἢ ἄλλα σοι
ἐρεῖ ἐκεῖνος ἢ ταῦτα ; ἀλλ᾽ εἰ μὲν τὸ ἄγαλμα ἧς
τὸ Φειδίου, ἡ ᾿Αθηνᾶ ἢ ὁ Ζεύς, ἐμέμνησο ἂν καὶ
σαυτοῦ καὶ τοῦ τεχνίτου καὶ εἴ τινα αἴσθησιν
εἶχες, ἐπειρῶ ἂν μηδὲν ἀνάξιον ποιεῖν τοῦ κατα-
σκευάσαντος μηδὲ σεαυτοῦ, μηδ᾽ ἐν ἀπρεπεῖ
σχήματι φαίνεσθαι τοῖς ὁρῶσι" νῦν δέ σε ὅτι ὁ
Ζεὺς πεποίηκεν, διὰ τοῦτο ἀμελεῖς οἷόν τινα

1 Wolf: περιτιθέντα 8. 2 Reiske: ἐπάγηι S.

1 Referring to the chryselephantine statues at Athens and
at Olympia, upon which the fame of Pheidias principally
rested. The statue of Athena held a Nike in the out-
stretched right hand; ¢f. ὃ 20 below.

262

BOOK II. vm. 12-19

converse, do you not know that you are nourishing
God, exercising God? You are bearing God about
with you, you poor wretch, and know it not! Do
you suppose I am speaking of some external God,
made of silver or gold? It is within yourself that
you bear Him, and do not perceive that you are
defiling Him with impure thoughts and filthy actions.
Yet in the presence of even an image of God you
would not dare to do anything of the things you are
now doing. But when God Himself is present within
you, seeing and hearing everything, are you not
ashamed to be thinking and doing such things as
these, O insensible of your own nature, and object
of God's wrath !

Again, when we send a young man forth from the
school to sundry activities, why are we afraid that
he will do something amiss—eat amiss, have inter-
course with women amiss, be abased if dressed in rags
or conceited if he has on fine clothes? This fellow
does not know the God within him, this fellow does
not know the companion with whom he is setting
forth Nay, can we allow him to say, “O God,
would that I had Thee here”? Have you not God
there, where you are? And when you have Him, do
you seek for someone else? Or will He have other
commands for you than these? Nay, if you were a
statue of Pheidias, his Athena or his Zeus,! you
would have remembered both yourself and your
artificer, and if you had any power of perception
you would have tried to do nothing unworthy of
him that had fashioned you, nor of yourself, and you
would have tried not to appear in an unbecoming
attitude beforethe eyes of men ; but as it is, because
Zeus has made you, do you on that account not care

263

20

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22

23

24

25

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

’ , e fol
δείξεις σεαυτόν ; Kal τί ὁ τεχνίτης τῷ τεχνίτῃ
ὅμοιος ἢ τὸ κατασκεύασμα τῷ κατασκευάσματι;
cal ,
καὶ ποῖον ἔργον τεχνίτου εὐθὺς ἔχει τὰς δυνάμεις
al / ¥ n n
ἐν ἑαυτῷ, ἃς ἐμφαίνει διὰ τῆς κατασκευῆς ; οὐχὶ
λίθος ἐστὶν ἢ χαλκὸς ἢ χρυσὸς ἢ ἐλέφας ; καὶ ἡ
᾿Αθηνὰ ἡ Φειδίου ἅπαξ ἐκτείνασα τὴν χεῖρα καὶ
A la > ᾽ > an / av iA
τὴν Νίκην ἐπ᾽ αὐτῆς δεξαμένη ἕστηκεν οὕτως
ef. a IA \ \ a n vA ΝΜ
do τῷ αἰῶνι, τὰ δὲ τοῦ θεοῦ κινούμενα, ἔμ-
πνοα, χρηστικὰ φαντασιῶν, δοκιμαστικά. τούτου
τοῦ δημιουργοῦ κατασκεύασμα ὧν καταισχύνεις
αὐτό; τί δ᾽; ὅτι οὐ μόνον σε κατεσκεύασεν,
> \ \ Ν , > ΄ \ [4
ἀλλὰ καὶ σοὶ μόνῳ ἐπίστευσεν καὶ παρακατέθετο,
7O\ 4 / > \ \ “
οὐδὲ τούτου μεμνήσῃ, ἀλλὰ καὶ καταισχυνεῖς
\ > ΄ ᾽ / > , a \
τὴν ἐπιτροπήν ; εἰ δέ σοι ὀρφανόν τινα ὁ θεὸς
/ ο΄ ΓΝ > -“ Ε] , [4 /
παρέθετο, οὕτως ἂν αὐτοῦ ἠμέλεις ; παραδέδωκέ
σοι σεαυτὸν καὶ λέγει “οὐκ εἶχον ἄλλον πιστό-
fal 4 a
τερόν σου: τοῦτόν μοι φύλασσε τοιοῦτον οἷος
, > / 7 e , > a
πέφυκεν, αἰδήμονα, πιστόν, ὑψηλόν, ἀκατά-
n ’
πληκτον, ἀπαθῆ, ἀτάραχον." εἶτα σὺ ov
φυλάσσεις;
“᾿Αλλ᾽ ἐροῦσιν: “πόθεν ἡμῖν οὗτος ὀφρῦν
-“ »γ» ΕΙΣ ᾿]
ἐνήνοχεν καὶ σεμνοπροσωπεῖ ; οὔπω κατ
ἀξίαν. ἔτι γὰρ οὐ θαρρῷ οἷς ἔμαθον καὶ
συγκατεθέμην: ἔτι τὴν ἀσθένειαν τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ
lol a ,
φοβοῦμαι. ἐπεί τοι ἄφετέ με θαρρῆσαι καὶ τότε
ὄψεσθε βλέμμα οἷον δεῖ καὶ σχῆμα οἷον δεῖ, τότε

1 See the note on p. 262.
264

BOOK II. vu. 19-25

what manner of person you show yourself to be?
And yet what comparison is there between the one
artificer and the other, or between the one work of
art and the other? And what work of an artificer
has forthwith within itself the faculties which its
workmanship discloses? Is it not mere stone, or
bronze, or gold, or ivory? And the Athena of
Pheidias, when once it had stretched out its hand
and received the Nike! upon it, stands in this attitude
for all time to come; but the works of God are
capable of movement, have the breath of life, can
make use of external impressions, and pass judge-
ment upon them. Do you dishonour the workman-
ship of this Craftsman, when you are yourself that
workmanship? Nay more, do you go so faras to
forget, not only that He fashioned you, but also
that He entrusted and committed you to yourself
alone, and moreover, by forgetting, do you dis-
honour your trust? Yet if God had committed
some orphan to your care, would you so neglect
Him? He has delivered your own self into your
keeping, saying, “I had no one more faithful than
you ; keep this man for me unchanged from the char-
acter with which nature endowed him—reverent,
faithful, high-minded, undismayed, unimpassioned,
unperturbed.” After that do you fail so to keep
him?

* But men will say, ‘Where do you suppose our
friend here got his proud look and his solemn
countenance?’” Ah, but my bearing is not yet what
it should be! For I still lack confidence in what I
have learned and agreed to; I am still afraid of my
own weakness. Just let me gain confidence and
then you will see the right look in my eye and the

265

26

27
28

29

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

ὑμῖν δείξω τὸ ἄγαλμα, ὅταν τελειωθῇ, ὅταν
στιλπνωθῇ. τί δοκεῖτε; ὀφρῦν; μὴ γένοιτο.
\ \ ε \ ς ἃ ? ΄, > a 9 "4
μὴ γὰρ ὁ Ζεὺς ὁ ἐν ᾿Ολυμπίᾳ ὀφρῦν ἀνέσπακεν ;
\ 7. ἢ
ἀλλὰ πέπηγεν αὐτοῦ τὸ βλέμμα, οἷον δεῖ εἶναι
τοῦ ἐροῦντος
> \ p Ἐς" ΄ 29? 5 ΄
οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸν παλινάγρετον οὐδ᾽ ἀπατηλόν.
τοιοῦτον ὑμῖν δείξω ἐμαυτόν, πιστόν, αἰδήμονα,
γενναῖον, ἀτάραχον. μή τι οὖν ἀθάνατον, ἀγή-
»
ρων, μή τι ἄνοσον ; ἀλλ᾽ ἀποθνήσκοντα θείως,
νοσοῦντα θείως. ταῦτα ἔχω, ταῦτα δύναμαι:
\ > + v7 > » ” 7 / ree
τὰ δ᾽ ἄλλα οὔτ᾽ ἔχω οὔτε δύναμαι. δείξω ὑμῖν
ral a ?
νεῦρα φιλοσόφου: ποῖα νεῦρα; ὄρεξιν ἀναπό-
τευκτον, ἔκκλισιν ἀπερίπτωτον, ὁρμὴν καθήκου-
σαν, πρόθεσιν ἐπιμελῆ, συγκατάθεσιν ἀπρόπτω-
τον. ταῦτα ὄψεσθε.

θ΄. Ὅτι οὐ δυνάμενοι τὴν ἀνθρώπου ἐπαγγελίαν
πληρῶσαι τὴν φιλοσόφου προσλαμβάνομεν

᾽
Οὐκ ἔστι τὸ τυχὸν αὐτὸ μόνον ἀνθρώπου ἐπ-

2 ἀγγελίαν πληρῶσαι. τί γάρ ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος ;

Ζῷον, φησί, λογικόν, θνητόν. Εὐθὺς ἐν τῷ

an a lel Ά,
λογικῷ τίνων χωριζόμεθα ; Τῶν θηρίων. Kai
τίνων ἄλλων; Τῶν προβάτων καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων.
a = / / « , , » δὲ =
Opa οὖν μή τί πως ὡς θηρίον ποιήσῃς" εἰ δὲ μή,
ἀπώλεσας τὸν ἄνθρωπον, οὐκ ἐπλήρωσας τὴν

1 Homer, Jliad, I. 526, Bryant’s translation.

2 That is, what a person or a thing promises or is expected
to perform, In rendering ἐπαγγελία the same word has been
retained throughout the chapter, even in unusual colloca-
tions, so as to preserve clearly the point of the analogy.

266

BOOK II. yur. 25-1x. 3

right bearing ; then, when the statue is finished and
polished, I will show it to you. What do you think
of it? A lofty air, say you? Heaven forbid! For
the Zeus at Olympia does not show a proud look,
does he? No, but his gaze is steady, as befits one
who is about to say,

No word of mine can be revoked or prove untrue.}

Of such character will I show myself to you—faithful,
reverent, noble,unperturbed. You do not mean, there-
fore, immortal, or ageless, or exempt from disease ?
No, but one who dies like a god, who bears disease
like a god. This is what I have; this is what I can
do; but all else I neither have nor can do. I will
show you the sinews of a philosopher Whatdo you
mean by sinews? A desire that fails not of achieve-
ment, an aversion proof against encountering what
it would avoid, an appropriate choice, a thoughtful
purpose, a well-considered assent. This is what you
shall see.

CHAPTER IX

That although we are unable to fulfil the profession of
a man, we adopt that of a philosopher

Ir is no simple task, this of fulfilling merely the
profession * of aman. For whatisaman? A rational,
mortal animal, someone says. To begin with, from
what are we distinguished by the rational element ?
From the wild beasts. And from what else? From
sheep and the like. See to it, then, that you never
act like a wild beast; if you do, you will have
destroyed the man in you, you have not fulfilled

267

eo -I

=)

10

11

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

ἐπαγγελίαν. ὅρα μή τι ὡς πρόβατον" εἰ δὲ μή,
καὶ οὕτως ἀπώλετο ὁ ἄνθρωπος. τίνα. ο
ποιοῦμεν ὡς πρόβατα ; ὅταν τῆς γαστρὸς ἕνεκα,
ὅταν τῶν αἰδοίων, ὅταν εἰκῇ, ὅταν ῥυπαρῶς, ὅταν
ἀνεπιστρέπτως, ποῦ ἀπεκλίναμεν ; : ἐπὶ τὰ 'πρό-
βατα. τί ἀπωλέσαμεν ; τὸ λογικόν. ὅταν μαχί-
pos καὶ βλαβερῶς καὶ θυμικῶς καὶ ὠστικῶς,
ποῦ ἀπεκλίναμεν ; ἐπὶ τὰ θηρία. λοιπὸν οἱ μὲν
ἡμῶν μεγάλα θηρία εἰσίν, οἱ δὲ Onpidia κακοήθη
καὶ μικρώ, ἐφ᾽ ᾿ ὧν ἔστιν εἰπεῖν.“ λέων με καὶ
φαγέτω.᾽ διὰ πάντων δὲ τούτων ἀπόλλυται ἡ
τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐπαγγελία. πότε γὰρ σῴζεται
συμπεπλεγμέν ον; ὅταν τὴν ἐπαγγελίαν * πλη-
ρώσῃ, ὥστε σωτηρία συμπεπλεγμένου ἐστὶ τὸ ἐξ
armbar συμπεπλέχθαι. πότε διεζευγμένον ;
ὅταν τὴν ἐπαγγελίαν πληρώσῃ. πότε αὐλοί,
πότε λύρα, πότε ἵππος, πότε κύων; τί οὗν
θαυμαστόν, εἰ καὶ ἄνθρωπος ὡσαύτως piv
, ς ’ ? > / » >
σῴζεται, ὡσαύτως δ᾽ ἀπόλλυται; αὔξει ὃ
ἕκαστον καὶ σῴζει τὰ κατάλληλα ἔργα" τὸν
τέκτονα τὰ τεκτονικά, τὸν γραμματικὸν τὰ
γραμματικά. ἂν δ᾽ ἐθίσῃ γράφειν ἀγραμμάτως,
ἀνάγκη καταφθείρεσθαι καὶ ἀπόλλυσθαι τὴν
τέχνην. οὕτως τὸν μὲν αἰδήμονα σῴζξει τὰ αἰδή-
μονα ἔργα, ἀπολλύει δὲ Ta? ἀναιδῆ: τὸν δὲ

1 Wolf: ἀφ᾽ S. 2 Wolf: τὸν 8.

1 Referring to the proverb, ‘‘ Let a lion devour me, and
not a fox,” ascribed to Aesop. Prov. 15 (Paroemiographi
Graeci, II. 230). As it is considered to be a greater mis-
fortune to be killed by a mean and small animal than by
a great one, so malignant and petty people are more hateful
than the strong and fierce.

268

BOOK II. 1x. 3-11

your profession. See to it that you never act like a
sheep; if you do, the man in you is destroyed in this
way also. Well, when do we act like sheep? When
we act for the aie of the belly, or of our sex-organs,
or at random, or in a filthy fashion, or withont due
consideration, to what level have we degenerated ?
To the level of sheep. What have we destroyed?
The reason. When we act pugnaciously, and injuri-
ously, and angrily, and rudely, to what level have
we degenerated? To the level of the wild beasts.
Well, the fact is that some of us are wild beasts of a
larger size, while others are little animals, malignant
and petty, which give us occasion to say, “ Let it be
a lion that devours me!” By means of all these
actions the profession of a man is destroyed. For
when is a complex thing preserved? When it
fulfils its profession; consequently, the salvation
of a complex thing is to be composed of parts that
are true. When is a discrete? thing preserved?
When it fulfils its profession. When are flutes, a
lyre, a horse, a dog preserved? What is there to
be surprised at, then, if a man also is preserved in
the same way and in the same way destroyed?
Now deeds that correspond to his true nature
strengthen and preserve each particular man;
carpentry does that for the carpenter, grammatical
studies for the grammarian. But if a man acquires
the habit of writing ungrammatically, his art must
necessarily be destroyed and perish. So modest
acts preserve the modest man, whereas immodest
acts destroy him; and faithful acts preserve the

2 A thing viewed as a rate entity Ἀρόρῳωχο κα ἢ se, not
as @ mere component βάψα of something else.

269

13

14

16

17

18

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

πιστὸν τὰ πιστὰ Kal τὰ ἐναντία ἀπολλύει. καὶ
‘ > , , > , > .
τοὺς ἐναντίους πάλιν ἐπαύξει τὰ ἐναντία" τὸν
ἀναίσχυντον ἀναισχυντία, τὸν ἄπιστον ἀπιστία,"
τὸν λοίδορον λοιδορία, τὸν ὀργίλον ὀργή, τὸν
φιλάργυρον αἱ ἀκατάλληλοι λήψεις καὶ δόσεις.
Διὰ τοῦτο παραγγέλλουσιν οἱ φιλόσοφοι μὴ ἀρ-
κεῖσθαι μόνῳ τῷ θεῖν, ἀλλὰ L μελέ
εἶσθαι μόνῳ τῷ μαθεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ μελέτην
, 9 yy nr 4A ᾿ς
προσλαμβάνειν, εἶτα ἄσκησιν. πολλῷ γὰρ χρόνῳ
᾿] / lal 7 \ \ e /
τὰ ἐναντία ποιεῖν εἰθίσμεθα Kal τὰς ὑπολήψεις
τὰς ἐναντίας ταῖς ὀρθαῖς χρηστικὰς ἔχομεν. ἂν
οὖν μὴ καὶ τὰς ὀρθὰς χρηστικὰς ποιήσωμεν,
‘ ,
ovdev ἄλλο ἢ ἐξηγηταὶ ἐσόμεθα ἀλλοτρίων
δογμάτων. ἄρτε γὰρ τίς ἡμῶν οὐ δύναται
τεχνολογῆσαι περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν; ὅτι τῶν
ὄντων τὰ μὲν ἀγαθά, τὰ δὲ κακά, τὰ δ᾽ ἀδιάφορα"
ἀγαθὰ μὲν οὖν ἀρεταὶ καὶ τὰ μετέχοντα τῶν
> a \ \ > > / > ‘ ‘
ἀρετῶν: κακὰ τὰ δ᾽ ἐναντία: ἀδιάφορα δὲ
fal et ’ , es > HK \ ’
πλοῦτος, ὑγεία, δόξα. eit ἂν μεταξὺ λεγόντων
ἡμῶν ψόφος μείζων γένηται ἢ τῶν παρόντων τις
καταγελάσῃ ἡμῶν, ἐξεπλάγημεν. ποῦ ἐστιν,
, a a Κ΄ 4 <A ,
φιλόσοφε, ἐκεῖνα ἃ ἔλεγες ; πόθεν αὐτὰ προφερό-
“ n Ma
μενος ἔλεγες ; ἀπὸ τῶν χειλῶν αὐτόθεν. τί οὖν
ἀλλότρια βοηθήματα μολύνεις ; τί κυβεύεις περὶ
τὰ μέγιστα; ἄλλο γάρ ἐστιν ὡς εἰς ταμιεῖον
ἀποθέσθαι ἄρτους καὶ οἶνον, ἄλλο ἐστὶ φαγεῖν.
\ \ 3 / >? , - εν κα ,
τὸ βρωθὲν ἐπέφθη, ἀνεδόθη, νεῦρα ἐγένετο, σάρκες,

1 Supplied by Upton from his ‘‘ codex.”
270

BOOK. II. 1. 11-18

faithful man while acts of the opposite character
destroy him. And again, acts of the opposite
character strengthen men of the opposite character ;
shamelessness strengthens the shameless man, faith-
lessness the faithless, abuse the abusive, wrath the
wrathful, a disproportion between what he receives
and what he pays out the miserly.

That is why the philosophers admonish us not to
be satisfied with merely learning, but to add thereto
practice also, and then training. For in the course
of years we have acquired the habit of doing the
opposite of what we learn and have in*use opinions
which are the opposite of the correct ones. If,
therefore, we do not also put in use the correct
opinions, we shall be nothing but the interpreters of
other men’s judgements. _ For who is there among
us here and now that cannot give a philosophical
discourse about good and evil? It will run like
this: Of things that be, some are good, others evil,
and others indifferent; now good things are virtues
and everything that partakes in the virtues; evil
are the opposite; while indifferent are wealth,
health, reputation. Then, if we are interrupted in
the midst of our speech by some unusually loud
noise, or if someone in the audience laughs at us,
we are upset. Where, you philosopher, are the
things you are talking about? Where did you get
what you were just saying? From your lips, and
that is all. Why, then, do you pollute the helpful
principles that are not your own? Why do you
gamble about matters of the very utmost concern ?
For to store away bread and wine ina pantry is one
thing, and to eat them is another. What is eaten is
digested, distributed, becomes sinews, flesh, bones,

271

19

20

21

22

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

ὀστέα, αἷμα, εὔχροια, εὔπνοια. τὰ ἀποκείμενα
ὅταν μὲν θελήσῃς ἐκ προχείρου λαβὼν δεῖξαι
δύνασαι, ἀπ᾿ αὐτῶν δέ σοι ὄφελος οὐδὲν εἰ μὴ
μέχρι τοῦ δοκεῖν ὅτι ἔχεις. τί γὰρ διαφέρει
ταῦτα ἐξηγεῖσθαι ἢ τὰ τῶν ἐἑἙἑτεροδόξων ;
τεχνολόγει νῦν καθίσας τὰ ᾿Επικούρου καὶ τάχα
ἐκείνου χρηστικώτερον τεχνολογήσεις. τί οὖν
Στωικὸν λέγεις σεαυτόν, τί ἐξαπατᾷς τοὺς
πολλούς, τί ὑποκρίνῃ ᾿Ιουδαῖον ὧν “Ελλην 1;
οὐχ ὁρᾷς, πῶς ἕκαστος λέγεται ᾿Ιουδαῖος, πῶς
Σύρος, πῶς Αἰγύπτιος ; καὶ ὅταν τινὰ ἐπαμ-
φοτερίζοντα ἴδωμεν, εἰώθαμεν λέγειν “οὐκ ἔστιν
Ἰουδαῖος, ἀλλ᾽ ὑποκρίνεται. ὅταν δ᾽ ἀναλάβῃ
τὸ πάθος τὸ τοῦ βεβαμμένοῦ καὶ ἡρημένου, τότε
καὶ ἔστι τῷ ὄντι καὶ καλεῖται ᾿Ιουδαῖος. οὕτως
καὶ ἡμεῖς παραβαπτισταί,5 λόγῳ μὲν ᾿Ιουδαῖοι,
ἔργῳ δ᾽ ἄλλο τι, ἀσυμπαθεῖς πρὸς τὸν λόγον,
μακρὰν ἀπὸ τοῦ χρῆσθαι τούτοις ἃ λέγομεν, ἐφ᾽
οἷς ὡς εἰδότες αὐτὰ ἐπαιρόμεθα. οὕτως οὐδὲ τὴν
τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐπαγγελίαν πληρῶσαι δυνάμενοι
προσλαμβάνομεν τὴν τοῦ φιλοσόφου, τηλικοῦτο

' Schenk]: ἰουδαῖος ὧν ἕλληνας S.
2 παραβαπτιστοί Salmasius, perhaps correctly.

1 It would appear (especially from the expression ‘‘ counter-
feit ‘ baptists’” below) that Epictetus is here speaking really
of the Christians, who were in his time not infrequently
confused with the Jews. (But it should be observed that
the text translated here is an emendation, for the MS. says
“the part of Greeks when you are a Jew,” which may
possibly be defended on the understanding that, in the
parlance of Epictetus, a Jew is one who does not follow
reason as his sole guide.)

The sense of this much vexed passage I take to be: True

272

ee Ρ ν»

BOOK II. 1x. 18-22

blood, a good complexion, easy breathing. What
is stored away you can readily take and show when-
ever you please, but you get no good from it except
in so far as you are reputed to possess it. For how
much better is it to set forth these principles than
those of other schools of thought? Sit down now
and give a philosophical discourse upon the principles
of Epicurus, and perhaps you will discourse more
effectively than Epicurus himself. Why, then, do
you call yourself a Stoic, why do you deceive the
multitude, why do you act the part of a Jew,} when
you are a Greek? Do you not see in what sense
men are severally called Jew, Syrian, or Egyptian?
For example, whenever we see a man _ halting
between two faiths, we are in the habit of saying,
“ He is not a Jew, he is only acting the part.” But
when he adopts the attitude of mind of the man
who has been baptized and has made his choice,
then he both is a Jew in fact and is also called one.
So we also are counterfeit “ baptists,”’ ostensibly
Jews, but in reality something else, not in sympathy
with our own reason, far from applying the principles
which we profess, yet priding ourselves upon them
as being men who know them. So, although we
are unable even to fulfil the profession of man, we
take on the additional profession of the philosopher

Jews (i.e. Christians) are a very marked class of men because
of the rigorous consistency between their faith and their
practice. But there are some who for one reason or another
(possibly in order to avail themselves of the charity which
the Christians dispensed to the poor, as Schweighauser
suggests,—like the so-called ‘‘rice Christians”) profess a
faith which they do not practise. It is this class, then,
which Epictetus has in mind when he bitterly calls himself
and his pupils ‘‘ counterfeit ‘ baptists.’”

273

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

’ ν / / « \ 4
φορτίον, οἷον εἴ τις δέκα λίτρας ἄραι μὴ δυνάμενος
\ a Μ , ͵ ”
τὸν τοῦ Αἴαντος λίθον βαστάζειν ἤθελεν.

, a > 5 -“ > , \- ,
¢. Πῶς ἀπὸ τῶν ὀνομάτων Ta καθήκοντα
ἔστιν εὑρίσκειν;

, , “ \ - Ν a ᾽
Σκέψαι τίς el. τὸ πρῶτον ἄνθρωπος, τοῦτο ὃ
ἔστιν οὐδὲν ἔχων κυριώτερον προαϊιρέσεως, ἀλλὰ
΄ \ ΝΜ ig / > \ > 2 4
ταύτῃ Ta ἄλλα ὑποτεταγμένα, αὐτὴν δ᾽ ἀδού-
λευτον καὶ ἀνυπότακτον. σκόπει οὖν, τίνων
/
κεχώρισαι κατὰ λόγον. κεχώρισαι θηρίων,
κεχώρισαι προβάτων. ἐπὶ τούτοις πολίτης εἶ
a , an “
τοῦ κόσμου καὶ μέρος αὐτοῦ, οὐχ ἕν τῶν ὑπηρε-
τικῶν, ἀλλὰ τῶν προηγουμένων: παρακολου-
θητικὸς γὰρ εἶ τῇ θείᾳ διοικήσει καὶ τοῦ ἑξῆς
ἐπιλογιστικός. τίς οὖν ἐπαγγελία πολίτου ;
\ a >o7 / \ Ν 4
μηδὲν ἔχειν ἰδίᾳ συμφέρον, περὶ μηδενὸς Bovreve-
. ᾽ , > > “ ΨΜ | Le. } Ν
σθαι ὡς ἀπόλυτον, ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ ἄν, εἰ ἡ χεὶρ
ἢ ὁ ποὺς λογισμὸν εἶχον καὶ παρηκολούθουν
τῇ φυσικῇ κατασκευῇ, οὐδέποτ᾽ ἂν ἄλλως
ὥρμησαν ἢ ὠρέχθησαν ἢ ἐπανενεγκόντες ἐπὶ τὸ
ὅλον. διὰ τοῦτο καλῶς λέγουσιν οἱ φιλόσοφοι
“ bd f e Ν εἶν. \ ΣΝ
ὅτι εἰ προήδει ὁ καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς τὰ ἐσόμενα,
συνήργει ἂν καὶ τῷ νοσεῖν καὶ τῷ ἀποθνήσκειν
x n a - , x lol
καὶ τῷ πηροῦσθαι, αἰσθανόμενός γε, OTL ἀπὸ τῆς

! The huge one with which he beat down Aeneas. Homer,
Iliad, VII. 264.
2 Cf. IL. 8, 6f. and note.

274

BOOK II. ix, 22-x. 5

—so huge a burden! It isas though a man who was
unable to raise ten pounds wanted to lift the stone
of Aias.?

CHAPTER X

How is it possible to discover a man’s duties from
the designations which he bears?

Consiper who you are. To begin with, a Man;
that is, one who has no quality more sovereign than
moral choice, but keeps everything else subordinate
to it, and this moral choice itself free from slavery
and subjection. Consider, therefore, what those
things are from which you are separated by virtue
of the faculty of reason. You are separated from
wild beasts, you are separated from sheep. In
addition to this you are a citizen of the world, and
a part of it, not one of the parts destined for service,
but one of primary importance ;? for you possess the
faculty of understanding the divine administration
of the world, and of reasoning upon the conse-
quences thereof. What, then, is the profession of
a citizen? To treat nothing as a matter of private
profit, not to plan about anything as though he were
a detached unit, but to act like the foot or the hand,
which, if they had the faculty of reason and under-
stood the constitution of nature, would never exercise
choice or desire in any other way but by reference
to the whole. Hence the philosophers well say
that if the good and excellent man knew what was
going to happen, he would help on the processes of
disease and death and maiming, because he would
realize that this allotment comes from the orderly

275

10

11

12

13

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

TOV ὅλων διατάξεως τοῦτο ἀπονέμεται, κυριώτερον
δὲ τὸ ὅλον τοῦ μέρους καὶ ἡ πόλις τοῦ πολίτου.
νῦν δ᾽ ὅτι οὐ προγιγνώσκομεν, “καθήκει τῶν πρὸς
ἐκλογὴν εὐφυνεστέρων ἔχεσθαι, ὅτι καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο
γεγόναμεν.

Μετὰ τοῦτο μέμνησο, ὅτι υἱὸς el. τίς τούτου
τοῦ προσώπου ἐπαγγελία; πάντα τὰ αὑτοῦ
ἡγεῖσθαι τοῦ πατρός, πάντα ὑπακούειν, μηδέποτε
ψέξαι πρὸς τινα μηδὲ βλαβερόν τι αὐτῷ εἰπεῖν ἢ
πρᾶξαι, ἐξίστασθαι ἐν πᾶσιν καὶ παραχωρεῖν
συνεργοῦντα κατὰ δύναμιν.

Μετὰ τοῦτο ἴσθι ὅτι καὶ ἀδελφὸς el. καὶ πρὸς
τοῦτο δὲ τὸ πρόσωπον ὀφείλεται παραχώρησις,
εὐπείθεια, εὐφημία, μηδέποτ᾽ “ἀντιποιήσασθαί
τινος πρὸς αὐτὸν 5 τῶν ἀπροαιρέτων, ἀλλ᾽ ἡδέως
ἐκεῖνα προίεσθαι, ἵ ἵν᾽ ἐν τοῖς προαιρετικοῖς πλέον
ἔχῃς. ὅρα γὰρ οἷόν ἐστιν ἀντὶ θίδρακος, ἂν
οὕτως τύχῃ, καὶ καθέδρας αὐτὸν εὐγνωμοσύνην
κτήσασθαι, ὅ ὅση ἡ πλεονεξία.

Μετὰ ταῦτα εἰ βουλευτὴς πόλεώς τινος, ὅτι
βουλευτής" εἰ νέος, ὅτι νέος" εἰ πρεσβύτης, ὅτι
πρεσβύτης" εἰ πατήρ, ὅτι πατήρ. ἀεὶ γὰρ
ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων ὀνομάτων εἰς ἐπιλογισμὸν
ἐρχόμενον ὑπογράφει. τὰ οἰκεῖα ἔργα. ἐὰν δ᾽
ἀπελθὼν ψέγῃς σου τὸν ἀδελφόν, λέγω σοι “᾿ἐπε-
λάθου, τίς εἶ καὶ τί σοι ὄνομα." εἶτα εἰ μὲν

1 Reiske.
2 Wolf: ἑαυτὸν S.

1 πλέον ἔχειν (πλευνεξία), “ getting the best of it,” usually
had a bad sense, but there ds a πλεονεξία which should attract
the good man.

276

— ν»Εαε

ae

BOOK II. x. 5-13

arrangement of the whole, and the whole is more
sovereign than the part, and the state more sovereign
than the citizen. But as it is, seeing that we do
not know beforehand what is going to happen, it is
our duty to cleave to that which is naturally more
fit to be chosen, since we are born for this purpose.

Next bear in mind that you are a Son.- What is
the profession of this character? To treat every-
thing that is his own as belonging to his father, to
be obedient to him in all things, never to speak ill
of him to anyone else, nor to say or do anything
that will harm him, to give way to him in everything
and yield him precedence, helping him as far as is
within his power.

Next know that you are also a Brother. Upon
this character also there is incumbent deference,
obedience, kindly speech, never to claim as against
your brother any of the things that lie outside the
realm of your free moral choice, but cheerfully to
give them up, so that in the things that do lie within
the realm of your free moral choice you may have
the best of it.! For see what it is, at the price of a
head of lettuce, if it so chance, or of a seat, for you
to acquire his goodwill—how greatly you get the
best of it there!

Next, if you sit in the town council of some city,
remember that you are a councillor; if you are
young, remember that you are young; if old, that
you are an elder; if a father, that you are a father.
For each of these designations, when duly con-
sidered, always suggests the acts that are appropriate
to it. But if you go off and speak ill of your
brother, I say to you, “ You have forgotten who
you are and what your designation 15. Why, if you

277

14

15

16

17

18

19

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

χαλκεὺς. av expe τῇ opupa ἄλλως, ἐπιλελη-
σμένος ἂν ἧς τοῦ χαλκέως" εἰ δὲ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ
ἐπελάθου καὶ ἀντὶ ἀδελφοῦ ἐχθρὸς ἐγένου, οὐδὲν
ἀντ᾽ οὐδενὸς ἠχλλάχθαι φανεῖ σεαυτῷ ᾿; εἰ δ᾽ ἀντὶ
ἀνθρώπου, ἡμέρου ζῴου καὶ κοινωνικοῦ, θηρίον
γέγονας βλαβερόν, ἐπίβουλον, δηκτικόν, οὐδὲν
ἀπολώλεκας ; ἀλλὰ δεῖ σε κέρμα ἀπολέσαι, ἵνα
a ΝΜ ᾽ > \ > ‘ . \
ζημιωθῇς, ἄλλου δ᾽ οὐδενὸς ἀπώλεια ζημιοῖ τὸν
ΝΜ fal A 3 2 \ \ 2 ᾿ \ ν
ἄνθρωπον ; εἶτα 5 γραμματικὴν μὲν ἀποβαλὼν ἢ
μουσικὴν ξημίαν ἂν 3 ἡγοῦ τὴν ἀπώλειαν αὐτῆς"
εἰ δ᾽ αἰδῶ καὶ καταστολὴν καὶ ἡμερότητα ἀπο-
βαλεῖς, οὐδὲν ἡγῇ τὸ πρᾶγμα; καίτοι ἐκεῖνα
μὲν παρ᾽ ἔξωθέν τινα καὶ ἀπροαίρετον αἰτίαν
ἀπόλλυται, ταῦτα δὲ παρ᾽ ἡμᾶς". καὶ ἐκεῖνα μὲν
»}ν»ν ΄ > 4 Pe να , ? 4
οὔτ᾽ ἔχειν καλὸν ἐστιν οὔτ ἀπολλύειν αἰσχρὸν
ἐστιν, ταῦτα δὲ καὶ μὴ ἔχειν καὶ ἀπολλύειν καὶ
,
αἰσχρόν ἐστι καὶ ἐπονείδιστον Kal ἀτύχημα. τί
ἀπολλύει ὁ τὰ τοῦ κιναίδον πάσχων ; τὸν ἄνδρα.
΄ >
ὁ δὲ διατιθείς ; πολλὰ μὲν Kal ἄλλα Kal αὐτὸς ὃ
> ἈΝ ? \ ” ? £2 ΄ € 7
οὐδὲν ἧττον τὸν ἄνδρα. τί ἀπολλύει ὁ μοιχεύων ;
τὸν αἰδήμονα, τὸν ἐγκρατῆ, τὸν κόσμιὸν, TOV πολί-
‘ ΄ Fad 4 ae / ° ΝΜ
την, τὸν γείτονα. τί ἀπολλύει ὁ ὀργιζόμενος ; ἄλλο
ε 4 ” » \ OL >
τι. ὁ φοβούμενος ; ἄλλο τι. οὐδεὶς δίχα ἀπω-
ν ,,
λείας καὶ ζημίας κακός ἐστιν. λοιπὸν εἰ τὴν ζημίαν
-“ -“ ᾿ /
ζητεῖς ἐν κέρματι, πάντες οὗτοι ἀβλαβεῖς, «fn-
μιοι, ἂν οὕτως τύχῃ, καὶ ὠφελούμενοι καὶ
1 Schenk]: φανεῖς ἑαυτῶι S. 2 Schenkl: εἰ S.

8 Supplied by Koraes.
* καλόν ἐστιν supplied by Schenkl.

278

CO ΣΕ ἐν δοννο......κ.᾿Ὁ. τ... .

BOOK II. x. 13-19

were a smith and used your hammer amiss, you
would have forgotten the smith you were; but if
you forget the brother you are, and become an
enemy instead of a brother, will you seem to
yourself to have exchanged nothing for nothing?
And if, instead of being a man, a gentle and
social being, you have become a wild beast, a mis-
chievous, treacherous, biting animal, have you lost
nothing? What, must you lose a bit of pelf so as to
suffer damage, and does the loss of nothing else
damage a man? Yet, if you lost your skill in the
use of language or in music, you would regard the
loss of it as damage ; but if you are going to lose
self-respect and dignity and gentleness, do you
think that does not matter? And yet those former
qualities are lost from some external cause that is
beyond the power of our will, but these latter are
lost through our own fault; and it is neither noble
to have nor disgraceful to lose these former quali-
ties, but not to have these latter, or having had
them to lose them, is a disgrace and a reproach and
a calamity. What is lost by the victim of unnatural
lust? His manhood. And by the agent? Beside
a good many other things he also loses his manhood
no less than the other. What does the adulterer
lose? He loses the man of self-respect that was,
the man of self-control, the gentleman, the citizen,
the neighbour. What does the man lose who is
given to anger? Something else. Who is given
to fear? Something else. No one is evil without
loss and damage. Furthermore, if you look for
your loss in pelf, all those whom I have just men-
tioned suffer neither injury nor loss; nay, if it so
chance, they even get gain and profit, when, through

279

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

κερδαίνοντες, ὅταν διά τινος τούτων τῶν ἔργων
κέρμα αὐτοῖς προσγένηται. ὅρα δ᾽ εἰ ἐπὶ
κερμάτιον πάντα ἀνάγεις, ὅτι οὐδ᾽ ὁ τὴν ῥῖνά
σοι ἀπολλύων ἔσται βεβλαμμένος.---Ναί, φησίν,
, \ \ a ” ε \ ‘
κεκολόβωται yap τὸ caua— Aye, ὁ δὲ τὴν
οσφρασίαν αὐτὴν ἀπολωλεκὼς οὐδὲν ἀπολλύει;
ψυχῆς οὖν δύναμις οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδεμία, ἣν ὁ μὲν
/ > “ «ς Pe \ . rn
κτησάμενος ὠφελεῖται, ὁ δ᾽ ἀποβαλὼν ζημιοῦται;
- Ποίαν καὶ λέγεις ;---Οὐδὲν ἔχομεν αἰδῆμον
φύσει ;---ἔχομεν.---Ὁ τοῦτο ἀπολλύων οὐ by-
fal TS) \ , ὑδὲ > ,
μιοῦται, οὐδενὸς στερίσκεται, οὐδὲν ἀποβάλλει
τῶν πρὸς αὑτόν; οὐκ ἔχομεν φύσει τι πιστόν,
φύσει στερκτικόν, φύσει ὠφελητικόν, ἀλλήλων

s a
φύσει avextixov ; ὅστις οὖν εἰς ταῦτα περιορᾷ

la
ζημιούμενον ἑαυτόν, οὗτος ἡ ἀβλαβὴς καὶ
/
ἀζήμιος ;
Τί οὖν ; μὴ βλάψω τὸν βχάψαντα ;---Πρῶτον
\ > 4 7 > 4 / a
μὲν ἰδού, τί ἐστι βλάβη καὶ μνήσθητι ὧν
ἤκουσας παρὰ τῶν φιλοσόφων. εἰ γὰρ τὸ
ἀγαθὸν ἐν προαιρέσει καὶ τὸ κακὸν ὡσαύτως ἐν
/ / \ a» ἢ a , “ /
προαιρέσει, βλέπε μὴ τοιοῦτ᾽ ἐστιν ὃ λέγεις" “τί
ἣν > \ ? a e \ wv \ /
οὗν; ἐπειδὴ ἐκεῖνος ἑαυτὸν ἔβλαψεν πρὸς ἐμέ τι
» 7, > gets > \ \ 7 ᾿
ἄδικον ποιήσας, ἐγὼ ἐμαυτὸν μὴ βλάψω πρὸς
-“ > a
ἐκεῖνον ἄδικόν TL ποιήσας ;” τί οὖν οὐ τοιοῦτόν τι
, > δ Φ - \ > ,
φανταζόμεθα, ἀλλ᾽ ὅπου TL σωματικὸν ἐλάττωμα
A > a > A - , “ > \
ἢ εἰς κτῆσιν, ἐκεῖ ἡ βλάβη, ὅπου εἰς τὴν
’, > / / BA \ A
προαίρεσιν, οὐδεμία βλάβη; οὔτε γὰρ τὴν

1 Supplied by Wolf.
280

BOOK II. x. 19-28

some of their deeds just mentioned, they also
acquire pelf. But observe that if you make paltry
pelf your standard for everything, not even the man
who loses his nose will in your eyes have suffered an
injury.—“ Oh yes, he has,” someone says, “ for his
body is mutilated.” —Come now, and does the man
who has lost his entire sense of smell lose nothing?
Is there, then, no such thing as a faculty of the
mind, the possession of which means gain to a man,
and the loss, injury ?—What faculty do you mean?
Have we not a natural sense of self-respect ?>—-We
have.— Does not the man who destroys this suffer a
loss, is he not deprived of something, does he not
lose something that belonged to him? Do we not
have a natural sense of fidelity, a natural sense of
affection, a natural sense of helpfulness, a natural
sense of keeping our hands off one another? Shall,
therefore, the man who allows himself to suffer
loss in such matters, be regarded as having suffered
neither injury nor loss?

Well, what then? Am I not to injure the man
who has injured me?—First consider what injury
is, and call to mind what you have heard the
philosophers say.. For if the good lies in moral
purpose, and the evil likewise in moral purpose, see
if what you are saying does not come to something
like this, “ Well, what then? Since so-and-so has
injured himself by doing me some wrong, shall I
not injure myself by doing him some wrong?”
Why, then, do we not represent the case to our-
selves in some such light as that? Instead of that,
where there is some loss affecting our body or our
property, there we count it injury; but is there no
injury where the loss affects our moral purpose?

VOL. I. L 281

29

30

to

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

κεφαλὴν ἀλγεῖ ὁ ἐξαπατηθεὶς ἢ ἀδικησας οὔτε
τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν οὔτε τὸ ἰσχίον, οὔτε τὸν ἀγρὸν
ἀπολλύει. ἡμεῖς δ᾽ ἄλλο οὐδὲν ἐθέλομεν ἢ
ταῦτα: τὴν προαίρεσιν δὲ πότερον αἰδήμονα καὶ
πιστὴν ἕξομεν ἢ ἀναίσχυντον καὶ ἄπιστον, οὐδ᾽
ἐγγὺς διαφερόμεθα πλὴν μόνον ἐν τῇ σχολῇ μέχρι
τῶν λογαρίων. τοιγαροῦν μέχρι τῶν λογαρίων
προκόπτομεν, ἔξω δ᾽ αὐτῶν οὐδὲ τὸ ἐλάχιστον.

ια΄. Τίς ἀρχὴ φιλοσοφίας ;

᾿Αρχὴ φιλοσοφίας παράγε τοῖς ὡς δεῖ καὶ κατὰ
θύραν ἁπτομένοις αὐτῆς συναίσθησις τῆς αὑτοῦ
" , \ 3 , ‘ > a
ἀσθενείας καὶ ἀδυναμίας περὶ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα.
> / \ \ , ὃ “4 ε , 1
ὀρθογωνίου μὲν γὰρ τριγώνου ἢ διέσεως ἡμιτονίου

>
οὐδεμίαν φύσει ἔννοιαν ἥκομεν ἔχοντες, ἀλλ᾽ ἔκ
΄ / / “

τινος τεχνικῆς παραλήψεως διδασκόμεθα ἕκαστον

> fn \ \ »" . Α > / > Ν 20» Μ
αὐτῶν καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οἱ μὴ εἰδότες αὐτὰ οὐδ᾽ οἴονται
εἰδέναι. ἀγαθοῦ δὲ καὶ κακοῦ καὶ καλοῦ καὶ
αἰσχροῦ καὶ πρέποντος καὶ ἀπρεποῦς καὶ εὐδαι-
μονίας καὶ προσήκοντος καὶ ἐπιβάλλοντος καὶ

n n tal fol ’
ὅ τι δεῖ ποιῆσαι καὶ ὅ τι οὐ δεῖ ποιῆσαι τίς οὐκ
ἔχων ἔμφυτον ἔννοιαν ἐλήλυθεν ; διὰ τοῦτο
-
πάντες χρώμεθα τοῖς ὀνόμασιν καὶ ἐφαρμόξειν
1 4 ἡμιτονίου 8, perhaps rightly.

282

BOOK Il. x. 28-x1. 4

For the man who has been deceived or who has
done some wrong has no pain in his head, or his
eye, or his hip, neither does he lose his land. But
these are the things we care for and nothing else ;
yet the question whether we are going to have a
moral purpose characterized by self-respect and
good faith, or by shamelessness and bad faith, does
not so much as begin to disturb us, except only in
so far as we make it a topic of trivial discussion in
the classroom. Therefore, so far as our trivial dis-
cussions go, we do make some progress, but, apart
from them, not even the very least.

CHAPTER XI

What is the beginning of philosophy ?

Tue beginning of philosophy with those who take
it up as they should, and enter in, as it were, by the
gate, is a consciousness of a man’s own weakness and
impotence with reference to the things of real con-
sequence in life. For we come into being without
any innate concept of a right-angled triangle, or of
a half-tone musical interval, but by a certain syste-
matic method of instruction we are taught the
meaning of each of these things, and for that reason
those who do not know them also do not fancy that
they do. But, on the other hand, who has come
into being without an innate concept of what is good
and evil, honourable and base, appropriate and in-
appropriate, and happiness, and of what is proper and
falls to our lot, and what we ought to do and what
we ought not to do? Wherefore, we all use these
terms and endeavour to adapt our preconceptions

283

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©

10

1]

12

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

πειρώμεθα Tas προλήψεις ταῖς ἐπὶ μέρους οὐσίαις.
καλῶς ἐποίησεν, δεόντως, οὐ δεόντως" ἠτύχησεν,
εὐτύχησεν: ἄδικός ἐστιν, δίκαιός ἐστιν. τίς
ἡμῶν φείδεται τούτων τῶν ὀνομάτων ; τίς ἡμῶν
ἀναβάλλεται τὴν χρῆσιν αὐτῶν μέχρι μάθῃ καθά-
περ τῶν περὶ τὰς γραμμὰς ἢ τοὺς φθόγγους οἱ οὐκ
εἰδότες ; τούτου δ᾽ αἴτιον τὸ ἥκειν ἤδη τινὰ ὑπὸ
τῆς φύσεως κατὰ τὸν τόπον ὥσπερ δεδιδαγ-
μένους, ἀφ᾽ ὧν ὁρμώμενοι καὶ τὴν οἴησιν προσ-
εἰλήφαμεν. Νὴ Δία yap φύσει οὐκ οἷδα ἐγὼ τὸ
καλὸν καὶ τὸ αἰσχρόν; οὐκ ἔχω ἔννοιαν αὐτοῦ;---
“Eyews.—Ov« ἐφαρμόζω τοῖς ἐπὶ μέρους; --- Edap-
μόζεις.---Οὐ καλῶς οὖν ἐφαρμόζω ;---Ενταῦθά
ἐστι τὸ ζήτημα πᾶν καὶ οἴησις ἐνταῦθα προσγίνε-
ται. ἀφ᾽ ὁμολογουμένων γὰρ ὁρμώμενοι τούτων ἐπὶ
τὸ ἀμφισβητούμενον προάγουσιν ὑπὸ τῆς ἀκαταλ-
λήλου ἐφαρμογῆς. ὡς εἴ γε καὶ τοῦτο ἔτι πρὸς ἐκεί-
νοις ἐκέκτηντο, τί ἐκώλυε αὐτοὺς εἶναι τελείους; νῦν
δ᾽ ἐπεὶ δοκεῖς ὅτι καὶ καταλλήλως ἐφαρμόξεις τὰς
προλήψεις τοῖς ἐπὶ μέρους, εἰπέ μοι, πόθεν τοῦτο
λαμβάνεις ;--Ξ“Οτι δοκεῖ μοι.--- ουτὶ 5 οὖν τινι οὐ
δοκεῖ, καὶ οἴεται καὶ αὐτὸς ἐφαρμόζειν καλῶς: ἢ
οὐκ οἴεται ; ---ΟΟἴεται.---,Δἂὰύνασθε οὖν περὶ ὧν τὰ
μαχόμενα δοξάξετε ἀμφότεροι καταλλήλως ἐφαρ-
μόζειν τὰς προλήψεις ;—Ovd δυνάμεθα..---" Εχεις
1 Schenkl (note): Διὰ γὰρ φησίν 8,
2 Schenkl: τούτωι 8.

284

BOOK Ul. ΧΙ. 4-12

about them to the individual instances. “He has
done well, as he ought, or as he ought not; he has
been unfortunate, or fortunate ; he is a wicked man,
or he is a just man”—who of us refrains from
expressions of this kind? Who of us waits before
he uses them until he has learned what they mean,
as those who have no knowledge of lines or sounds
wait before they use the terms relating to them ἢ
The reason is that we come into the world with a
certain amount of instruction upon this matter already
given us, as it were, by nature, and that starting with
this we have added thereto our opinion.— Yes, by Zeus,
for do [ in my own case not have by gift of nature
knowledge of what is noble and base; do I not have
a concept of the matter?—You do.—Do I not apply
it to individual instances >—You do.—Do I not, then,
apply it properly ?—There lies the whole question,
and there opinion comes in. For men start with
these principles upon which they are agreed, but
then, because they make an unsuitable application
of them, get into disputes. Since if, in addition
to having the principles themselves, they really
possessed also the faculty of making suitable
application of the same, what could keep them from
being perfect? But now, since you think that you
can also apply your preconceptions suitably to the
individual cases, tell me, whence do you get this
gift ?—It is because I think so.—But on this precise
point someone else does not think so, and yet he too
fancies that he is applying the principles properly,
does he not >—He does so fancy.—Can both of you,
then, be making suitable applications of your
preconceptions in the matters upon which your
opinions are at variance?—-We cannot.—Can you,

285

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οὖν δεῖξαί τι ἡμῖν πρὸς τὸ αὐτὰς ἐφαρμόζειν
ἄμεινον ἀνωτέρω τοῦ δοκεῖν cot; ὁ δὲ μαινόμενος
ἄλλα τινὰ ποιεῖ ἢ τὰ δοκοῦντά οἱ καλά ; κἀκείνῳ
οὖν ἀρκεῖ τοῦτο τὸ κριτήριον ;—OvK ἀρκεῖ.---
᾿Ελθὲ 1 οὖν ἐπί τι ἀνωτέρω τοῦ δοκεῖν.---Τί τοῦτό
ἐστιν;

Ἴδ᾽ ἀρχὴ φιλοσοφίας" αἴσθησις μάχης τῆς πρὸς
ἀλλήλους τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ ζήτησις τοῦ παρ᾽ ὃ
γίνεται ἡ μάχη καὶ κατάγνωσις καὶ ἀπιστία πρὸς
τὸ ψιλῶς δοκοῦν, ἔρευνα δέ τις περὶ τὸ δοκοῦν εἰ
ὀρθῶς δοκεῖ καὶ εὕρεσις κανόνος τινός, οἷον ἐπὶ
βαρῶν τὸν ζυγὸν εὕρομεν, οἷον ἐπὶ εὐθέων καὶ
στρεβλῶν τὴν στάθμην.--- Τοῦτ᾽ ἔστιν ἀρχὴ φιλο-
σοφίας ; πάντα καλῶς ἔχει τὰ δοκοῦντα ἅπασι;
Καὶ πῶς δυνατὸν τὰ μαχόμενα καλῶς ἔχειν;
οὐκοῦν οὐ Tavta.— Αλλὰ τὰ ἡμῖν δοκοῦντα ; 3 τί
μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ Σύροις, τί μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ Αἰγυπτίοις,
τί μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ ἐμοὶ φαινόμενα ἢ τὰ τῷ δεῖνι ;—
Οὐδὲν μᾶλλον.--- Οὐκ ἄρα ἀρκεῖ τὸ δοκοῦν ἑκάστῳ
πρὸς τὸ εἶναι' οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐπὶ βαρῶν ἢ μέτρων
ψιλῇ τῇ ἐμφάσει ἀρκούμεθα, ἀλλὰ κανόνα τινὰ
ἐφ᾽ ἑκάστου εὕρομεν: ἐνταῦθ᾽ οὖν οὐδεὶς κανὼν
ἀνωτέρω τοῦ δοκεῖν ; καὶ πῶς οἷόν τε ἀτέκμαρτα
εἶναι καὶ ἀνεύρετα τὰ ἀναγκαιότατα ἐν ἀνθρώποις ;

1 Sc.: ἐλθὼν S.

2 Kronenberg : οὐκοῦν ob πάντα, ἀλλὰ τὰ ἡμῖν δοκοῦντα. S

(and Schenkl).

1 «Bach man” (ἕκαστος, as below, ὃ 15) would have been
a more logical form for this question, for it is clear from the
context that Epictetus is not speaking here of the actual
correctness of any opinion universally held, but only of any
opinion held by any man,

286

BOOK Il. XI. 12-16

then, show us anything higher than your own
opinion which will make it possible for us to apply
our preconceptions better? And does the madman
do anything else but that which seems to him to be
good? Is this criterion, then, sufficient in his case
also?—It is not.—Go, therefore, to something
higher than your own opinion, and tell us what
that is.

Behold the beginning of philosophy !—a recog-
nition of the conflict between the opinions of
men, and a search for the origin of that conflict,
and a condemnation of mere opinion, coupled with
scepticism regarding it, and a kind of investigation
to determine whether the opinion is rightly held,
together with the invention of a kind of standard of
judgement, as we have invented the balance for the
determination of weights, or the carpenter’s rule for
the determination of things straight and crooked.—
Is this the beginning of philosophy? [5 everything
right that every man thinks?! Nay, how is it
possible for conflicting opinions to be right? Con-
sequently, not all opinions are rig ht.— But are our
opinions right? Why ours, rather than those of
the Syrians; why ours, rather than those of the
Egyptians; why ours, rather than my own, or those
of so-and-so ?—There is no reason why.—Therefore,
the opinion which each man holds is not a sufficient
criterion for determining the truth; for also in the
ease of weights and measures we are not satisfied
with the mere appearance, but we have invented a
certain standard to test each. In the present case,
then, is there no standard higher than opinion?
And yet how can it possibly be that matters of the
utmost consequence among men should be unde-

287

17

18

19

20

21

22

23
24

25

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

% -» ;

- Ἔστιν οὖν.---Καὶ διὰ τί οὐ ζητοῦμεν αὐτὸν καὶ
> / wos , Ν > 4

ἀνευρίσκομεν καὶ ἀνευρόντες λοιπὸν ἀπαραβάτως
χρώμεθα δίχα αὐτοῦ μηδὲ τὸν δάκτυλον ἐκτεί-
νοντες ; τοῦτο γάρ, οἶμαι, ἐστὶν ὃ εὑρεθὲν ἀπαλ-

, rn tal
λάσσει μανίας τοὺς μόνῳ τῷ δοκεῖν μέτρῳ πάντων
χρωμένους, ἵνα λοιπὸν ἀπό τινων γνωρίμων καὶ
διευκρινημένων ὁρμώμενοι χρώμεθα ἐπὶ τῶν ἐπὶ

, , ca) /
μέρους διηρθρωμέναις ταῖς προλήψει.

Tis ὑποπέπτωκεν οὐσία περὶ ἧς ζητοῦμεν ;—
“Ηδονή.---Ὑπαγε αὐτὴν τῷ κανόνι, βάλε εἰς τὸν
ζυγόν. τὸ ἀγαθὸν δεῖ εἶναι τοιοῦτον, ἐφ᾽ ᾧ θαρρεῖν
ἄξιον καὶ ᾧ πεποιθέναι ;---Δεῖ.---᾿ βεβαίῳ οὖν
τινι θαρρεῖν ἄξιον ;---Οὔ.---Μή τι οὖν βέβαιον ἡ
ἡδονή ;—Ov.—Apov οὖν καὶ βάλε ἔξω ἐκ τοῦ
ζυγοῦ καὶ ἀπέλασον τῆς χώρας τῶν ἀγαθῶν μακράν.
εἰ δ᾽ οὐκ ὀξυβλεπτεῖς καὶ ἕν σοι ζυγὸν οὐκ ἀρκεῖ,
φέρε ἄλλο. ἐπὶ τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἄξιον ἐπαίρεσθαι ;—
Ναί.--- Ἐφ᾽ ἡδονῇ οὖν παρούσῃ ἄξιον ἐπαίρεσθαι ;
βλέπε μὴ εἴπῃς ὅτι ἄξιον" εἰ δὲ μή, οὐκέτι σε

x ΦΧ a a ὟΝ ς /
οὐδὲ τοῦ ζυγοῦ ἄξιον ἡγήσομαι.
Οὕτως κρίνεται τὰ πράγματα καὶ ἵσταται τῶν
, ε , Ν \ a a_f
κανόνων ἡτοιμασμένων: καὶ τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν τοῦτο
ἐστιν, ἐπισκέπτεσθαι καὶ βεβαιοῦν τοὺς κανόνας,
τὸ 8 ἤδη χρῆσθαι τοῖς ἐγνωσμένοις τοῦτο τοῦ

fo) 279 aw > /
καλοῦ Kal ἀγαθοῦ ἔργον ἐστίν.

288

BOOK II. x1. 16-25

terminable and undiscoverable.—Therefore, there is
some standard.—Then why do we not look for it
and find it, and when we have found it thenceforth
use it unswervingly, not so much as stretching out
our finger without it? For this is something, I
think, the discovery of which frees from madness
those who use only opinion as the measure of all
things, so that thenceforward, starting with certain
principles that are known and clearly discriminated,
we may use in the judgement of specific cases an
organically articulated system of preconceived ideas.

What subject has arisen that we wish to investi-
gate ?—Pleasure.—Subject it to the standard, put
it into the balance. Should the good be the sort of
thing that we can properly have confidence and
trust in?—It should.—Can we properly have con-
fidence, then, in something that is insecure >—No.—
Pleasure contains no element of security, does it >—
No.—Away with it, then, and throw it out of the
balance, and drive it far away from the region of
things good. But if you are not endowed with
keen eyesight and if one balance is not enough for
you, bring another. Can one properly feel elated
over the good >—Yes.—Can one properly feel elated,
then, over the moment’s pleasure? See that you
do not say that it is proper; if you do,I shall no
longer regard you as a proper person even to have a
balance!

And so are matters judged and weighed, if we have
the standards ready with which to test them; and
the task of philosophy is this—to examine and to
establish the standards; but to go ahead and use
them after they have become known is the task
of the good and excellent man.

289

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ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

ιβ΄. Περὶ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι.

“A μὲν δεῖ μαθόντα εἰδέναι χρῆσθαι λόγῳ, ἠκρί-
βωται ὑπο τῶν ἡμετέρων" περὶ δὲ τὴν χρῆσιν
αὐτῶν τὴν προσήκουσαν τελέως ἀγύμναστοί ἐσμεν.
δὸς γοῦν ᾧ θέλεις ἡμῶν ἰδιώτην τινὰ τὸν προσδια-
λεγόμενον: καὶ οὐχ εὑρίσκει χρήσασθαι αὐτῷ,
ἀλλὰ μικρὰ κινήσας τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἂν παρὰ
σκέλος ' ἀπαντᾷ ἐκεῖνος, οὐκέτι δύναται μεταχει-
ρίσασθαι, ἀλλ᾽ ἢ λοιδορεῖ λοιπὸν ἢ καταγελᾷ καὶ
λέγει “ἰδιώτης ἐστίν" οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτῷ χρήσασθαι."
ὁ δ᾽ ὁδηγός, ὅταν λάβῃ τινὰ πλανώμενον, ἤγαγεν
ἐπὶ τὴν ὁδὸν τὴν δέουσαν, οὐχὶ καταγελάσας ἢ
λοιδορησάμενος ἀπῆλθεν. καὶ σὺ δεῖξον αὐτῷ

Ἁ 2 / ἂν ἐδ a > tal 4 ᾽
τὴν ἀλήθειαν καὶ ὄψει ὅτι ἀκολουθεῖ. μέχρι
ἂν οὗ μὴ δεικνύῃς, μὴ ἐκείνου καταγέλα, ἀλλὰ
μᾶλλον αἰσθάνου τῆς ἀδυναμίας τῆς αὑτοῦ.

Πῶς οὖν ἐποίει Σωκράτης ; αὐτὸν ἠνάγκαζεν
τὸν προσδιαλεγόμενον αὐτῷ μαρτυρεῖν, ἄλλου δ᾽
οὐδενὸς ἐδεῖτο μάρτυρος. τοιγαροῦν ἐξῆν αὐτῷ
λέγειν ὅτι “ τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους ἐῶ χαίρειν, ἀεὶ δὲ τῷ
ἀντιλέγοντι ἀρκοῦμαι μάρτυρι" καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἄλ-
λους οὐκ ἐπιψηφίζω, τὸν δὲ προσδιαλεγόμενον
μόνον." οὕτω γὰρ ἐναργῆ ἐτίθει τὰ ἀπὸ τῶν
ἐννοιῶν, ὥστε πάνθ᾽ ὁντιναοῦν συναισθανόμενον
τῆς μάχης ἀναχωρεῖν ἀπ᾽ αὐτῆς. “ἾΑρά γε ὁ

1 παρὰ μέλος (“ off the tune, out of harmony ᾽ἢ s, perhaps
correctly.

1 A free paraphrase of Plato, Gorgias, 4744; compare
also 472c. A still freer paraphrase of the same general
idea appears in II. 26, 6.

290

BOOK II. xu. r-7

CHAPTER XII
Upon the art of argumentation

Wuat a man ought to learn before he will know
how to conduct an argument has been precisely
defined by the philosophers of our school; but as
to the proper use of what we have learned we are
still utterly inexperienced. At all events, give to
anyone of us you please some layman with whom to
carry on an argument; he will find no way of dealing
with him, but after moving the man a little, in case
the latter thwarts him, our man gives up trying to
handle him, and thereafter either reviles him, or
laughs him to scorn, and remarks, “He is a mere
layman; it is impossible to do anything with him.”
But the real guide, whenever he finds a person
going astray, leads him back to the right road,
instead of leaving him with a scornful laugh or
an insult. So also do you show him the truth and
you will see that he follows. But so long as you do
not show him the truth, do not laugh him to scorn,
but rather recognize your own incapacity.

How did Socrates act? He used to force the
man who was arguing with him to be his witness,
and never needed any other witness. That is why
he could say, “I can dispense with all the others,
and am always satisfied to have my fellow-disputant
for a witness; and the votes of the rest I do not
take, but only that of my fellow-disputant.”! For
he used to make so clear the consequences which
followed from the concepts, that absolutely everyone
realized the contradiction involved and gave up
the battle. ‘And so does the man who feels envy

291

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ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

φθονῶν χαίρει ; "-“ Οὐδαμῶς, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον
ra a ’ὔ
λυπεῖται." ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐναντίου ἐκίνησε τὸν πλησίον.
“Ti δ᾽; ἐπὶ κακοῖς δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι λύπη ὁ φθόνος;
\ / e , 2 \ al ᾽ν > “ > Lal
καὶ τί ὁ φθόνος ἐστὶ κακῶν ;” οὐκοῦν ἐκεῖνον
? / > “- “ 4 > \ vis, ᾽ a ©
ἐποίησεν εἰπεῖν OTe λύπη ἐστὶν ἐπ᾽ ἀγαθοῖς ὁ
φθόνος. “Τί δέ; φθονοίη ἄν τις τοῖς οὐδὲν πρὸς
is Pcl OY 9 ἐν" nD \ “ 2
αὐτὸν; ---΄ Οὐδαμῶς. καὶ οὕτως ἐκπεπλη-
\ \ x \ ὃ θ \ > ἘΠ ,
ρωκὼς τὴν ἐννοιαν Kal διηρθρωκῶς ἀπηλλάσ-
> , μὰ “ec a ’ὔ Ν θ / ” “4
σετο, οὐ λέγων ὅτι “ ὅρισαί μοι τὸν φθόνον," εἶτα
ὁρισαμένου “ κακῶς ὡρίσω" οὐ γὰρ ἀντακολουθεῖ
A A
τῷ κεφαλαιώδει TO ὁρικόν" " ῥήματα τεχνικὰ καὶ
διὰ τοῦτο τοῖς ἰδιώταις φορτικὰ καὶ δυσπαρα-
κολούθητα, ὧν ἡμεῖς ἀποστῆναι οὐ δυνάμεθα.
> Ad > > \ ec > ’ > Lal ~
ἐξ ὧν δ᾽ αὐτὸς ὁ ἰδιώτης ἐπακολουθῶν ταῖς
΄ a 4
αὑτου φαντασίαις παραχωρῆσαι δύναιτ᾽ ἄν τι
ἢ ἀθετῆσαι, οὐδαμῶς διὰ τούτων αὐτὸν κινῆσαι
δυνάμεθα. καὶ λοιπὸν εἰκότως συναισθανόμενοι
ταύτης ἡμῶν τῆς ἀδυναμίας ἀπεχόμεθα τοῦ
΄ὔ “ > ’ , > / € \
πράγματος, ὅσοις γ᾽ ἐστί τι εὐλαβείας. οἱ δὲ
πολλοὶ καὶ εἰκαῖοι συγκαθέντες εἴς TL τοιοῦτον
’ \ δ᾽ \ -
φύρονται καὶ φύρουσι καὶ τὰ τελευταῖα
λοιδορήσαντες καὶ λοιδορηθέντες ἀπέρχονται.
Τὸ πρῶτον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ μάλιστα ἴδιον Σωκρά-

τοὺς μηδέποτε παροξυνθῆναι ἐν λόγῳ, μηδέποτε

λοίδορον προενέγκασθαι μηδέν, μηδέποθ᾽ ὑβρει-

1 Based on Xenophon, Memorabilia, IIL. 9, 8, and Plato,
Philebus, 488, and following.

292

BOOK II. xu. 7-14

rejoice in it?’’ 4—“ Not at all; but he experiences
pain rather than joy.” (By the contradiction in
terms he has moved the other party to the argu-
ment.) “Very well, does envy seem to you to be
feeling of pain at evils? And yet what envy is
there of evils?” (Consequently, he has made his
opponent say that envy is a feeling of pain at good
things.) “Very well, would a man feel envy
about matters that did not concern him in the
least ?””—* Not at all.” And so he filled out and
articulated the concept, and after that went his way ;
he did not start in by saying, “Define envy for
me,’ and then, when the other had defined it,
remark, “That is a bad definition you have made,
for the definition term does not fit the subject de-
fined.” . Those are technical terms, and for that
reason wearisome to the layman and hard for him
to follow, and yet we are unable to dispense with
them. But as to terms which the layman could
himself follow, and so, by the assistance of his own
external impressions, be able to accept or reject
some proposition—we are absolutely unable to
move him by their use. The result is that, recog-
nizing this incapacity of ours, we naturally refrain
from attempting the matter, those of us, 1 mean,
who are at all cautious. But the rash multi-
tude of men, when once they have let themselves
in for something of this sort, get confused them-
selves and confuse others, and finally, after reviling
their opponents and being themselves reviled, they
walk away,

Now this was the first and most characteristic
thing about Socrates, that he never got wrought up
during an argument, never used any term of abuse

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20

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ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

στικόν, ἀλλὰ τῶν λοιδορούντων ἀνέχεσθαι Kal
παύειν μάχην. εἰ θέλετε γνῶναι, πόσην ἐν
τούτῳ δύναμιν εἶχεν, ἀνάγνωτε τὸ Ξενοφῶντος
, \ ; d , ,
Συμπόσιον καὶ ὄψεσθε πόσας μάχας διαλέλυκεν.
διὰ τοῦτο εἰκότως καὶ παρὰ τοῖς ποιηταῖς ἐν
μεγίστῳ ἐπαίνῳ λέλεκται τὸ
4 4 \ l4 a 3 4 LA
αἷψά τε Kal μέγα νεῖκος ἐπισταμένως κατέ-
παυσεν.
Τί οὖν ; οὐ λίαν ἐστὶ νῦν ἀσφαλὲς τὸ πρᾶγμα
καὶ μάλιστα ἐν Ῥώμῃ. τὸν γὰρ ποιοῦντα αὐτὸ
> b] 4 , 7 -“ >
οὐκ ἐν γωνίᾳ δηλονότι δεήσει ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ προσ-
ελθόντα ὑπατικῷ τινι, ἂν οὕτως τύχῃ, πλουσίῳ
4 ? ~ 6c > a μι 2 e
πυθέσθαι αὐτοῦ “ἔχεις μοι εἰπεῖν, ὦ οὗτος, @
fal ”
τινι τοὺς ἵππους τοὺς σεαυτοῦ παρέδωκας ;
“ ἔγωγε." ‘apa τῷ τυχόντι καὶ ἀπείρῳ ἱππι-
a ΕΣ “ec ὑὃ lal » “ , δ᾽ ὦ .Ψ Ν ,ὔ
Kis ; “οὐδαμῶς. τί δ᾽; ᾧ τινι τὸ χρυσίον
ΕΓ Ν > 4 \ > a ἘΣ] “ ὑδὲ La] lal
ἢ τὸ ἀργύριον ἢ τὴν ἐσθῆτα ; οὐδὲ ταῦτα τῷ
a a \
τυχόντι. “τὸ σῶμα δὲ τὸ σαυτοῦ ἤδη τινὶ
or ? ' ᾿' ΤᾺ , γι A gece
ἔσκεψαι ἐπιτρέψαι eis ἐπιμέλειαν αὐτοῦ ; “πῶς
\ » 2 6c 3 / ὃ , \ / >
yap οὔ ; ἐμπείρῳ δηλονότι καὶ τούτῳ ἀλειπτι-
a n f
κῆς ἢ ἰατρικῆς ;” “πάνυ μὲν οὖν." “πότερον
an , \ / / > a A ”
ταῦτά σοι τὰ KpaTLOTa ἐστιν ἢ καὶ ἄλλο TL
> a Ν ij ᾽ν
ἐκτήσω πάντων ἄμεινον ;" “ποῖον καὶ λέγεις ;
“τὸ αὐτοῖς νὴ Δία τούτοις χρώμενον καὶ δοκι-
, Ψ \ , » Fe Set \
μάξον ἕκαστον καὶ βουλευόμενον. dpa γε τὴν
a 4
ψυχὴν λέγεις 3” “ ὀρθῶς ὑπέλαβες. ταύτην γάρ

1 Hesiod, Theogony, 87.
294

BOOK II. xu. 14-21

or insolence, but endured the abuse of others, and
put an end to strife. If you wish to know how
great was the faculty he had in this field, read the
Symposium of Xenophon, and you will see how many
cases of strife he settled. Therefore, and with good
reason, among the poets also very high praise has
been accorded to the following sentiment:

. Soon doth he shrewdly make an end of a quarrel
though weighty.”?

Well, what then? Nowadays this activity is not
a very safe one, and especially so in Rome. For
the man who engages in it will clearly be under
obligation not to do it in a corner, but he must
go up to some rich person of consular rank, if it
so chance, and ask him, “ You there, can you tell
to whose care you have entrusted your horses?”
“41 can, indeed,” answers the man. “Is it, then,
some chance comer, a man who knows nothing about
the care of horses?” “Not at all.” “And what
then? Can you tell me to whom you have entrusted
your gold, or your silver, or your clothing?” “I
have not entrusted these, either, to a chance comer.”
* And have you ever thought about entrusting your
body to someone to look after it?’ “Why, cer-
tainly.” “ And, of course, he too is a man of special
skill in the art of physical training, or medicine,
is he not?” ‘Yes, indeed.” “Are these your
most valuable possessions, or have you something
else that is better than all of them?” “Just what
do you mean?” “That, by Zeus, which utilizes
these other things, and puts each of them to the
test, and exercises deliberation?’”’ “Ah so, you
are talking about my soul, are you?” “You have

295

22

23
24

25

ΩΝ

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

τοι Kal λέγω. “Tord νὴ Δία TOV ἄλλων τοῦτο
Ψ 8 n an » co 0 = > » 1
ἄμεινον δοκῶ μοι κεκτῆσθαι. ἔχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν,
-“ , a a , > 7
ὅτῳ τρόπῳ THs ψυχῆς ἐπιμεμέλησαι; ov yap
εἰκἢ χὠς 5 ἔτυχεν εἰκός σε οὕτως σοφὸν ὄντα
καὶ ἐν τῇ πόλει δόκιμον τὸ κράτιστον τῶν σεαυ-
a a ᾽ν
τοῦ περιορᾶν ἀμελούμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον.
‘ x a a κὸὉ OE ἃ , Ὁ 4
οὐδαμῶς. ἀλλ᾽ αὐτὸς ἐπιμεμέλησαι αὐτοῦ ;
θὰ / x ε A > , .?? DO
πότερον μαθὼν παρά του ἢ εὑρὼν αὐτός ;” ὧδε
λοιπὸν ὁ κίνδυνος, μὴ πρῶτον μὲν εἴπῃ “ τί δέ σοι
μέλει, βέλτιστε; κύριός 8 μου εἶ ;" εἶτ᾽ ἂν ἐπι-
΄
μείνῃς πράγματα παρέχων, διαράμενος κονδύλους
σοι δῷ. τούτου τοῦ πράγματος ἤμην ποτὲ
ζηλωτὴς καὶ αὐτός, πρὶν εἰς ταῦτα ἐμπεσεῖν.

ty’. Περὶ τοῦ ἀγωνιᾶν.

Οταν ἀγωνιῶντα ἴδω ἄνθρωπον, λέγω" οὗτος
τί ποτε θέλει ; εἰ μὴ τῶν οὐκ ἐφ᾽ αὑτῷ τι ἤθελεν,
πῶς ἂν ἔτι ἠγωνία ; : διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ὁ κιθαρῳδὸς
μόνος μὲν ἄδων οὐκ ἀγωνιᾷ, εἰς θέατρον δ᾽ εἰσ-
ἐρχόμενος, κἂν λίαν εὔφωνος ἦ καὶ καλῶς κιθα-
pity: οὐ yap doa μόνον θέλει καλῶς, ἀλλὰ καὶ
εὐδοκιμῆσαι, τοῦτο δ᾽ οὐκέτι ἐστὶν ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ.
λοιπὸν οὗ μὲν ἡ ἐπιστήμη αὐτῷ πρόσεστιν, ἐκεῖ

1 Schenk]: ἡμῖν S \steeuyes ἡμῖν 8).

2 Schenkl: γ᾽ ὡς 3. 3 ©. Schenkl: τίς 8.

296

- BOOK II. xu. 21-x1n. 3

understood me aright, for it is precisely this that
I am talking about.” “By Zeus, I regard this as
far and away the most valuable of all my possessions.”
“Can you, then, tell in what way you have taken
care of your soul? For it is not to be supposed
that as wise a man as yourself and one so honoured
in the city is recklessly and at random allowing the
very best of his possessions to go to ruin through
neglect.” “Certainly not.” “But have you your-
self taken care of that possession? Did you learn
how to take care of it from somebody else, or did
you discover how yourself?” Then comes the
danger that first he will say, “ What is that to you,
good sir? Are you my master?” and after that,
if you persist in annoying him, that he will lift his
fist and give you a blow. ‘This was a pursuit that
I too was very fond of once upon a time, before I
fell to my present estate.

CHAPTER XIII
Of anziely

Wuen I see a man in anxiety, I say to myself,
What can it be that this fellow wants? For if he did
not want something that was outside of his control,
how could he still remain in anxiety? That is why
the citharoede when singing all alone shows no
anxiety, but does so when he enters the theatre, even
though he has a very beautiful voice and plays the
cithara admirably; for he does not wish merely
to sing well, but also to win applause, and that is no
longer under his control. Accordingly, where he
has skill, there he shows confidence. Set before him

297

~

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

xX /
τὸ θάρσος" φέρε dv θέλεις ἰδιώτην καὶ οὐκ ἐπι-
/
στρέφεται: ὅπου δ᾽ οὐκ oldev οὐδὲ μεμελέτηκεν,
>. tie εν a , an 4 a > ἊΨ ,
ἐκεῖ ἀγωνιᾷ. τί δ᾽ ἔστι τοῦτο; οὐκ οἶδεν, τί
ἐστιν ὄχλος οὐδὲ τί ὄχλου ἔπαινος" ἀλλὰ τὴν
νήτην μὲν τύπτειν ἔμαθεν καὶ τὴν ὑπάτην, ἔπαι-
νος δ᾽ ὁ παρὰ τῶν πολλῶν τί ἐστι καὶ τίνα
δύναμιν ἔχει ἐν βίῳ οὔτε οἷδεν οὔτε μεμελέτηκεν
3 a
αὐτό. ἀνάγκη λοιπὸν τρέμειν Kal ὠχριᾶν.
Κιθαρῳδὸν μὲν οὖν οὐ δύναμαι εἰπεῖν μὴ εἶναι,
« ” \ , » t Ὁ
ὅταν ἴδω τινὰ φοβούμενον, ἄλλο δέ τι δύναμαι
εἰπεῖν καὶ οὐδὲ ἕν, ἀλλὰ πολλά. καὶ πρῶτον
᾿. / > \ an \ 3 2 ¢
πάντων Eévov αὐτὸν καλῶ Kal λέγω" οὗτος ὁ
” > L a a a > > > >»
ἄνθρωπος οὐκ oldev ποῦ τῆς γῆς ἐστιν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκ
τοσούτου χρόνου ἐπιδημῶν ἀγνοεῖ τοὺς νόμους
- \ \ » Ψυ \ ᾽ὔ ᾽
τῆς πόλεως καὶ τὰ ἔθη καὶ τί ἔξεστι καὶ τί οὐκ
ἔξεστιν: ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ νομικόν τινα παρέλαβεν
πώποτε τὸν ἐροῦντα αὐτῷ καὶ ἐξηγησόμενον τὰ
νόμιμα: ἀλλὰ διαθήκην μὲν οὐ γράφει μὴ εἰδὼς
lal “ ᾿]
πῶς δεῖ γράφειν ἢ παραλαβὼν τὸν εἰδότα οὐδ
ἐγγύην ἄλλως σφραγίζεται ἢ ἀσφάλειαν γράφει,
ὀρέξει δὲ χρῆται δίχα νομικοῦ καὶ ἐκκλίσει καὶ
e a \ > a \ / a ,
ὁρμῇ Kat ἐπιβολῇ καὶ προθέσει. πῶς δίχα
a > φ [τς , \ \ ΄ \
νομικοῦ ; οὐκ οἶδεν ὅτι θέλει TA μὴ διδόμενα καὶ
οὐ θέλει τὰ ἀναγκαῖα καὶ οὐκ οἶδεν οὔτε τὰ ἴδια
οὔτε τὰ ἀλλότρια. εἰ δέ γ᾽ ἤδει, οὐδέποτ᾽ ἂν
> , γ07 3 ΄ > ἀπ΄ τὺ ΄,
ἐνεποδίζετο, οὐδέποτ᾽ ἐκωλύετο, οὐκ ἂν ἠγωνία.

298

BOOK II. xm. 3-8

any layman that you please, and the musician pays
no attention to him; but in a matter of which he has
no knowledge, and which he has never studied,
there he is in anxiety. What is the meaning of
this? Why, he simply does not know what a crowd
is, or the applause of a crowd; to be sure, he has
learned how to strike the lowest and the highest
strings on the cithara, but what the praise of the
multitude is, and what function it has in life, that he
neither knows nor has studied. Hence he must
needs tremble and turn pale.

Now then, I cannot say that the man is not a
citharoede, when I see anyone in a state of fear,
but I can say something else of him, and, indeed, not
one thing only, buta number of things. And first of
all, I call him a stranger and say: This man does
not know where in the world he is, but though he
has been living here so long a time, he is ignorant of
the laws of the city and its customs, what he is
allowed to do and what he is not allowed to do.
Nay more, he has never even called in a lawyer to
tell him and explain to him what are the usages
conformable with law; yet he does not write a will
without knowing how he ought to write it or else
calling in an expert, nor does he just casually affix
his seal to a bond or give a written guarantee; but
without the services of a lawyer he exercises desire
and aversion and choice and design and purpose,
How do I mean “ without the services of a lawyer”?
Why, he does not know that he is wishing for things
that are not vouchsafed him, and wishing to avoid
the inevitable, and he does not know either what is
his own or what is another's. Did he but know, he
would never feel hindered, never constrained, would

299

10

11

12

13

14

15

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

a A an rn \
πῶς yap ov; φοβεῖταί τις οὖν ὑπὲρ τῶν μὴ κα-
2 » , ᾽ ς \ lal n , PD.
κῶν ;—Ov.—Ti δ᾽; ὑπὲρ τῶν κακῶν μέν, ἐπ
» a > ἐδ “ 4 “ cal
αὐτῷ δ᾽ ὄντων ὥστε μὴ συμβῆναι ;—Ovdapas.—
>
Ei οὖν τὰ μὲν ἀπροαίρετα οὔτ᾽ ἀγαθὰ οὔτε κακά,
\ \ \ / ΟΡ, = cal 2 Σὰ
Ta προαιρετικὰ δὲ πάντα ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν Kal οὔτ᾽ ade-
/ rn a
λέσθαι τις ἡμῶν αὐτὰ δύναται οὔτε περιποιῆσαι
a a a
ἃ οὐ θέλομεν αὐτῶν, ποῦ ἔτι τόπος ἀγωνίας ;
\ fe) “ A [al
ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ σωματίου ἀγωνιῶμεν, ὑπὲρ TOU
, fol rn r
κτησιδίου, περὶ τοῦ τί δόξει τῷ Καίσαρι, περὶ
- Μ >] > , / Ν -“ A lal
τῶν ἔσω δ᾽ οὐδενός. μή τι περὶ τοῦ μὴ ψεῦδος
ὑπολαβεῖν ;---Οὔ: ἐπ’ ἐμοὶ γάρ ἐστιν.---Μή τι
τοῦ ὁρμῆσαι παρὰ φύσιν ;---Οὐδὲ περὶ τούτου----
°C) 3 νΝ \ > lal e rae, Ἁ > x
ταν οὖν idns τινὰ ὠχριῶντα, WS ὁ ἰατρὸς ἀπὸ
τοῦ χρώματος λέγει “τούτου ὁ σπλὴν πέπονθε,
΄ ΝΣ 4 » «᾿ ae ee a ,
τούτου δὲ τὸ ἧπαρ," οὕτως καὶ σὺ λέγε “τούτου
ὄρεξις καὶ ἔκκλισις πέπονθεν, οὐκ εὐοδεῖ, φλεγ-
μαίνει." χρῶμα γὰρ οὐ μεταβάλλει οὐδὲν ἄλλο
> \ , -“ > \ , -“ ? , > ‘
οὐδὲ τρόμον ποιεῖ οὐδὲ ψόφον τῶν ὀδόντων οὐδὲ
μετοκλάζει καὶ ἐπ᾽ ἀμφοτέρους πόδας ἵζει.
“ /
διὰ τοῦτο Ζήνων μὲν ᾿Αντιγόνῳ μέλλων ἐντυγχά-
νειν οὐκ ἠγωνία" ἃ γὰρ οὗτος ἐθαύμαζεν, τούτων
οὐδενὸς εἶχεν ἐκεῖνος ἐξουσίαν, ὧν δ᾽ εἶχεν ἐκεῖνος
> ? t 2 ? "ἦν \ ΄
οὐκ ἐπεστρέφετο οὗτος: ᾿Αντίγονος δὲ Ζήνωνι
, > ΄ > ’ὔ Ἀ ᾽ , ”
μέλλων ἐντυγχάνειν ἠγωνία, καὶ εἰκότως" ἤθελε
γὰρ ἀρέσκειν αὐτῷ, τοῦτο δ᾽ ἔξω ἔκειτο" οὗτος δ᾽

1 Homer, Jiiad, XIII. 281 ; that is, the coward in ambush
is restless and cannot keep in one position.

300

BOOK IL. xi. 9-15

not be anxious. Howcould he? Is any man in fear
about things that are not evil ?—No.—What then?
Is he in fear about things that are evil, indeed, but .
that are in his own power to prevent ?—Not at all,—
If, then, things indifferent are neither good nor bad,
but all matters of moral purpose are under our
control, and no man can either take them away from
us, or bring upon us such of them as we do not wish,
what room is there left for anxiety? Yet we are
anxious about our wretched body, about our trifling
estate, about what Caesar will think, but are anxious
about none of the things that are within us. Weare
not anxious about not conceiving a false opinion, are
we ?—No, for that is under my control.—Or about
making a choice contrary to nature ?—No, not about
this, either—Then, whenever you see a man looking
pale, just as the physician judging from the complex-
ion says, “This man’s spleen is affected, and this
man’s liver,’ so do you also say, “ This man’s desire
and aversion are affected, he is not getting along well,
he is feverish.” For there is nothing else that
changes a man’s complexion, or makes him tremble,
or his teeth to chatter, or to

« Shift from knee to knee and rest on either foot.” ?

That is why Zeno was not anxious when he was
about to meet Antigonus; for over none of the
things that Zeno regarded highly did Antigonus
have power, and what Antigonus did have power
over Zeno cared nothing about. But Antigonus ©
was anxious when he was about to meet Zeno,
and very naturally so; for he wanted to please him,
and that lay outside of his control; yet Zeno did
not care about pleasing him, any more than any other

+o
(oun?)
ts |LHBRARY} |
Ὁ J,
Xe = 3

<>

16

17

18

19

20

21

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

ἐκείνῳ οὐκ ἤθελεν, οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλος τις prec
τῷ ἀτέχνῳ.
"Eyo σοι ἀρέσαι θέλω ; ἀντὶ τίνος ; oldas γὰρ
\ “4 > A , ” e ᾽ > ,
Ta μέτρα, καθ᾽ ἃ κρίνεται ἄνθρωπος ὑπ᾽ ἀνθρώ-
που; μεμέληκέ! σοι γνῶναι, τί ἐστιν ἀγαθὸς
ἄνθρωπος καὶ τί κακὸς καὶ πῶς ἑκάτερον γίγνε-
Δεν \ > \ wee 1. > 3 a
tat; διὰ τί οὖν σὺ αὐτὸς ἀγαθὸς οὐκ εἶ ;---Πώς,
, > >? , “ ὃ A > θὸ θ tal
φησίν, οὐκ eit ;—Ore οὐδεὶς ἀγαθὸς πενθεῖ
OA / > \ > , > \ > n A
οὐδὲ στενάζει, οὐδεὶς οἰμώζει, οὐδεὶς ὠχριᾷ Kal
7 IDX ; <e a » 9 , a
τρέμει οὐδὲ λέγει “πῶς μ᾽ ἀποδέξεται, TAS μου
ἀκούσει ; "ἡ ἀνδράποδον, ὡς ἂν αὐτῷ δοκῇ. τί
4 / - > ’ “- ᾽
οὖν σοὶ μέλει περὶ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων; νῦν οὐκ
ἐκείνου ἁμάρτημά ἐστι τὸ κακῶς ἀποδέξασθαι
\ \ n A ΝΜ ΄ Ἦν
τὰ παρὰ σοῦ ;---Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; ---Δύναται δ᾽ ἄλλου
μὲν εἶναι ἁμάρτημα, ἄλλου δὲ κακόν ;—O’.—Ti
οὖν ἀγωνιᾷς ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ;—Nai: ἀλλ᾽
> a = n b] \ > n la ΦΞΩΝΣ >
ἀγωνιῶ, πῶς ἐγὼ αὐτῷ λαλήσω.---Εἰἶτ᾽ οὐκ
ἔξεστι γὰρ ὡς θέλεις αὐτῷ λαλῆσαι ;--- Αλλὰ
δέδοικα μὴ ἐκκρουσθῶ.---Μή τι γράφειν μέλλων
τὸ Δίωνος ὄνομα δέδοικας μὴ ἐκκρουσθῆς ;---
Οὐδαμῶς.---Τί τὸ αἴτιον ; οὐχ ὅτι μεμελέτηκας
/ a \ ” , δ᾽ > Ψ'
γράφειν ;---[Πῶς γὰρ οὔ ;—Ti δ᾽ ; ἀναγιγνώσκειν
μέλλων οὐχ ὡσαύτως ἂν εἶχες ;---Ωσαύτως.---Τί
τὸ αἴτιον ; ὅτι πᾶσα τέχνη ἰσχυρόν τι ἔχει καὶ
θαρραλέον ἐν τοῖς ἑαυτῆς. λαλεῖν οὖν οὐ μεμε-
λέτηκας ; καὶ τί ἄλλο ἐμελέτας ἐν τῇ σχολῇ ;--
Συλλογισμοὺς καὶ μεταπίπτοντας.---ξ’ασὶ τί;

1 Schenkl: μεμελέτηκε S,

- 302

- BOOK II. xm. 15-21

artist cares about pleasing one who has no know-
ledge of his art.

Do I care to please you? What dol gain thereby ὃ
For do you know the standards according to which
man is judged by man? Have you been concerned
to know what a good man is, and what an evil man,
and how each becomes what he is? Why, then, are
you not a good man yourself?—How do you make
out, he answers, that I am not a good man?—Why,
because no good man grieves or groans, no good
man laments, no good man turns pale and trembles,
or asks, “ How will he receive me? How will he
listen to me?” You slave! He will receive you
and listen to you asseems best to him. Why, then, are
you concerned about things that are not your own?
Now is it not his own fault ifhe gives a bad reception
to what you have to say >—Of course.—Is it possible
for one man to make the mistake and yet another
suffer the harm ?—No.—Why, then, are you anxious
over what is not your own?—That is all very well,
but I am anxious over how I shall speak to him.—
What, are you not privileged to speak to him as you
please ?—Yes, but I am afraid that I shall be dis-
concerted.—You are not afraid of being disconcerted
when you are about to write the name Dio, are you ?
—No, not at all.— What is the reason? Is it not that
you have practised writing ?—Yes, of course.—What
then? If you were about to read something, would
you not feel the same way about it?—Quite the
same.—What is the reason? Why, because every art
has an element of strength and confidence inside its
own field. Have you, then, not practised speaking?
And what else did you practise in your school?
—Syllogisms and arguments involving equivocal

393

22

23

24

25
26

27

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

οὐχ ὥστε ἐμπείρως διαλέγεσθαι ; τὸ δ᾽ ἐμπείρως
ἐστὶν οὐχὶ εὐκαίρως καὶ ἀσφαλῶς καὶ συνετῶς,
ἔτι δ᾽ ἀπταίστως καὶ ἀπαραποδίστως, ἐπὶ πᾶσι
δὲ τούτοις τεθαρρηκότως ;---Ν αί.---Ἰππεὺς οὖν
ὧν εἰς πεδίον ἐληλυθὼς πρὸς πεζὸν ἀγωνιᾷς,
ὅπου σὺ μεμελέτηκας, ἐκεῖνος δ᾽ ἀμελέτητός
> ‘ > \ > f Μ > -“ ,
ἐστιν ;—Nai- ἀλλὰ ἐξουσίαν ἔχει ἀποκτεῖναί
με.---Λέγε οὖν τὰ ἀληθῆ, δύστηνε, καὶ μὴ ἀλαζο-
/ \ , > > ’ A » 2
νεύου μηδὲ φιλόσοφος εἶναι ἀξίου μηδὲ ἀγνόει
σου τοὺς κυρίους, ἀλλὰ μέχρις ἂν ἔχης ταύτην
\ \ \ > Ν - , ᾿ ,
τὴν λαβὴν τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος, ἀκολούθει
παντὶ τῷ ἰσχυροτέρῳ. λέγειν δὲ Σωκράτης ἐμε-
λέτα ὁ πρὸς τοὺς τυράννους οὕτως διαλεγόμενος,
ὁ πρὸς τοὺς δικαστάς, ὁ ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ.
λέγειν Διογένης μεμελετήκει ὁ πρὸς ᾿Αλέξανδρον
o A ‘ \ , ε Η \
οὕτως λαλῶν, ὁ πρὸς Φίλιππον, ὁ πρὸς τοὺς
πειρατάς, ὁ πρὸς τὸν ὠνησάμενον αὐτόν. ..
5 , t s 2 r 6 a \ δ᾽ \
ἐκείνοις, ols μεμέληκεν, τοῖς θαρροῦσι: σὺ δ᾽ ἐπὶ
τὰ σαυτοῦ βάδιζε καὶ ἐκείνων ἀποστῇς μηδέποτε"
> \ a > \ 7 A if
εἰς τὴν γωνίαν ἀπελθὼν κάθησο καὶ πλέκε
\ ν ἢ Ν ,
συλλογισμοὺς Kal ἄλλῳ προτεινε"
> Μ > > \ / 3 e \ > ’
οὐκ ἔστι δ᾽ ἐν σοὶ πόλεος 8 ἡγεμὼν ἀνήρ.

1 The editors have noted a lacuna here.
2 Schweighiiuser: μεμελέτηκεν S.
8 (᾽ν, Schenkl: πόλεως 3,

304

BOOK II. xm. 21-27

premisses.—To what end? Was it not to enable you
to conduct an argument skilfully? And does not
“skilfully’”» mean seasonably and_ securely and
intelligently, and, more than that, without making
mistakes and without embarrassment, and, in addition
to all this, with confidence ?>—Surely.— Well then, if
you are on horseback and have ridden out upon the
plain against a man whois on foot, are you in anxiety,
assuming that you are in practice and the other is
not?—Yes, that is all very well, but Caesar has
authority to put me to death.—Then tell the truth,
wretch, and do not brag, nor claim to be a philosopher,
nor fail to recognize your masters; but as long as
you let them have this hold on you through your
body, follow everyone that is stronger than you are.
But Socrates used to practise speaking to some
—Socrates, who discoursed as he did to the
Tyrants,! to his judges, and in the prison. Diogenes
had practised speaking—Diogenes, who talked to
Alexander as he did, to Philip, to the pirates, to the
man who had bought him . . . [Leave such matters]
to those who are seriously interested in them, to the
brave ; but do you walk away to your own concerns
and never depart from them again; go into your
corner and sit down, and spin syllogisms and
propound them to others:
In thee the State hath found no leader true.” 3

1 The “Thirty Tyrants,” who ruled in Athens a short
while before the death of Socrates.
2 A verse of unknown authorship.

395

1

tw

w

~

σι

@

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

ιδ΄. Πρὸς Νάσωνα.

EicedOovtos τινὸς τῶν ωμαικῶν μετὰ υἱοῦ
καὶ ἐπακούοντος ἑνὸς ἀναγνώσματος Οὗτος, ἔφη,
ὁ τρόπος ἐστὶ τῆς διδασκαλίας καὶ ἀπεσιώπησεν.
ἀξιοῦντος δ᾽ ἐκείνου εὑρεῖν τὰ ἑξῆς, Κόπον ἔχει,
ἔφη, πᾶσα τέχνη τῷ ἰδιώτῃ καὶ ἀπείρῳ αὐτῆς,
ὅταν παραδιδῶται. καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν
γινόμενα τήν τε χρείαν εὐθὺς ἐνδείκνυται πρὸς ὃ
γέγονεν καὶ τὰ πλεῖστα αὐτῶν ἔχει τι καὶ ἀγωγὸν
καὶ ἐπίχαρι. καὶ γὰρ σκυτεὺς πῶς μὲν μανθάνει τις
παρεῖναι καὶ παρακολουθεῖν ἀτερπές, τὸ δ᾽ ὑπό-
δημα χρήσιμον καὶ ἰδεῖν ἄλλως οὐκ ἀηδές. καὶ
τέκτονος ἡ μὲν μάθησις ἀνιαρὰ μάλιστα τῷ ἰδιώτῃ
παρατυγχάνοντι, τὸ δ᾽ ἔργον ἐπιδείκνυσι τὴν
χρείαν τῆς τέχνης. πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον ἐπὶ μουσικῆς
ὄψει αὐτό: ἂν γὰρ παρῇς τῷ διδασκομένῳ, φανεῖταί
σοι πάντων ἀτερπέστατον τὸ μάθημα, τὰ μέντοι
ἀπὸ τῆς μουσικῆς ἡδέα καὶ ἐπιτερπῆ τοῖς ἰδιώταις
ἀκούειν.

Καὶ ἐνταῦθα τὸ μὲν ἔργον τοῦ φιλοσοφοῦντος
τοιοῦτόν τι φανταζόμεθα, ὅτι δεῖ τὴν αὑτοῦ
βούλησιν συναρμόσαι τοῖς γινομένοις, ὡς μήτε τι
τῶν γινομένων ἀκόντων ἡμῶν γίνεσθαι μήτε τῶν
μὴ γινομένων θελόντων ἡμῶν μὴ γίνεσθαι. ἐξ οὗ
περίεστι τοῖς συστησαμένοις αὐτὸ ἐν ὀρέξει μὴ

1 Upton: ἀπρεπές 8.

1 Apparently named Naso, to judge from the title to this
chapter. A Julius Naso, the son of a man of letters, is
mentioned not infrequently in the correspondence of the
younger Pliny. See Prosop. Imp. Romani, 11. p. 202, no, 293.

306

BOOK II. xiv. 1-8

CHAPTER XIV
To Naso

Once when a certain Roman citizen ! accompanied
by his son had come in and was listening to one of
his readings, Epictetus said: This is the style of my
teaching, and then lapsed into silence. But when
the other requested to know what came next, he
replied: Instruction in the technique of any art is
boring to the layman who has had no experience in
it. Now the products of the arts show immediately
their use towards the purpose for which they are
made, and most of them possess also a certain
attractiveness and charm. For example, to stand by
and watch the process by which a shoemaker learns
his trade is, indeed, not pleasant, yet the shoe is
useful and not an unpleasant thing to look at either.
And the process of education in the case of a
carpenter is especially tiresome to the layman who
happens to be watching, but the work which the
carpenter does shows the use of his art. You will
find the same much more true in the case of music;
for if you are standing by when someone is taking a
lesson, the process of instruction will strike you as
the most unpleasant of all, yet the results of music
are sweet and pleasing to the ear of the layman.

So also in our own case, we picture the work of
the philosopher to be something like this: He should
bring his own will into harmony with what happens,
so that neither anything that happens happens
against our will, nor anything that fails to happen
fails to happen when we wish it to happen. The
result of this for those who have so ordered the work

3°7

10

11

12

13

14

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

> ΄ ? ? , \ Ν ,
ἀποτυγχάνειν, ἐν ἐκκλίσει δὲ μὴ περιπίπτειν,
> ΄ ᾽ / > / [4 > e Ἁ
ἀλύπως, ἀφόβως, ἀταράχως διεξάγειν καθ᾽ αὑτὸν
a a n ΄
μετὰ τῶν κοινωνῶν τηροῦντα τὰς σχέσεις τάς τε
Ν ld _\
φυσικὰς καὶ ἐπιθέτους, τὸν υἱόν, τὸν πατέρα, TOV
> , \ , ‘ wv ἈΝ bad
ἀδελφόν, τὸν πολίτην, τὸν ἄνδρα, THY γυναῖκα,
\ , Ν Ἁ
τὸν γείτονα, τὸν σύνοδον, τὸν ἄρχοντα, τὸν
/
ἀρχόμενον.
Vues -“ a lal ,
To ἔργον τοῦ φιλοσοφοῦντος τοιοῦτόν Te φαντα-
, A ΕῚ ~ 4 r -
ζόμεθα. λοιπὸν ἐφεξῆς τούτῳ ζητοῦμεν, πῶς
4 n e al
ἔσται τοῦτο. ὁρῶμεν οὖν ὅτι ὁ τέκτων μαθών τινα
/ e ,
γίνεται τέκτων, ὁ κυβερνήτης μαθών τινα γίνεται
/ / , 4 ae 7, > > »"
κυβερνήτης. μή ποτ᾽ οὖν καὶ ἐνθάδε οὐκ ἀπαρκεῖ
\ /
τὸ βούλεσθαι καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι, χρεία
\ -“ on ,
δὲ καὶ μαθεῖν twa; ζητοῦμεν οὖν τίνα ταῦτα.
/ al r
λέγουσιν οἱ φιλόσοφοι, ὅτι μαθεῖν δεῖ πρῶτον
la) -“ al “
τοῦτο, ὅτι ἔστι θεὸς καὶ προνοεῖ τῶν ὅλων καὶ
> »Μ Lal - βχέ,; > , “ > ?
οὐκ ἔστι λαθεῖν αὐτὸν οὐ μόνον ποιοῦντα, ἀλλ
γὼ" ΄ a > , 3 as
οὐδὲ διανοούμενον ἢ ἐνθυμούμενον: εἶτα ποῖοί
7 a », - \
tives εἰσίν. οἷοι yap ἂν ἐκεῖνοι εὑρεθῶσιν, τὸν
ἐκείνοις ἀρέσοντα καὶ πεισθησόμενον ἀνάγκη
~ \ rn ’ ?
πειρᾶσθαι κατὰ δύναμιν ἐξομοιοῦσθαι ἐκείνοις. εἰ
- κ /
πιστόν ἐστι TO θεῖον, Kal τοῦτον εἶναι πιστόν. εἰ
> 4 A n 4 > > r
ἐλεύθερον, καὶ τοῦτον ἐλεύθερον' εἰ εὐεργετικόν,
lal , , 7 \ r
καὶ τοῦτον εὐεργετικόν: εἰ μεγαλόφρον, καὶ τοῦτον
, n , \ ter
μεγαλόφρονα: ws θεοῦ τοίνυν ζηλωτὴν τὰ ἑξῆς
πάντα καὶ ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν.
Πόθεν οὖν ἄρξασθαι det ;—"Av συγκαθῇς, ἐρῶ
308

- BOOK IL. xiv. 8-14

of philosophy is that in desire they are not dis-

inted, and in aversion they do not fall into what
they would avoid; that each person passes his life to
himself, free from pain, fear, and perturbation, at the
same time maintaining with his associates both the
natural and the acquired relationships, those namely
of son, father, brother, citizen, wife, neighbour,
fellow-traveller, ruler, and subject.

Something like this is our picture of the work of
the philosopher. The next thing after this is that
we seek the means of achieving it. We see, then,
that the carpenter becomes a carpenter by first
learning something, the helmsman becomes a helms-
man by first learning something. May it not be,
then, that in our case also it is not sufficient to wish
to become noble and good, but that we are under
the necessity of learning something first? We
seek, then, what this is. Now the philosophers say
that the first thing we must learn is this: That
there is a God, and that He provides for the
universe, and that it is impossible for a man to
conceal from Him, not merely his actions, but even
his purposes and his thoughts. Next we must learn
what the gods are like; for whatever their
character is discovered to be, the man who is going
to please and obey them must endeavour as best he
can to resemble them. If the deity is faithful, he
also must be faithful; if free, he also must be free ;
if beneficent, he also must be beneficent ; if high-
minded, he also must be high-minded, and so forth;
therefore, in everything he says and does, he must
act as an imitator of God.

Where, then, ought I to start?—If you enter
upon this task, I will say that in the first place you

399

15

16

17

18

19

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

σοι ὅτι πρῶτον δεῖ σε τοῖς ὀνόμασι παρακολουθεῖν.
—"Oor ἐγὼ νῦν οὐ παρακολουθῶ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν;
--Οὐπαρακολουθεῖς.---Τῶς οὖν χρῶμαι αὐτοῖς;---
Οὕτως ὡς οἱ ἀγράμματοι ταῖς ἐγγραμμάτοις
φωναῖς, ὡς τὰ κτήνη ταῖς φαντασίαις" ἄλλο γάρ
ἐστι χρῆσις, ἄλλο παρακολούθησις. εἰ δ᾽ οἴει
παρακολουθεῖν, φέρε ὃ θέλεις ὄνομα καὶ βασανί-
σωμεν αὑτούς, εἰ παρακολουθοῦμεν.--- Αλλ᾽ ἀνια-
ρὸν τὸ ἐξελέγχεσθαι πρεσβύτερον ἄνθρωπον ἤδη
κἂν οὕτως τύχῃ τὰς τρεῖς στρατείας ἐστρατευμένον.
--Οἶδα κἀγώ. νῦν γὰρ σὺ ἐλήλυθας πρὸς ἐμὲ ὡς
μηδενὸς δεόμενος. τίνος δ᾽ ἂν καὶ φαντασθείης
ὡς ἐνδέοντος ; πλουτεῖς, τέκνα ἔχεις, τυχὸν καὶ
γυναῖκα, καὶ οἰκέτας πολλούς, ὁ Καῖσάρ σε οἶδεν,
ἐν Ρώμῃ πολλοὺς φίλους κέκτησαι, τὰ καθήκοντα.
ἀποδίδως, οἷδας τὸν εὖ ποιοῦντα ἀντευποιῆσαι καὶ
τὸν κακῶς ποιοῦντα κακῶς ποιῆσαι. τί σοι λείπει;
ἂν οὖν σοι δείξω, ὅτι τὰ ἀναγκαιότατα καὶ
μέγιστα πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν, καὶ ὅτι μέχρι δεῦρο
πάντων μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν προσηκόντων ἐπιμεμέλησαι,
ΑΓ - ᾿ a ” , 6. ἐμ 5
καὶ τὸν κολοφῶνα ἐπιθῶ"} οὔτε τί θεός ἐστιν οἶδας

1 Upton’s “" codex”: πείθω 3.

1 By the municipal law of Caesar (C. /.Z. I?, 593 = Dessau,
Inser. Lat.. 6085, § 89), a man to be eligible to the Senate of
a municipality must have served three campaigns in the
cavalry, or six in the infantry, and it is probable that this
provision is referred to here. Cf. IV. 1, 37-40, and on
the tres militiae equestres see Mommsen: Rémisches Staatsrecht,
III. (1887), 543, n. 2-4; 549, n. 1. On the other hand the
scholiast (probably Arethas, see Schenkl, pp. Ixxii. ff.)
on § 17 apparently took this to mean that Naso had once
been a commanding officer (for the corrupt διὰ τὸν ἄσωνα
λέγει «.7,A., one ought probably to read something like

310

- BOOK IL. xiv. 14-19

ought to understand the meaning of terms.—So you
imply that I do not now understand the meaning of
terms ?—You do not.—How comes it, then, that I
use them ?—Why, you use them as the illiterate use
written speech, as the cattle use external im-
pressions; for use is one thing, and understanding
another. But if you think you understand terms,
propose any term you please, and let us put
ourselves to the test, to see whether we understand
it—But it is unpleasant to be subjected to an
examination when one is already somewhat ad-
vanced in years, and, if it so chance, has served his
three campaigns.\—I realize that myself. For now
you have come to me like a man who stood in need
of nothing. But what could anyone even imagine
you to be in need of? You are rich, you have
children, possibly also a wife, and many slaves;
Caesar knows you, you have many friends in Rome,
you perform the duties incumbent upon you, and
when a man has done you either good or harm you
know how to pay him back in kind. What do
you still lack? If, therefore, I show you that what
you lack are things most necessary and important
for happiness, and that hitherto you have devoted
your attention to everything but what was appro-
priate for you to do, and if I add the colophon,?

στρατηγὸν Νάσωνα λέγει, ἦν yap τῶν μεγάλων τῆς ‘Péuns),
although this can hardly have been more than a guess on his

2 τς the finishing touch ; a word (sometimes derived from
the ancient city Colophon because of a tradition that its
efficient cavalry gave the finishing stroke in every war in
which it was engaged [Strabo, XIV. i, 28), but more
probably a common noun in the sense of ‘‘tip,” “summit,”
‘finishing point,”) used to indicate the title and other
explanatory data when entered at the end of a work.

311

20

21

22

23

25

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

οὔτε TL ἄνθρωπος οὔτε Ti ἀγαθὸν οὔτε τί κακόν,
καὶ τὸ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων ἴσως ἀνεκτόν, ὅτι δ᾽ αὐτὸς
αὑτὸν ἀγνοεῖς, πῶς δύνασαι ἀνασχέσθαι μου καὶ
ὑποσχεῖν τὸν ἔλεγχον καὶ παραμεῖναι ; οὐδαμῶς,
ἀλλ᾽ εὐθὺς ἀπαλλάσσῃ χαλεπῶς ἔχων. καίτοι τί
σοι ἐγὼ κακὸν πεποίηκα ; εἰ μὴ καὶ τὸ ἔσοπτρον
τῷ αἰσχρῷ, ὅτι δεικνύει αὐτὸν αὐτῷ οἷός ἐστιν: εἰ
μὴ καὶ ὁ ἰατρὸς τὸν νοσοῦντα ὑβρίζει, ὅταν εἴπη
αὐτῷ “ἄνθρωπε, δοκεῖς μηδὲν ἔχειν, πυρέσσεις δέ"
ἀσίτησον σήμερον, ὕδωρ Tie” καὶ οὐδεὶς χέγει “ ὦ
δεινῆς ὕβρεως. ἐὰν δέ τινι εἴπῃς “ αἱ ὀρέξεις σου
φλεγμαίνουσιν, αἱ ἐκκλίσεις ταπειναί εἰσιν, αἱ
ἐπιβολαὶ ἀνομολογούμεναι, αἱ ὁρμαὶ ἀσύμφωναι
τῇ φύσει, αἱ ὑπολήψεις εἰκαῖαι καὶ ἐψευσμέναι,"
εὐθὺς ἐξελθὼν λέγει “ ὕβρισέν με."

Τοιαῦτά ἐστι τὰ ἡμέτερα ὡς ἐν πανηγύρει. τὰ
μὲν κτήνη πραθησόμενα ἄγεται καὶ οἱ βόες, οἱ δὲ
πολλοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων οἱ μὲν ὠνησόμενοι οἱ δὲ
πωλήσοντες" ὀλίγοι δέ τινές εἰσιν οἱ κατὰ θέαν
ἐρχόμενοι τῆς πανηγύρεως, πῶς τοῦτο γίνεται καὶ
διὰ τί καὶ τίνες οἱ τιθέντες τὴν πανήγυριν καὶ ἐπὶ
τίνι. οὕτως καὶ ἐνθάδ᾽ ἐν τῇ πανηγύρει ταύτη" οἱ
μέν τινες ὡς κτήνη οὐδὲν πλέον πολυπραγμονοῦσι
τοῦ χόρτου: ὅσοι γὰρ περὶ κτῆσιν καὶ ἀγροὺς καὶ
οἰκέτας καὶ ἀρχάς τινας ἀναστρέφεσθε, ταῦτα
οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ χόρτος ἐστίν: ὀλίγοι δ᾽ εἰσὶν οἱ πανη-
γυρίζοντες ἄνθρωποι φιλοθεώμονες. “ τί ποτ᾽

10. Schenkl: ὅταν αὐτὸν ὑβρίζηι S (the first two words
deleted in the Cambridge ed. of 1655).

1 A famous comparison, ascribed to Pythagoras. See Cicero,
Tusenl. Disp. v. 9; Diog. Laert. VIII. 8; Iamblichus, Vita
Pythagori, 58. Cf. Menander, frg. 481K (Allinson, p. 442).

312

BOOK Il. x1v. 19-25

saying: You know neither what God is, nor what
man is, nor what good, nor what evil is—if I say
that you are ignorant of these other matters you
may possibly endure that; but if I say that you do
not understand your own self, how can you possibly
bear with me, and endure and abide my question-
ing? You cannot do so at all, but immediately you
go away offended. And yet what harm have I done
you? © None at all, unless the mirror also does harm
to the ugly man by showing him what he looks
like; unless the physician insults the patient, when
he says to him, “ Man, you think there is nothing
the matter with you; but you have a fever; fast
to-day and drink only water’’; and no one says,
« What dreadful insolence!’’ Yet if you tell a man,
“Your desires are feverish, your attempts to avoid
things are humiliating, your purposes are incon-
sistent, your choices are out of harmony with your
nature, your conceptions are hit-or-miss and false,”
why, immediately he walks out and says, “He
insulted me.”’

Our position is like that of those who attend a
fair. Cattle and oxen are brought there to be sold,
and most men engage in buying and selling, while
there are only a few who go merely to see the fair,
how it is conducted, and why, and who are pro-
moting it, and for what purpose. So it is also in
this “fair” of the world in which we live; some
persons, like cattle, are interested in nothing but
their fodder; for to all of you that concern your-
selves with property and lands and slaves and one
office or another, all this is nothing but fodder!
And few in number are the men who attend the
fair because they are fond of the spectacle. “ What,

VOL. 1. u 6 «383

26

27

28

29

~

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

Φ ᾿ « 4 4 > \ tal 2g ἡ

οὖν ἐστιν ὁ κόσμος, Tis αὐτὸν διοικεῖ. οὐδείς ;

\ a , , \ “ ‘ ,
kal πῶς οἷόν τε πόλιν μὲν ἢ οἶκον μὴ δύνασθαι
διαμένειν μηδ᾽ ὀλιγοστὸν χρόνον δίχα τοῦ διοι-

a \ / Ν > 4 \
κοῦντος Kal ἐπιμελομένου, τὸ δ᾽ οὕτως μέγα Kal
καλὸν κατασκεύασμα εἰκῇ καὶ ὡς ἔτυχεν οὕτως
εὐτάκτως ῖ οἰκονομεῖσθαι ; ἔστιν οὖν ὁ διοικῶν.
ποῖός τις καὶ πῶς ὁ διοικῶν ; ἡμεῖς δὲ τίνες ὄντες
ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ γεγόναμεν καὶ πρὸς τί ἔργον ; ἄρά γ᾽
Μ ,ὔ > A XN > \ \ , es UY
ἔχομέν τινα ἐπιπλοκὴν πρὸς αὐτὸν Kal σχέσιν ἢ
οὐδεμίαν ;” ταῦτ᾽ ἔστιν ἃ πάσχουσιν οὗτοι οἱ
ὀλίγοι: καὶ λοιπὸν τούτῳ μόνῳ σχολάζουσι τῷ
τὴν πανήγυριν ἱστορήσαντας 5 ἀπελθεῖν. τὶ οὖν;
καταγελῶνται ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν" καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ οἱ
θεαταὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐμπόρων" καὶ εἰ τὰ κτήνη συναί-
σθησίν τινα εἶχεν; κατεγέλα ἂν 3 τῶν ἄχλο τι
τεθαυμακότων ἢ τὸν χόρτον.

- Φ
te’. Πρὸς τοὺς σκληρῶς τισιν ὧν ἔκριναν
ἐμμένοντας.
er > , , , fal ΄ “

Οταν ἀκούσωσί τινες τούτων τῶν λόγων, ὅτι

-" » ’ὔ 4
βέβαιον εἶναι δεῖ καὶ ἡ μὲν προαίρεσις ἐλεύθερον
’ \ > 7 Ν , ΕἸΣ 4
φύσει καὶ ἀνανάγκαστον, τὰ δ᾽ ἄλλα κωλυτά,

1 Bentley: ἀτάκτως 8. 3 Salmasius: ἱστορήσαντ᾽ S.
3 Added by Upton from his ‘‘ codex.”

314

BOOK II. xv. 25-xv. 1

then, is the universe,’ they ask, ‘‘and who governs
it? Noone? Yet how can it be that, while it is
impossible for a city or a household to remain even
a very short time without someone to govern and
eare for it, nevertheless this great and beautiful
structure should be kept in such orderly arrange-
ment by sheer accident and chance? There must
be, therefore, One who governs it. What kind of
a being is He, and how does He govern it? And
what are we, who have been created by Him, and
for what purpose were we created? Do we, then,
really have some contact and relation with Him
or none at all?” That is the way these few are
affected; and thenceforward they have leisure for
this one thing only—to study well the “fair”
of life before they leave it. With what result,
then? They are laughed to scorn by the crowd,
quite as in the real fair the mere spectators
are laughed at by the traffickers; yes, and if the
cattle themselves had any comprehension like
ours of what was going on, they too would laugh at "
those who had wonder and admiration for anything
but their fodder!

CHAPTER XV

To those who cling obstinately to the judgements
which they have once formed

Some men, when they hear the following precepts :
That one ought to be steadfast, and that the moral
purpose is naturally free and not subject to com-
pulsion, while everything else is liable to inter-

315

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

ἀναγκαστά, δοῦλα, ἀλλότρια, φαντάζονται ὅτι
δεῖ παντὶ τῷ κριθέντι ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν ἀπαραβάτως
2 ἐμμένειν. ἀλλὰ πρῶτον ὑγιὲς εἶναι δεῖ τὸ κεκρι-
μένον. θέλω γὰρ εἶναι τόνους ἐν σώματι, ἀλλ᾽
oe eve , ¢ ᾽ a a , a
3 ws ὑγιαίνοντι, ὡς ἀθλοῦντι" ἂν δέ μοι φρενιτεκοῦ
, Ψ > / A > Y ᾽ » “
τόνους ἔχων ἐνδεικνύῃ καὶ ἀλαζονεύῃ ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῖς,
», δ er tee er , x ,
ἐρῶ σοι ὅτι “ ἄνθρωπε, ζήτει τὸν θεραπεύσοντα.
fal > ee / > "Ὁ / »”»
τοῦτο οὐκ εἰσὶ τόνοι, ἀλλ᾽ ἀτονία.
Ὁ , al A a
4 “Erepov τρόπον τοιοῦτόν τι καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς
πάσχουσιν οἱ παρακούοντες τῶν λόγων τούτων.
? ee , e r > > lal > δε yy
οἷον καὶ ἐμός τις ἑταῖρος ἐξ οὐδεμιᾶς αἰτίας ἔκρι-
ὅ νεν ἀποκαρτερεῖν. ἔγνων ἐγὼ ἤδη τρίτην ἡμέραν
ΝΜ > a a > a \ > \ ? 5
ἔχοντος αὐτοῦ τῆς ἀποχῆς καὶ ἐλθὼν ἐπυνθανό-
6 μην τί ἐγένετο.---Κέκρικα, φησίν.--- Arr ὅμως
τί σε ἦν TO ἀναπεῖσαν; εἰ γὰρ ὀρθῶς ἔκρινας,
> \ 7 ΄ \ lal 3
ἰδοὺ παρακαθήμεθά σοι καὶ συνεργοῦμεν, ἵν

-

ἐξέλθῃς" εἰ δ᾽ ἀλόγως ἔκρινας, μετάθου.--- οἷς
a > / a , a » >
κριθεῖσιν ἐμμένειν Set.—Ti ποιεῖς, ἄνθρωπε; ov
cal > \ “-“ » a > \ \ ΝΜ Ψ
πᾶσιν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ὀρθῶς. ἐπεὶ παθὼν ἄρτι ὅτι
νύξ ἐστιν, ἄν σοι δοκῇ, μὴ μετατίθεσο, ἀλλ᾽
4 \ , “ cal “-“ > / a
ἔμμενε Kal λέγε ὅτι τοῖς κριθεῖσιν ἐμμένειν δεῖ.
8 οὐ θέλεις τὴν ἀρχὴν στῆσαι καὶ τὸν θεμέλιον,
A / / , © \ x 3 e ’ὔ
τὸ κρίμα σκέψασθαι πότερον ὑγιὲς ἢ οὐχ ὑγιές,
καὶ οὕτως λοιπὸν ἐποικοδομεῖν αὐτῷ τὴν εὐ-
, \ 2 ΄, x \ Ν e TA
9 τονίαν, τὴν ἀσφάλειαν ; ἂν δὲ σαπρὸν ὑποστήσῃ
316

BOOK II. xv. 1-9

ference and compulsion, subject to others and not
our own—some men, | say, fancy that whenever
they have formed a judgement they ought to stand
by it immovably. And yet the first requirement is
thatthe judgement formed be a sound one. For
I want vigour in the body, but it must be the
vigour of the body in a state of health and physical
exercise ; whereas, if you show me that you possess
the vigour of a madman, and boast about it, I will
say to you, “Man, look for someone to cure you.
This is not vigour, but feebleness.”’

The following is another way in which the minds
of those are affected who hear these precepts amiss.
For example, a friend of mine for no reason at all

‘made up his mind to starve himself to death. I
learned about it when he was already in the third
day of his fasting, and went and asked what had
happened.—I have decided, he answered.—Very
well, but still what was it that induced you to make
up your mind? For if your judgement was good, see,
we are at your side and ready to help you to make
your exit from this life ; but if your judgement was
irrational, change it.-—I must abide by my decisions.
—Why, man, what are you about? You mean not
all your decisions, but only the right ones. For
example, if you are convinced at this moment that
it is night, do not change your opinion, if that seems
best to you, but abide by it and say that you ought
to abide by your decisions! Do you not wish to
make your beginning and your foundation firm, that
is, to consider whether your decision is sound or
unsound, and only after you have done that proceed
to rear thereon the structure of your determination
and your firm resolve? But if you lay a rotten and

317

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ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

\ -“ > 3 ὃ a 1 δ᾽
καὶ καταπῖπτον, οὐκ οἰκοδομημάτιον, ὅσῳ
ἂν πλείονα καὶ ἰσχυρότερα ἐπιθῆς, τοσούτῳ
θᾶττον κατενεχθήσεται. ἄνευ πάσης αἰτίας
> ’ ς tad ” > le! n ,
ἐξάγεις ἡμῖν ἄνθρωπον ἐκ τοῦ ζῆν φίλον καὶ
συνήθη, τῆς αὐτῆς πόλεως πολίτην καὶ τῆς
μεγάλης καὶ τῆς μικρᾶς" εἶτα φόνον ἐργαζόμενος

Aap ’ ΝΜ \ ? /
καὶ ἀπολλύων ἄνθρωπον μηδὲν ἠδικηκότα λέγεις
“ a -" > / a >? > > ipl
ὅτι τοῖς κριθεῖσιν ἐμμένειν δεῖ. εἰ δ᾽ ἐπῆλθέν
σοί πώς ποτ᾽ ἐμὲ ἀποκτεῖναι, ἔδει σε ἐμμένειν
τοῖς κριθεῖσιν ;

᾿Εκεῖνος μὲν οὖν μόγις μετεπείσθη. τῶν .δὲ
νῦν τινας οὐκ ἔστι μεταθεῖναι. ὥστε μοι δοκῶ
ὃ πρότερον ἠγνόουν νῦν εἰδέναι, τί ἐστι τὸ ἐν τῇ
συνηθείᾳ λεγόμενον: μωρὸν οὔτε πεῖσαι οὔτε
en »” , / /: » ν
ῥῆξαι ἔστιν. μή μοι γένοιτο φίλον ἔχειν σοφὸν
μωρόν. δυσμεταχειριστότερον 5 οὐδέν ἐστιν.
“ce , ” \ e , > > “

κέκρικα. καὶ γὰρ οἱ μαινόμενοι" ἀλλ᾽ ὅσῳ
βεβαιότερον κρίνουσι τὰ οὐκ ὄντα, τοσούτῳ
πλείονος ἐλλεβόρου δέονται. οὐ θέλεις τὰ τοῦ
νοσοῦντος ποιεῖν καὶ τὸν ἰατρὸν παρακαλεῖν ;
“νρσῶ, κύριε: βοήθησόν μοι. τί με δεῖ ποιεῖν

/ 3 , ) / / ” Ca \
σκέψαι: ἐμόν ἐστι πείθεσθαί σοι. οὕτως καὶ
ἐνταῦθ. “ἃ δεῖ με ποιεῖν οὐκ οἶδα, ἐλήχυθα
δὲ μαθησόμενος." οὔ, ἀλλὰ “περὶ τῶν ἄλλων

1 Ὁ Schenkl and Elter: οἰκοδόμημά τι ὄν S. Perhaps οὐκ

(or οὐ καὶ) οἰκοδομητέον (or οἰκοδομητέον τί) after Schegk.
2 Wolf: δυσμεταχείριστον S.

1 That is, the Universe, in Stoic parlance.
2 Is amenable neither to reason nor force; will neither
bend nor break.

318

_ BOOK IL. xv. 9-16

crumbling foundation, you cannot rear thereon even
a small building, but the bigger and the stronger
your superstructure is the more quickly it will fall
down. Without any reason you are taking out of
this life, to our detriment, a human being who is
a familiar friend, a citizen of the same state, both
the large state! and the small; and then, though
in the act of murder, and while engaged in the
destruction of a human being that has done
no wrong, you say that you “must abide by
your decisions”! But if the idea ever entered
your head to kill me, would you have to abide by
your decisions?

Well, it was hard work to persuade that man;
but there are some men of to-day whom it is im
possible to move. So that I feel that I now know
what I formerly did not understand—the meaning
of the proverb, “A fool you can neither persuade
nor break.” 2 God forbid that I should ever have
for a friend a wise fool!? There is nothing harder
to handle. “I have decided,” he says!. Why yes,
and so have madmen; but the more firm their
decision is about what is false, the more hellebore 5
they need. Will you not act like a sick man, and
summon a physician? “I am sick, sir; help me.
' Consider what I ought to do; it is my part to obey
you.” So also in the present instance. “I know
not what I ought to be doing, but I have come to
find out.” Thus one should speak. No, but this
is what one hears, “ Talk to me about anything else,

3 A loquacious and argumentatively stubborn person. In
the original this sentence makes a trimeter scazon, and hence
is probably a quotation from some satirical poem.

4 Commonly used in antiquity as a remedy for insanity.

319

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20

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

μοι A€ye* τοῦτο δὲ κέκρικα." περὶ ποίων ἄλλων ;
, cal
τί yap ἐστι μεῖζον ἢ προὐργιαίτερον τοῦ πει-
rn re nak
σθῆναί σε, ὅτι οὐκ ἀρκεῖ TO κεκρικέναι. καὶ TO
μὴ μεταθέσθαι; οὗτοι οἱ μανικοὶ τόνοι, οὐχ
ὑγιεινοί. “ἀποθανεῖν θέλω, ἄν με τοῦτο ἀναγ-
[4 ᾽᾽ ὃ \ 4 Mv ’ > / “ce ,
κάσης. wa τί, ἄνθρωπε; τί ἐγένετο ; “κέ-
2 .
κρικα." ἐσώθην, ὅτι ov κέκρικας ἐμὲ ἀποκτεῖναι.
« » ’ > , » δὶ x δ “ce é ”
ἀργύριον ov λαμβάνω. ia TL; “κέκρικα.
ν θ “ : ΄ a a \ \ \ x β ΄
ἴσθι ὅτι ᾧ τόνῳ νῦν χρῇ πρὸς τὸ μὴ λαμβάνειν,
> \ δ > ’ ‘ es ἊΣ Ν
οὐδὲν κωλύει σε ἀλόγως ποτὲ ῥέψαι πρὸς τὸ
/ \ , / “ “ce , ᾽ν
λαμβάνειν καὶ πάλιν λέγειν ὅτι “κέκρικα,
ὥσπερ ἐν νοσοῦντι καὶ ῥευματιζομένῳ σώματι
ποτὲ μὲν ἐπὶ ταῦτα ποτὲ δ᾽ ἐπ᾽ ἐκεῖνα ῥέπει
Ν fen a \ 3 \ / “
τὸ ῥεῦμα. οὕτως καὶ ἀσθενὴς ψυχή, ὅπου μὲν
τὰ» » » “ \ \ , Vs
κλίνει, ἄδηλον ἔχει: ὅταν δὲ Kal τόνος προσῇ
fal a a , /
τῷ κλίματι τούτῳ Kal TH φορᾷ, τότε γίνεται
τὸ κακὸν ἀβοήθητον καὶ ἀθεράπευτον.

U cr > a a a ry
is’. “Ὅτι οὐ μελετῶμεν χρῆσθαι τοῖς περὶ
ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν δόγμασιν.

Ποῦ τὸ ἀγαθόν ;--- Ἐν προαιρέσει.----ΠΠοῦ τὸ
, 2 / a Ἀ > /
κακόν ;—Ev προαιρέσει.---Ποῦ τὸ οὐδέτερον ;—
a / / ΄
Ἔν τοῖς ἀπροαιρέτοις.---Τί οὖν; μέμνηταί τις
n n - \
ἡμῶν ἔξω τούτων TOV λόγων ; μελετᾷ τις αὐτὸς

1 Cf. § 12 above.
2 Probably the criticism of some Cynic philosopher
addressed to Epictetus.

320

BOOK II. xv. 16—xvi. 2

but on this point I have made my decision.” “ Any-
thing else” indeed! Why, what is more important
or more to your advantage than to be convinced
that it is not sufficient for a man merely to have
reached decisions, and to refuse to change? These
are the sinews of madness, not health. “If you
force me to this, I would gladly die.” What for,
man? What has happened? “I have decided !”’
It was fortunate for me that you did not decide
to kill me!+ Or again, another says, “I take
no money for my services.” Why so? “Be-
cause 1 have decided.” Rest assured that there
is nothing to prevent you from some day turning
irrationally to taking money for your services, and
that with the same vehemence with which you now
refuse to take it, and then saying again, “I have
decided” ; precisely as in a diseased body, suffering
from a flux, the flux inclines now in this direction
and now in that. Such is also the sick mind; it
is uncertain which way it is inclined, but when
vehemence also is added to this inclination and
drift, then the evil gets past help and past cure.”

CHAPTER XVI

That we do not practise the application of our
judgements about things good and evil

Wuerein lies the good?—In moral purpose.—
Wherein lies evil?—In moral purpose.—Wherein
lies that which is neither good nor evil ?—In the
things that lie outside the domain of moral purpose.
—Well, what of it? Does any one of us remember
these statements outside the classroom? Does any

321

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8

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ἐφ᾽ αὑτοῦ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἀποκρίνεσθαι τοῖς
πράγμασιν ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν ἐρωτημάτων ; > “ἄρά γε
ἡμέρα ἐστίν; ἘῈ τς ναί." “τί δέ; νύξ ἐστιν ;"
“οὔ. “ti δ᾽; ἄρτιοί εἰσιν οἱ ἀστέρες ; ." “οὐκ
ἔχω λέγειν." ὅταν σοι -προφαίνηται ἀργύριον,
μεμελέτηκας ἀποκρίνεσθαι τὴν δέουσαν ἀπόκρι-
σιν, ὅτι " “οὐκ ἀγαθόν"; ; ἤσκηκας ἐ ἐν ταύταις ταῖς
ἀποκρίσεσιν ἢ πρὸς μόνα τὰ σοφίσματα ; τί οὖν
θαυμάζεις, εἰ, ὅπου μὲν μεμελέτηκας, ἐκεῖ κρείτ-
των γέν σεαυτοῦ, ὅπου δ᾽ ἀμελετήτως ἔχεις,
ἐκεῖ δ᾽ ὁ αὐτὸς διαμένεις ; ἐπεὶ διὰ τί ὁ ῥήτωρ
εἰδὼς ὅτι γέγραφε καλῶς, ὅτι ἀνείληφε τὰ
γεγραμμένα, φωνὴν εἰσφέρων ἡδεῖαν ὅμως, ἔτι
ἀγωνιᾷ ; ὅτι οὐκ ἀρκεῖται τῷ μελετῆσαι. τί οὖν
θέλει ; ; ἐπαινεθῆναι ὑπὸ τῶν παρόντων. πρὸς μὲν
οὖν τὸ δύνασθαι μελετᾶν ἤσκηται, πρὸς ἔπαινον
δὲ καὶ ψόγον οὐκ ἤσκηται. πότε γὰρ ἤκουσεν
παρά τινος, τί ἐστιν ἔπαινος, τί ἐστι Ψόγος,
τίς ἑκατέρου φύσις ; τοὺς ποίους τῶν ἐπαίνων
διωκτέον ἢ τοὺς ποίους τῶν ψόγων φευκτέον; πότε
δ᾽ ἐμελέτησεν ταύτην τὴν μελέτην ἀκόλουθον
τούτοις τοῖς λόγοις ; τί οὖν ἔτι θαυμάζεις, εἰ,
ὅπου μὲν ἔμαθεν, ἐκεῖ διαφέρει τῶν ἄλλων, ὅπου.
δ᾽ οὐ μεμελέτηκεν, ἐκεῖ τοῖς πολλοῖς ὁ αὐτός
ἐστιν; ὡς ὁ κιθαρῳδὸς οἶδεν κιθαρίζειν, ἄδει

καλῶς, στατὸν ἔχει καλὸν καὶ ὅμως εἰσερχόμενος

τρέμει: ταῦτα γὰρ οἶδεν, ὄχλος δὲ τί ἐστιν οὐκ
1 τί éomv ἔπαινος added by Wolf.

1 The answers to these questions are obvious and are
given without hesitation. Questions about the facts of life,
about good and evil, like the following, should be answered
with equal promptness and conviction.

322

BOOK II. xvi. 2-9

one of us*when by himself practise answering facts in
the way he answers these questions? ‘“Soit is day,
isit?” “Yes.” “What then? Isit night?” “No.”
“What then? Is the number of the stars even?”
“41 cannot say.”? When you are shown money,
have you practised giving the proper answer, namely,
that it is not a good thing? Have you trained
yourself in answers of this kind, or merely to answer
sophisms? Why, then, are you surprised to find
that in the fields in which you have practised you
surpass yourself, but in that in which you have not
practised you remain the same? For why is it that
the orator, although he knows that he has composed
a good speech, has memorized what he has written
and is bringing a pleasing voice to his task, is still
anxious despite all that? Because he is not satisfied
with the mere practice of oratory. What, then,
does he want? He wants to be praised by his
audience. Now he has trained himself with a view to
being able to practise oratory, but he has not trained
himself with reference to praise and blame. For
when did he ever hear any one say what praise is,
what blame is, and what is the nature of each?
What kinds of praise are to be sought, and what
kinds of blame are to be avoided? And when did
he ever go through this course of training in accord-
ance with these principles? Why, then, are you
any longer surprised because he surpasses all others in
the field in which he has studied, but in that in which
he has not practised he is no better than the multi-
tude? He is like a citharoede who knows how to
play to the harp, sings well, has a beautiful flowing
gown, and still trembles when he comes upon the
stage ; for all that has gone before he knows, but

373

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>
οἶδεν οὐδ᾽ ὄχλου βοὴ οὐδὲ κατάγελως. GAN οὐδ᾽
Ν a /

αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγωνιᾶν τί ἐστιν οἶδεν, πότερον ἡμέτερον
ΝΜ > \ Xx > , »” τη, Ἢ a a
ἔργον ἐστὶν ἢ ἀλλότριον, ἔστιν αὐτὸ παῦσαι ἢ
οὐκ ἔστιν. διὰ τοῦτο ἐὰν μὲν ἐπαινεθῇ, φυση-
θεὶς ἐξῆλθεν: ἐὰν δὲ καταγελασθῇ, τὸ φυση-
μάτιον ἐκεῖνο ἐκεντήθη καὶ προσεκάθισεν.

Τοιοῦτόν τι καὶ ἡμεῖς πάσχομεν. τίνα θαυ-

i > τὰ ἐκτό Ἵ δά
μάζξομεν ; τὰ ἐκτός. περὶ τίνα σπουδάζομεν ;

\ \ > , > > > -“ lel 7

περὶ τὰ ἐκτός. εἶτ᾽ ἀποροῦμεν, πῶς φοβούμεθα
FY n > a 7 > > , 4
ἢ πῶς ἀγωνιῶμεν ; τί οὖν ἐνδέχεται, ὅταν τὰ
> , \ ¢t , > σὺ \
ἐπιφερόμενα κακὰ ἡγώμεθα; ov δυνάμεθα μὴ
φοβεῖσθαι, οὐ δυνάμεθα μὴ ἀγωνιᾶν. εἶτα λέ-
γομεν “κύριε ὁ θεός, πῶς μὴ ἀγωνιῶ ;" μωρέ,
χεῖρας οὐκ ἔχεις ; οὐκ ἐποίησέν σοι αὐτὰς ὁ θεός ;
εὔχου νῦν καθήμενος, ὅπως ai μύξαι σου μὴ
a Ε] , o \ wa Mig , ld Φ
ῥέωσιν: ἀπόμυξαι μᾶλλον καὶ μὴ ἐγκάλει. τί οὖν ;
ἐνταῦθά σοι οὐδὲν δέδωκεν ; οὐ δέδωκέ σοι καρ-
τερίαν, οὐ δέδωκέ σοι μεγαλοψυχίαν, οὐ δέδωκεν
’ la 4 » al Μ -“
ἀνδρείαν ; τηλικαύτας ἔχων χεῖρας ἔτι ζητεῖς
τὸν ἀπομύξοντα ; ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ μελετῶμεν ταῦτα
»O) > , > \ , oe Υ
οὐδ᾽ ἐπιστρεφόμεθα. ἐπεὶ δότε μοι ἕνα, ᾧ μέλει
πῶς τι ποιήσῃ, ὃς ἐπιστρέφεται οὐ τοῦ τυχεῖν
τινος, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἐνεργείας τῆς αὑτοῦ. τίς περι-
πατῶν τῆς ἐνεργείας τῆς αὑτοῦ ἐπιστρέφεται;
τίς βουλευόμενος αὐτῆς τῆς βουλῆς, οὐχὶ δὲ τοῦ
324

BOOK II. xvi. 9-15

what a crowd is he does not know, nor what the
shouting and the scornful laughter of a crowd are.
Nay, he does not even know what this anxiety itself
is, whether it is something that we can control,
or beyond our powers, whether he can stop it or
not. That is why, if he is praised, he goes off the
stage all puffed up; but if he is laughed to scorn,
that poor windbag of his conceit is pricked and
flattens out.

We too experience something of the same kind.
What do we admire? Externals. What are we in
earnest about? About externals. Are we, then,
at a loss to know how it comes about that we are
subject to fear and anxiety? Why, what else can
possibly happen, when we regard impending events
as things evil? We cannot help but be in fear, we
cannot help but be in anxiety. And then we say,
“0 Lord God, how may I escape anxiety?’ Fool,
have you not hands? Did not God make them for
you? Sit down now and pray forsooth that the
mucus in your nose may not run! Nay, rather wipe
your nose and do not blame God! What then?
Has he given you nothing that helps in the present
case? Has he not given you endurance, has he
not given you magnanimity, has he not given you
courage? When you have such serviceable hands
as these do you still look for someone to wipe your
nose? But these virtues we neither practise nor
concern ourselves withal. Why, show me one single
man who cares how he does something, who is con-
cerned, not with getting something, but with his
own action. Who is there that is concerned with
his own action while he is walking around? Who,
when he is planning, is concerned with the plan

325

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τυχεῖν ἐκείνου περὶ οὗ βουλεύεται; κἂν μὲν
/ - eae \ 7 “ an ὰ e a a
τύχῃ, ἐπῆρται καὶ λέγει “ πῶς yap ἡμεῖς καλῶς
ἐβουλευσάμεθα; οὐκ ἔλεγόν σοι, ἀδελφέ, ὅτι
ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν ἡμῶν τι σκεψαμένων μὴ οὕτως
ἐκβῆναι ;" ἂν δ᾽ ἑτέρως χωρήσῃ, τεταπείνωται
τάλας, οὐχ εὑρίσκει οὐδὲ τί εἴπῃ περὶ τῶν γε-
γονότων. τίς ἡμῶν τούτου ἕνεκα μάντιν παρέ-
. , «ε -“ 1 > 50 e \ > , *
λαβεν; tis ἡμῶν ' ἐνεκοιμήθη ὑπὲρ ἐνεργείας ;
’ σ , A Μ nr a > “
τίς ; ἕνα μοι δότε, ἵνα ἴδω τοῦτον, ὃν ἐκ πολλοῦ
’ - \ » > / > a > lal
χρόνου ζητῶ, Tov ταῖς ἀληθείαις εὐγενῆ καὶ εὐφυᾶ"
εἴτε νέον εἴτε πρεσβύτερον, δότε.
Τί οὖν ἔτι θαυμάζομεν εἰ περὶ μὲν τὰς ὕλας
τετρίμμεθα, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἐνεργείαις ταπεινοί, ἀσχή-
> \ ” A Ee ,
μονες, οὐδενὸς ἄξιοι, δειλοί, ἀταλαίπωροι, ὅλοι
ἀτυχήματα ; ; οὐ γὰρ μεμέληκεν ἡμῖν οὐδὲ μελε-
τῶμεν. εἰ δὲ μὴ τὸν θάνατον ἢ τὴν φυγὴν
ἐφοβούμεθα, ἀλλὰ τὸν φόβον, ἐμελετῶμεν ἂν
ἐκείνοις μὴ περιπίπτειν ἃ φαίνεται ἡμῖν κακά.
νῦν δ᾽ ἐν μὲν τῇ σχολῇ γοργοὶ καὶ κατάγλωσσοι,
κἂν ζητημάτιον ἐμπέσῃ περί τινος τούτων, ἱκανοὶ
\ ter > a a. > > - \
τὰ ἑξῆς ἐπελθεῖν" ἕλκυσον δ᾽ εἰς χρῆσιν καὶ
εὑρήσεις τάλανας ναυαγούς. προσπεσέτω φαν-
τασία ταρακτικὴ καὶ γνώσῃ, τί ἐμελετῶμεν καὶ
πρὸς τί ἐγυμναζόμεθα. λοιπὸν ὑπὸ 2 τῆς ἀμε-
λετησίας προσεπισωρεύομεν ἀεί τινα καὶ προσ-

1 οὐκ after ἡμῶν in S was deleted by Wolf.
2 Wolf: ἐπὶ S.

1 Referring to a dream oracle like that of Asclepius, but
the tcxt is somewhat uncertain.

326

BOOK IL. xvi. 15-21

itself, and not with getting what he is planning
about? And then if he gets it, he is all set up and
says, “ Yes, indeed, what a fine plan we made! Did
I not tell you, brother, that, if there was anything
at all in my views, it was impossible for the plan to
fall out otherwise?” Butit the plan goes the other
way, he is humble and wretched, and cannot even
find any explanation of what has happened. Who of
us ever called in a seer for a case of this kind? Who
of us ever slept in a temple! for enlightenment
about our action? Who? Show me but one, that
I may see him, the man that I have long been
looking for, the truly noble and gifted man; be
he young or old, only show him!

Why, then, do we wonder any longer that,
although in material things we are thoroughly
experienced, nevertheless in our actions we are
dejected, unseemly, worthless, cowardly, anwilling
to stand the strain, utter failures one and all? For
we have not troubled ourselves about these matters
in time past, nor do we even now practise them.
Yet if we were afraid, not of death or exile, but
of fear itself, then we should practise how not to
encounter those things that appear evil to us. But
as it is, we are fiery and fluent in the schoolroom,
and if some trivial question about one of these
points comes up, we are able to pursue the logical
consequences ; yet drag us into practical application,
and you will find us miserable shipwrecked mariners.
Let a disturbing thought come to us and you will
find out what we have been practising and for what
we have been training! Asa result, because of our
lack of practice, we are ever going out of our way
to heap up terrors and to make them out greater

327

22

23

24

25

27

28

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

/ , -“ , > Ἁ ’
πλάσσομεν μείζονα τῶν καθεστώτων. εὐθὺς ἐγώ,
cd , 4 > Δ, ἈΝ \
ὅταν πλέω, κατακύψας eis τὸν βυθὸν ἢ τὸ

lA
πέλαγος περιβλεψάμενος Kal μὴ ἰδὼν γῆν ἐξ-
, \ / “ [ὦ Lal Ν
ίσταμαι καὶ φανταζόμενος, ὅτι ὅλον με δεῖ τὸ
πέλαγος τοῦτο ἐκπιεῖν, ἂν ναυαγήσω, οὐκ ἐπέρ-
χεταί μοι, ὅτε μοι τρεῖς ξἕέσται ἀρκοῦσιν. τί
> , ‘ / » ? \ \
οὖν με ταράσσει; TO πέλαγος ; OV, ἀλλὰ TO
δόγμα. πάλιν ὅταν σεισμὸς γένηται, φαντάζομαι
eo id , > ’ Ls > > Lal
OTL ἡ πόλις ἐπιπίπτειν μοι μέλλει: οὐ γὰρ ἀρκεῖ
μικρὸν λιθάριον, ἵν᾽ ἔξω μου τὸν ἐγκέφαλον βάλῃ ;
Τίνα οὖν ἐστι τὰ βαροῦντα καὶ ἐξιστάντα ἡμᾶς ;
, \ Ν x» \ ’ \ \ > Ul
τίνα yap ἄλλα ἢ Ta δόγματα ; Tov yap ἐξιόντα
καὶ ἀπαλλαττόμενον τῶν συνήθων καὶ ἑταίρων
καὶ τόπων καὶ συναναστροφῆς τί ἐστι τὸ βαροῦν
ἄλλο ἢ δόγμα ; τὰ γοῦν παιδία εὐθὺς ὅταν κλαύσῃ
μικρὰ τῆς τιτθῆς ἀπελθούσης, πλακούντιον λα-
, > le / s \ id Lal »-“"
βόντα ἐπιλέλησται. θέλεις οὖν καὶ ἡμεῖς τοῖς
δί e fal 1 ») Ἁ Ἀ ’ » \
παιδίοις ὁμοιωθῶμεν ; ov, νὴ Tov Δία. ov yap
δ΄. , a , > a > xe 4
ὑπὸ πλακουντίου τοῦτο πάσχειν ἀξιῶ, ἀλλ᾽ ὑπὸ
δογμάτων ὀρθῶν. τίνα δ᾽ ἐστὶ ταῦτα ; ἃ δεῖ τὸν
ἄνθρωπον ὅλην τὴν ἡμέραν μελετῶντα μηδενὶ προσ-
a > /
πάσχειν τῶν ἀλλοτρίων, μηθ᾽ ἑταίρῳ μήτε τόπῳ
μήτε γυμνασίοις, ἀλλὰ μηδὲ τῷ σώματι τῷ αὑτοῦ,
μεμνῆσθαι δὲ τοῦ νόμου καὶ τοῦτον πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν
ἔχειν. τίς δ᾽ ὁ νόμος ὁ θεῖος ; τὰ ἴδια τηρεῖν, τῶν
> , \ b] cal > \ , \
ἀλλοτρίων μὴ ἀντιποιεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ διδομένοις μὲν

fol a i
χρῆσθαι, μὴ διδόμενα δὲ μὴ ποθεῖν, ἀφαιρουμένου
δέ τινος ἀποδιδόναι εὐλύτως καὶ αὐτόθεν, χάριν

1 Koraes: ὁμοῶμεν 3.

228

-~BOOK II. xvi 21-28

than they actually are. For example, whenever I
go to sea, on gazing down into the deep or looking
around upon the expanse of waters and seeing no
land, I am beside myself, fancying that if I am
wrecked I shall have to swallow this whole ex-
panse of waters; but it does not occur to me that
three pints are enough. What is it, then, that
disturbs me? The expanse of sea? No, but my
judgement. Again, when there is an earthquake, |
fancy that the whole city is going to fall upon me;
what, is not a little stone enough to knock my
brains out ?

What, then, are the things that weigh upon us
and drive us out of our senses? Why, what else
but our judgements? For when a man goes hence
abandoning the comrades, the places, and the
social relations to which he is accustomed, what else
is the burden that is weighing him down but a
judgement? Children, indeed, when they cry a
little because their nurse has left, forget their
troubles as soon as they get a cookie, Would you,
therefore, have us resemble children? No, by Zeus!
For 1 claim that we should be influenced in this
way, not by a cookie, but by true judgements. And
what are these? The things which a man ought
to practise all day long, without being devoted to
what is not his own, either comrade, or place, or
gymnasia, nay, not even to his own body; but he
should remember the law and keep that before his
eyes. And what is the law of God? To guard
what is his own, not to lay claim to what is not his
own, but to make use of what is given him, and not
to yearn for what has not been given; when some-
thing is taken away, to give it up readily and with-

329

29

30

31

32

33

34

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

εἰδότα οὗ ἐχρήσατο χρόνου, εἰ θέλεις μὴ κλάειν +
τὴν τιτθὴν καὶ μάμμην. τί γὰρ διαφέρει, τίνος
ἥττων ἐστὶ καὶ ἐκ τίνος κρέμαται ; τί κρείττων εἶ
τοῦ διὰ κοράσιον κλάοντος, εἰ διὰ γυμνασίδιον καὶ
στωίδια καὶ νεανισκάρια καὶ τοιαύτην διατριβὴν
- ” \ “ ΡΩΝ A “ ,
πενθεῖς ; ἄλλος ἐλθὼν ὅτι οὐκέτι τὸ τῆς Δίρκης
ὕδωρ πίνειν μέλλει. τὸ γὰρ Μάρκιον χεῖρόν ἐστι
τοῦ τῆς Δίρκης ; “ἀλλ᾽ ἐκεῖνό μοι σύνηθες ἦν."
\ fol , ” 7 ᾽
καὶ τοῦτο πάλιν ἔσται σοι σύνηθες. εἶτ᾽ ἂν μὲν
τοιούτῳ προσπάθῃς, καὶ τοῦτο πάλιν κλαῖε καὶ
ζήτει στίχον ὅμοιον τῷ Εὐριπίδου ποιῆσαι

θερμάς τε τὰς Νέρωνος Μάρκιόν θ᾽ ὕδωρ.

ἴδε πῶς τραγῳδία γίνεται, ὅταν εἰς μωροὺς
ἀνθρώπους πράγματα Ta? τυγχάνοντ᾽ ἐμπέσῃ.
«- Π , = > 6 ΄ , Ν A \
ote οὖν ᾿Αθήνας πάλιν ὄψομαι καὶ τὴν
z , ” ᾽ὔ’ > > ~~ / >
ἀκρόπολιν ;” τάλας, οὐκ ἀρκεῖ σοι ἃ βλέπεις καθ
- "-" ᾽ ~ rol ’
ἡμέραν ; κρεῖττόν τι ἔχεις ἢ μεῖζον ἰδεῖν τοῦ ἡλίου,
τῆς σελήνης, τῶν ἄστρων, τῆς γῆς ὅλης, τῆς
θαλάσσης ; εἰ δὲ δὴ παρακολουθεῖς τῷ διοικοῦντι
τὰ ὅλα κἀκεῖνον ἐν σαυτῷ περιφέρεις, ἔτι ποθεῖς
λιθάρια καὶ πέτραν κομψήν ; ὅταν οὖν μέλλης
ἀπολιπεῖν αὐτὸν τὸν ἥλιον καὶ τὴν σελήνην, τί
ποιήσεις ; κλαύσεις καθήμενος ὡς τὰ παιδία ; τί

1 Shaftesbury : καλεῖν 8.
2 Added by Schweighauser.

1 The fountain of Dirce was at Thebes; the Marcian
aqueduct brought good water to Rome at this time.

2 A parody upon the Phornissar, 368: **‘The gymnasia in
which I was reared and the water of Dirce.” Polyneices
is speaking.

33°

. BOOK IL. xvi. 28-34

out delay, being grateful for the time in which he
had the use of it—all this if you do not wish to be
erying for your nurse and your mammy! For what
difference does it make what object a man has a
weakness for and depends upon? In what respect
are you superior to the man who weeps for a maid,
if you grieve for a trivial gymnasium, a paltry colon-
nade, a group of youngsters, and that way of spend-
ing your time? Someone else comes and grieves
because he is no longer going to drink the water
of Dirce.1_ What, is the water of the Marcian aque-
duct inferior to that of Dirce? “Nay, but I was
accustomed to that water.” And you will get
accustomed to this in turn. And then, if you
become addicted to something of this kind, weep
for this too in turn, and try to write a line after the
pattern of that of Euripides:

To Nero’s baths and Marcian founts once more.”

Behold how tragedy arises, when everyday events
befall fools !

“When, then, shall I see Athens once more and
the Acropolis?”” Poor man, are you not satisfied
with what you are seeing every day? Have you
anything finer or greater to look at than the sun,
the moon, the stars, the whole earth, the sea? And
if you really understand Him that governs the
universe, and bear Him about within you, do you
yet yearn for bits of stone and a pretty rock??
When, therefore, you are about to leave the sun and
the moon, what will you do? Will you sit and cry
as little children cry? What was it you did at

* The rock of the Acropolis and the marble buildings
upon it.

331

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

οὖν ἐν τῇ σχολῇ ἐποίεις, τί ἤκουες, τί ἐμάνθανες ; :
τί σαυτὸν φιλόσοφον ἐπέγραφες ἐξὸν τὰ ὄντα
ἐπιγράφειν ; ; ὅτι ri εἰσαγωγὰς ἔπραξά τινας καὶ
Χρυσίππεειά ἀνέγνων, φιλοσόφου δ᾽ οὐδὲ θύραν
35 παρῆλθον. ποῦ γάρ μοι μέτεστι τούτου τοῦ
πράγματος, οὗ Σωκράτει μετῆν τῷ οὕτως
ἀποθανόντι, οὕτως ξήσαντι ; > οὗ ὗ Διογένει μετῆν ;
36 ἐπινοεῖς τούτων τινὰ κλάοντα ἢ ἀγανακτοῦντα,
ὅτι τὸν δεῖνα οὐ μέλλει βλέπειν οὐδὲ τὴν δεῖνα
οὐδ᾽ ἐν ᾿Αθήναις ἔσεσθαι ἢ ἐν Κορίνθῳ, ἀλλ᾽, ἂν
37 οὕτως τύχῃ, ἐν Σούσοις ἢ ἐν ᾿Εκβατάνοις ; ᾧ γὰρ
ἔξεστιν ἐξελθεῖν, ὅταν θέλῃ, τοῦ συμποσίου καὶ
μηκέτι παίξεινν ὅ ἔτι οὗτος ἀνιᾶται μένων ; οὐχὶ δ᾽
ὡς παιδία 1 παραμένει, μέχρις ἂν ψυχαγωγῆται ;
88 ταχύ γ᾽ ἂν ὁ τοιοῦτος ὑπομείναι φυγήν τινα
φυγεῖν εἰς ἅπαντα ἢ τὴν ἐπὶ θανάτῳ κατακριθείς.
389 Οὐ θέλεις ἤδη ὡς τὰ παιδία ἀπογαλακτισθῆναι
καὶ ἅπτεσθαι τροφῆς στερεωτέρας μηδὲ κλάειν
40 μάμμας καὶ τιτθάς, γραῶν ἀποκλαύματα ; ΩΣ ἀλλ᾽
ἐκείνας ἀπαλλασσόμενος ἀνιάσω. σὺ αὐτὰς
ἀνιάσεις ; οὐδαμῶς, ἀλλ᾽ ὅπερ καὶ σέ, τὸ δόγμα.
τί οὖν ἔχεις ποιῆσαι ; ; ἔξελε, τὸ δ᾽ ἐκείνων, ἂν εὖ
ποιῶσιν, αὐταὶ ἐξελοῦσιν" εἰ δὲ μή, οἰμώξουσι δι᾿
41 αὑτάς. ἄνθρωπε, τὸ λεγόμενον τοῦτο ἀπονοήθητι
ἤδη ὑπὲρ évpoias, ὑπὲρ ἐλευθερίας, ὑπὲρ μεγα-
1 Gataker (supported by Bentley and Upton), παιδιᾷ S.
Compare the very close parallel in I. 24, 20, and for the
frequent use by Epictetus of illustrations from the character

and behaviour of children see E. Kenner: Das Kind. Ein
Glei: hnissmittel bei Kpiktet, Miinchen, 1905, 54 ff.

1 Did no serious work in philosophy. For the figure of
speech compare IV. 1, 177.

332

‘BOOK Il. xvt. 34-41

school? What was it you heard and learned? Why
did you record yourself as a philosopher when you
might have recorded the truth in these words: “I
studied a few introductions, and did some reading
in Chrysippus, but I did not even get past the door
of a philosopher ?+ Since what part have 1 in that
business in which Socrates, who died so nobly, and
so nobly lived, had a part? Or in that in which
Diogenes had a part?” Can you imagine one of
these men crying or fretting because he is not going
to see such-and-such a man, or such-and-such a
woman, or to live in Athens or in Corinth, but, if it
so happen, in Susa or in Ecbatana? What, does he
who is at liberty to leave the banquet when he
will, and to play the game no longer, keep on
annoying himself by staying? Does he not stay,
like children, only as long as he is entertained?
Such a man would be likely, forsooth, to endure
going into exile for life or the exile of death, if this
were his sentence.

Are you not willing, at this late date, like children,
to be weaned and to partake of more solid food, and
not to cry for mammies and nurses—old wives’
lamentations? “But if I leave, I shall cause those
women sorrow?’ You cause them sorrow? Not
at all, but it will be the same thing that causes
sorrow to you yourself—bad judgement.* What,
then, can you do? Get rid of that judgement, and,
if they do well, they will themselves get rid of their
judgement ; otherwise, they will come to grief and
have only themselves to thank for it. Man, do
something desperate, as the expression goes, now if
never before, to achieve peace, freedom, and high-

3 This point is especially well brought out in Encheiridion, δ.
333

43

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

λχοψυχίας. ἀνάτεινόν ποτε τὸν τράχηλον ὡς
ἀπηλλαγμένος δουλείας, τόλμησον ἀναβλέψας
πρὸς τὸν θεὸν εἰπεῖν ὅτι “ χρῶ μοι λοιπὸν εἰς ὃ ἂν
θέλῃς: ὁμογνωμονῶ σοι, σός ' εἶμι" οὐδὲν παραι-
a a \ 4 “ f ΝΜ
τοῦμαι τῶν σοὶ δοκούντων' ὅπου θέλεις. ἄγε: ἣν
θέλεις ἐσθῆτα περίθες. ἄρχειν με θέλεις, ἐδιω-
τεύειν, μένειν, φεύγειν, πένεσθαι, πλουτεῖν ; ἐγώ
σοι ὑπὲρ ἁπάντων τούτων πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους
» ’ ’ὔ ‘ « ’ ’
ἀπολογήσομαι: δείξω τὴν ἑκάστου φύσιν οἵα
> , ᾽ν Ν > > » ὃ e ὁ 2 6 /
ἐστίν." οὔ ἀλλ᾽ ἔνδον ὡς κοράσια 3 καθήμενος
ἐκδέχου σου τὴν μάμμην, μέχρις σε χορτάσῃ. ὁ
Ἡρακλῆς εἰ τοῖς ἐν οἴκῳ παρεκάθητο, τίς ἂν ἦν;
ρακλῆς εἰ τοῖς ἐν οἴκῳ παρεκάθητο, τίς ἂν HV;
na ,
Εὐρυσθεὺς καὶ οὐχὶ Ἡρακλῆς. ἄγε, πόσους δὲ
περιερχόμενος τὴν οἰκουμένην συνήθεις ἔσχεν,
φίλους ; ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲν φίλτερον τοῦ θεοῦ" διὰ τοῦτο
ἐπιστεύθη Διὸς υἱὸς εἶναι καὶ ἦν. ἐκείνῳ τοίνυν
πειθόμενος περιήει καθαίρων ἀδικίαν καὶ ἀνομίαν.
ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ εἶ Ηρακλῆς καὶ οὐ δύνασαι καθαίρειν τὰ
ἀλλότρια κακά, ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ Θησεύς, ἵνα τὰ τῆς
᾿Αττικῆς καθάρῃς" τὰ σαυτοῦ κάθαρον. ἐντεῦθεν
> a , Ψ > \ 4 \
ἐκ τῆς διανοίας ἔκβαλε ἀντὶ ἸΠροκρούστου καὶ
Σκίρωνος λύπην, φόβον, ἐπιθυμίαν, φθόνον,
ἐπιχαιρεκακίαν, φιλαργυρίαν, μαλακίαν, ἀκρα-
1 Salmasius: ἴσος 8.
2 Capps: ἐν Buds κοιλίᾳ S (retained by Schenkl), “‘in a
cow’s belly,” which might conceivably be a contemptuous

expression for a cradle, or baby-basket, but I know of no
evidence to support this view.

1 Compare the critical note.

334

_ BOOK Il. xvi. 41-45

mindedness. Lift up your neck at last like a man
escaped from bondage, be bold to look towards God
and say, “ Use me henceforward for whatever Thou
wilt; | am of one mind with Thee; I am Thine;
I crave exemption from nothing that seems good
in Thy sight; where Thou wilt, lead me; in what
raiment Thou wilt, clothe me. Wouldst Thou have
me to hold office, or remain in private life; to
remain here or go into exile ; to be poor or be rich?
I will defend all these Thy acts before men; I will
show what the true nature of each thing 15. Nay,
you will not; sit rather in the house as girls do!
and wait for your mammy until she feeds you! If
Heracles had sat about at home, what would he
have amounted to? He would have been Eurystheus?
and no Heracles. Come, how many acquaintances
and friends did he have with him as he went up and
down through the whole world? Nay, he had no
dearer friend than God. That is why he was
believed to be a son of God, and was. It was there-
fore in obedience to His will that he went about
clearing away wickedness and lawlessness. But you
are no Heracles, you say, and you cannot clear away
the wickedness of other men, nay, nor are you even a
Theseus, to clear away the ills of Attica merely. Very
well, clear away your own then. From just here,
from out your own mind, cast not Procrustes and
Sciron,? but grief, fear, desire, envy, joy at others’
ills ; cast out greed, effeminacy, incontinency. These

2 The craven, stay-at-home king, under whose orders
Heracles performed his ‘‘ labours.

3 Two famous robbers who infested the road between
Athens and Megara and were given their just deserts by
Theseus.

335

46

47

bo

w

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

σίαν. ταῦτα δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλως ἐκβαλεῖν, εἰ μὴ
πρὸς μόνον τὸν θεὸν ἀποβλέποντα, ἐκείνῳ μόνῳ
προσπεπονθότα, τοῖς ἐκείνου προστάγμασι καθω-
σιωμένον. ἂν δ᾽ ἄλλο τι θέλῃς, οἰμώξων καὶ
στένων ἀκολουθήσεις τῷ ἰσχυροτέρῳ ἔξω ζητῶν
ἀεὶ τὴν εὔροιαν καὶ μηδέποτ᾽ εὐροεῖν δυνάμενος.
ἐκεῖ γὰρ αὐτὴν ζητεῖς, οὗ μή ἐστιν, ἀφεὶς. ἐκεῖ
ζητεῖν, ὅπου ἐστίν.

ιζ΄. Πῶς ἐφαρμοστέον τὰς προλήψεις τοῖς ἐπὶ
᾿ μέρους ;

Ti πρῶτόν ἐστιν ἔργον τοῦ φιλοσοφοῦντος ;
ἀποβαλεῖν οἴησιν: ἀμήχανον γάρ, ἅ τις εἰδέναι
οἴεται, ταῦτα ἄρξασθαι μανθάνειν. τὰ μὲν οὖν
ποιητέα καὶ οὐ ποιητέα καὶ ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακὰ καὶ
καλὰ καὶ αἰσχρὰ πάντες ἄνω καὶ κάτω λαλοῦντες
ἐρχόμεθα πρὸς τοὺς φιλοσόφους, ἐπὶ τούτοις ἐπαι-
νοῦντες Ψέγοντες, ἐγκαλοῦντες μεμφόμενοι, περὶ
ἐπιτηδευμάτων καλῶν καὶ αἰσχρῶν ἐπικρίνοντες
καὶ διαλαμβάνοντες. τίνος δ᾽ ἕνεκα προσερχόμεθα
τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ; pabnodpevor+ ἃ οὐκ οἰόμεθα
εἰδέναι. τίνα δ᾽ ἐστὶ ταῦτα ; τὰ θεωρήματα. ἃ
γὰρ λαλοῦσιν οἱ φιλόσοφοι μαθεῖν θέλομεν οἱ μὲν 5
ὡς κομψὰ καὶ δριμέα, οἱ δ᾽, ἵν᾽ ἀπ᾿ αὐτῶν περιποιή-
σωνται. γελοῖον οὖν τὸ οἴεσθαι, ὅτι ἄλλα μέν
τις μαθεῖν βούλεται, ἄλλα δὲ μαθήσεται, ἢ λοιπὸν
ὅτε προκόψει τις ἐν οἷς οὐ μανθάνει. τὸ δ᾽ ἐξα-

t Added by Schenkl.
2 of μὲν added by Schweighauser.

1 7,¢., of conceit in one’s own opinion,

336

BOOK II. xvt. 45—xvii. 5:

things you cannot cast out in any other way than
by looking to God alone, being specially devoted
to Him only, and consecrated to His commands.
But if you wish anything else, with lamentation and
groaning you will follow that which is stronger than
you are, ever seeking outside yourself for peace, and
never able to be at peace. For you seek peace
where it is not, and neglect to seek it where it is.

CHAPTER XVII
How ought we adjust our preconceptions to individual -

instances ?

Wuar is the first business of one who practises
philosophy? To get rid of thinking that one
knows?; for it is impossible to get a man to begin
to learn that which he thinks he knows. How-
ever, as we go to the philosophers we all babble
hurly-burly about what ought to be done and what
ought not, good and evil, fair and foul, and on these
grounds assign praise and blame, censure and repre-
hension, passing judgement on fair and foul practices,
and discriminating between them. But what do we
go to the philosophers for? To learn what we do
not think we know. And what is that? General
principles. For some of us want to learn what the
philosophers are saying, thinking it will be witty
and shrewd, others, because they wish to profit
thereby. But it is absurd to think that when a man
wishes to learn one thing he will actually learn
something elsc, or, in short, that a man will make
progress in anything without learning it. But the

337

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

πατῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς τοῦτ᾽ ἔστιν, ὅπερ καὶ
Θεόπομπον τὸν ῥήτορα, ὅς mov! καὶ Πλάτωνι
6 ἐγκαλεῖ ἐπὶ τῷ βούλεσθαι ἕ ἕκαστα ὁρίξεσθαι. τί
γὰρ λέγει; “ οὐδεὶς ἡ ἡμῶν πρὸ σοῦ ἔλεγεν ἀγαθὸν
7 δίκαιον; ἢ μὴ παρακολουθοῦντες τί ἐστι τούτων
ἕκαστον ἀσήμως καὶ κενῶς ἐφθεγγόμεθα 5 τὰς
7 φωνάς ; ;” τίς yap σοι λέγει, Θεόπομπε, ὅτι
ἐννοίας οὐκ εἴχομεν ἑκάστου τούτων φυσικὰς καὶ
προλήψεις ; ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ οἷόν 7 ἐφαρμόξειν τὰς
προλήψεις ταῖς καταλλήλοις οὐσίαις μὴ διαρθρώ-
σαντα αὐτὰς καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο σκεψάμενον, ποίαν
8 τινὰ ἑκάστῃ αὐτῶν οὐσίαν ὑποτακτέον. ἐπεὶ
τοιαῦτα λέγε καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἰατρούς: “τίς γὰρ
ἡμῶν οὐκ ἔλεγεν ὑγιεινόν TL καὶ νοσερόν, πρὶν
Ἱπποκράτη γενέσθαι ; ; ἢ κενῶς τὰς φωνας ταύτας
9 ἀπηχοῦμεν ; ὃ ἔχομεν γάρ τινα καὶ ὑγιεινοῦ πρό-
ληψιν. ἀλλ᾽ ἐφαρμόσαι οὐ ) δυνάμεθα. διὰ τοῦτο
ὁ μὲν λέγει “ ἀνάτεινον,᾽" ὁ δὲ λέγει “ δὸς τροφήν"
καὶ ὁ μὲν “λέγει - φλεβοτόμησον,᾽" ὁ δὲ “λέγει
᾿σικύασον.᾽ τί τὸ αἴτιον; ἄλλο γε ἢ ὅτι
τὴν τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ “πρόληψιν ‘ob δύναται καλῶς
ἐφαρμόσαι τοῖς ἐπὶ μέρους ; ;
Ι0 Οὕτως ἔ ἔχει καὶ ἐνθάδ᾽ ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον:
ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν καὶ συμφέρον καὶ ἀσύμφορον
τίς ἡμῶν οὐ λαλεῖ; τίς γὰρ ἡμῶν οὐκ ἔχει τού-

1 Wolf and Koraes: ὅπου 8.
2 Schegk and Salmasius: φθεγγόμεθα 8.

+ Almost certainly the same as Theopompus of Chios, the
upil of Isocrates, more generally known to us as an histori ian,
but also famous in his own time in his declamations (ems.

338

-BOOK II. xvi. 5-10

multitude are under the same misapprehension as
was Theopompus, the orator,) who actually censures
Plato for wishing to define every term. Well, what
does he say? “Did none of us before your time
ever use the words ‘ good’ or ‘just’? Or, without
understanding what each of these terms severally
mean, did we merely utter them as vague and
empty sounds?” Why, who tells you, Theopompus,
that we did not have a natural conception of each
term, that is,a preconceived idea of it? But it is
impossible to adjust our preconceived ideas to the
appropriate facts without having first systematized
them and having raised precisely this question—
what particular fact is to be classified under each -
preconception. Suppose, for example, that you make
the same sort of remark to the physicians: “ Why,
who among us did not use terms ‘healthy’ and
‘diseased’ before Hippocrates was born? Or were
we merely making an empty noise with these
sounds?” For, of course, we have a certain pre-
conception of the idea “healthy.” But we are
‘ unable to apply it. That is why one person says,
“Keep abstaining from food,” and another, “ Give
nourishment” ; again, one says, “Cut a vein,” and
another says, “Use the cupping-glass.” What is
the reason? Is it really anything but the fact that
a person is unable properly to apply the preconceived
idea of “healthy” to the specific instances?

So it stands here also, in the affairs of life. Who
among us has not upon his lips the words “ good”’
and “ evil,” “advantageous” and “disadvantageous”?
For who among us does not have a preconceived

δεικτικοὶ λόγοι). The following quotation is probably from
the Diatribe against Plato (Athen. XI. 508c).

339

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12

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14

15

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ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

των ἑκάστου πρόληψιν ; ap’ οὖν διηρθρωμένην καὶ
τελείαν ; τοῦτο δεῖξον. “πῶς SeiEw;” ἐφάρ-
μοσον αὐτὴν καλῶς ταῖς ἐπὶ μέρους οὐσίαις.
εὐθὺς τοὺς ὅρους Πλάτων μὲν ὑποτάσσει τῇ τοῦ
χρησίμου προλήψει, σὺ δὲ τῇ τοῦ ἀχρήστου.
υνατὸν οὖν ἐστιν ἀμφοτέρους ὑμᾶς ἐπιτυγχά-
νειν; πῶς οἷόν τε; τῇ δὲ τοῦ πλούτου οὐσίᾳ
οὐχ ὁ μέν τις ἐφαρμόζει τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ πρό-
ληψιν, ὁ δ᾽ ov; τῇ δὲ τῆς ἡδονῆς, τῇ δὲ τῆς
ὑγείας; καθόλου γὰρ εἰ πάντες οἱ τὰ ὀνόματα
λαλοῦντες μὴ κενῶς ἴσμεν ἕκαστα τούτων καὶ
μηδεμιᾶς ἐπιμελείας περὶ τὴν διάρθρωσιν τῶν
προλήψεων δεόμεθα, τί διαφερόμεθα, τί πολε-
μοῦμεν, τί ψέγομεν ἀλλήλους ;

Καὶ τί μοι νῦν τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους μάχην
παραφέρειν καὶ ταύτης μεμνῆσθαι ; σὺ αὐτὸς εἰ
ἐφαρμόζεις καλῶς τὰς προλήψεις, διὰ τί δυσροεῖς,
διὰ τί ἐμποδίζῃ ; ἀφῶμεν ἄρτι τὸν δεύτερον τόπον
τὸν περὶ τὰς ὁρμὰς καὶ τὴν κατὰ ταύτας περὶ
τὸ καθῆκον φιλοτεχνίαν. ἀφῶμεν καὶ τὸν τρίτον
τὸν περὶ τὰς συγκαταθέσεις. χαρίζομαί σοι
ταῦτα πάντα. στῶμεν ἐπὶ τοῦ πρώτου καὶ σχε-
δὸν αἰσθητὴν παρέχοντος τὴν ἀπόδειξιν τοῦ μὴ
ἐφαρμόζειν καλῶς τὰς προλήψεις. νῦν σὺ θέλεις
τὰ δυνατὰ καὶ τὰ σοὶ δυνατά; τί οὖν ἐμποδίζῃ ;
διὰ τί δυσροεῖς ; νῦν οὐ φεύγεις τὰ ἀναγκαῖα;

1 The word, δυσροεῖν, is the opposite of the technical term
εὐροεῖν (τὸ εὐροῦν, εὑροία), which is a metaphor derived from
the even flow of quiet waters.

2 The three fields, according to Epictetus, are, 1. ὄρεξις,
desire; 2. ὁρμή, choice; 3. συγκατάθεσις, assent. Compare
ITT. 2.

340

~BOOK II. xvi. 10-17

idea of each of these terms? Very well, is it fitted
into a system and complete? Prove that it is.
“How shall I prove it?” Apply it properly to
specific facts. To start with, Plato classifies defini-
tions under the preconception “the useful,” but you
classify them under that of “the useless.” Is it,
then, possible for both of you to be right? How
can that be? Does not one man apply his pre-
conceived idea of “the good” to the fact of wealth,
while another does not? And another to that of
pleasure, and yet another to that of health? Indeed,
to sum up the whole matter, if all of us who have
these terms upon our lips possess no mere empty
knowledge of each one severally, and do not need
to devote any pains to the systematic arrangement
of our preconceived ideas, why do we disagree, why
fight, why blame one another?

And yet what need is there for me to bring
forward now our strife with one another and make
mention of that? Take your own case; if you apply
properly your preconceived ideas, why are you
troubled, why are you hampered? Let us pass by
for the moment the second field of study *—that
which has to do with our choices and the discussion
of what is our duty in regard to them. Let us pass
by also the third—that which has to do with our
assents. I make you a present of all this. Let us
confine our attention to the first field, one which
allows an almost palpable proof that you do not
properly apply your preconceived ideas. Do you
at this moment desire what is possible in general
and what is possible for you in particular? If so,
why are you hampered? Why are you troubled?
Are you not at this moment trying to escape what

341

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

διὰ τί οὖν περιπίπτεις τινί, διὰ τί δυστυχεῖς ; διὰ
΄ ΄, , us > / Ν \ i

τί θέλοντός σού τι ov γίνεται Kal μὴ θέλοντος

γίνεται ; ἀπόδειξις γὰρ αὕτη μεγίστη δυσροίας
καὶ κακοδαιμονίας. θέλω τι καὶ οὐ γίνεται" καὶ

,ὔ > > , > na > , Ἁ
τί ἐστιν ἀθλιώτερον ἐμοῦ; οὐ θέλω τι καὶ
γίνεται" καὶ τί ἐστιν ἀθλιώτερον ἐμοῦ;

Τοῦτο καὶ ἡ Μήδεια οὐχ ὑπομείνασα ἦλθεν
ἐπὶ τὸ ἀποκτεῖναι τὰ τέκνα. μεγαλοφυῶς κατά
γε τοῦτο. εἶχε γὰρ ἣν δεῖ φαντασίαν, οἷόν ἐστι

Ν , ‘ cal oc 7, cf
τὸ ἃ θέλει Tim μὴ προχωρεῖν. “εἶτα οὕτως
τιμωρήσομαι τὸν ἀδικήσαντά με καὶ ὑβρίσαντα.
καὶ τί ὄφελος τοῦ κακῶς οὕτως διακειμένου ;
πῶς οὖν γένηται; ἀποκτείνω μὲν τὰ τέκνα.
ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐμαυτὴν τιμωρήσομαι. καὶ τί μοι

a a 4
μέλει 7 τοῦτ᾽ ἔστιν ἔκπτωσις ψυχῆς “μεγάλα
νεῦρα ἐχούσης. οὐ “γὰρ ἤδει, ποῦ κεῖται τὸ
ποιεῖν ἃ θέλομεν, ὅτι τοῦτο οὐκ ἔξωθεν δεῖ
λαμβάνειν οὐδὲ τὰ πράγματα μετατιθέντα καὶ
, , θέ \ ΝΜ ὃ \ ὑδὲ
μεθαρμοζόμενον. μή θέλε τὸν ἄνδρα, καὶ οὐδὲν
ὧν θέλεις οὐ γίνεται. μὴ θέλε αὐτὸν ἐξ ἅπαντός
-“ Ν , > , \
σοι συνοικεῖν, μὴ θέλε μένειν ἐν Κορίνθῳ καὶ

na « Ν
ἁπλῶς μηδὲν ἄλλο θέλε ἢ ἃ ὁ θεὸς θέλει. καὶ
’, 4 , > ΄ > “
τίς σε κωλύσει, τίς ἀναγκάσει; οὐ μᾶλλον
τὸν Δία.
“ r Μ e la \ 4
Otay τοιοῦτον ἔχῃς ἡγεμόνα Kal τοιούτῳ
΄ \ Oe: ‘4 a \ >
συνθέλῃς καὶ συνορέγῃ, τί φοβῇ ἔτι μὴ ἀπο-
΄ , ) ”
τύχῃς ; χάρισαί σου τὴν ὄρεξιν καὶ THY ἔκκλισιν

1 What follows is a free paraphrase of Euripides, Medea,
790 ff.
342

- BOOK II. xvi. 17-24

is inevitable? If so, why do you fall into any
trouble, why are you unfortunate? Why is it that
when you want something it doves not happen, and
when you do not want it, it does happen? For this
is the strongest proof of trouble and misfortune. I
want something, and it does not happen; and what
creature is more wretched than I? I do not want
something, and it does happen; and what creature
is more wretched than |?

Medea, for example, because she could not endure
this, came to the point of killing her children. In
this respect at least hers was the act of a great
spirit. For she had the proper conception of what
it means for anyone’s wishes not to come true.
** Very well, then,” says she,! “in these circumstances
I shall take vengeance upon the man who has
wronged and insulted me. Yet what good do 1 get
out of his being in such an evil plight? How can
that be accomplished? I kill my children. But 1
shall be punishing myself also. Yet what do I
ceare?”’ This is the outbursting of a soul of great
force. For she did not know where the power lies
to do what we wish—that we cannot get this from
outside ourselves, nor by disturbing and deranging
things. Give up wanting to keep your husband,
and nothing of what you want fails to happen. Give
up wanting him to live with you at any cost. Give
up wanting to remain in Corinth, and, in a word, give
up wanting anything but what God wants. And who
will prevent you, who will compel you? No one,
any more than anyone prevents or compels Zeus.

When you have such a leader as Zeus and identify
your wishes and your desires with His, why are you
still afraid that you will fail? Give to poverty and

343

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ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

πενίᾳ καὶ πλούτῳ: ἀποτεύξῃ, περιπεσῇ.} ἀλλ᾽
ὑγιείᾳ: δυστυχήσεις" ἀρχαῖς, τιμαῖς, πατρίδι,
φίλοις, τέκνοις, ἁπλῶς ἄν τινε τῶν ἀπροαιρέτων.
ἀλλὰ τῷ Διὶ χάρισαι αὐτάς,;Σ τοῖς ἄλλοις θεοῖς"
ἐκείνοις παράδος, ἐκεῖνοι κυβερνάτωσαν, μετ᾽
ἐκείνων τετάχθωσαν' καὶ ποῦ ἔτι δυσροήσεις ;
εἰ δὲ φθονεῖς, ἀταλαίπωρε, καὶ ἐλεεῖς καὶ ζηλοτυ-
πεῖς καὶ τρέμεις καὶ μίαν ἡμέραν οὐ διαλείπεις,
ἐν 7) οὐ κατακλάεις καὶ σαυτοῦ καὶ τῶν θεῶν,
καὶ τί ἔτι λέγεις 3 πεπαιδεῦσθαι ; ποίαν παι-
δείαν, ἄνθρωπε; ὅτι συλλογισμοὺς ἔπραξας,
μεταπίπτοντας ; οὐ θέλεις ἀπομαθεῖν, εἰ δυνατόν,
πάντα ταῦτα καὶ ἄνωθεν ἄρξασθαι συναισθανό-
μενος ὅτι μέχρι νῦν οὐδ᾽ ἥψω τοῦ πράγματος, καὶ
λοιπὸν ἔνθεν ἀρξάμενος προσοικοδομεῖν τὰ ἑξῆς,
πῶς μηδὲν ἔσται σοῦ μὴ θέλοντος, θέλοντος 4
μηδὲν οὐκ ἔσται;

Δότε μοι ἕνα νέον κατὰ. "ταύτην τὴν ἐπιβολὴν
ἐληλυθότα εἰς σχολήν, τούτου τοῦ πράγματος
ἀθλητὴν γενόμενον καὶ λέγοντα ὅτε “ἐμοὶ τὰ
μὲν ἄλλα πάντα χαιρέτω, ἀρκεῖ δ᾽ εἰ ἐξέσται
ποτὲ ἀπαραποδίστῳ καὶ ἀλύπῳ διαγαγεῖν καὶ
ἀνατεῖναι τὸν τράχηλον πρὸς τὰ πράγματα ὡς
ἐλεύθερον καὶ εἰς τὸν οὐρανὸν ἀναβλέπειν ὡς
φίλον τοῦ θεοῦ μηδὲν φοβούμενον τῶν συμβῆναι
δυναμένων." δειξάτω τις ὑμῶν αὐτὸν τοιοῦτον,
ἵνα εἴπω: ἔρχου, νεανίσκε, εἰς τὰ σά" σοὶ γὰρ

1 Wolf: wep'ex« 3. 2 Schweighiuser : αὐτά 8S.

8 Wolf: ἐπιλέγεις S. 4 Supplied by Schweighiauser.
344 :

-BOOK II. xv. 24-30

to wealth your aversion and your desire: you will
fail to get what you wish, and you will fall into what
you would avoid. Give them to health; you will
come to grief; so also if you give them to offices,
honours, country, friends, children, in short to any-
thing that lies outside the domain of moral purpose.
But give them to Zeus and the other gods; entrust
them to their keeping, let them exercise the control ;
let your desire and your aversion be ranged on their
side—and how can you be troubled any longer?
But if you show envy, wretched man, and pity, and
jealousy, and timidity, and never let a day pass
without bewailing yourself and the gods, how can
you continue to say that you have been educated?
What kind of education, man, do you mean? Because
you have worked on syllogisms, and arguments with
equivocal premisses? Will you not unlearn all this,
if that be possible, and begin at the beginning,
realizing that hitherto you have not even touched
the matter; and for the future, beginning at this
point, add to your foundations that which comes
next in order—provision that nothing shall be that
you do not wish, and that nothing shall fail to be
that you do wish?

Give me but one young man who has come to
school with this purpose in view, who has become
an athlete in this activity, saying, “‘ As for me, let
everything else go; I am satisfied if I shall be
free to live untrammelled and untroubled, to hold
up my neck in the face of facts like a free man, and
to look up to heaven as a friend of God, without
fear of what may possibly happen.” Let one of you
show me such a person, so that I can say to him:
Enter, young man, into your own, for it is your

VOL. 1. n 345

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ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

εἵμαρται κοσμῆσαι φιλοσοφίαν, σά ἐστε ταῦτα

\ 14 \ \ , ‘ e U >
Ta κτήματα, σὰ τὰ βιβλία, σοὶ οἱ λόγοι. εἶθ᾽,
ὅταν τοῦτον " ἐκπονήσῃ καὶ καταθλήσῃ τὸν
τόπον, πάλιν ἐλθών μοι εἰπάτω “ἐγὼ θέλω μὲν
καὶ ἀπαθὴς εἶναι καὶ ἀτάραχος, θέλω δ᾽ ὡς
εὐσεβὴς καὶ φιλόσοφος καὶ ἐπιμελὴς εἰδέναι a
μοι πρὸς θεούς ἐστι καθῆκον, τί πρὸς γονεῖς, τί
πρὸς ἀδελφούς, τί πρὸς τὴν πατρίδα, τί πρὸς
ξένους." ἔρχου καὶ ἐπὶ τὸν δεύτερον. τόπον" σός
ἐστι καὶ οὗτος. “ἀλλ᾽ ἤδη καὶ τὸν δεύτερον
τόπον ἐκμεμελέτηκα. ἤθελον δ᾽ ἀσφαλῶς
ἔχειν 5 καὶ ἀσείστως 8 καὶ οὐ μόνον ἐγρηγορώς,
ἀλλὰ καὶ καθεύδων καὶ οἰνωμένος καὶ ἐν μελαγ-

\ ν᾿ “ =! ΝΜ \ ,
χολίᾳ." σὺ θεὸς εἶ, ὦ ἄνθρωπε, σὺ μεγάλας
ἔχεις ἐπιβολάς.

Οὔ: ἀλλ᾽ “ἐγὼ θέλω γνῶναι, τί λέγει Χρύ-
σιίππὸος ἐν τοῖς περὶ τοῦ Ψευδομένου." οὐκ
EJ s Ν r > nr ΄ ΄
ἀπάγξῃ μετὰ τῆς ἐπιβολῆς ταύτης, τάλας ; καὶ
τί σοι ὄφελος ἔσται ; πενθῶν ἅπαν ἀναγνώσῃ
καὶ τρέμων πρὸς ἄλλους ἐρεῖς. οὕτως καὶ ὑμεῖς

᾿ ποιεῖτε. “θέλεις ἀναγνῶ σοι, ἀδελφέ, καὶ σὺ

ἐμοί; ye θαυμαστῶς, “ἄνθρωπε, γράφεις" καὶ
‘ov μεγάλως εἰς τὸν Ξενοφῶντος χαρακτῆρα,"
«σὺ εἰς τὸν Πλάτωνος, “σὺ εἰς τὸν ᾿Αντισθέ-
vous.” εἶτ᾽ ἀλλήλοις ὀνείρους διηγησάμενοι
πάλιν ἐπὶ ταὐτὰ ἐπανέρχεσθε- ὡσαύτως ὀρέ-

1 Schegk and Upton: τοιοῦτον S.
2 Added by Se. 3 Wolf: ἀσίτως 8.

1 Compare I. 18, 23.

2 A stock sophism in the form: If a person says, ‘‘ I am
ive does he lie or tell the truth? If he is lying, he
is telling the truth ; if he is telling the truth, he is lying. Cf.

346

I eee

i. ἡ

οὐδ

BOOK II. xvi. 30-36

destiny to adorn philosophy, yours are these pos-
sessions, yours these books, yours these discourses.
Then, when he has worked his way through this
first field of study and mastered it like an athlete,
let him come to me again and say, “I want, it is
true, to be tranquil and free from turmoil, but I
want also, as a god-fearing man, a philosopher and
a diligent student, to know what is my duty towards
the gods, towards parents, towards brothers, towards
my country, towards strangers.’’ Advance now to
the second field of study ; this also is yours. “ Yes,
but I have already studied this second field. What
I wanted was to be secure and unshaken, and that
not merely in my waking hours, but also when
asleep, and drunk, and melancholy-mad.”! Man,
you are a god, great are the designs you cherish !

No, that is not the way it goes, but someone says,
“1 wish to know what Chrysippus means in his
treatise on The Liar.”? If that is your design, go
hang, you wretch! And what good will knowing
that do you? With sorrow you will read the whole
treatise, and with trembling you will talk about
it to others. This is the way you also, my hearers,
behave. You say: “Shall I read aloud to you,
brother, and you to me?”% “Man, you write
wonderfully.” And again, “ You have a great gift
for writing in the style of Xenophon,” “You for
that of Plato,” “ You for that of Antisthenes.”” And
then, when you have told dreams to one another,
you go back to the same things again; you have
Von Arnim, Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, II. 92, frag. 280 ff.
Chrysippus is said to have written six books on the subject,
Diog. τ. VIL. 196. Cf. Pease on Οἷς. De Div. II. 11.

3 That is, each his own compositions, in expectation of
mutual compliments. Cf. Hor. Zp. 11. 2, 87 ff.

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ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

γεσθε, ὡσαύτως ἐκκλίνετε, ὁμοίως ὁρμᾶτε, ἐπι-
βάλλεσθε, προτἴθεσθε," ταὐτὰ 3 εὔχεσθε, περὶ
ταὐτὰ σπουδάζετε. εἶτα οὐδὲ ζητεῖτε τὸν ὑπο-
μνήσοντα ὑμᾶς, ἀλλ᾽ ἄχθεσθε, ἐὰν ἀκούητε
τούτων. εἶτα λέγετε “ ἀφιλόστοργος γέρων"
ἐξερχομένου μου οὐκ ἔκλαυσεν, οὐδ᾽ εἶπεν “ εἰς
οἵαν περίστασιν ἀπέρ ῃ μοι, ᾿ τέκνον" ἂν σωθῇς,
ἅψω λύχνους. " ταῦτ ἔστι τὰ τοῦ φιλοστόργου ; Ὁ
μέγα σοι ἀγαθὸν ἔσται σωθέντι τοιούτῳ καὶ
λύχνων ἄξιον. ἀθάνατον γὰρ εἶναί σε δεῖ καὶ
ἄνοσον.

Ταύτην οὖν, ὅπερ λέγω, τὴν οἴησιν τὴν τοῦ
δοκεῖν εἰδέναι τι τῶν χρησίμων ἀποβαλόντας *
ἔρχεσθαι δεῖ πρὸς τὸν λόγον, ὡς πρὸς τὰ yew
μετρικὰ προσάγομεν, ὡς πρὸς τὰ μουσικά. εἰ
δὲ μή, οὐδ᾽ ἐγγὺς ἐσόμεθα τῷ προκόψαι, κἂν
πάσας τὰς εἰσαγωγὰς ὃ καὶ τὰς συντάξεις τὰς
Χρυσίππου μετὰ τῶν ᾿Αντιπάτρου καὶ ᾿Αρχεδήμου
διέλθωμεν.

-

͵ - > ,ὔ Ν Ν ,
νη΄. Πῶς ἀγωνιστέον πρὸς tas φαντασίας ;

Πᾶσα ἕξις καὶ δύναμις ὑπὸ τῶν καταλλήλων
ἔργων συνέχεται καὶ αὔξεται, ἡ περιπατητικὴ
ὑπὸ τοῦ περιπατεῖν, ἡ τροχαστικὴ ὑπὸ τοῦ
τρέχειν. ἂν θέλῃς ἀναγνωστικὸς εἶναι, ἀναγί-
γνωσκε; ἂν γραφικός, γράφε. ὅταν δὲ τριάκοντα

1 Wolf: προστίθεσθε S. 53. Schegk and Wolf: ταῦτα 8,
3 Koraes: ἀπέρχομαι S. * Koraes : ἀποβάλλοντας S.
5 Reiske: cuvaywyds S.

1 Compare I. 19, 24.
348

BOOK IL. xvu. 36-xvm. 2

exactly the same desires as before, the same
ayersions, in the same way you make your choices,
your designs, and your purposes, you pray for the
same things and are interested in the same things.
In the second place, you do not even look for
anybody to give you advice, but you are annoyed
if you are told what I am telling you. Again, you
say: ‘‘ He is an old man without the milk of human
kindness in him; he did not weep when I left, nor
say, ‘I fear you are going into a very difficult
situation, my son; if you come through safely, I
will light lamps.’” + Is this what a man with the
milk of human kindness in him would say? It will
be a great piece of good luck for a person like you
to come through safely, a thing worth lighting
lamps to celebrate! Surely you ought to be
free from death and free from disease !

It is this conceit of fancying that we know some-
thing useful, that, as I have said, we ought to
cast aside before we come to philosophy, as we do
in the case of geometry and music. Otherwise we
shall never even come near to making progress, even
if we go through all the Introductions and the
Treatises of Chrysippus, with those of Antipater and
Archedemus thrown in!

CHAPTER XVIII

How must we struggle against our external impressions ?

Every habit and faculty is confirmed and
strengthened by the corresponding actions, that
of walking by walking, that of running by running.
If you wish to be a good reader, read; if you wish
to be a good writer, write. If you should give up

349

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF: EPICTETUS

ἐφεξῆς ἡ ἡμέρας μὴ ἀναγνῷς, ἀλλ᾽ ἄλλο τι πράξῃς,
γνώσῃ τὸ γινόμενον. οὕτως κἂν ἀναπέσῃης δέκα
ἡμέρας, ἀναστὰς ἐπιχείρησον μακροτέραν ὁδὸν
περιπατῆσαι καὶ ὄψει, πῶς σου τὰ σκέλη παρα-
λύεται. καθόλου οὖν εἴ τι ποιεῖν ἐθέλῃς, ἑ ἑκτικὸν
ποίει αὐτό" εἴ τι μὴ ποιεῖν ἐθέλῃς, μὴ ποίει αὐτό,
ἀλλ᾽ ἔθισον ἄλλο τι πράττειν μᾶλλον ἀντ᾽ αὐτοῦ.
οὕτως ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ψυχικῶν: ὅταν ὀργισθῆς,
γίγνωσκε ὅτι οὐ μόνον σοι τοῦτο γέγονεν κακόν,
ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι καὶ τὴν ἕξιν ηὔξησας καὶ ὡς πυρὶ
φρύγανα παρέβαλες. ὅταν ἡττηθῇς τίνος ἐν
συνουσίᾳ, μὴ τὴν μίαν ἧτταν ταύτην λογίξου,
ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι καὶ τὴν ἀκρασίαν σου τέτροφας, ἐπηύ-
Encas. ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν καταλλήλων
ἔργων μὴ καὶ τὰς ἕξεις καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις τὰς μὲν
ἐμφύεσθαι μὴ πρότερον οὔσας, τὰς δ᾽ ἐπιτείνεσθαι
καὶ ἰσχυροποιεῖσθαι.

Οὕτως ἀμέλει καὶ τὰ ἀρρωστήματα. ὑποφύε:
σθαι λέγουσιν οἱ φιλόσοφοι: ὅταν γὰρ ἅπαξ
ἐπιθυμήσῃς ἀργυρίου, ἂν μὲν προσαχθῇ λόγος
εἷς αἴσθησιν ἄξων" τοῦ κακοῦ, πέπαυταί τε ἡ
ἐπιθυμία καὶ τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν ἡμῶν εἰς τὸ ἐξαρχῆς
ἀποκατέστη: ἐὰν δὲ μηδὲν προσαγάγῃς εἰς θερα-
πείαν, οὐκέτι εἰς ταὐτὰ ἐπάνεισιν, ἀλλὰ πάλιν
ἐρεθισθὲν ὑπὸ τῆς καταλλήλου φαντασίας θᾶττον
ἢ πρότερον ἐξήφθη πρὸς τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν. καὶ
τούτου συνεχῶς γινομένου τυλοῦται λοιπὸν καὶ

2 Wolf: ἀξιῶν 8.
350

ee ee ee

“BOOK IL xvm. 2-9

reading for thirty days one after the other, and
be engaged in something else, you will know what
happens. So also if you lie in bed for ten days, get
up and try to take a rather long walk, and you will
see how wobbly your legs are. In general, there-
fore, if you want to do something, make a habit
of it; if you want not to do something, refrain from
doing it, and accustom yourself to something else
instead. The same principle holds true in the
affairs of the mind also; when you are angry, you
may be sure, not merely that this evil has befallen
you, but also that you have strengthened the habit,
and have, as it were, added fuel to the flame.
When you have yielded to someone in carnal inter-
course, do not count merely this one defeat, but
count also the fact that you have fed your incon-
tinence, you have given it additional strength. For
it is inevitable that some habits and faculties should,
in consequence of the corresponding actions, spring
up, though they did not exist before, and that others
which were already there should be intensified and
made strong.

In this way, without doubt, the infirmities of our
mind and character spring up, as the philosophers
say. For when once you conceive a desire for
money, if reason be applied to bring you to a
realization of the evil, both the passion is stilled and
our governing principle is restored to its original
authority ; but if you do not apply a remedy, your
governing principle does not revert to its previous
condition, but, on being aroused again by the corres-
ponding external impression, it bursts into the flame
of desire more quickly than it did before. And
if this happens over and over again, the next stage

35!

10

11

12

19

14

15

16

17

18

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

τὸ ἀρρώστημα βεβαιοῖ τὴν φιλαργυρίαν. ὁ yap
πυρέξας, εἶτα παυσάμενος οὐχ ὁμοίως ἔχει τῷ
πρὸ τοῦ πυρέξαι, ἂν μή τι θεραπευθῇ εἰς ἅπαν.
τοιοῦτόν TL καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς παθῶν
γίνεται. ἴχνη τινὰ καὶ μώλωπες ἀπολείπονται
ἐν αὐτῇ, ods εἰ μή τις ἐξαλείψῃ καλῶς, πάλιν
κατὰ τῶν αὐτῶν μαστιγωθεὶς οὐκέτε μώλωπας,
ἀλλ᾽ ἕλκη ποιεῖ. εἰ οὖν θέλεις μὴ εἶναι ὀργίλος,
μὴ τρέφε σοὺ τὴν ἕξιν, μηδὲν αὐτῇ παράβαλλε

> , : Ν , ς , \ . ἡ <
αὐξητικὸν. τὴν πρώτην ἡσυχασον καὶ Tas

Εν > LO 4 > > lA θ cc θ᾽ αν
ἡμέρας ἀρίθμει ἃς οὐκ ὠργίσθης. “καθ᾽ ἡμέραν
εἰώθειν ὀργίζεσθαι, νῦν παρ᾽ ἡμέραν, εἶτα παρὰ
δύο, εἶτα παρὰ τρεῖς." ἂν δὲ καὶ τριάκοντα παρα-
λίπῃς, ἐπίθυσον τῷ θεῷ. ἡ γὰρ ἕξις ἐκλύεται
-“΄Ἵ > nm
τὴν πρώτην, εἶτα Kal παντελῶς ἀναιρεῖται.
εἰ > > 9 a ” ae ᾽ a:
σήμερον οὐκ ἐλυπήθην οὐδ᾽ αὔριον οὐδ᾽ ἐφεξῆς
\
διμήνῳ καὶ τριμήνῳ: ἀλλὰ προσέσχον γενομένων
lol lal ᾽ν , a a /
τινῶν ἐρεθιστικῶν." γίγνωσκε ὅτι κομψῶς σοί
ἐστιν.
/ \ 29 \ a \ > ed SEN

Σήμερον καλὸν ἰδὼν ἢ καλὴν οὐκ εἶπον αὐτὸς
here ὅτι " “ dpedov TLS pera ταύτης ἐκοιμήθη "
καὶ “μακάριος ὁ ἀνὴρ αὐτῆς" ὁ γὰρ τοῦτ᾽ εἰπὼν

“ μακάριος ᾽ καὶ “ὁ μοιχός᾽ ᾿. οὐδὲ τὰ ἑξῆς ἀναζξω-
γραφῶ, παροῦσαν αὐτὴν καὶ ἀποδυομένην καὶ
παρακατακλινομένην. καταψῶ τὴν κορυφήν μου

\ / 8 > / \ /
Kal λέγω" εὖ, ᾿Επίκτητε, κομψὸν σοφισμάτιον
Υ. -“ ΄ rn 4
ἔλυσας, πολλῷ κομψότερον τοῦ ΚΚυριεύοντος.
ἂν δὲ καὶ βουλομένου τοῦ γυναικαρίου καὶ νεύον-

1 See Π, 19, especially 1-9.

352

~ BOOK II. xvm. 9-18

is that a callousness results and the infirmity
strengthens the avarice. For the man who has
had a fever, and then recovered, is not the same
as he was before the fever, unless he has experienced
a complete cure. Something like this happens also
with the affections of the mind. Certain imprints
and weals are left behind on the mind, and unless a
man erases them perfectly, the next time he is
scourged upon the old scars, he has weals no longer
but wounds. If, therefore, you wish not to be hot-
tempered, do not feed your habit, set before it
nothing on which it can grow. As the first step,
keep quiet and count the days on which you have
not been angry. “1 used to be angry every day,
after that every other day, then every third, and
then every fourth day.” If you go as much as
thirty days without a fit of anger, sacrifice to God.
For the habit is first weakened and then utterly
destroyed. “To-day I was not grieved”’ (and so the
next day, and thereafter for two or three months) ;
“but I was on my guard when certain things
happened that were capable of provoking grief.”
Know that things are going splendidly with you.
To-day when I saw a handsome lad or a handsome
woman 1 did not say to myself, “ Would that a man
might sleep with her,” and “Her husband is a
happy man,” for the man who uses the expression
“happy” of the husband means “ Happy is the
adulterer” also; 1 do not even picture to myself the
next scene—the woman herself in my presence,
disrobing and lying down by my side. 1 pat myself
on the head and say, Well done, Epictetus, you have
solved a clever problem, one much more clever than
the so-called “ Master” +; But when the wench is

353

19

21

22

23

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

Tos καὶ προσπέμποντος, ἂν δὲ καὶ ἁπτομένου καὶ
συνεγγίζοντος ἀπόσχωμαι καὶ νικήσω, τοῦτο μὲν
ἤδη τὸ σόφισμα ὑπὲρ τὸν Ψευδόμενον, ὑπὲρ τὸν
“Hovydfovta. ἐπὶ τούτῳ καὶ μέγα φρονεῖν ἄξιον.
οὐκ ἐπὶ τῷ τὸν Κυριεύοντα ἐρωτῆσαι.

Πῶς οὖν γένηται τοῦτο; θέλησον ἀρέσαι αὐτός
ποτε σεαυτῷ, θέλησον καλὸς φανῆναι τῷ θεῷ"
ἐπιθύμησον καθαρὸς μετὰ καθαροῦ σαυτοῦ γενέ-
σθαι καὶ μετὰ τοῦ θεοῦ. εἶθ᾽ ὅταν προσπίπτῃ
σοί τις φαντασία τοιαύτη, Πλάτων μὲν ὅτε ἴθι
ἐπὶ τὰς ἀποδιοπομπήσεις, ἴθε ἐπὶ θεῶν ἀποτρο-
παίων ἱερὰ ἱκέτης" ἀρκεῖ κἂν ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν καλῶν
καὶ ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν συνουσίας ἀποχωρήσας πρὸς
τούτῳ γίνῃ ἀντεξετάζων, ἄν τε τῶν ζώντων τινὰ
ἔχῃς ἄν τε τῶν ἀποθανόντων. ἄπελθε πρὸς
Σωκράτη καὶ ἴδε αὐτὸν συγκατακείμενον ’AXKi-
βιάδῃ καὶ διαπαίξοντα αὐτοῦ τὴν ὥραν. ἐνθυμή-
θητι οἵαν νίκην ποτὲ ἔγνω ἐκεῖνος νενικηκότα
ἑαυτόν, ola ᾿Ολύμπια, πόστος ἀφ᾽ “Ἡρακλέους
ἐγένετο ἵνα τις, νὴ τοὺς θεούς, δικαίως
ἀσπάζξηται αὐτὸν “χαῖρε, παράδοξε," οὐχὶ τοὺς
σαπροὺς τούτους πύκτας καὶ παγκρατιαστὰς
οὐδὲ τοὺς ὁμοίους αὐτοῖς, τοὺς μονομάχους.
ταῦτα ἀντιθεὶς νικήσεις τὴν φαντασίαν, οὐχ

1 For The Liar see on Il. 17, 34. ‘‘ The Quiescent” was
the somewhat desperate solution of Chrysippus for the
sorites fallacy. On being asked whether two grains made a
heap, then three, and so forth, he would finally stop
answering the questions at all! Cicero, Acad. Post. IL 93.

2 Laws, 1X. 8548 (slightly modified).

3 Plato, Symposium, 218p ff.

4 As traditional founder and first victor at the Olympic
games ; all others might be enumerated in order beginning

354

TT

ao ee ee

Ὁ
«ὦ

ΟΠ BOOK IL. xvm. 18-23

not only willing, but nods to me and sends for me,
yes, and when she even lays hold upon me and
snuggles up to me, if | still hold aloof and conquer,
this has become a solved problem greater than The
Liar, and The Quiescent.1_ On this score a man has
a right to be proud indeed, but not about his
proposing ““ The Master”’ problem.

How, then, may this be done? Make it your wish
finally to satisfy your own self, make it your wish
to appear beautiful in the sight of God. Set your
desire upon becoming pure in the presence of your
pure self and of God. “Then when an external
impression of that sort comes suddenly upon you,”
says Plato, “go and offer an expiatory sacrifice,
go and make offering as a suppliant to the sanctuaries
of the gods who avert evil’’; it is enough if you
only withdraw “to the society of the good and
excellent men,” and set yourself to comparing your
conduct with theirs, whether you take as your model
one of the living, or one of the dead. Go to Socrates
and mark him as he lies down beside Alcibiades?
and makes light of his youthful beauty. Bethink
yourself how great a victory he once won and knew
it himself, like an Olympic victory, and what his
rank was, counting in order from Heracles‘; so
that, by the gods, one might justly greet him with
the salutation, “ Hail, wondrous man!” for he was
victor over something more than these rotten boxers
and pancratiasts, and the gladiators who resemble
them. If you confront your external impression
with such thoughts, you will overcome it, and not
with him, although the ordinary count was from Coroebus
out sup to have been winner of the footrace in

355

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

31

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

με , « , > iol Ν rn 7 ε Ν n
ἑλκυσθήσῃ ὑπ᾽ αὐτῆς. τὸ πρῶτον δ᾽ ὑπὸ τῆς
ὀξύτητος μὴ συναρπασθῆς, ἀλλ᾽ εἰπὲ “ἔκδεξαί
με μικρόν, φαντασία" ἄφες ἴδω τίς εἶ καὶ περὶ
τίνος, ἄφες σε δοκιμάσω." καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν μὴ
ἐφῇς αὐτῇ προάγειν ἀναζωγραφούσῃ. τὰ ἑξῆς.
> \ / Μ / » “ x , >

εἰ δὲ μή, οἴχεταί σε ἔχουσα ὅπου ἂν θέλῃ. ἀλλὰ
μᾶλλον ἄλλην τινὰ ἀντεισάγαγε καλὴν καὶ
γενναίαν φαντασίαν καὶ ταύτην τὴν ῥυπαρὰν

ἔκβαλε. κἂν ἐθισθῇς οὕτως γυμνάζεσθαι, ὄψει,

οἷοι ὦμοι γίνονται, οἷα νεῦρα, οἷοι τόνοι" νῦν δὲ
7 \ ΄ \ , IO\ 7
μόνον τὰ λογάρια Kal πλέον οὐδὲ ἕν.
Οὗ ’ > © 4 a > θ / > \ e
UTOS ἐστιν O Tats ἀληθείαις ἀσκητὴς oO
πρὸς τὰς τοιαύτας φαντασίας γυμνάζων ἑαυτόν.
μεῖνον, τάλας, μὴ συναρπασθῇς. μέγας ὁ ἀγών
a ’ f
ἐστιν, θεῖον τὸ ἔργον, ὑπὲρ βασιλείας, ὑπὲρ
, ig \ > , νὴ \ > , lal
ἐλευθερίας, ὑπὲρ εὐροίας, ὑπὲρ ἀταραξίας. τοῦ
θεοῦ μέμνησο, ἐκεῖνον ἐπικαλοῦ βοηθὸν καὶ
παραστάτην ὡς τοὺς Διοσκόρους ἐν χειμῶνι οἱ
- 7] e
πλέοντες. ποῖος yap μείζων χειμὼν ἢ ὁ ἐκ
φαντασιῶν ἰσχυρῶν καὶ ἐκκρουστικῶν τοῦ λόγου;
> 5 \ « : Ν 4, ᾿] ‘ 7 7,
αὗτος yap ὁ χειμὼν TL ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ φαντασία ;
3 td s ἈΝ , rn , Ν /
ἐπεί Tot ἄρον τὸν φόβον τοῦ θανάτου καὶ φέρε
ὅσας θέλεις βροντὰς καὶ ἀστραπὰς καὶ γνώσῃ,
ὅση γαλήνη ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ ἡγεμονικῷ καὶ εὐδία.
ἂν δ᾽ ἅπαξ ἡττηθεὶς εἴπῃς ὅτι ὕστερον νικήσεις,
> / Ν > , ν [ἐς LA » κῃ
εἶτα πάλιν τὸ αὐτό, ἴσθι ὅτι οὕτως ποθ᾽ ἕξεις
κακῶς Kal ἀσθενῶς, ὥστε μηδ᾽ ἐφιστάνειν ὕστερον

1 That is, reason.

356

δ ee ee κὐν..- γ..χ νϑρ “πλὰ μω ὦ..

- BOOK II, xvi. 23-31

be carried away by it. But, to begin with, be not
swept off your feet, I beseech you, by the vividness
of the impression, but say, “ Wait for me a little, O
impression ; allow me to see who you are, and what
you are an impression of; allow me to put you
to the test.” And after that, do not suffer it to
lead you on by picturing to you what will follow.
Otherwise, it will take possession of you and go off
with you wherever it will. But do you rather
introduce and set over against it some fair and noble
impression, and throw out this filthy one. And if
you form the habit of taking such exercises, you
will see what mighty shoulders you develop, what
sinews, what vigour; but as it is, you have merely
your philosophic quibbles, and nothing more,

The man who exercises himself against such
external impressions is the true athlete in training.
Hold, unhappy man; be not swept along with
your impressions! Great is the struggle, divine
the task ; the prize is a kingdom, freedom, serenity,

Remember God ; call upon Him to help you
and stand by your side, just as voyagers, in a storm,
call upon the Dioscuri. For what storm is greater
than that stirred up by powerful impressions which
unseat the reason? As for the storm itself, what else
is it but an external impression? To prove this,
just take away the fear of death, and then bring
on as much thunder and lightning as you please, _
and you will realize how great is the calm, how fair
the weather, in your governing principle.’ But if
you be once defeated and say that by and by you
will overcome, and then a second time do the same
thing, know that at last you will be in so wretched
a state and so weak that by and by you will not so

357

32

1

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

“ ε , > A 4 > ΄ » ¢ ΄

ὅτι ἁμαρτάνεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπολογίας ἄρξῃ πορί-

few ὑπ’ ρ τοῦ πράγματος" καὶ τότε βεβαιώσεις
Lal ‘ .

τὸ τοῦ Ησιόδου, ὅτι ἀληθές ἐστιν

αἰεὶ δ᾽ ἀμβολιεργὸς ἀνὴρ ἄτῃσι παλαΐει.

10’. ἹΤρὸς τοὺς μέχρι λόγου μόνον ἀναλαμ-
βάνοντας τὰ τῶν φιλοσόφων.

Ὁ 4 ᾿ 3 Ἁ 4 Led > “
κυριεύων λόγος ἀπὸ τοιούτων τινῶν ἀφορμῶν
ἠρωτῆσθαι φαίνεται: κοινῆς γὰρ οὔσης μάχης
τοῖς τρισὶ τούτοις πρὸς ἄλληλα, τῷ πᾶν παρε-
ληλυθὸς ἀληθὲς ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι καὶ τῷ δυνατῷ
ἀδύνατον μὴ ἀκολουθεῖν καὶ τῷ δυνατὸν ἷ εἶναι
a wv »᾽ Μ » A vw 9 ΝΜ \ ~ %
ὃ οὔτ᾽ ἔστιν ἀληθὲς οὔτ᾽ ἔσται, συνιδὼν τὴν
μάχην ταύτην ὁ Διόδωρος τῇ τῶν πρώτων δυεῖν
, 7 lal
πιθανότητι συνεχρήσατο πρὸς παράστασιν τοῦ
\ 3 , a y » > \ vw?
μηδὲν εἶναι δυνατόν, ὃ οὔτ᾽ ἔστιν ἀληθὲς οὔτ

Μ \ ε r ͵7ὔ cal
2 ἔσται. λοιπὸν ὁ μέν τις ταῦτα τηρήσει τῶν

fal av ΕΙΣ / ’ a . ee > \
δυεῖν, ὅτε ἔστι TE τι δυνατόν, ὃ οὔτ᾽ ἔστιν ἀληθὲς
᾽ν» \ na 907 > > -“
οὔτ᾽ ἔσται, καὶ δυνατῷ ἀδύνατον οὐκ ἀκολουθεῖ:
οὐ πᾶν δὲ παρεληλυθὸς ἀληθὲς ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν,
1 Before this word there is an erasure of two letters
in S.

1 Works and Days, 413.

2 So called because thought to be unanswerable ; it in-
volved the questions of ‘‘ the possible” and ‘‘ the necessary,”
in other words, chance and fate, freewill and determination.
The matter was first set forth in a note contributed to
Upton’s edition of Epictetus by James Harris, and re-
published, with additions, by Schweighauser. Definitive
is the discussion by Eduard Zeller, Sitzungsber. der Berliner

358

BOOK IL. xvi. 31—x1x. 2

much as notice that you are doing wrong, but you
will even begin to offer arguments in justification
of your conduct; and then you will confirm the
truth of the saying of Hesiod :

Forever with misfortunes dire must he who loiters
cope.?
CHAPTER XIX

To those who take up the teachings of the philosophers
only to talk about them

Tue “ Master argument”? appears to have been
propounded on the strength of some such principles
as the following. Since there is a general contra-
diction with one another? between these three
propositions, to wit : (1) Everything true as an event
in the past is necessary, and (2) An impossible does
not follow a possible, and (3) What is not true now
and never will be, is nevertheless possible, Diodorus,
realizing this contradiction, used the plausibility
of the first two propositions to establish the prin-
ciple, Nothing is possible which is neither true
now nor ever will be. But one man will maintain,
among the possible combinations of two at a time,
the following, namely, (3) Something is possible,
which is not true now and never will be, and (2) An
impossible does not follow a possible; yet he will
not grant the third proposition (1), Everything true
as an event in the past is necessary, which is what

Akad. 1882, 151-9. See also his Phi/osophie der Griech-n‘,
II, 1, 269-70 For the context in which these problems
appear, see also Von Arnim, Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenia,
L 109; I. 92f.

3 That is, any two are supposed to contradict the third.

359

i

oO

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

καθάπερ οἱ περὶ Κλεάνθην φέρεσθαι δοκοῦσιν,
οἷς ἐπὶ πολὺ συνηγόρησεν. ᾿Αντίπατρος. οἱ δὲ
τἄλλα δύο, ὅτι δυνατόν τ᾽ ἐστίν, ὃ οὔτ᾽ ἔστιν
ἀληθὲς οὔτ᾽ ἔσται, καὶ πᾶν παρεληλυθὸς ἀληθὲς
ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν, δυνατῷ δ᾽ ἀδύνατον ἀκολουθεῖ.
τὰ τρία δ᾽ ἐκεῖνα τηρῆσαι ἀμήχανον διὰ τὸ
κοινὴν εἶναι αὐτῶν μάχην.

“Av οὖν τίς μου πύθηται τ σὺ δὲ “ποῖα αὐτῶν
τηρεῖς ; 3 ἀποκρινοῦμαι πρὸς αὐτὸν ὅτι οὐκ οἷδα"
παρείληφα δ᾽ ἱστορίαν τοιαύτην, ὅτε Διόδωρος
μὲν ἐκεῖνα ἐτήρει, οἱ δὲ περὶ Πανθοίδην οἶμαι
καὶ Κλεάνθην τὰ ἄχλα, οἱ δὲ περὶ Χρύσιππον
τὰ ἄλλα. “σὺ οὖν τί; 3 . οὐδὲ γέγονα πρὸς
τούτῳ, τῷ βασανίσαι τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ φαντασίαν
καὶ συγκρῖναι Ta λεγόμενα καὶ δόγμα τι ἐμαυτοῦ
ποιήσασθαι κατὰ τὸν τόπον. διὰ τοῦτο οὐδὲν
διαφέρω τοῦ γραμματικοῦ. “ τίς ἦν ὁ τοῦ
Ἕκτορος πατήρ; “ Πρίαμος. nai ἐξ τίνες ἀδελφοί; ε
{ ᾿Αλέξανδρος καὶ Δηίφοβος." τ μήτηρ δ᾽ αὐτῶν
τίς ;" “ (Εκάβη. παρείληφα, ταύτην τὴν στο-
pieiy” “παρὰ τίνος ;" “παρ᾽ Ὁμήρου. γράφει
δὲ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν δοκῶ καὶ ᾿Ἑλλάνικος καὶ εἴ
τις ἄλλος τοιοῦτος." κἀγὼ περὶ " τοῦ Κυριεύοντος
τί ἄλλο ἔχω ἀνωτέρω ; . GAN ἂν ὦ κενός, μάλιστα
ἐπὶ συμποσίῳ καταπλήσσομαι τοὺς παρόντας,
ἐξαριθμούμενος τοὺς γεγραφότας. - γέγραφεν
δὲ καὶ Χρύσιππος θαυμαστῶς ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ

1 That i δ, deny (2) that ‘‘ An impossible does not follow a
possible.”
2 That is, each pair is in conflict with the third.

360

αν. α κα

—

~~

-"

ον»:

ΠῚ ΕΞ BOOK II. xtx. 2-9

Cleanthes and his group, whom Antipater has
stoutly supported, seem to think. But others will
maintain the other two propositions, (3) A thing
is possible which is not true now and never will
be, and (1) Everything true as an event in the past
is necessary, and then will assert that, An impossible
does follow a possible.1 But there is no way by
which one can maintain all three of these proposi-
tions, because of their mutual contradiction.”

If, then, someone asks me, “‘ But which pair of
these do you yourself maintain?” I shall answer
him that I do not know; but I have received the
following account: Diodorus used to maintain one
pair, Panthoides and his group, I believe, and
Cleanthes another, and Chrysippus and his group
the third. “What, then, is your opinion?” I do
not know, and I was not made for this purpose—to
test my own external impression upon the subject,
to compare the statements of others, and to form
a judgement of my own. For this reason 1
am no better than the grammarian. When asked,
“Who was the father of Hector?” he replied,
“Priam.” “ Who were his brothers?” “ Alexander
and Deiphobus.” “And who was their mother?”
“‘Hecuba. This is the account that I have received.”
“From whom?” “From Homer,” he said. “ And
Hellanicus also, I believe, writes about these same
matters, and possibly others like him.” And so it
is with me about the “ Master Argument”; what
further have I to say about it? But if I am a vain
person, I can astonish the company, especially at
a banquet, by enumerating those who have written
on the subject. ‘Chrysippus also has written ad-
mirably on this topic in the first book of his treatise

361

10

1

12

13

14

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

Δυνατῶν. καὶ Κλεάνθης δ᾽ ἰδίᾳ γέγραφεν περὶ
τούτου καὶ ᾿Αρχέδημος. γέγραφεν δὲ καὶ ᾿Αντί-
πατρος, οὔ μόνον δ᾽ ἐν τοῖς περὶ Δυνατῶν, ἀλλὰ
καὶ κατ᾽ ἰδίαν ἐ ἐν τοῖς περὶ τοῦ Κυριεύοντος. οὐκ
ἀνέγνωκας τὴν σύνταξιν ;" “οὐκ ἀνέγνωκα."

“ ἀνάγνωθι." καὶ τί ὠφεληθήσεται; φλυαρό-
TEpos ἔσται καὶ ἀκαιρότερος ἢ νῦν ἐστιν. σοὶ
γὰρ τί ἄλλο προσγέγονεν ἀναγνόντι ; Ἶ ae
δόγμα πεποίησαι κατὰ τὸν τόπον ; ἀλλ᾽
ἡμῖν Ἑλένην καὶ Πρίαμον καὶ τὴν τῆς Καλυψοῦς
νῆσον τὴν οὔτε γενομένην οὔτ᾽ ἐσομένην. ᾿

Καὶ ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὐδὲν μέγα τῆς ἱστορίας
κρατεῖν, ἴδιον δὲ δόγμα μηδὲν “πεποιῆσθαι. ἐπὶ
τῶν ἠθικῶν δὲ πάσχομεν αὐτὸ πολὺ μᾶλλον ὴ
ἐπὶ τούτων. “εἰπέ μοι περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν.

“ ἄκουε"

Ἰχιόθεν με φέρων ἄνεμος Κικόνεσσι πέλασσεν.

~ ὄντων τὰ μέν ἐστιν ἀγαθά, τὰ δὲ κακά, τὰ

δ᾽ ἀδιάφορα. ἀγαθὰ μὲν οὖν αἱ ἀρεταὶ καὶ τὰ
μετέχοντα αὐτῶν, κακὰ δὲ κακίαι καὶ τὰ μετέ-
χοντα κακίας, ἀδιάφορα δὲ τὰ μεταξὺ τούτων,
πλοῦτος, ὑγίεια, ζωή, θάνατος, ἡδονή, πόνος."

“πόθεν οἶδας ;" “ ‘Ed Aavexos λέγει ἐν τοῖς
Αἰγυπτιακοῖς." τί ,ap διαφέρει τοῦτο εἰπεῖν ἢ
ὅτε Διογένης ἐν τῇ ᾿Ηθικῇ ἢ Χρύσιππος ἢ
Κλεάνθης ; βεβασάνικας οὖν τι αὑτῶν καὶ δόγμα

1 That is, instead of speaking from your own knowledge
or belief, you will merely recite the opinions of others.

. Homer, Od., 1X. 39. The inappropriate quotation (as
with Hellanicus below) shows the absurdity of such a
treatment of ethical questions.

362

Ee —

ee ἐμ ὦ

τ νυ

BOOK II. xix. 9-14

On Things Possible. And Cleanthes has written a
> ot work on the subject, and Archedemus.
ae sg also has written, not only in his book
kings Possible, but also a separate monograph
in his discussion of The Master Argument. Have
you not read the treatise?” “I have not read it.”
“Then read it.” And what good will it do him?
He will be more trifling and tiresome than he is
already. You, for example, what have you gained
by the reading of it? What judgement have you
formed on the subject? Nay, you will tell us of
Helen, and Priam, and the island of Calypso? which
never was and never will be!

And in the field of literary history, indeed, it is
of no great consequence that you master the received
account without having formed any judgement of
your own. But in questions of conduct we suffer
from this fault much more than we do in literary
matters. “Tell me about things good and evil.”
Listen:

The wind that blew me from the Trojan shore

Brought me to the Ciconians.?

Of things some are good, others bad, and yet others
indifferent. Now the virtues and everything that
shares in them are good, while vices and everything
that shares in vice are evil, and what falls in between
these, namely, wealth, health, life, death, pleasures,
pain, are indifferent.” “Where do you get that
knowledge?” “Hellanicus says so in his History
of Egypt.” For what difference does it make
whether you say this, or that Diogenes says so in
his Treatise on Ethics, or Chrysippus, or Cleanthes?
Have you, then, tested any of these statements and

363

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17

18

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ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

σεαυτοῦ πεποίησαι; δείκνυε πῶς εἴωθας ἐν πλοίῳ
χειμάζεσθαι. μέμνησαι ταύτης τῆς διαιρέσεως,
ὅταν ψοφήσῃ τὸ ἱστίον καὶ ἀνακραυγάσαντί δοι
κακόσχολός πως παραστὰς εἴπῃ “λέγε μοι
\ θ 4 t 3 , / 14
τοὺς θεούς σοι οἷα 3 πρῴην ἔλεγες" μή τι κακία
ἐστὶ τὸ ναυαγῆσαι, μή τι κακίας μετέχον ;” οὐκ
ἄρας ξύλον ἐνσείσεις αὐτῷ ; “τί ἡμῖν καὶ col,
ἄνθρωπε; ἀπολλύμεθα καὶ σὺ ἐχθὼν παίζεις."
ἂν δέ ce 6° Καῖσαρ μεταπέμψηται κατηγο-
ρούμενον, μέμνησαι τῆς διαιρέσεως: ἄν τίς σοι
εἰσιόντι καὶ ὠχριῶντι ἅμα καὶ τρέμοντι προσ-
ελθὼν εἴπῃ “τί τρέμεις, ἄνθρωπε; περὶ τίνων
Pi «ς , ν € an > .
σοί ἐστιν ὁ λόγος ; μή τι ἔσω ὁ Καῖσαρ ἀρετὴν
καὶ κακίαν τοῖς εἰσερχομένοις δίδωσι ; " “ τί μοι
ἐμπαίξεις καὶ σὺ πρὸς τοῖς ἐμοῖς κακοῖς ;
“ὅμως, φιλόσοφε, εἶπέ μοι, τί τρέμεις ; οὐχὶ
θάνατός ἐστι τὸ κινδυνευόμενον ἢ δεσμωτήριον
a , ἴον , a \ > ’ὔ ὔ
ἢ πόνος τοῦ σώματος ἢ φυγὴ ἢ ἀδοξία ; τί γὰρ
ἄλλο; μή τι κακία, μή τι μέτοχον κακίας ; σὺ
οὖν τίνα ταῦτα ἔλεγες ; “τί ἐμοὶ καὶ coi,
Μ bd a aeee | ἈΝ \ γένυν ᾽᾿ cal
ἄνθρωπε; ἀρκεῖ ἐμοὶ τὰ ἐμὰ κακά." καὶ καλῶς
λέγεις. ἀρκεῖ γάρ σοι τὰ σὰ κακά, ἡ ἀγέννεια,
ἡ δειλία, ἡ ἀλαζονεία, ἣν ἠλαζονεύου ἐν τῇ σχολῇ
καθήμενος. τί τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις ἐκαλλωπίξου ; τί
Στωικὸν ἔλεγες σεαυτόν;

1 Restored by Bentley from Gellius, Noctes Atticae, I. 2, 8:
γυμνάζεσθαι S. 2 Preserved by Gellius: om. 5.
8 Bentley: σοι, ἃ Gellius, ofa S.
4 Bentley: κακεία Gellius, κακίας 8.
5 Preserved by Gellius: om. S.

364

BOOK II. xix. 14-19

have you formed your own judgement upon them ?
Show me how you are in the habit of conducting
yourself in a storm on board ship. Do you bear
in mind this logical distinction between gvod and
evil when the sail crackles, and you have screamed
and some fellow-passenger, untimely humorous,
comes up and says, “Tell me, I beseech you by
the gods, just what you were saying a little while
ago. Is it a vice to suffer shipwreck? Is there
any vice in that?’’ Will you not pick up a piece of
wood and cudgel him? “ What have we to do with
you, fellow? We are perishing and you come and
erack jokes!’’ And if Caesar sends for you to
answer an accusation, do you bear in mind this
distinction? Suppose someone approaches you when
you are going in pale and trembling, and says,
“Why are you trembling, fellow? What is the
affair that concerns you? Does Caesar inside the
palace bestow virtue and vice upon those who
appear before him?” “Why do you also make
mock of me and add to my other ills?” “ But yet,
philosopher, tell me, why are you trembling? Is
not the danger death, or prison, or bodily pain, or
exile, or disrepute? Why, what else can it be?
Is it a vice at all, or anything that shares in
vice? What was it, then, that you used to call
these things?” “What have I to do with you,
fellow? My own evils are enough for me.” And
in that you are right. For your own evils are
enough for you—your baseness, your cowardice, the
bragging that you indulged in when you were sit-
ting in the lecture room. Why did you pride your-
self upon things that were not your own? Why
did you call yourself a Stoic?

365

20

21

22

23

26

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

Τηρεῖτε οὕτως ἑαυτοὺς ἐν ols ἐπράσσετε Kal
εὑρήσετε τίνος ἔσθ᾽ αἱρέσεως. τοὺς πλείστους
ὑμῶν ᾿Επικουρείους εὑρήσετε, ὀλίγους τινὰς
Περιπατητικοὺς καὶ τούτους ἐκλελυμένους. ποῦ
γὰρ ἵν᾽ ὑμεῖς τὴν ἀρετὴν πᾶσιν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἴσην
ἢ καὶ κρείττονα ἔργῳ ὑπολάβητε; Στωικὸν δὲ
δείξατέ μοι, εἴ τινα ἔχητε. ποῦ ἢ πῶς; ἀλλὰ
τὰ λογάρια τὰ Στωικὰ λέγοντας μυρίους. τὰ
γὰρ ᾿Επικούρεια αὐτοὶ οὗτοι χεῖρον λέγουσι;
τὰ γὰρ Περιπατητικὰ οὐ καὶ αὐτὰ ὁμοίως ἀκρι-
βοῦσιν; τίς οὖν ἐστι Στωικός; ὡς λέγομεν
ἀνδριάντα Φειδιακὸν τὸν τετυπωμένον κατὰ τὴν
τέχνην τὴν Φειδίου, οὕτως τινά μοι δεΐξατε κατὰ
τὰ δόγματα ἃ λαλεῖ τετυπωμένον. δείξατέ μοί
τινα νοσοῦντα καὶ εὐτυχοῦντα, κινδυνεύοντα
καὶ εὐτυχοῦντα, ἀποθνήσκοντα καὶ εὐτυχοῦντα,
πεφυγαδευμένον καὶ εὐτυχοῦντα, ἀδοξοῦντα καὶ
εὐτυχοῦντα. δείξατ᾽'' ἐπιθυμῶ τινα νὴ τοὺς
θεοὺς ἰδεῖν Στωικόν. GAN οὐκ ἔχετε τὸν TeETU-
πωμένον δεῖξαι" τόν γε τυπούμενον δείξατε, τὸν
ἐπὶ ταῦτα κεκλικότα. εὐεργετήσατέ με' μὴ
φθονήσητε ἀνθρώπῳ γέροντι ἰδεῖν θέαμα, ὃ μέχρι
νῦν οὐκ εἶδον. οἴεσθε ὅτι τὸν Δία τὸν Φειδίου
δείξετε ἢ τὴν ᾿Αθηνᾶν, ἐλεφάντινον καὶ χρυσοῦν
κατασκεύασμα; ψυχὴν δειξάτω τις ὑμῶν
ἀνθρώπου θέλοντος ὁμογνωμονῆσαι τῷ θεῷ καὶ
μηκέτι μήτε θεὸν μήτ᾽ ἄνθρωπον μέμφεσθαι, μὴ
ἀποτυχεῖν τινος, μὴ περιπεσεῖν τινι, μὴ ὀργι-

1 An early Christian scholiast remarks at this point
‘©And I would fain see a monk.”

366

EE eT

‘BOOK Il. xtx. 20-26

Observe yourselves thus in your actions and you
will find out to what sect of the philosophers you
belong. You will find that most of you are Epi-
cureans, some few Peripatetics, but these without
any backbone; for wherein do you in fact show
that you consider virtue equal to all things else, or
even superior? But as for a Stoic, show me one if you
can! Where, or how? Nay, but you can show me
thousands who recite the petty arguments of the
Stoics. Yes, but do these same men recite the
petty arguments of the Epicureans any less well?
Do they not handle with the same precision the
petty arguments of the Peripatetics also? Who,
then, is a Stoic? As we call a statue “‘ Pheidian”
that has been fashioned according to the art of
Pheidias, in that sense show me a man fashioned
according to the judgements which he _ utters.
Show me a man who though sick is happy, though
in danger is happy, though dying is happy, though
condemned to exile is happy, though in disrepute is
happy. Show him! By the gods, 1 would fain see a
Stoic!} But you cannot show me a man completely
so fashioned ; then show me at least one who is be-
coming so fashioned, one who has begun to tend
in that direction; do me this favour; do not
begrudge an old man the sight of that spectacle
which to this very day I have never seen. Do
you fancy that you are going to show me the Zeus
or the Athena of Pheidias, a creation of ivory
and gold? Let one of you show me the soul of a
man who wishes to be of one mind with God, and
never again to blame either God or man, to fail in
nothing that he would achieve, to fall into nothing
that he would avoid, to be free from anger, envy

367

27

28

29

30

31

32

33

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

σθῆναι, μὴ φθονῆσαι, μὴ ζηλοτυπῆσαι (τί γὰρ
δεῖ περιπλέκειν ;), θεὸν ἐξ ἀνθρώπου ἐπιθυμοῦντα
γενέσθαι καὶ ἐν τῷ σωματίῳ τούτῳ τῷ νεκρῷ
περὶ τῆς πρὸς τὸν Δία κοινωνίας βουλευόμενον.
δείξατε. ἀλλὰ οὐκ ἔχετε. τί οὖν αὑτοῖς ἐμπαί-
ζετε καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους κυβεύετε ; καὶ περιθέμενοι
σχῆμα ἀλλότριον περιπατεῖτε κλέπται καὶ
λωποδύται τούτων τῶν οὐδὲν “ροσηκόντων
ὀνομάτων καὶ πραγμάτων ;

Καὶ νῦν ἐγὼ μὲν παιδευτής εἰμι ὑμέτερος, ὑμεῖς
δὲ παρ᾽ ἐμοὶ παιδεύεσθε. κἀγὼ μὲν ἔχω ταύτην
τὴν ἐπιβολήν, ἀποτελέσαι ὑμᾶς ἀκωλύτους,
ἀναναγκάστους, ἀπαραποδίστους, ἐλευθέρους,
εὐροοῦντας, εὐδαιμονοῦντας, εἰς τὸν θεὸν ἀφο-
ρῶντας ἐν παντὶ καὶ μικρῷ καὶ μεγάλῳ" ὑμεῖς
δὲ ταῦτα μαθησόμενοι καὶ μελετήσοντες πάρεστε.
διὰ τί οὖν οὐκ ἀνύετε τὸ ἔργον, εἰ καὶ ὑμεῖς
ἔχετ᾽ ἐπιβολὴν olav δεῖ κἀγὼ πρὸς τῇ ἐπιβολῇ
καὶ παρασκευὴν οἵαν δεῖ; τί τὸ λεῖπόν ἐστιν ;
ὅταν ἴδω τέκτονα, ὅτῳ" ὕλη πάρεστιν παρα-
κειμένη, ἐκδέχομαι τὸ ἔργον. καὶ ἐνθάδε τοίνυν
ὁ τέκτων ἐστίν, ἡ ὕλη ἐστίν: τί ἡμῖν λείπει;
οὐκ ἔστι διδακτὸν τὸ πρᾶγμα; διδακτόν. οὐκ
ἔστιν οὖν ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν; μόνον μὲν οὖν τῶν ἄλλων
πάντων. οὔτε πλοῦτός ἐστιν ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν οὔθ᾽
ε , 2 / wv ΝΜ e rn \ » ‘
ὑγίεια οὔτε δόξα οὔτε ἄλλο TL ἁπλῶς πλὴν ὀρθὴ
χρῆσις φαντασιῶν. τοῦτο ἀκώλυτον φύσει μό-

lal > , \ ΄ io > > ya
νον, τοῦτο ἀνεμπόδιστον. διὰ τί οὖν οὐκ ἀνύετε;

εἴπατέ μοι τὴν αἰτίαν. ἢ γὰρ Tap ἐμὲ γίνεται ἢ
1 Schenkl: ὅτ᾽ ἂν S (ὅταν corr.).

368

——— ee Δδυ aS

J

a

jem

* BOOK II. xix. 26-33

and jealousy—but why use circumlocutions >—a man
who has set his heart upon changing from a man.
into a god, and although he is still in this paltry
body of death, does none the less have his purpose
set upon fellowship with Zeus. Show him to me!
But you cannot. Why, then, do you mock your
own selves and cheat everybody else? And why
do you put on a guise that is not your own and walk
about as veritable thieves and robbers who have
stolen these designations and properties that in no
sense belong to you?

And so now I am your teacher, and you are being
taught in my school. And my purpose is this—to
make of you a perfect work, secure against restraint,
compulsion, and hindrance, free, prosperous, happy,
looking to God in everything both small and great ;
and you are here with the purpose of learning and
practising all this. Why, then, do you not complete
the work, if it is true that you on your part have
the right kind of purpose and I on my part, in
addition to the purpose, have the right kind of
preparation? What is it that is lacking? When
I see a craftsman who has material lying ready at
hand, I look for the finished product. Here also,
then, is the craftsman, and here is the material;
what do we yet lack? Cannot the matter be
taught? Itcan. [5 it, then, not under our control?
Nay, it is the only thing in the whole world that is
under our control. Wealth is not under our control,
nor health, nor fame, nor, in a word, anything else
except the right use of external impressions. This
alone is by nature secure against restraint and
hindrance. Why, then, do you not finish the work?
Tell me the reason. For it lies either in me, or in

369

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

Tap ὑμᾶς ἢ mapa τὴν φύσιν τοῦ πράγματος.
αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα ἐνδεχόμενον καὶ μόνον ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν.
λοιπὸν οὖν ἢ παρ᾽ ἐμέ ἐστιν ἢ παρ᾽ ὑμᾶς ἤ, ὅπερ

34 ἀληθέστερον, παρ᾽ ἀμφοτέρους. τί οὖν; θέλετε
ἀρξώμεθά ποτε τοιαύτην ἐπιβολὴν κομίζειν ἐν-
ταῦθα; τὰ μέχρι νῦν ἀφῶμεν. ἀρξώμεθα μόνον,
πιστεύσατέ μοι, καὶ ὄψεσθε.

κ΄. Πρὸς ᾿Επικουρείους καὶ ᾿Ακαδημαϊκούς.

1 Τοῖς ὑγιέσι καὶ ἐναργέσιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ οἱ

ἀντιλέγοντες προσχρῶνται" καὶ σχεδὸν τοῦτο
΄ a

μέγιστον ἄν τις ποιήσαιτο τεκμήριον TOD ἐναργές
τι εἶναι, τὸ ἐπάναγκες εὑρίσκεσθαι καὶ τῷ

2 ἀντιλέγοντι συγχρήσασθαι αὐτῷ: οἷον εἴ τις
᾽ a - ld x > f n
ἀντιλέγοι τῷ εἶναί τι καθολικὸν ἀληθές, δῆλον
ὅτι τὴν ἐναντίαν ἀπόφασιν οὗτος ὀφείλει ποι-
[4 > / > Ν > / 7 lA
ήσασθαι' οὐδέν ἐστι καθολικὸν ἀληθές. ἀνδρά-

8 ποδον, οὐδὲ τοῦτο. τί γὰρ ἄλλο ἐστὶ τοῦτο ἢ οἷον
» Μ , lal , > ΄ Ψ

4 εἴ τι ἔστι καθολικόν, ψεῦδός ἐστιν; πάλιν ἄν τις

,

παρελθὼν λέγη “viyvecke, ὅτι οὐδέν ἐστι
γνωστόν, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἀτέκμαρτα, ἢ ἄλλος
“ “ , , \ > X: 6 ΄ 2 ὑδὲ ὃ »"
ὅτι ““πίστευσόν μοι καὶ ὠφεληθήσῃ" οὐδὲν δεῖ
᾽ , ΄ > ἃ ΄ ” Ὦφ τ ’
ἀνθρώπῳ πιστεύειν," ἢ πάλιν ἄλλος “μάθε παρ

5 ἐμοῦ, ἄνθρωπε, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἐνδέχεται μαθεῖν: ἐγώ

1 In § 29.

2 The essential position of the philosophers of the New or
Middle Academy as pxemplified by Arcesilaus and Carneades,
which Epictetus attacks here, was the denial of the possi-
bility of knowledge, or of the existence of any positive
proof, and the maintenance of an attitude of suspended
judgement.

379

OE — ————— s

“ὦ tea

- BOOK II. χιχ. 33-xx. 5

you, or in the nature of the thing. The thing itselt
is possible and is the only thing that is under our
control. Consequently, then, the fault lies either
in me, or in you, or, what is nearer the truth, in us
both. What then? Would you like to have us at
last begin to introduce here a purpose such as I
have described?! Let us let bygones be bygones.
Only let us begin, and, take my word for it, you
shall see.

CHAPTER XX
Against Epicureans and Academics 3

Tue propositions which are true and evident must
of necessity be employed even by those who con-
tradict them; and one might consider as perhaps
the strongest proof of a proposition being evident
the fact that even the man who contradicts it finds
himself obliged at the same time to employ it. For
example, if a man should contradict the proposition
that there is a universal statement which is true, it
is clear that he must assert the contrary, and say:
No universal statement is true. Slave, this is not
true, either. For what else does this assertion
amount to than: If a statement is universal, it is
false? Again, if a man comes forward and says,
“1 would have you know that nothing is knowable,
but that everything is uncertain”; or if someone
else says, “Believe me, and it will be to your
advantage, when I say: One ought not to believe
a man at all” ; or again, someone else, “ Learn from
me, man, that it is impossible to learn anything; it

37!

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

σοι λέγω τοῦτο καὶ διδάξω ce, ἐὰν Oédys*” τίνι
οὖν τούτων διαφέρουσιν οὗτοι---τίνες ποτέ;---οἱ
> “
Ακαδημαϊκοὺς αὑτοὺς λέγοντες ; “ὦ ἄνθρω-
ποι, συγκατάθεσθε ὅτι οὐδεὶς συγκατατίθεται"
πιστεύσατε ἡμῖν ὅτι οὐδεὶς πιστεύει οὐδενί."
6. Οἴὕτως καὶ ᾿Επίέκουρος, ὅταν ἀναιρεῖν θέλῃ τὴν
A la > 4, Ἁ > lé
φυσικὴν κοινωνίαν ἀνθρώποις πρὸς ἀλλήλους,
7 αὐτῷ τῷ ἀναιρουμένῳ συγχρῆται. τί γὰρ λέγει;
“ \ Ε] -“ Μ ,
μὴ ἐξαπατᾶσθε, ἄνθρωποι, μηδὲ παράγεσθε
μηδὲ διαπίπτετε' οὐκ ἔστι φυσικὴ κοινωνία τοῖς
λογικοῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους: πιστεύσατέ μοι. οἱ
δὲ τὰ ἕτερα λέγοντες ἐξαπατῶσιν ὑμᾶς καὶ
8 παραλογίζονται." τί οὖν σοι μέλει; ἄφες ἡμᾶς
> ‘el / a > /
ἐξαπατηθῆναι. μή τι χεῖρον ἀπαλλάξεις, ἂν
/ e Μ' - i / >
πάντες οἱ ἄλλοι πεισθῶμεν, ὅτι φυσική ἐστιν
¢ «a , \ > , Ν 4 »
ἡμῖν κοινωνία πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ ταύτην δεῖ
παντὶ τρόπῳ φυλάσσειν ; καὶ πολὺ κρεῖσσον
καὶ ἀσφαλέστερον. ἄνθρωπε, τί ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν
φροντίζεις, τί δι’ ἡμᾶς ἀγρυπνεῖς, τί λύχνον
ef / > / / fel /
antes, τί ἐπανίστασαι, τί τηλικαῦτα βιβλία
συγγράφεις ; μή τις ἡμῶν ἐξαπατηθῇ περὶ θεῶν
e b ΄ by , A ΄ ”
ὡς ἐπιμελουμένων ἀνθρώπων ἢ μή Tis ἄλλην
10 οὐσίαν ὑπολάβῃ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἢ ἡδονήν; εἰ γὰρ
ef a ΝΜ Ν , \ fol
οὕτως ταῦτα ἔχει, βαλὼν κάθευδε καὶ τὰ τοῦ
, /
σκώληκος ποίει, ὧν ἄξιον ἔκρινας σεαυτόν" ἔσθιε
καὶ πῖνε καὶ συνουσίαζε καὶ ἀφόδευε καὶ ῥέγκε.
11 τί δὲ σοὶ μέλει, πῶς οἱ ἄχλοι ὑπολήψονται περὶ
- a / \ x
τούτων, πότερον ὑγιῶς ἢ OVX ὑγιῶς ; TL yap σοὶ

372

©

BOOK II. xx. 5-11

is I who tell you this and I will prove it to you, if you
wish,’ what difference is there between these persons
and—whom shall 1 say ?—those who call themselves
Academics? “Ὁ men,” say the Academics, “ give
your assent to the statement that no man assents to
any statement ; believe us when we say that no man
can believe anybody.”

So also Epicurus, when he wishes to do away
with the natural fellowship of men with one another,
at the same time makes use of the very principle
that he is doing away with. For what does he
say? “Be not deceived, men, nor led astray, nor
mistaken; there is no natural fellowship with
one another among rational beings; believe me.
Those who say the contrary are deceiving you and
leading you astray with false reasons.’ Why do
you care, then? Allow us to be deceived. Will
you fare any the worse, if all the rest of us are
persuaded that we do have a natural fellowship with
one another, and that we ought by all means to
guard it? Nay, your position will be much better
and safer. Man, why do you worry about us, why
keep vigil on our account, why light your lamp, why
rise betimes, why write such big books? Is it to
keep one or another of us from being deceived into
the belief that the gods care for men, or is it
to keep one or another of us from supposing that
the nature of the good is other than pleasure? For
if this is so, off to your couch and sleep, and lead
the life of a worm, of which you have judged your-
self worthy ; eat and drink and copulate and defe-
cate and snore. What do you care how the rest of
mankind will think about these matters, or whether
their ideas be sound or not? For what have you to

373

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

καὶ ἡμῖν; τῶν yap προβάτων σοι μέλει, ὅτι

12

13

14

1ὅ

16

17

παρέχει ἡμῖν αὑτὰ Kapnoopeva Kal ἀμελχθη-
σόμενα καὶ τὸ τελευταῖον κατακοπησόμενα ; οὐχὶ
δ᾽ εὐκταῖον ἦν, εἰ ἐδύναντο οἱ ἄνθρωποι κατα-
κηληθέντες καὶ ἐπᾳσθέντες ὑπὸ τῶν Στωικῶν
ἀπονυστάζειν καὶ παρέχειν σοι καὶ τοῖς ὁμοίοις
καρησομένους καὶ ἀμελχχθησομένους ἑαυτούς ;
πρὸς γὰρ τοὺς Συνεπικουρείους ἔδει σε ταῦτα
λέγειν, οὐχὶ δὲ πρὸς ἐκείνους ἀποκρύπτεσθαι,
καὶ πολὺ μάλιστ᾽ ἐκείνους πρὸ πάντων ἀνα-
πείθειν, ὅτι φύσει κοινωνικοὶ γεγόναμεν, ὅτι
ἀγαθὸν ἡ ἐγκράτεια, ἵνα σοι πάντα τηρῆται; ἢ
πρός Twas μὲν δεῖ φυλάττειν ταύτην τὴν κοι-
νωνίαν, πρός τινας δ᾽ οὔ; πρὸς τίνας οὖν δεῖ
τηρεῖν; πρὸς τοὺς ἀντιτηροῦντας ἢ πρὸς τοὺς
παραβατικῶς αὐτῆς ἔχοντας ; καὶ τίνες παρα-
βατικώτερον αὐτῆς ἔχουσιν ὑμῶν τῶν ταῦτα
διειληφότων ;
Τί οὖν ἦν τὸ ἐγεῖρον αὐτὸν ἐκ τῶν ὕπνων καὶ
ἀναγκάζον γράφειν ἃ ἔγραφεν ; τί γὰρ ἄλλο ἢ
τὸ πάντων τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἰσχυρότατον, ἡ
φύσις ἕλκουσα ἐπὶ τὸ αὑτῆς βούλημα ἄκοντα
καὶ στένοντα; “ὅτι γὰρ δοκεῖ σοι ταῦτα τὰ
ἀκοινώνητα, γράψον αὐτὰ καὶ ἄλλοις ἀπόλιπε
καὶ ἀγρύπνησον dt αὐτὰ καὶ αὐτὸς ἔργῳ κατήγο-
ρος γενοῦ τῶν σαυτοῦ δογμάτων." εἶτα ᾿᾽Ορέστην
μὲν ὑπὸ ᾿Ερινύων ἐλαυνόμενον φῶμεν ἐκ τῶν
ὕπνων ἐξεγείρεσθαι" τούτῳ δ᾽ οὐ χαλεπώτεραι
αἱ ᾿Ερινύες καὶ ἸΠοιναΐ; ἐξήγειρον καθεύδοντα
καὶ οὐκ εἴων ἠρεμεῖν, ἀλλ᾽ ἠνάγκαζον ἐξαγγέν-
λειν τὰ αὑτοῦ κακὰ ὥσπερ τοὺς Γάλλους ἡ μανία
1 Added by Wolf.

374

OO ae ee

—
a. “4
aa ae ἢ

BOOK II. xx. 11-17

do with us? Come, do you interest yourself in
sheep because they allow themselves to be shorn by
us, and milked, and finally to be butchered and cut
up? Would it not be desirable if men could be
charmed and bewitched into slumber by the Stoics
and allow themselves to be shorn and milked by
you and your kind? Is not this something that you
ought to have said to your fellow Epicureans
only and to have concealed your views from out-
siders, taking special pains to persuade them, of
all people, that we are by nature born with a sense
of fellowship, and that self-control] is a good thing,
so that everything may be kept for you? Or ought
we to maintain this fellowship with some, but not
with others? With whom, then, ought we to main-
tain it? With those who reciprocate by maintaining
it with us, or with those who are transgressors of it ?
' And who are greater transgressors of it than you
Epicureans who have set up such doctrines ?

What, then, was it that roused Epicurus from his
slumbers and compelled him to write what he did?
What else but that which is the strongest thing in
men—nature, which draws a man to do her will
though he groans and is reluctant? “For,” says
she, “since you hold these anti-social opinions,
write them down and bequeathe them to others and
give up your sleep because of them and become
in fact yourself the advocate to denounce your own
doctrines.’’ Shall we speak of Orestes as being
pursued by the Furies and roused from his slumbers?
But are not the Furies and the Avengers that
beset Epicurus more savage? They roused him
from sleep and would not let him rest, but compelled
him to herald his own miseries, just as madness and

375

18

19

20

21

22

23

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

καὶ ὁ οἶνος. οὕτως ἰσχυρόν τι καὶ ἀνίκητόν
ἐστιν ἡ φύσις ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη. πῶς γὰρ δύναται
ἄμπελος μὴ ἀμπελικῶς κινεῖσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ ἐλαικῶς,
KA > 7 , \ > r 3 ᾽ > ζ a
ἢ ἐλαία πάλιν μὴ ἐλαικῶς, ἀλλ ἀμπελικῶς ;
ἀμήχανον, ἀδιανόητον. οὐ τοίνυν οὐδ᾽ ἄνθρωπον
οἷόν τε παντελῶς ἀπολέσαι τὰς κινήσεις τὰς
ἀνθρωπικὰς καὶ οἱ ἀποκοπτόμενοι τάς γε προ-
θυμίας τὰς τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἀποκόψασθαι οὐ δύναν-
ται. οὕτως καὶ ᾿Επίκουρος τὰ μὲν ἀνδρὸς πάντ᾽
ἀπεκόψατο καὶ τὰ οἰκοδεσπότου καὶ πολίτου

Ν I Ν \ / \ > \
καὶ φίλου, tas δὲ προθυμίας τὰς ἀνθρωπικὰς
> > > \ QO 7 > al a
οὐκ ἀπεκόψατο' ov yap ἠδύνατο, οὐ μᾶλλον. ἢ
οἱ ἀταλαίπωροι ᾿Ακαδημαϊκοὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις τὰς
αὑτῶν ἀποβαλεῖν ἢ ἀποτυφλῶσαι δύνανται Kai-
TOL τοῦτο μάλεστα πάντων ἐσπουδακότες.

3 n

Q τῆς 1 ἀτυχίας" λαβών τις παρὰ τῆς
φύσεως μέτρα καὶ κανόνας εἰς ἐπίγνωσιν τῆς
ἀληθείας οὐ προσφιλοτεχνεῖ τούτοις προσθεῖναι
καὶ προσεξεργάσασθαι τὰ λείποντα, ἀλλὰ πᾶν
τοὐναντίον, εἴ τι καὶ ἔχει" γνωριστικὸν τῆς
ἀληθείας, ἐξαιρεῖν πειρῶται καὶ ἀπολλύειν. τί
λέγεις, φιλόσοφε; τὸ εὐσεβὲς καὶ τὸ ὅσιον ποῖόν
τί σοι φαίνεται ; > “ap θέλῃς, κατασκευάσω ὅτι
ἀγαθόν." ναὶ κατασκεύασον, ἵν᾽ οἱ πολῖται ἡμῶν
ἐπιστραφέντες τιμῶσι τὸ θεῖον καὶ παύσωνταί
ποτε ῥᾳθυμοῦντες περὶ τὰ μέγιστα. “ ἔχεις οὖν
τὰς κατασκευάς ;” ἔχω καὶ χάριν οἷδα. “ ἐπεὶ

1 Schenk! : τί (σ added later) 4 S.
2 Schenkl: ἐκεῖ S.

1 Priests of Cybele who mutilated themselves in frenzy.

376

- BOOK II. xx. 17-23

wine compel the Galli Such a powerful and in-
vincible thing is the nature of man. For how can
a vine be moved to act, not like a vine, but like an
olive, or again an olive to act, not like an olive,
but like a vine? It is impossible, inconceivable.
Neither, then, is it possible for a man absolutely to
lose the affections of a man, and those who cut off
their bodily organs are unable to cut off the really
important thing—their sexual desires. So with
Epicurus: he cut off everything that characterizes
a man, the head of a household, a citizen, and a
friend, but he did not succeed in cutting off the
desires of human beings; for that he could not do,
any more than the easy-going? Academics are able to
cast away or blind their own sense-perceptions,
although they have made every effort to do so.

Ah, what a misfortune! Aman has received from
nature measures and standards for discovering the
truth, and then does not go on and take the pains to
add to these and to work out additional principles
to supply the deficiencies, but does exactly the
opposite, endeavouring to take away and destroy
whatever faculty he does possess for discovering the
truth. What do you say, philosopher? What is
your opinion of piety and sanctity? “If you wish,
I shall prove that it is good.” By all means, prove
it, that our citizens may be converted and may
honour the Divine and at last cease to be indifferent
about the things that are of supreme importance.
“Do you, then, possess the proofs?” I do, thank
heaven. “Since, then, you are quite satisfied with

2 That is, unwilling to think matters through to a logical

end. The meaning of the expression comes out clearly in
the following section.

_ VOL. I, ὃ. 332

24

25

26

27

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

οὖν ταῦτά σοι λίαν ἀρέσκει, λάβε τὰ ἐναντία"
ὅτι θεοὶ οὔτ᾽ εἰσίν, εἴ τε καὶ εἰσίν, οὐκ ἐπιμε-
λοῦνται ἀνθρώπων οὐδὲ κοινόν τι ἡμῖν ἐστι πρὸς
αὐτοὺς τό T εὐσεβὲς τοῦτο καὶ ὅσιον παρὰ τοῖς
πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις λαλούμενον κατάψευσμά
ἐστιν ἀλαζόνων ἀνθρώπων καὶ σοφιστῶν ἢ νὴ
Δία ORD ts εἰς φόβον καὶ ἐπίσχεσιν τῶν
ἀδικούντων." » φιλόσοφε: ,ὠφέλησας ἡμῶν
τοὺς πολίτας, ΠΡ ΣΟ τοὺς νέους ῥέποντας ἤδ
πρὸς καταφρόνησιν τῶν θείων. “τί οὖν ; οὐκ
ἀρέσκει σοι ταῦτα ; λάβε νῦν, πῶς ἧ δικαιοσύνη
οὐδέν ἐ ἐστιν, πῶς ἡ αἰδὼς μωρία ἐστίν, πῶς πατὴρ
οὐδέν ἐστιν, πῶς ὁ υἱὸς οὐδέν ἐστιν." εὖ, φιλό-
σοφε' ἐπίμενε, πεῖθε τοὺς νέους, ἵνα πλείονας
ἔχωμεν ταὐτά σοι πεπονθότας καὶ λέγοντας. ἐκ
τούτων τῶν λόγων ηὐξήθησαν ἡμῖν αἱ εὐνομού-
μεναι πόλεις, Λακεδαίμων διὰ τούτους τοὺς
λόγους ἐγένετο, Λυκοῦργος ταῦτα τὰ πείσματα
ἐνεποίησεν αὐτοῖς διὰ τῶν νόμων αὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς
παιδείας, ὅτι οὔτε τὸ δουλεύειν αἰσχρόν ἐστι
μᾶλλον ἢ καλὸν οὔτε τὸ ἐλευθέρους εἶναι καλὸν
μᾶλλον ἢ αἰσχρόν, οἱ ἐν Θερμοπύλαις ἀποθα-
νόντες διὰ ταῦτα τὰ δόγματα ἀπέθανον, Αθηναῖοι
δὲ τὴν πόλιν διὰ ποίους ἄλλους λόγους ἀπέλιπον ;
εἶτα οἱ λέγοντες ταῦτα γαμοῦσι καὶ παιδοποι-
οὔνται καὶ πολιτεύονται καὶ ἱερεῖς καθιστᾶσιν
αὑτοὺς καὶ προφήτας. τίνων ; τῶν οὐκ ὄντων"
καὶ τὴν Πυθίαν ἀνακρίνουσιν αὐτοί, ἵνα τὰ ψευδῆ
πύθωνται, καὶ ἄλλοις τοὺς χρησμοὺς ἐξηγοῦνται.
ὦ μεγάλης ἀναισχυντίας καὶ γοητείας.

1 The Athenians twice abandoned their city, once in 480 Β.6.,
and again in 479 B.o., rather than submit to the Persians.

378

BOOK If. xx. 23-27

all this, hear the contrary: The gods do not exist,
and even if they do, they pay no attention to men,
nor have we any fellowship with them, and hence
this piety and sanctity which the multitude talk about
is a lie told by impostors and sophists, or, I swear,
by legislators to frighten and restrain evildoers.”
Well done, philosopher! You have conferred a
service upon our citizens, you have recovered our
young men who were already inclining to despise
things divine. “What then? Does not all this
satisfy you? Learn now how righteousness is
nothing, how reverence is folly, how a father is
nothing, how a son is nothing.” Well done,
philosopher! Keep at it; persuade the young men,
that we may have more who feel and speak as you
do. It is from principles like these that our well-
governed states have grown great! Principles like
these have made Sparta what it was! These are
the convictions which Lycurgus wrought into the
Spartans by his laws and his system of education,
namely that neither is slavery base rather than
noble, nor freedom noble rather than base! Those
who died at Thermopylae died because of these
judgements regarding slavery and freedom! And
for what principles but these did the men of Athens
give up their city? And then those who talk thus
marry and beget children and fulfil the duties of
citizens and get themselves appointed priests and
prophets! Priests and prophets of whom? Of
gods that do not exist! And they themselves con-
sult the Pythian priestess—in order to hear lies
and to interpret the oracles to others! Oh what
monstrous shamelessness and imposture!

379

28

30

31

32

33

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS.

"AvOpwre, τί ποιεῖς ; αὐτὸς σεαυτὸν ἐξελέγχεις
καθ᾽ ἡμέραν καὶ οὐ θέλεις ἀφεῖναι τὰ ψυχρὰ
ταῦτα ἐπιχειρήματα: ἐσθίων ποῦ φέρεις τὴν χεῖρα;
εἰς τὸ στόμα ἢ εἰς τὸν ὀφθαλμόν ; λουόμενος ποῦ
ἐμβαίνεις ; πότε τὴν χύτραν εἶπες λοπάδα ἢ τὴν
τορύνην ὀβελίσκον ; εἴ τινος αὐτῶν δοῦλος ἤμην,
εἰ καὶ ἔδει με καθ᾽ ἡμέραν ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ ἐκδέρεσθαι,
ἐγὼ ἂν αὐτὸν ἐστρέβλουν. “βάλε ἐλάδιον,
παιδάριον, εἰς τὸ βαλανεῖον. ἔβαλον ἂν γάριον
καὶ ἀπελθὼν κατὰ τῆς κεφαλῆς αὐτοῦ κατέχεον.
“τί τοῦτο; “φαντασία μοι ἐγένετο ἐλαίου
ἀδιάκριτος, ὁμοιοτάτη, νὴ τὴν σὴν τύχην."
““δὸς ὧδε τὴν πτισάνην." ἤνεγκα ἂν αὐτῷ
γεμίσας παροψίδα ὀξογάρου. ““οὐκ ἥτησα τὴν
πτισάνην ;᾿ “vat, κύριε: τοῦτο πτισάνη ἐστίν."
“τοῦτο οὐκ ἔστιν ὀξόγαρον ; " “τί μᾶλλον ἢ
πτισάνη ; “λάβε καὶ ὀσφράνθητι, λάβε καὶ
γεῦσαι. “πόθεν οὖν οἶδας, εἰ αἱ αἰσθήσεις
ἡμᾶς ψεύδονται ; " τρεῖς, τέσσαρας, τῶν συν-
δούλων εἰ ἔσχον ὁμονοοῦντας, ἀπάγξασθαι ἂν
αὐτὸν ἐποίησα ῥηγνύμενον ἢ μεταθέσθαι. νῦν δ᾽
ἐντρυφῶσιν ἡμῖν τοῖς μὲν παρὰ τῆς φύσεως διδο-
μένοις πᾶσι χρώμενοι, λόγῳ δ᾽ αὐτὰ ἀναιροῦντες.

Εὐχάριστοί γ᾽ ἄνθρωποι καὶ αἰδήμονες. εἰ

\ ες πο ’ Μ > ’ὔ a
μηδὲν ἄλλο καθ᾽ ἡμέραν ἄρτους ἐσθίοντες τολμῶσι
λέγειν ὅτι “ οὐκ οἴδαμεν, εἰ ἔστι τις Δημήτηρ ἡ
Κόρη ἢ Πλούτων: ἵνα μὴ λέγω, ὅτε νυκτὸς καὶ

1 There is an abrupt transition here from the Epicureans
to the Academics.

2 Demeter and Kore represent agriculture and the ‘ corn-
spirit.” Pluto is added as the personification of the darkness
of earth out of which the plants spring, and as the spouse of

380

BOOK II. xx. 28-33

Man, what are you doing?! You are confuting
your own self every day, and are you unwilling
to give up these frigid attempts of yours? When
you eat, where do you bring your hand? To your
mouth, or to youreye? When you take a bath, into
what do you step? When did you ever call the pota
plate, or the ladle a spit? If I were slave to one of
these men, even if I had to be soundly flogged by
him every day, I would torment him. “ Boy, throw
a little oil into the bath.” I would have thrown a
little fish sauce in, and as 1 left would pour it down
on his head. ‘‘ What does this mean?” “I had an
external impression that could not be distinguished
from olive oil; indeed, it was altogether like it. I
swear by your fortune.” “ Here, give me the gruel.”
I would have filled a side dish with vinegar and fish
sauce and brought it tohim. ‘ Did I not ask for the
gruel?” ‘‘ Yes, master; thisis gruel.” “Is not this
vinegar and fish sauce?’’ ‘ How so, any more than
gruel.” “Take and smell it, take and taste it.”
“ Well, how do you know, if the senses deceive us?”
If I had had three or four fellow-slaves who felt as I
did, I would have made him burst with rage and hang
himself, or else change his opinion. But as it is, such
men are toying with us; they use all the gifts of
nature, while in theory doing away with them.

Grateful men indeed and reverential: Why, if
nothing else, at least they eat bread every day, and
yet have the audacity to say, “ We do not know if
there is a Demeter, or a Kore, or a Pluto” 2; not to

Kore, or else, possibly, because he suggests the death of the
grain of corn before the new shoot appears. Cf. 1. Corinth.
ae cee That which thou sowest is not quickened, except
it die.

381

34

36

37

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

ς

ἡμέρας ἀπολαύοντες καὶ μεταβολῶν τοῦ ἔτους
καὶ ἄστρων καὶ θαλάσσης καὶ γῆς καὶ τῆς παρ᾽
ἀνθρώπων συνεργείας ὑπ᾽ οὐδενὸς τούτων οὐδὲ
κατὰ ποσὸν ἐπιστρέφονται, ἀλλὰ μόνον ἐξεμέσαι
τὸ προβλημάτιον ζητοῦσι καὶ τὸν στόμαχον γυ-
μνάσαντες ἀπελθεῖν ἐν βαλανείῳ. τί δ᾽ ἐροῦσι
καὶ περὶ τίνων ἢ πρὸς τίνας καὶ τί ἔσται αὐτοῖς
ἐκ τῶν λόγων τούτων, οὐδὲ κατὰ βραχὺ πεφρον-
τίκασι: μή τι νέος εὐγενὴς ἀκούσας τῶν λόγων
τούτων πάθῃ τι ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν ἢ καὶ παθὼν πάντ᾽
ἀπολέσῃ τὰ τῆς εὐγενείας σπέρματα' μή τινι
μοιχεύοντι ἀφορμὰς παράσχωμεν τοῦ ἀπαναι-
σχυντῆσαι πρὸς τὰ γινόμενα" μή τις τῶν νοσφι-
ζομένων τὰ δημόσια εὑρεσιλογίας τινὸς ἐπιλάβηται
ἀπὸ τῶν λόγων τούτων' μή τις τῶν αὑτοῦ γονέων
ἀμελῶν θράσος τι καὶ ἀπὸ τούτων προσλάβῃ.

Τί οὖν κατὰ σὲ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν, αἰσχρὸν 5 ἢ
καλόν; ταῦτα ἢ ταῦτα; τί οὖν; ἔτι τούτων
τις ἀντιλέγει τινὶ ἢ λόγον δίδωσιν ἢ λαμβάνει
ἢ μεταπείθειν πειρᾶται; πολὺ νὴ Δία μᾶλλον
τοὺς κιναίδους ἐλπίσαι τις ἂν μεταπείσειν ἢ
τοὺς ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἀποκεκωφωμένους καὶ ἄποτε-
τυφλωμένους.

κα΄. Περὶ ἀνομολογίας.

-“ \ . 4 a 3 \ Ν [ δί ε
Τῶν περὶ αὑτοὺς κακῶν ὃ τὰ μὲν ῥᾳδίως opo-
λογοῦσιν ἄνθρωποι, τὰ δ᾽ οὐ ῥᾳδίως. οὐδεὶς οὖν

1 εἰς βαλανεῖον Schenkl, but ef. I. 11, 32.

2 Added by Wolf.

8 τῶν. . . κακῶν transferred by Wendland from the end of
the preceding chapter.

382

BOOK Il. xx. 33-XXI. I

mention that, although they enjoy night and day, the
changes of the year and the stars and the sea and the
earth and the co-operation of men, they are not
moved in the least by any one of these things, but
look merely for a chance to belch out their trivial
“problem,” and after thus exercising their stomach
to go off to the bath. But what they are going to
say, or what they are going to talk about, or to whom,
and what their hearers are going to get out of these
things that they are saying, all this has never given
them a moment’s concern. I greatly fear that a
noble-spirited young man may hear these statements
and be influenced by them, or, having been influenced
already, may lose all the germs of the nobility which
he possessed; that we may be giving an adulterer
grounds for brazening out his acts; that some
embezzler of public funds may lay hold of a specious
plea based upon these theories ; that someone who
neglects his own parents may gain additional
affrontery from them.

What, then, in your opinion is good or bad, base or
noble? This or that? What then? Is there any
use in arguing further against any of these persons, or
giving them a reason, or listening to one of theirs, or
trying to convert them? By Zeus, one might much
rather hope to convert a filthy degenerate than men
who have become so deaf and blind!

CHAPTER XXI
Of inconsistency
Some of their faults men readily admit, but others
not so readily. Now no one will admit that he is

383

wo

“1

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

ε / ae.
ὁμολογήσει ὅτι ἄφρων ἐστὶν ἢ ἀνόητος, ἀχχὰ πᾶν
τοὐναντίον πάντων ἀκούσεις λεγόντων “ ὠφελον
€ / ” “ A 4 3 ” \
ὡς φρένας ἔχω οὕτως καὶ τύχην εἶχον." δειλοὺς
δὲ ῥᾳδίως ἑ ὺς ὁμολογοῦ ὶ λέ “ ἐγὰ
ῥᾳδίως ἑαυτοὺς ὁμολογοῦσι καὶ λέγουσιν “ ἐγὼ
, ΄ > c fal > »” ? >
δειλότερός εἰμι, ὁμολογῶ τὰ δ᾽ ἄλλ᾽ οὐχ
εὑρήσεις με μωρὸν ἄνθρωπον." ἀκρατῆ οὐ ῥᾳδίως
ε ν
ὁμολογήσει τις, ἄδικον οὐδ᾽ ὅλως, φθονερὸν οὐ
ΕΝ lal 7.
πάνυ ἢ περίεργον, ἐλεήμονα οἱ πλεῖστοι. τί οὖν
Ἁ
τὸ αἴτιον ; τὸ μὲν κυριώτατον ἀνομολογία καὶ
ταραχὴ ἐν τοῖς περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν, ἄλλοις δ᾽
ἄλλα αἴτια καὶ σχεδὸν ὅσα ἂν αἰσχρὰ φαντά-
a ΄, a Ν
ζωνται, ταῦτα οὐ πάνυ ὁμολογοῦσι" τὸ δὲ δειλὸν
> > ιν A / \ \
εἶναι εὐγνώμονος ἤθους φαντάζονται Kal TO ἐλε-
/ ἈΝ > 2 / < J lal > ,
ἥμονα, τὸ δ᾽ ἠλίθιον εἶναι παντελῶς ἀνδραπόδου"
καὶ τὰ περὶ κοινωνίαν δὲ πλημμελήματα οὐ πάνυ
προσίενται. ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν πλείστων ἁμαρτημάτων
κατὰ τοῦτο μάλιστα φέρονται ἐπὶ τὸ ὁμολογεῖν
αὐτά, ὅτι φαντάζονταί τι ἐν αὐτοῖς εἶναι ἀκούσιον
καθάπερ ἐν τῷ δειλῷ καὶ ἐλεήμονι. κἂν ἀκρατῆ
που παρομολογῇ τις αὑτόν, ἔρωτα προσέθηκεν,
ὥστε συγγνωσθῆναι ὡς ἐπ᾽ ἀκουσίῳ. τὸ δ᾽
” ᾽ an , > ΄ Ν
ἄδικον οὐδαμῶς φαντάζονται ἀκούσιον. ἔνι τι
καὶ τῷ ζηλοτύπῳ, ὡς οἴονται, τοῦ ἀκουσίου. διὰ
τοῦτο καὶ περὶ τούτου παρομολογοῦσιν.
Pi ,
Ἔν οὖν τοιούτοις ἀνθρώποις ἀναστρεφόμενον,
οὕτως τεταραγμένοις, οὕτως οὐκ εἰδόσιν οὔθ᾽ ὅ τι
wf? “{ ” \ a 22 7 x
λέγουσιν οὔθ᾽ ὅ τι ἔχουσιν κακὸν ἢ εἰ 5 ἔχουσιν ἢ
1 Shaftesbury: τι" οὐ 8. 2 Supplied by Schenkl.
384

BOOK II. xx. 1-8

foolish or unintelligent, but, quite the contrary, you
hear everyone say, “I wish I had as much luck as I
have sense.” But they readily admit that they are
timid, and say, “I am a bit timid, I admit; but in
general you will not find me to be a fool.” A man
will not readily admit that he is incontinent, not at
all that he is unjust, and will never admit that he is
envious or meddlesome; but most men will admit
that they are moved by pity. What is the reason for
this? The principal reason is confusion of thought
and an unwillingness to admit a fault in matters
which involve good and evil; but, apart from that,
different people are affected by different motives, and,
as a rule, they will never admit anything that they
conceive to be disgraceful; timidity, for example,
they conceive to be an indication of a prudent dispo-
sition, and the same is true of pity, but stupidity they
conceive to be a slave’s quality altogether ; also they
will never plead guilty to offences against society.
Now in the case of most errors, the principal reason
why men are inclined to admit them is because they
conceive that there is an involuntary element in
them, as, for instance, in timidity and pity. And if
a man ever does, grudgingly, admit that he is incon-
tinent, he adds that he is in love, expecting to be
excused as for an involuntary act. Butinjustice they
do not at all conceive of as involuntary. In jealousy
there is also, as they fancy, an element of the
involuntary, and therefore this too is a fault which
men grudgingly admit.

When such are the men we live among—so
confused, so ignorant both of what they mean by
“evil” and what evil quality they have, or whether
they have one, or, if so, how they come to have it, or

385

10

11

12

13

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

Tapa τί ἔχουσιν ἢ πῶς παύσονται αὐτῶν, Kal
αὐτὸν οἶμαι ἐφιστάνειν ἄξιον συνεχὲς “ μὴ που καὶ
A
αὐτὸς els εἰμι ἐκείνων ; τίνα φαντασίαν ἔχω περὶ
ἐμαυτοῦ ; πῶς ἐμαυτῷ χρῶμαι; μή τι καὶ αὐτὸς
ων \
ὡς φρονίμῳ, μή τι καὶ αὐτὸς ὡς ἐγκρατεῖ; μὴ
καὶ αὐτὸς λέγω ποτὲ ταῦτα, ὅτι εἰς τὸ ἐπιὸν
πεπαίδευμαι ; ἔχω ἣν δεῖ συναίσθησιν τὸν μηδὲν
> , isd > \ - Ψ X ‘ la
εἰδότα, ὅτι οὐδὲν olda; ἔρχομαι πρὸς τὸν διδά-
σκαλον ὡς ἐπὶ τὰ χρηστήρια πείθεσθαι παρε-
σκευασμίνος ; ἢ καὶ αὐτὸς κορύζης μεστὸς εἰς τὴν
σχολὴν εἰσέρχομαι μόνην τὴν ἱστορίαν μαθησό-
μενος καὶ τὰ βιβλία νοήσων, ἃ πρότερον οὐκ ἐνό-
x > Ὁ ’ \ > , ᾽ν
ουν, ἂν δ᾽ οὕτως τύχῃ, καὶ ἄλλοις ἐξηγησόμενος ;
ἄνθρωπ᾽, ἐν οἴκῳ διαπεπύκτευκας τῷ δουλαρίῳ,
τὴν οἰκίαν ἀνάστατον πεποίηκας, τοὺς γείτονας
συντετάραχας" καὶ ἔρχη μοι καταστολὰς ποιήσας
ὡς σοφὸς καὶ καθήμενος κρίνεις, πῶς ἐξηγησάμην
τὴν λέξιν, πρὸς ' τί ποτ᾽ ἐφλυάρησα τὰ ἐπελθόντα
μοι; φθονῶν ἐλήλυθας, τεταπεινωμένος, ὅτι σοι
ἐξ οἴκου φέρεται οὐδέν, καὶ κάθη μεταξὺ λεγο-
/ a / > \ ὑδὲ »” » θ 4 a
μένων τῶν λόγων AUTOS οὔδεν ἄλλο ἐνθυμούμενος ἢ
fal e A \ ἈΝ a -“ e Ἰὃ 4 “ Le}
TOS ὁ πατὴρ TA πρὸς σε ἢ πῶς ὁ ἀδελφός. “τί
λέγουσιν οἱ ἐκεῖ ἄνθρωποι περὶ ἐμοῦ ; νῦν οἴονταί
μὲ προκόπτειν καὶ λέγουσιν ὅτι ᾿ ἥξει ἐκεῖνος

1 Reiske and Koraes: πῶς 3.
2 Salmasius: τὰ 3.

1 Evidently the student depended upon his home for his
supplies,

386

BOOK ΠΙ: xx. 8-13

how they will get rid of it—among such men I
wonder whether it is not worth while for us also to
watch ourselves, each one asking himself the
questions: “Is it possible that I too am one of these
people? What conceit am I cherishing regarding
myself? How do I conduct myself? Do 1 for my
part act like a wise man? Do 1 for my part act like
a man of self-control? Do I for my part ever say
that I have been educated to meet whatever comes ?
Have I the consciousness, proper to a man who
knows nothing, that I do know nothing? Do | go
to my teacher, like one who goes to consult an
oracle, prepared to obey? Or do I, too, like a
sniffing child, go to school to learn only the history
of philosophy and to understand the books which I
did not understand before, and, if chance offers, to
explain them to others?’’ Man, at home you have
fought a regular prize-fight with your slave, you
have driven your household into the street, you have
disturbed your neighbours’ peace; and now do you
come to me with a solemn air, like a philosopher,
and sitting down pass judgement on the explanation
I gave of the reading of the text and on the
application, forsooth, of the comments I made as I
babbled out whatever came into my head? You
have come in a spirit of envy, in a spirit of
humiliation because nothing is being sent you from
home,! and you sit there while the lecture is going
on, thinking, on your part, of nothing in the world
but how you stand with your father or your brother!
You reflect: “What are my people at home
saying about me? At this moment they are
thinking that I am making progress in my studies,
and they are saying ‘He will know everything

387

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

Ι4 πάντα εἰδώς. ἤθελόν πώς ποτε πάντα μαθὼν

ιδ

ἐπανελθεῖν, ἀλλὰ πολλοῦ πόνου χρεία καὶ οὐδεὶς
οὐδὲν πέμπει καὶ ἐν Νικοπόλει σαπρῶς λούει τὰ
βαλανεῖα καὶ ἐν οἴκῳ κακῶς καὶ ὧδε κακῶς."
Εἶτα λέγουσιν “οὐδεὶς ὠφελεῖται ἐκ τῆς
rn » / cd > , ΄ὔ 4
σχολῆς." τίς yap ἔρχεται εἰς σχολήν, τίς γάρ,
ε , ig / © a.
ὡς θεραπευθησόμενος ; Tis ὡς παρέξων αὑτοῦ τὰ
δόγματα ἐκκαθαρθησόμενα, τίς συναισθησόμενος

16 τίνων δεῖται; τί οὖν θαυμάζετ᾽, εἰ ἃ φέρετ᾽ εἰς

\ / > \ Led > / 4 >
τὴν σχολὴν, αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἀποφέρετε πάλιν; οὐ
γὰρ ὡς ἀποθησόμενον ἢ ἐπανορθώσοντες ἢ

17 ἄλλ᾽ ἀντ᾽ αὐτῶν ληψόμενοι ἔρχεσθε. πόθεν;

ι8

ι9

οὐδ᾽ ἐγγύς. ἐκεῖνο γοῦν βλέπετε μᾶλλον, εἰ
ἐφ᾽ ὃ ἔρχεσθε τοῦτο ὑμῖν γίνεται. θέλετε λαλεῖν
περὶ τῶν θεωρημάτων. τί οὖν ; οὐ φλυαρότεροι
γίνεσθε; οὐχὶ δὲ παρέχει τινὰ ὕλην ὑμῖν πρὸς
τὸ ἐπιδείκνυσθαι τὰ θεωρημάτια ; οὐ συλλο-
γισμοὺς ἀναλύετε, μεταπίπτοντας ; οὐκ ἐφοδεύετε
Ψευδομένου λήμματα, ὑποθετικούς ; τί οὖν ἔτι
ἀγανακτεῖτε εἰ ἐφ᾽ ἃ πάρεστε, ταῦτα λαμβάνετε ;
“ναί: ἀλλ᾿’ ἂν ἀποθάνῃ μου τὸ παιδίον ἢ ὁ
ἀδελφὸς ἢ ἐμὲ ἀποθνήσκειν δέῃ ἢ στρεβλοῦσθαι,
τί με τὰ τοιαῦτα 52 ὠφελήσει; " μὴ γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῦτο
ἦλθες, μὴ γὰρ τούτου ἕνεκά μοι παρακάθησαι, μὴ
γὰρ διὰ τοῦτό ποτε λύχνον ἧψας ἢ ἠγρύπνησας ;

1 Supplied by Wolf. 3 Meibom: μετὰ ταῦτα 8.

1 See II. 17, 34, and note.
388

BOOK II. χχι. 13-19

when he comes back home!’ I did want, at one
time, I suppose, to learn everything before going back
home, but that requires a great deal of hard work,
and nobody sends me anything, and at Nicopolis
they have rotten accommodations at the baths, and
my lodgings are bad, and the school here is bad.”
And then people say: “Nobody gets any good
from going to school.” Well, who goes to school—
who, I repeat—with the expectation of being cured?
Who with the expectation of submitting his own
- judgements for purification? Who with the ex-
pectation of coming to a realization of what
judgements he needs? Why, then, are you sur-
prised, if you carry back home from your school
precisely the judgements you bring to it? For you
do not come with the expectation of laying them
aside, or of correcting them, or of getting others in
exchange for them. Not at all, nor anything like
it. Look rather to this at least—whether you
are getting what you came for. You want to be
able to speak fluently about philosophic principles.
Well, are you not becoming more of an idle
babbler? Do not these petty philosophic principles
supply you with material for making exhibitions?
Do you not resolve syllogisms, and arguments with
equivocal premisses? Do you not examine the
assumptions in The Liar} syllogism, and in hypo-
thetical syllogisms? Why, then, are you still
vexed, if you are getting what you came for?
“Yes, but if my child or my brother dies, or if I
must die, or be tortured, what good will such things
dome?” But was it really for this that you came?
Is it really for this that you sit by my side? Did
you ever really light your lamp, or work late at

389

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

ἢ eis τὸν περίπατον ἐξελθὼν προέβαλές ποτε
a / Ν ) »" Ν
σαυτῷ φαντασίαν τινὰ ἀντὶ συλλογισμοῦ καὶ

20 ταύτην κοινῇ ἐφωδεύσατε; ποῦ ποτε; εἶτα

21

ce

ἄχρηστα τὰ θεωρήματα." τίσιν ; τοῖς
> ε »" 4 ον >

οὐχ ws δεῖ χρωμένοις. τὰ yap κολλύρια οὐκ
ἄχρηστα τοῖς ὅτε δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ ἐγχριομένοις, τὰ
μαλάγματα δ᾽ οὐκ ἄχρηστα, οἱ ἁλτῆρες οὐκ
ἄχρηστοι, ἀλλὰ τισὶν ἄχρηστοι, τισὶν πάλιν
χρήσιμοι. ἄν μου πυνθάνῃ νῦν “ χρήσιμοί εἰσιν
οἱ συλλογισμοί ;" ἐρῶ σοι ὅτι χρήσιμοι, κἂν
θέλῃς, ἀποδείξω πῶς. “ἐμὲ οὖν τι ὠφελήκασιν ; ἢ
ΝΜ \ \ ? 4 > Ν ἤ >

ἄνθρωπε, μὴ yap ἐπύθου, εἰ σοὶ χρήσιμοι, ἀλλὰ

λέγετε

22 καθόλου; πυθέσθω μου καὶ ὁ δυσεντερικός, εἰ

ἢ " ‘yn ὦ ΄ ic De ΟΦ
χρήσιμον ὄξος, ἐρῶ ὅτι χρήσιμον. “ἐμοὶ οὖν
χρήσιμον ; ᾿ ἐρῶ “ov. ζήτησον πρῶτον σταλῆναί

A cn 8 ΄ > fol >” \
gov τὸ ῥεῦμα, τὰ EXKVOpLA ἀπουλωθῆναι." Kal
ὑμεῖς, ἄνδρες, τὰ ἕλκη πρῶτον θεραπεύετε, τὰ

a /

ῥεύματα ἐπιστήσατε, ἠρεμήσατε τῇ διανοίᾳ,
ἀπερίσπαστον αὐτὴν ἐνέγκατε εἰς τὴν σχολήν"
καὶ γνώσεσθε οἵαν ἰσχὺν ὁ λόγος ἔχει.

κβ΄. Περὶ φιλίας.
Περὶ ἅ τις ἐσπούδακεν, φιλεῖ ταῦτα εἰκότως.
μή τι οὖν περὶ τὰ κακὰ ἐσπουδάκασιν οἱ ἄνθρω-
fal ἈΝ
ποι; οὐδαμῶς. ἀλλὰ μή τι περὶ τὰ μηδὲν πρὸς
390

‘BOOK II. xxt. r9-xxu. 1

night, for this? Or when you went out into the
covered walk did you ever set before yourself,
instead of a syllogism, some external impression and
examine this with your fellow-students? When did
you ever do that? And then you say, “The
principles are useless.” To whom? To those who
do not use them properly. For instance, eye-salves
are not useless to those who rub them on when and
as they ought, and poultices are not useless,
jumping-weights are not useless; but they are
useless to some people, and, on the other hand,
useful to others. If you ask me now, “Are our
syllogisms useful?” I will tell you that they are,
and, if you wish, I will show how they are useful.
“ Have they, then, helped me at all?” Man, you
did not ask, did you? whether they are useful to
you, but whether they are useful in general? Let
the man who is suffering from dysentery ask me
whether vinegar is useful; I will tell him that it is
useful. “Is it useful, then, to me?’ I will say,
“No. Seek first to have your discharge stopped,
the little ulcers healed.” So do you also, men, first
cure your ulcers, stop your discharges, be tranquil in
mind, bring it free from distraction into the school;
and then you will know what power reason has,

CHAPTER XXII
Of friendship
WuaTeverR a man is interested in he naturally
loves. Now do men take an interest in things evil ?

Not at all. Well, and do they take an interest in
things which in no respect concern them? No, not

391

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

> , > Ν | lel e ’
2 αὐτούς ; οὐδὲ περὶ ταῦτα. ὑπολείπεται τοίνυν
8 περὶ μόνα τὰ ἀγαθὰ ἐσπουδακέναι αὐτούς" εἰ
δ᾽ > ὃ / 2 a nm .“ =
ἐσπουδακέναι, καὶ φιλεῖν ταῦτα. ὅστις οὖν
> a > la > / Φ x a.
ἀγαθῶν ἐπιστήμων ἐστίν, οὗτος ἂν καὶ φιλεῖν
> ! a
εἰδείη: ὁ δὲ μὴ δυνάμενος διακρῖναι τὰ ἀγαθὰ
ἀπὸ τῶν κακῶν καὶ τὰ οὐδέτερα ἀπ᾿ ἀμφοτέρων
πῶς ἂν ἔτι οὗτος φιλεῖν δύναιτο; τοῦ φρονίμου
τοίνυν ἐστὶ μόνου τὸ φιλεῖν.
4 Καὶ πῶς; φησίν: ἐγὼ γὰρ ἄφρων dv ὅμως
5 φιλῶ μου τὸ παιδίον.---αυμάζξω μὲν νὴ τοὺς
θεούς, πῶς καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ὡμολόγηκας ἄφρονα
εἶναν σεαυτόν. τί γάρ σοι λείπει; οὐ χρῇ
Ld / > ld / > \
αἰσθήσει, ov φαντασίας διακρίνεις, ov τροφὰς
προσφέρῃ τὰς ἐπιτηδείους τῷ σώματι, οὐ σκέπην,
> ΝΜ , Φ e ne Μ Φ
6 οὐκ οἴκησιν ; πόθεν οὖν ὁμολογεῖς ἄφρων εἶναι;
ὅτι νὴ Δία πολλάκις ἐξίστασαι ὑπὸ τῶν φαντα-
σιῶν καὶ ταράττῃ καὶ ἡττῶσίν σε αἱ πιθανότητες
> a \ \ \ fol ? Y ft ΄
αὐτῶν: καὶ ποτὲ μὲν ταῦτα ἀγαθὰ ὑπολαμβάνεις,
εἶτα ἐκεῖνα αὐτὰ κακά, ὕστερον δ᾽ οὐδέτερα" καὶ
ὅλως λυπῇ, φοβῇ, φθονεῖς, ταράσσῃ, μεταβάλλῃ:
7 διὰ ταῦτα ὁμολογεῖς ἄφρων εἶναι. ἐν δὲ τῷ
φιλεῖν οὐ μεταβάλλῃ; ἀλλὰ πλοῦτον μὲν καὶ
ἡδονὴν καὶ ἁπλῶς αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα ποτὲ μὲν
ἀγαθὰ ὑπολαμβάνεις εἶναι, ποτὲ δὲ κακά: ἀνθρώ-
πους δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς οὐχὶ ποτὲ μὲν ἀγαθούς, ποτὲ
>
δὲ κακοὺς Kal ποτὲ μὲν οἰκείως ἔχεις, ποτὲ ὃ

392

BOOK II. xxm. 1-7

in these, either. It remains, therefore, that men
take an interest in good things only; and if they
take an interest in them, they love them. Whoever,
then, has knowledge of good things, would know
how to love them too; but when a man is unable
to distinguish things good from things evil, and
what is neither good nor evil from both the others,
how could he take the next step and have the
power to love? Accordingly, the power to love
belongs to the wise man and to him alone,

How so? says someone; for I am foolish myself,
but yet I love my child.—By the gods, I am sur-
prised at you; at the very outset you have admitted
that you are foolish. For something is lacking in
you; what is it? Do you not use sense perception,
do you not distinguish between external impressions,
d6 you not supply the nourishment for your body
that is suitable to it, and shelter, and a dwelling?
How comes it, then, that you admit you are foolish ἢ
Because, by Zeus, you are frequently bewildered
and disturbed by your external impressions, and
overcome by their persuasive character; and at one
moment you consider these things good, and then
again you consider them, though the very same,
evil, and later on as neither good nor evil; and, in
a word, you are subject to pain, fear, envy, turmoil,
and change; that is why you are foolish, as you
admit you are. And in loving are you not change-
able? But as for wealth, and pleasure, and, in a
word, material things, do you not consider them
at one moment good, at another bad? And do you
not consider the same persons at one moment good,
and at another bad, and do you not at one moment
feel friendly towards them, and at another unfriendly,

393

10

11

12

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

> Ὁ lal Lal
ἐχθρῶς αὐτοῖς, καὶ ποτὲ μὲν ἐπαινεῖς, ποτὲ δὲ
/ ‘ a
ψέγεις ;—Nai καὶ ταῦτα racyo—Ti οὖν; ὁ
> / , -“
ἐξηπατημένος περί τινος δοκεῖ coe φίλος εἶναι
> n «
αὐτοῦ ;---Οὐ πάνυ.----Ο δὲ μεταπτώτως ἑλόμενος
αὐτὸν εἶναι εὔνους ῖ αὐτῷ ;---Οὐδ᾽ οὗτος.---Ὁ δὲ
νῦν λοιδορῶν μέν τινα, ὕστερον δὲ θαυμάζων ;---
Οὐδ᾽ οὗτος.---Τί οὖν ; κυνάρια οὐδέποτ᾽ εἶδες σαί-
\ / > ᾿ 7? Μ
νοντα καὶ προσπαίζοντα ἀλλήλοις, ἵν᾿ εἴπῃς
ε ὑδὲ , ” > 7 ῳΨ ν | oie |
οὐδὲν hirtxwtepov” ; ἀλλ᾽ ὅπως ἴδης, τί ἐστι
/ / la > / \ , ,
φιλία, βάλε κρέας εἰς μέσον καὶ γνώσῃ. βάλε
καὶ σοῦ καὶ τοῦ παιδίου μέσον ἀγρίδιον καὶ
, fal ‘
γνώσῃ, πῶς σὲ τὸ παιδίον ταχέως κατορύξαι
θέλει καὶ σὺ τὸ παιδίον εὔχῃ ἀποθανεῖν. εἶτα
σὺ πάλιν “οἷον ἐξέθρεψα τεκνίον: πάλαι ἐκφέ-
ρει." βάλε κορασίδιον κομψὸν καὶ αὐτὸ ὁ
γέρων φιλεῖ κἀκεῖνος ὁ νέος: ἂν δέ, δοξάριον. ἂν
δὲ κινδυνεῦσαι δέῃ, ἐρεῖς τὰς φωνὰς τὰς τοῦ
᾿Αδμήτου πατρός"

θέλεις βλέπειν φῶς, πατέρα δ᾽ οὐ θέλειν
δοκεῖς ; 3 ᾿

» μι > a > ᾿ / \ » , nd
οἴει ὅτι ἐκεῖνος οὐκ ἐφίλει τὸ ἴδιον παιδίον, ὅτε
μικρὸν ἦν, οὐδὲ πυρέσσοντος αὐτοῦ ἠγωνία οὐδ᾽
ἔλεγεν πολλάκις ὅτι “ὦφελον ἐγὼ μᾶλλον
ἐπύρεσσον᾽᾽; εἶτα ἐλθόντος τοῦ πράγματος καὶ

1 Wolf: εὔνουν 8.

2 Quoted from memory. That of Euripides give χαίρεις
ὁρῶν. .. χαίρειν δοκεῖς. That of Epictetus gives both
versions, but the correct version, preceding the incorrect,
was bracketed by Elter.

1 Euripides, A/cestis, 691, Browning’s translation. Οὐ. the
critical note. Admetus had been reproaching his father for
not being willing to die in his stead.

394

BOOK II. xxn. 7-12

and at one moment praise them, while at another
you blame them?—Yes, I am subject to exactly
these emotions.—What then? Do you think that
the man who has been deceived about someone can
be his friend?—-No, indeed.—And can the man
whose choice of a friend is subject to change show
good will to that friend ?—No, neither can he.—
And the man who now reviles someone, and later
on admires him?—No, neither can he.—What
then? Did you never see dogs fawning on one
another and playing with one another, so that you
say, “Nothing could be more friendly”? But to
see what their friendship amounts to, throw a piece
of meat between them and you will find out. Throw
likewise between yourself and your son a small piece
of land, and you will find out how much your son
wants to bury you, the sooner the better, and how
earnestly you pray for your son’s death. Then you
will change your mind again and say, “What a child
I have brought up! All this time he has been ready
to carry me to my grave.” Throw between you a

tty wench, and the old man as well as the young
one falls in love with her; or, again, a bit of glory.
And if you have to risk your life you will say what
the father of Admetus did :

“Thou joyest seeing daylight: dost suppose
Thy father joys not too?’’?

Do you imagine that he did not love his own child
when it was small, and that he was not in agony
when it had the fever, and that he did not say over
and over again, “If only I had the fever instead”?
And then, when the test comes and is upon him,

395

I3

14

15

16

17

18

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

ἐγγίσαντος ὅρα οἵας φωνὰς ἀφιᾶσιν. ὁ ᾿Ετεοκλῆς
καὶ ὁ Πολυνείκης οὐκ ἦσαν ἐκ τῆς αὐτῆς μητρὸς
καὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πατρός ; οὐκ ἦσαν συντεθραμμένοι,
συμβεβιωκότες, συμπεπαικότες,ἷ συγκεκοιμη-
μένοι, πολλάκις ἀλλήλους ,“καταπεφιληκότες ; :
ὥστ᾽ εἴ τις οἶμαι εἶδεν αὐτούς, κατεγέλασεν ἂν
τῶν φιλοσόφων ἐφ᾽ οἷς “περὶ φιλίας παραδοξο-
λογοῦσιν. ἀλλ᾽ ἐμπεσούσης εἰς τὸ μέσον ὥσπερ
κρέως τῆς τυραννίδος ὅρα οἷα λέγουσι"

ποῦ ποτε στήσῃ 1 BR πύργων ;—ws Ti μ᾽ εἰρώ-
τας τόδε;

ΕῚ > \ ew + ΝΜ

ἀντιτάξομαι κτενῶν σε.---κἀμὲ τοῦδ᾽ ἔρως ἔχει.

καὶ εὔχονται εὐχὰς τοιάσδε.

Καθόλου. γάρ---μὴ ἐξαπατᾶσθε--πᾶν ζῷον
οὐδενὶ οὕτως ὠκείωται ὡς τῷ ἰδίῳ “συμφέροντι.
ὅ τι ἂν οὖν πρὸς τοῦτο φαίνηται αὐτῷ ἐμποδίζειν,
ἄν Τ᾽ ἀδελφὸς 7 τοῦτο ἄν τε πατὴρ ἄν τε τέκνον
ἄν τ᾽ ἐρώμενος ἄν τ᾽ ἐραστής, μισεῖ, προβάλ-
λεται, καταρᾶται. οὐδὲν γὰρ οὕτως φιλεῖν
πέφυκεν ὡς τὸ αὑτοῦ συμφέρον" τοῦτο πατὴρ
καὶ ἀδελφὸς καὶ συγγενεῖς καὶ πατρὶς καὶ θεός.
ὅταν γοῦν εἰς τοῦτο ἐμποδίζειν ἡμῖν οἱ θεοὶ
δοκῶσιν, κἀκεΐνους λοιδοροῦμεν καὶ τὰ ἱδρύματα
αὐτῶν καταστρέφομεν καὶ τοὺς ναοὺς ἐμπιπρῶ-
μεν, ὥσπερ ᾿Αλέξανδρος ἐκέλευσεν ἐμπρησθῆναι
τὰ ᾿Ασκλήπεια ἀποθανόντος τοῦ ἐρωμένου. διὰ
τοῦτο ἂν μὲν ἐν ταὐτῷ τις θῇ τὸ συμφέρον καὶ

1 Reiske (simul luserunt Schegk): συμπεπαιχότες Bentley,

Koraes: συμπεπωκότες S, Schenkl.
2 (eipéras) Bentley: ἐρωτᾶις. τῶιδ᾽ 3, Cf. the marginal

396

- BOOK Il. xxu. 12-18

just see what words he utters! Were not Eteocles
and Polyneices born of the same mother and the same
father? Had they not been brought up together,
lived together, played together, slept together, many
atime kissed one another? So that I fancy if anyone
had seen them, he would have laughed at the
philosophers for their paradoxical views on friendship.
But when the throne was cast between them, like a
piece of meat between the dogs, see what they say:

Eteo. Where before the wall dost mean to stand ὃ
Poly. Why asked thou this of me?

Eieo. I shall range myself against thee.

Poly. Mine is also that desire!*

Such also are the prayers they utter.?

It is a general rule—be not deceived—that every
living thing is to nothing so devoted as to its own
interest. Whatever, then, appears to it to stand in
the way of this interest, be it a brother, or father,
or child, or loved one, or lover, the being hates,
accuses, and curses it. For its nature is to love
nothing so much as its own interest; this to it
is father and brother and kinsmen and country and
God. When, for instance, we think that the gods
stand in the way of our attainment of this, we revile
even them, cast their statues to the ground, and
burn their temples, as Alexander ordered the temples
of Asclepius to be burned when his loved one died.
For this reason, if a man puts together in one scale

1 Euripides, Phoenissae, 621 f.

2 In vv. 1365 ff. and 1373 ff, where each prays that he
may kill his brother.

3 Hephaestion ; cf. Arrian, Anabasis, VII. 14, 5.
gloss ἐρωτᾷς in Marc. 471 on Phoenissae, 621, where the MSS.
give ἱστορεῖς, and Trans. Am. Philol. Assoc., 1.11. 49.

397

19

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

τὸ ὅσιον καὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ πατρίδα Kal γονεῖς
καὶ φίλους, σῴζεται ταῦτα πάντα: ἂν δ᾽ ἀλλα-
χοῦ μὲν τὸ συμφέρον, ἀλλαχοῦ δὲ τοὺς φίλους
καὶ τὴν πατρίδα καὶ τοὺς συγγενεῖς καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ
δίκαιον, οἴχεται πάντα ταῦτα καταβαρούμενα
ὑπὸ τοῦ συμφέροντος. ὅπου γὰρ ἂν τὸ “ἐγὼ
καὶ τὸ “ἐμόν, ἐκεῖ ἀνάγκη ῥέπειν τὸ ζῷον" εἰ
ἐν σαρκί, ἐκεῖ τὸ κυριεῦον εἶναι" εἰ ἐν προαιρέσει,

20 ἐκεῖ 1 εἶναι" εἰ ἐν τοῖς ἐκτός, ἐκεῖ. εἰ τοίνυν ἐκεῖ

21

22

24

εἰμι ἐγώ, ὅπου ἡ προαίρεσις, οὕτως μόνως καὶ
φίλος ἔ ἔσομαι οἷος δεῖ καὶ υἱὸς καὶ πατήρ. τοῦτο
γάρ μοι συνοίσει "τηρεῖν τὸν πιστόν, τὸν αἰδή-
μονα, τὸν ἀνεκτικόν, τὸν ἀφεκτικὸν καὶ συνεργη-
τικόν, φυλάσσειν τὰς σχέσεις" ἂν δ᾽ ἀλλαχοῦ μὲν
ἐμαυτὸν θῶ, ἀλλαγοῦ δὲ τὸ καλόν, οὕτως ἰσχυρὸς
γίνεται, ὁ ᾿Επικούρου λόγος, ἀποφαίνων ἢ μηδὲν
εἶναι τὸ καλὸν ἢ εἰ ἄρα τὸ ἔνδοξον.

Διὰ ταύτην τὴν ἄγνοιαν καὶ ᾿Αθηναῖοι καὶ
Λακεδαιμόνιοι διεφέροντο καὶ Θηβαῖοι πρὸς ἀμφο-
τέρους καὶ μέγας βασιλεὺς πρὸς τὴν “Ἑλλάδα
καὶ Μακεδόνες πρὸς ἀμφοτέρους καὶ νῦν Ῥωμαῖοι
πρὸς Γέτας καὶ ἔτι πρότερον τὰ ἐν ᾿Ιλίῳ διὰ
ταῦτα ἐγένετο. ὁ ᾿Αλέξανδρος τοῦ Μενελάου
ξένος ἣν, καὶ εἴ τις αὐτοὺς εἶδεν φιλοφρονου-
μένους ἀλλήλους, ἠπίστησεν ἂν τῷ λέγοντι οὐκ
εἶναι φίλους αὐτούς. ἀλλ᾽ ἐβλήθη εἰς τὸ μέσον
μερίδιον, κομψὸν γυναικάριον, καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ
πόλεμος. καὶ νῦν ὅταν ἴδῃς φίλους, ἀδελφοὺς

1 Upton (after Schegk): ἐκεῖνο 5.

1 That is, the things with which a man identifies himself
and his personal interest.

398

BOOK II. xxm. 18-24

his interest and righteousness and what is honour-
able and country and parents and friends, they
are all safe; but if he puts his interest in one
seale, and in the other friends and country and
kinsmen and justice itself, all these latter are lost
because they are outweighed by his interest. For
where one can say “I” and “mine,” to that side
must the creature perforce incline; if they? are in
the flesh, there must the ruling power be; if they
are in the moral purpose, there must it be; if they
are in externals, there must it be. — If, therefore, I
am where my moral purpose is, then, and then only,
will I be the friend and son and the father that I
should be. For then this will be my interest—to
keep my good faith, my self-respect, my forbearance,
my abstinence, and my co-operation, and to main-
tain my relations with other men. But if I put
what is mine in one scale, and what is honourable
in the other, then the statement of Epicurus assumes
strength, in which he declares that “ the honourable
is either nothing at all, or at best only what people
hold in esteem.”

It was through ignorance of this that the Athenians
and Lacedaemonians quarrelled, and the Thebans
with both of them, and the Great King with Greece,
and the Macedonians with both of them, and in our
days the Romans with the Getae, and yet earlier
than any of these, what happened at Ilium was due
to this. Alexander was a guest of Menelaus, and
if anyone had seen their friendly treatment of one
another, he would have disbelieved any man who
said they were not friends. But there was thrown
in between them a morsel, a pretty woman, and to
win her war arose. So now, when you see friends,

399

27

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

ς al ΄“ Ἁ > / > , \
ὁμονοεῖν δοκοῦντας, μὴ αὐτόθεν ἀποφήνῃ περὶ
a 7 ’ -“ > > r >
τῆς φιλίας τι αὐτῶν μηδ᾽ ἂν ὀμνύωσιν μηδ᾽ ἂν
ἀδυνάτως ἔχειν λέγωσιν ἀπηλλάχθαι ἀλλήλων.
> \ \ a , - : »Ω 2
οὐκ ἔστι πιστὸν τὸ τοῦ φαύλου ἡγεμονικόν: ἀβέ-
βαιόν ἐστιν, ἄκριτον, ἄλλοθ᾽ ὑπ᾽ ἄλλης φαντα-
σίας νικώμενον. ἀλλ᾽ ἐξέτασον μὴ ταῦθ᾽ ἃ οἱ
ἄλλοι, εἰ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν γονέων καὶ ὁμοῦ avaTe-
θραμμένοι καὶ ὑπὸ τῷ αὐτῷ παιδαγωγῷ, ἀλλ᾽
ἐκεῖνο μόνον, ποῦ τὸ συμφέρον αὐτοῖς τίθενται,
πότερον ἐκτὸς ἢ ἐν προαιρέσει. ἂν ἐκτός, μὴ
εἴπης φίλους οὐ μᾶλλον ἢ πιστοὺς ἢ βεβαίους
ἢ θαρραλέους ἢ ἐλευθέρους, ἀλλὰ μηδ᾽ ἀνθρώ-
ποὺς, εἰ νοῦν ἔχεις. οὐ yap ἀνθρωπικὸν δόγμα
ἐστὶ τὸ ποιοῦν δάκνειν ἀλλήλους ἢ; λοιδορεῖ-
σθαι καὶ τὰς ἐρημίας καταλαμβάνειν ἢ τὰς
ἀγορὰς ὡς θηρία 5 τὰ ὄρη, καὶ ἐν τοῖς δικαστη-

/ > / Ν a > \ Ἁ 2
ρίοις ἀποδείκνυσθαι Ta λῃστῶν: οὐδὲ TO aKpa-
τεῖς καὶ μοιχοὺς καὶ φθορεῖς ἀπεργαζόμενον"

29° vr 3 Mv fal ” ᾽
οὐδ᾽ ὅσ᾽ ἄλλα πλημμελοῦσιν ἄνθρωποι κατ
ἀλλήλων." δ ἕν καὶ μόνον τοῦτο δόγμα, τὸ ἐν
τοῖς ἀπροαιρέτοις τίθεσθαι αὑτοὺς καὶ τὰ ἑαυτῶν.
Δ > > 4 “ »-“ > ’ ᾿ La Ν
ἂν δ᾽ ἀκούσῃς, ὅτι ταῖς ἀληθείαις οὗτοι οἱ ἄν-
θρωποι ἐκεῖ μόνον οἴονται τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὅπου Tpoai-
ρεσις, ὅπου χρῆσις ὀρθὴ φαντασιῶν, μηκέτι
πολυπραγμονήσῃς μήτ᾽ εἰ υἱὸς καὶ πατήρ ἐστι

1 Capps: καὶ 8, ὃ

2 θηρία supplied by Capps.

3 The correct punctuation of this passage (colons after

ἀπεργαζόμενον and ἀλλήλων) is due to Capps.
400

‘BOOK II. χχῃ. 24-29

or brothers, who seem to be of one mind, do not
instantly make pronouncement about their friend-
ship, not even if they swear to it, nor even if they
say that they cannot be separated from one another.
The ruling principle of the bad man is not to be
trusted ; it is insecure, incapable of judgement, a
prey now to one external impression and now to
another. Nay, do not make the same enquiry that
most men do, asking whether two men are of the
same parents, or were brought up together, or had
the same school attendant, but this, and this only:
Where do they put their interest—outside them-
selves, or in their moral purpose? If outside, call
them not friends, any more than you would call
them faithful, steadfast, courageous, or free; nay,
eall them not even human beings, if you are wise.
For it is no judgement of human sort which makes
them bite (that is revile) one another, and take to
the desert (that is, to the market-place) as wild
beasts take to the mountains, and in courts of law
act the part of brigands; nor is it a judgement
of human sort which makes them profligates and
adulterers and corrupters; nor is it any such thing
which makes men guilty of any of the many other
crimes which they commit against one another; it
is because of one single judgement, and this alone—
because they put themselves and what belongs to
themselves in the category of things which lie outside
the sphere of moral purpose. But if you hear these
men assert that in all sincerity they believe the good
to be where moral purpose lies, and where there is
the right use of external impressions, then you need
no longer trouble yourself as to whether they are
son and father, or brothers, or have been schoolmates

401

81

32

33

36

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

μήτ᾽ εἰ ἀδελφοὶ μήτ᾽ εἰ πολὺν χρόνον συμπεφοι-
, »" n
THKOTES καὶ ἑταῖροι, ἀλλὰ μόνον αὐτὸ τοῦτο
γνοὺς θαρρῶν ἀποφαίνου, ὅτι φίλοι, ὥσπερ ὅτι
/ “ / lol Ν » a 7

πιστοί, ὅτι δίκαιοι. ποῦ yap ἀλλαχοῦ φιλία
ἢ ὅπου πίστις, ὅπου αἰδώς, ὅπου δόσις τοῦ
καλοῦ, τῶν δ᾽ ἄλλων οὐδενός ;

“᾿Αλλὰ τεθερά Ἴ d ul

/ εθεράπευκέ με τοσούτῳ χρόνῳ" καὶ

οὐκ ἐφίλει pe ;” πόθεν οἶδας, ἀνδράποδον, εἰ
οὕτως τεθεράπευκεν ὡς τὰ ὑποδήματα σπογγίξζει
τὰ ἑαυτοῦ, ὡς τὸ κτῆνος κτενίζει ; 5 πόθεν οἶδας,
εἰ τὴν χρείαν σ᾽ ἀποβαλόντα τὴν τοῦ σκευαρίου
,
ῥίψει ws κατεαγὸς πινάκιον ; “ἀλλὰ γυνή μου
ἐστὶ καὶ τοσούτῳ χρόνῳ συμβεβιώκαμεν." πόσῳ
> ’ 4 an?
δ᾽ ἡ ᾿Εριφύλη peta τοῦ ᾿Αμφιαράου καὶ τέκνων

/ ‘ \ lal > > “ Φ > \
μήτηρ Kal πολλῶν; ἀλλ᾽ ὅρμος ἦλθεν εἰς τὸ
μέσον. τί δ᾽ ἐστὶν ὅρμος ; τὸ δόγμα τὸ περὶ τῶν
τοιούτων. ἐκεῖνο ἦν τὸ θηριῶδες, ἐκεῖνο TO δια-᾿
κόπτον τὴν φιλίαν, τὸ οὐκ ἐῶν εἶναι γυναῖκα
γαμετήν, μητέραϑ μητέρα. καὶ ὑμῶν ὅστις
> “ὃ a > ἢ 4 7 LX x
ἐσπούδακεν ἢ αὐτὸς τινι εἶναι φίλος ἢ adXov
κτήσασθαι φίλον, ταῦτα τὰ δόγματα ἐκκοπτέτω,
ταῦτα μισησάτω, ταῦτα ἐξελασάτω ἐκ τῆς
ψυχῆς τῆς ἑαυτοῦ. καὶ οὕτως ἔσται πρῶτον

a \ /
μὲν αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ μὴ λοιδορούμενος, μὴ μαχό-
-“
μενος, μὴ μετανοῶν, μὴ βασανίζων ἑαυτόν. ἔπειτα
καὶ ἑτέρῳ, τῷ μὲν ὁμοίῳ πάντῃ ἁπλοῦς," τοῦ
, n ἈΝ ,

δ᾽ ἀνομοίου ἀνεκτικός, πρᾷος πρὸς αὐτόν, ἥμερος,
1 διάδοσις Schweighiiuser: δόσις καὶ λῆψις Shaftesbury :
θέσις Elter (after Schegk). 2 κτενίζει supplied by Capps.
3 τὴν before μητέρα deleted by Schenkl.

4 Schenkl (after Schegk): τις 8S.

5 Capps, combining πάντῃ (πάντη) of Schweighauser and
ἁπλοῦς of the Salamanca edition: παντὶ ἁπλῶς S.

402

-BOOK II. xxi. 29-36

a long time and are comrades ; but though this is the
only knowledge you have concerning them, you may
confidently declare them “friends,” just as you may
declare them “ faithful” and “ upright.” For where
else is friendship to be found than where there is
fidelity, respect, a devotion! to things honourable
and to naught beside?

“ But he has paid attention to me all these years;
and did he not love me?” How do you know,
slave, whether he has paid attention to you just as he
sponges his shoes, or curries his horse? How do
you know but that, when you have lost your utility,
as that of some utensil, he will throw you away like
a broken plate? “ But she is my wife and we have
lived together all these years.” But how long did
Eriphyle live with Amphiaraus, yes, and bore him
children, and many of them? But a necklace came
in between them. And what does a necklace signify ὃ
One’s judgement about things like a necklace. That
was the brutish element, that was what sundered
the bond of love, what would not allow a woman to
be a wife, a mother to remain a mother. So let
every one of you who is eager to be a friend to
somebody himself, or to get somebody else for a
friend, eradicate these judgements, hate them, banish
them from his own soul. When this is done, first
of all, he will not be reviling himself, fighting with
himself, repenting, tormenting himself: and, in the
second place, in relation to his comrade, he will be
always straightforward to one who is like him him-
self, while to one who is unlike he will be tolerant,
gentle, kindly, forgiving, as to one who is ignorant

1 For δόσις in this sense (not in L. and 8.), see Thes. L.G.

s.v. and especially R. Hirzel: Untersuch. zu Cic. Philos.
Schr. TL. (1882), 563, n. 1; Bonhéffer 1890: 286, n. 1.

403

37

-

bo

ὡς

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

συγγνωμονικὸς ὡς πρὸς ἀγνοοῦντα, ὡς πρὸς δια-
πίπτοντα περὶ τῶν μεγίστων" οὐδενὶ χαλεπός,
ἅτ᾽ εἰδὼς ἀκριβῶς τὸ τοῦ Πλάτωνος, ὅτι πᾶσα
ψυχὴ ἄκουσα στέρεται τῆς ἀληθείας. εἰ δὲ μή,
τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πράξετε πάντα ὅσα οἱ φίλοι καὶ
συμπιεῖσθε καὶ ᾿συσκηνήσετε καὶ συμπλεύσετε
καὶ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν γεγενημένοι ἔσεσθε: καὶ yap
οἱ ὄφεις. φίλοι δ᾽ οὔτ᾽ ἐκεῖνοι οὔθ᾽ ὑμεῖς, μέχρις
ἂν ἔχητε τὰ θηριώδη ταῦτα καὶ μιαρὰ δόγματα.

κγ΄. Περὶ τῆς τοῦ λέγειν rca

Βιβλίον πᾶς ἂν ἥδιον ἀναγνῴη 1 καὶ p ῥᾷον τὸ
εὐσημοτέροις γράμμασι γεγραμμένον. οὐκοῦν
καὶ λόγους πᾶς ἄν τις ῥᾷον ἀκούσειε" τοὺς
εὐσχήμοσιν ἅμα καὶ εὐπρεπέσιν “ὀνόμασι σεση-
μασμένους. οὐκ ἄρα τοῦτο ῥητέον, ὡς οὐδεμία
δύναμίς ἐστιν ἀπαγγελτική: τοῦτο γὰρ ἅμα
μὲν ἀσεβοῦς ἐστιν ἀνθρώπου, ἅμα δὲ δειλοῦ.
ἀσεβοῦς μέν, ὅτι τὰς παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ χάριτας
ἀτιμάξει, ὥσπερ εἰ ἀνήρει. τὴν εὐχρηστίαν Ths
ὁρατικῆς ἢ τῆς ἀκουστικῆς δυνάμεως ἢ αὐτῆς
τῆς φωνητικῆς. εἰκῇ οὖν σοι ὁ θεὸς ὀφθαλμοὺς
ἔδωκεν, εἰκῇ πνεῦμα ἐνεκέρασεν αὐτοῖς οὕτως
ἰσχυρὸν καὶ φιλότεχνον, ὥστε μακρὰν ἐξικνού-
μενον ἀναμάσσεσθαι τοὺς τύπους τῶν ὁρωμένων ;

1 Koraes: ἀναγνῶ ἣ 5. 2 Schenkl: ἀκούσει S.

1 Cf. I. 28, 4.

2 In Stoic physiology the spirit of vision connected the
central mind with the pupil of the eye, and sight was
produced by the action of this spirit upon external objects,

404

es ee oe ee

δύω.

BOOK II. xxu. 36-xxm. 3

or is making a mistake in things of the greatest
im ce; he will not be harsh with anybody,
because he knows well the saying of Plato, that
“every soul is unwillingly deprived of the truth.” 1
But if you fail to do this, you may do everything
else that friends do—drink together, and share the
same tent, and sail on the same ship—and you may
be sons of the same parents; yes, and so may snakes!
But they will never be friends and no more will you,
as long as you retain these brutish and abominable

judgements.
CHAPTER XXIII

Of the faculty of expression

Everyone would read with greater pleasure and
ease the book that is written in the clearer characters.
Therefore everyone would also listen with greater
ease to those discourses that are expressed in
appropriate and attractive language We must not,
therefore, say that there is no faculty of expression,
for this is to speak both as an impious man and
as a coward. As an impious man, because one is
thereby disparaging the gifts received from God, as
though one were denying the usefulness of the
faculty of vision, or that of hearing, or that of speech
itself. Did God give you eyes to no purpose, did
He to no purpose put in them a spirit? so strong
and so cunningly devised that it reaches out to a
great distance and fashions the forms of whatever
not by the passive reception of rays. See L. Stein,
Psychologie der Stoa (1886), 127-9; Erkenntnistheorie der Stoa
(1888), 135 f. ; A. Bonhéffer, Epiktet und die Stoa (1890), 123 ;

and for the origins of this general theory, J. I. Beare, Greek
Theories of elementary Cognition (1906), 11 ff.

405

.

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

καὶ ποῖος ἄγγελος οὕτως ὠκὺς καὶ ἐπιμελής ; ; εἰκῇ
δὲ καὶ τὸν » μεταξὺ ἀ ἀέρα. οὕτως ἐνεργὸν ἐποίησεν καὶ
ἔντονον, ὥστε δι᾿ αὐτοῦ ) τεινομένου i πως δεικνεῖ-
σθαι τὴν ὅρασιν; εἰκῇ δὲ φῶς ἐποίησεν, οὗ μὴ
παρόντος οὐδενὸς τῶν ἄχλων ὄφελος ἦν;
ἼΛνθρωπε, μήτ᾽ ἀχάριστος ἴσθι μήτε πάλιν
apy pov TOV κρεισσόνων, ἀλλ᾽ ὑπὲρ μὲν τοῦ
ὁρᾶν καὶ ἀκούειν καὶ νὴ Δία ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ
τοῦ ζῆν καὶ τῶν συνεργῶν πρὸς αὐτό, ὑπὲρ
καρπῶν ξηρῶν, ὑπὲρ οἴνου, ὑπὲρ ἐλαίου
εὐχαρίστει τῷ θεῷ" μέμνησο δ᾽ ὅτι ἄλλο τί σοι
δέδωκεν κρεῖττον ἁπάντων τούτων, τὸ ,χρησό-
μενον αὐτοῖς, τὸ δοκιμάσον, τὸ τὴν ἀξίαν ἑκάστου
λογιούμενον. τί γάρ ἐστι τὸ ἀποφαινόμενον
ὑπὲρ ἑκάστης τούτων τῶν δυνάμεων, πόσου
tis ἀξία ἐστὶν αὐτῶν ; μή τι αὐτὴ ἑκάστη ἡ
δύναμις ; μή TL τῆς ὁρατικῆς. ποτ᾽ ἤκουσας λε-
γούσης τι περὶ ἑαυτῆς, μή τι τῆς ἀκουστικῆς ; *
ἀλλ᾽ ὡς διάκονοι καὶ δοῦλαι τεταγμέναι εἰσὶν
ὑπηρετεῖν τῇ “χρηστικῇ τῶν φαντασιῶν. κἂν
πύθῃ, πόσου ἕκαστον ἄξιόν ἐστιν, τίνος πυνθά-
νῃ; τίς σοι ἀποκρίνεται ; πῶς οὖν δύναταί τις
ἄλλη δύναμις κρείσσων εἶναι ταύτης, ἣ καὶ ταῖς
λοιπαῖς διακόνοις χρῆται καὶ δοκιμάζει αὐτὴ
ἕκαστα καὶ ἀποφαίνεται ; τίς γὰρ ἐκείνων οἶδεν,
τίς ἐστιν αὐτὴ καὶ πόσου ἀξία; τίς ἐκείνων
οἶδεν, ὁπότε δεὶ χρῆσθαι αὐτῇ καὶ πότε μή;

t Wolf: γινομένου 8.

2 The words μή τι πυρῶν ; μή τι κριθῶν ; μή τι ἵππον; μή τι
κυνός; “ΟΥ wheat, or barley, or a horse, ora dog?” which
follow at this point in S, were deleted by Schenkl (after
Schweighduser) as being out of keeping with the context.

406

BOOK II. xxi. 4-9

is seen? And what messenger is so swift and so
attentive as the eye? And did He to no purpose
make also the intervening air so active and so intent}
that the vision passes through it as through some
tense medium? And did He to no purpose create
light, without the presence of which all else were
useless ?

Man, be neither ungrateful for these gifts, nor
yet forgetful of the better things, but for sight and
hearing, yes and, by Zeus, for life itself and for
what is conducive to it, for dry fruits, for wine, for
olive oil, give thanks unto God; and at the same
time remember that He has given you something
better than all these things—the faculty which can
make use of them, pass judgement upon them,
estimate the value of each. For what is that which,
in the case of each of these faculties, shows what it
is worth?? [5 it each faculty itself? Did you ever
hear the faculty of sight say anything about itself?
Or the faculty of vision? No, but they have been
appointed as servants and slaves to minister to the
faculty which makes use of external impressions.
And if you ask, what each thing is worth, of whom
do you ask? Who is to answer you? How, then,
can any other faculty be superior to this which both
uses the rest as its servants, and itself passes judge-
ment upon each several thing and pronounces upon
it? For which one of them knows what it is and
what it is worth? Which one of them knows when
one ought to use it, and when not? What is the

1 That is, firm, taut, elastic, so as to be sensitive to the
action of the spirit of vision, and not dull and yielding like
mud or putty.

2 For the general theme, see I. 1.

497

10

ll

12

13

14

15

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

tis ἐστιν ἡ avoiyouca Kal κλείουσα τοὺς ὀφθαλ-
μοὺς καὶ ἀφ᾽ ὧν δεῖ ἀποστρέφουσα, τοῖς δὲ
προσάγουσα; ἡ ὁρατική ; οὔ, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ προαιρε-
>
τική. τίς ἡ τὰ ὦτα ἐπικλείουσα Kal ἀνοίγουσα ;
, > / \ a a ΄
τίς, καθ᾽ ἣν περίεργοι καὶ πευθῆνες ἢ πάλιν
δον eo τὰ , Sere χς. 7 > ow: 5
ἀκίνητοι ὕπο λογου ; ἡ ἀκουστικὴ ;* οὐκ ἄλλη
ἢ ἡ προαιρετικὴ δύναμις. εἶτ᾽ αὐτὴ ἰδοῦσα, ὅτι
> “ Ν - a“ Μ" ig ld
ἐν τυφλαῖς καὶ κωφαῖς ταῖς ἄλλαις ἁπάσαις
/ 7 > / Υ͂ a

δυνάμεσίν ἐστι μηδέ τι ἄλλο συνορᾶν δυναμέναις
πλὴν αὐτὰ ἐκεῖνα τὰ ἔργα, ἐφ᾽ οἷς τεταγμέναι
εἰσὶ διακονεῖν ταύτῃ καὶ ὑπηρετεῖν, αὐτὴ δὲ μόνη
? \ / \ / ? Ν a ,
ὀξὺ βλέπει καὶ τάς τ᾽’ ἄλλας καθορᾷ, πόσου
ἑκάστη ἀξία, καὶ αὑτήν, μέλλει ἡμῖν ἄχλο τι
ἀποφαίνεσθαι τὸ κράτιστον εἶναι ἢ αὐτήν ; καὶ
τί ποιεῖ ἄλλο ὀφθαλμὸς ἀνοιχθεὶς ἢ Opa; εἶ δὲ
δεῖ τὴν τοῦ τινος ἰδεῖν γυναῖκα καὶ πῶς, τίς
λέγει ; ἡ προαιρετική. εἰ δὲ δεῖ πιστεῦσαι τοῖς
λεχθεῖσιν ἢ ἀπιστῆσαι καὶ πιστεύσαντα ἐρεθι-
σθῆναι ἢ μή, τίς λέγει; οὐχ ἡ προαιρετική ; ἡ δὲ
φραστικὴ αὕτη καὶ καλλωπιστικὴ τῶν ὀνομάτων,
ΕΠ] ΝΜ 50.},ὕ , 7 ΕΝ a mM bd
εἴ τις ἄρα ἰδία δύναμις, τί ἄχλο ποιεῖ ἤ, ὅταν
ἐμπέσῃ λόγος περί τινος, καλλωπίζει τὰ ὀνομάτια
καὶ συντίθησιν ὥσπερ οἱ κομμωταὶ τὴν κόμην;
πότερον δ᾽ εἰπεῖν ἄμεινον ἢ σιωπῆσαι καὶ οὕτως
ἄμεινον ἢ ἐκείνως καὶ τοῦτο πρέπον ἢ οὐ πρέπον,
καὶ τὸν καιρὸν ἑκάστου καὶ τὴν χρείαν τίς ἄλλη

, Ὁ © ta / φΦ > \
λέγει ἢ ἡ προαιρετική ; θέλεις οὖν αὐτὴν παρελ-
θοῦσαν αὑτῆς καταψηφίσασθαι;

1 Upton from his “‘ codex” (after Wolf): ἢ ἀκουστικοί 8.
408

BOOK II. xxi 9-15

faeulty that opens and closes the eyes, and turns
them away from the things from which it should turn
them, but directs them toward other things? The
faculty of sight? No, but the faculty of moral

What is the faculty that closes and opens
the ears? What is that faculty by virtue of which
men are curious and inquisitive, or again, unmoved
by what is said? The faculty of hearing? No, it
is none other than the faculty of moral purpose.
When, then, this faculty sees that all the other
faculties which surround it are blind and deaf, and
unable to see anything but the very acts for which
they have been appointed to serve and minister
unto it, while it ν᾿ ἀνῇ sees clearly and surveys, not
only all the rest, determining what each is worth,
but itself also, is it likely to pronounce that anything
else is supreme but itself? And what else can the
open eye do but see? But whether it ought to
see someone’s wife and how, what faculty tells it?
That of moral purpose. And what faculty tells a
man whether he ought to believe what he has been
told, or disbelieve, and, if he believes, whether he
ought to be provoked by it or not? Is it not that
of moral purpose? And this faculty of speech and
of the adornment of language, if it really is a separate
faculty, what else does it do, when discourse arises
about some topic, but ornament and compose the
words, as hairdressers do the hair? But whether
it is better to speak than to keep silence, and to
do so in this way, or in that, and whether this is
appropriate or not appropriate, and the proper
occasion and utility of each action—what else tells
us all this but the faculty of moral purpose? Would
you, then, have it come forward and condemn itself?

VOL. I. p 409

17

18

19

20

21

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

“Τί οὖν," φησίν, “ εἰ οὕτως τὸ πρᾶγμα ἔχει,
καὶ δύναται τὸ διακονοῦν κρεῖσσον εἶναι ἐκείνου
ᾧ διακονεῖ, ὁ ἵππος τοῦ ἱππέως ἢ ὁ κύων τοῦ
κυνηγοῦ ἢ τὸ ὄργανον τοῦ κιθαριστοῦ ἢ οἱ
ὑπηρέται τοῦ βασιλέως ;" —Ti ἐστι τὸ χρώμενον;
προαίρεσις. τί ἐπιμελεῖται πάντων ; προαίρεσις.
τί ὅλον ἀναιρεῖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ποτὲ μὲν λεμῷ,
ποτὲ δ᾽ ἀγχόνη, ποτὲ δὲ κατὰ κρημνοῦ ; mpoat-
pects. εἶτα τούτου τί ἰσχυρότερον ἐν ἀνθρώποις
ἐστίν; καὶ πῶς οἷόν τε τοῦ ἀκωλύτου τὰ
κωλυόμενα ; τὴν ὁρατικὴν δύναμιν τίνα πέφυκεν
ἐμποδίζειν; καὶ προαίρεσις καὶ ἀπροαίρετα."
τὴν ἀκουστικὴν ταὐτά, τὴν φρᾶστικὴν ὡσαύτως.
προαίρεσιν δὲ τί ἐμποδίζειν πέφυκεν ; ampoai-
ρετον οὐδέν, αὐτὴ δ᾽ ἑαυτὴν διαστραφεῖσα. διὰ
τοῦτο κακία μόνη αὕτη γίνεται ἢ ἀρετὴ μόνη.

Εἶτα τηλικαύτη δύναμις οὖσα καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς
” ᾽ ΄ a toa ῃ»:
ἄλλοις ἐπιτεταγμένη παρελθοῦσα ἡμῖν λεγέτω
κράτιστον εἶναι τῶν ὄντων τὴν σάρκα. οὐδὲ εἰ
αὐτὴ ἡ σὰρξ ἑαυτὴν ἔλεγεν εἶναι κράτιστον,
ἠνέσχετο ἄν τις αὐτῆς. νῦν δὲ τί ἐστιν, ᾿Επί-.
κουρε, τὸ ταῦτα ἀποφαινόμενον ; τὸ περὶ Τέλους
συγγεγραφός, τὸ τὰ Φυσικά, τὸ περὶ Κανόνος ;

1 Salmasius: προαιρετά 8.

1 This passage is very obscure in the original and it may
well be that something is missing before § 16 which would
make the objector’s question more plausible, or else after the
first part of the question, so that the remainder would belong
to the answer by Epictetus. It is not impossible that the
whole paragraph, §§ 16-19, is derived from a separate context
and fitted in here rather badly by Arrian himself or by some

410

BOOK II. xxi. 16-21

‘What then,” says an objector, “if the matter
stands like this, and it is possible for that which serves
to be superior to what it serves—the horse to the
rider, or the dog to the hunter, or his instrument
to the harper, or his servants tothe king?”! Well,
what faculty is it that uses the services of the rest
in this way? Moral purpose. What is it that
attends to everything? Moral purpose. What is it
that destroys the whole man, sometimes by hunger,
sometimes by a noose, sometimes by hurling him
over a cliff? Moral purpose. Is there, then, any-
thing stronger than this among men? Yet how
can the things that are subject to hindrance be
stronger than that which is unhindered? What are
by their very nature capable of hindering the faculty
of vision? Both moral purpose and things that lie
outside its sphere. The same hinder vision; and
so it is also with speech. But what is by its
very nature capable of hindering moral purpose?
Nothing that lies outside its sphere, but only itself
when perverted. For this reason moral purpose
becomes the only vice, or the only virtue.

Therefore, since it is so great a faculty and has
been set oyer everything else, let ἐξ come before
us and say that the flesh is of all things the most
excellent. Nay, even if the flesh itself called itself
most excellent, one would not have tolerated such a
statement. But now what is it, Epicurus, that makes
such a declaration? that composed the treatise
On the End, or The Physics, or On the Standard ??
srovent trades or edition, because pepen tally it does no more

t the precedin
od ρὲ λα works by = Pisin ig τ which the first treated

ethics and the third epistomology, the “‘standard ” being a
standard of judgement or criterion.

41t

22

23

24

25

26

27

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

TO τὸν πώγωνα καθεικός ; τὸ γράφον, ὅτε
ἀπέθνῃσκεν, ὅτι “ τὴν τελευταίαν. ἄγοντες ἅμα
καὶ μακαρίαν ἡμέραν ;” ἡ σὰρξ ἢ ἡ προαίρεσις ;
εἶτα τούτου τι κρεῖσσον ἔχειν ὁμολογεῖς καὶ οὐ
μαίνῃ; οὕτως τυφλὸς ταῖς ἀληθείαις καὶ κωφὸς
εἶ;

Τί οὖν; ἀτιμάξει τις τὰς ἄλλας δυνάμεις; μὴ
yévorto. λέγει τις μηδεμίαν εἶναι χρείαν ἢ
προαγωγὴν EE τῆς προαιρετικῆς δυνάμεως;
μὴ γένοιτο. ἀνόητον, ἀσεβές, , ἀχάριστον πρὸς
τὸν θεόν. ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀξίαν ἐκάστῳ ἀποδίδωσιν.
ἔστι γάρ τις καὶ ὄνου χρεία, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ἡλίκη βοός"
ἔστι καὶ κυνός, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ἡλίκη οἰκέτου: ἔστι
καὶ οἰκέτου, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ἡλίκη τῶν πολιτῶν" ἔστι
καὶ τούτων, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ἡλίκη τῶν ἀρχόντων. οὐ
μέντοι διὰ τὸ ἄλλα εἶναι κρείττονα καὶ ἣν
παρέχει. τὰ ἕτερα χρείαν ἀτιμαστέον. ἔστι τίς
ἀξία καὶ τῆς φραστικῆς δυνάμεως, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ
ἡλίκη τῆς προαιρετικῆς. ὅταν οὖν ταῦτα λέγω,
μή τις οἰέσθω ὅτι ἀμελεῖν ὑμᾶς ἀξιῶ φράσεως"
οὐδὲ γὰρ ὀφθαλμῶν οὐδ᾽ ὥτων οὐδὲ χειρῶν οὐδὲ
ποδῶν οὐδ᾽ ἐσθῆτος οὐδ᾽ ὑποδημάτων. ἀλλ᾽ ἄν
μου πυνθάνῃ “τί οὖν ἐστι κράτιστον τῶν ὄντων ;

1 Supplied by Schenkl.

1 That is, assume the réle of a philosopher, compare I. 2,
29, and note.

2 A slight variation from the standard form of the famous
saying of Epicurus on his death-bed. See Usener, Epicurea,
p. 143, 16 ff, and especially Diog. Laert. X. 10, 22: ‘* And
when he was at the point of death, he wrote the following
letter to Idomeneus: ‘We have written this letter to you on
a happy day to us, which is also the last day of ourlife. For

412

BOOK II. xxm. 21-27

that caused you to let your beard grow long??
that wrote as it was dying: “We are spending
what is our last and at the same time a happy
day?’ Was it the flesh or the moral purpose?
Come, do you confess that you have something
superior to the flesh, and you are not insane, either?
Are you, in all truth, so blind and deaf?

Well, what then? Does a man despise his
other faculties? Far from it! Does a man say
there is no use or advancement save in the faculty
of moral purpose? Far from it! That is unintel-
ligent, impious, ungrateful towards God. Nay, he is
but assigning its true value to each thing. For there is
some use in an ass, but not as much as there is in
an ox; there is use also in a dog, but not as much
as there is in a slave; there is use also in a slave,
but not as much as there is in your fellow-citizens ;
there is use also in these, but not as much as there
is in the magistrates. Yet because some things are
superior we ought not to despise the use which the
others give. There is a certain value also in the
faculty of eloquence, but it is not as great as that
of the faculty of moral purpose. When, therefore,
I say this, let no one suppose that I am bidding you
neglect speech, any more than I bid you neglect
eyes, or ears, or hands, or feet, or dress, or shoes,
But if you ask me, “ What, then, is the highest of

strangury has attacked me, and also a dysentery, so violent
that nothing can be added to the violence of my sufferings.
But the cheerfulness of my mind, which arises from the
recollection of all my philosophical contemplations, counter-
balances all these afflictions. And I beg you to take care of
the children of Metrodorus, in a manner worthy of the
devotion shown by the youth to me, and to philosophy.’”
(Yonge’s translation. )

413

28

29

30

31

32

33

34

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

τί εἴπω ; τὴν φραστικήν ; οὐ δύναμαι! ἀλλὰ τὴν
προαιρετικήν, ὅταν ὀρθὴ γένηται. τοῦτο yap
ἐστὲ τὸ κἀκείνῃ χρώμενον καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις
πάσαις καὶ μικραῖς καὶ μεγάλαις δυνάμεσιν:
τούτου κατορθωθέντος ἀγαθὸς ἄνθρωπος γίνεται,
ἀποτευχθέντος κακὸς ἄνθρωπος γίνεται" παρ᾽
ἀτυχοῦμεν, εὐτυχοῦμεν, μεμφόμεθ' ἀλλήλους,
εὐαρεστοῦμεν, ἁπλῶς ὃ λεληθὸς 5 μὲν κακοδαιμο-
νίαν ποιεῖται, τυχὸν δ᾽ ἐπιμελείας εὐδαιμονίαν.
Τὸ δ᾽ αἴρειν τὴν δύναμιν τῆς φραστικῆς καὶ
λέγειν μὴ εἶναι μηδεμίαν ταῖς ἀληθείαις οὐ μόνον
ἀχαρίστου ἐστὶ πρὸς τοὺς δεδωκότας, ἀλλὰ καὶ
δειλοῦ. ὁ γὰρ τοιοῦτος φοβεῖσθαί μοι δοκεῖ, μή,
εἴπερ ἐστί τις δύναμις κατὰ τὸν τόπον, οὐ
δυνηθῶμεν αὐτῆς καταφρονῆσαι. τοιοῦτοί εἰσι
καὶ οἱ λέγοντες μηδεμίαν εἶναι παραλλαγὴν
κάλλους πρὸς αἶσχος. εἶτα ὁμοίως ἣν κινηθῆναι
τὸν Θερσίτην ἰδόντα καὶ τὸν ᾿Αχιίλλέα ; ὁμοίως
τὴν ᾿Ελένην καὶ ἣν ἔτυχεϑ γυναῖκα ; καὶ ταῦτα
μωρὰ καὶ ἄγροικα καὶ οὐκ εἰδότων τὴν ἑκάστου
φύσιν, ἀλλὰ φοβουμένων μὴ ἄν τις αἴσθηται τῆς
διαφορᾶς, εὐθὺς συναρπασθεὶς καὶ ἡττηθεὶς
ἀπέλθῃ. ἀλλὰ τὸ μέγα τοῦτο, ἀπολιπεῖν ἑκάστῳ
τὴν αὑτοῦ δύναμιν ἣν ἔχει καὶ ἀπολιπόντα ἰδεῖν
τὴν ἀξίαν τῆς δυνάμεως καὶ τὸ κράτιστον τῶν
ὄντων καταμαθεῖν καὶ τοῦτο ἐν παντὶ μεταδιώκειν,
περὶ τοῦτο ἐσπουδακέναι, πάρεργα τἄλλα πρὸς

1 ΤῺ. word ἀγαθὸς before γίνεται was deleted by
Salmasius.

2 Sb: λεληθὲν S: Schenkl suggests ἀμεληθέν : neglecta
Wolf.

3 Upton: εἶχε 8.

414

BOOK II. xxi. 27-34

all things?’’ what shall I say? The faculty of elo-
quence? I cannot; but rather that of moral purpose,
when it becomes a right moral purpose. For it is this
which uses not only that faculty of eloquence but
also all the other faculties both small and great;
when this has been set right a man becomes good,
when it has failed a man becomes bad ; it is through
this that we are unfortunate, and are fortunate,
blame one another, and are pleased with one
another; in a word, it is this which, when ignored,
produces wretchedness, but when attended to pro-
duces happiness.

But to do away with the faculty of eloquence and
to say that in all truth it is nothing is the act not
merely of a man ungrateful to those who have given
it, but also cowardly. For such a person seems to
me to be afraid that, if there really is a faculty of
this kind, we may not be able to despise it. Such
also are those who assert that there is no difference
between beauty and ugliness. What! could a man
be affected in the same way by the sight of Thersites
and that of Achilles? Or by the sight of Helen
and that of some ordinary woman? But these are
the notions of foolish and boorish persons who do
not know the nature of each several thing, but are
afraid that if a man notices the superiority of the
faculty in question he will immediately be carried
away by it and come off worsted. Nay, the great
thing is this: to leave each in the possession of his
own proper faculty, and, so leaving him, to observe
the value of the faculty, and to learn what is the
highest of all things, and in everything to pursue
after this, to be zealous about this, treating all other
things as of secondary value in comparison with it,

415

va

35

36

37

38

39

41

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

τοῦτο πεποιημένον, οὐ μέντοι ἀμελοῦντα οὐδ᾽
ἐκείνων κατὰ δύναμιν. καὶ γὰρ ὀφθαλμῶν ἐπιμε-
λητέον, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὡς τοῦ κρατίστου, ἀλλὰ καὶ
τούτων διὰ τὸ κράτιστον" ὅτι ἐκεῖνο οὐκ ἄλλως
ἕξει κατὰ φύσιν εἰ μὴ ἐν τούτοις εὐλογιστοῦν καὶ
τὰ ἕτερα παρὰ τὰ ἕτερα αἱρούμενον.

Τί οὖν ἐστι τὸ γινόμενον ; οἷον εἴ τις ἀπιὼν εἰς
τὴν πατρίδα τὴν ἑαυτοῦ καὶ διοδεύων πανδοκεῖον
καλὸν ἀρέσαντος αὐτῷ τοῦ πανδοκείου καταμένοι
ἐν τῷ πανδοκείῳ. ἄνθρωπε, ἐπελάθου σου τῆς
προθέσεως: οὐκ εἰς τοῦτο ὥδευες, ἀλλὰ διὰ τούτου.
“ ἀλλὰ κομψὸν τοῦτο." πόσα δ᾽ ἄλλα πανδοκεῖα
κομψά, πόσοι δὲ λειμῶνες" ἁπλῶς ὡς δίοδος. τὸ
δὲ προκείμενον ἐκεῖνο: εἰς τὴν πατρίδα ἐπανελθεῖν,
τοὺς οἰκείους ἀπαλλάξαι δέους, αὐτὸν τὰ τοῦ
πολίτου ποιεῖν, γῆμαι, παιδοποιεῖσθαι, ἄρξαι τὰς
νομιζομένας ἀρχάς. οὐ γὰρ τοὺς κομψοτέρους
ἡμῖν τόπους ἐκλεξόμενος ἐλήλυθας, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν οἷς
ἐγένου καὶ ὧν κατατέταξαι πολίτης, ἐν τούτοις
ἀναστραφησόμενος. τοιοῦτόν τι καὶ ἐνταῦθά ἐστι
τὸ γινόμενον. ἐπεὶ διὰ λόγου καὶ τοιαύτης παρα:
δόσεως ἐλθεῖν ἐπὶ τὸ τέλειον δεῖ καὶ τὴν αὑτοῦ
προαίρεσιν ἐκκαθᾶραι καὶ τὴν δύναμιν τὴν χρη-
στικὴν τῶν φαντασιῶν ὀρθὴν κατασκευάσαι,
ἀνάγκη δὲ τὴν παράδοσιν γίνεσθαι διά τινων ἢ
θεωρημάτων καὶ διὰ λέξεως ποιᾶς καὶ μετά τινος
ποικιλίας καὶ δριμύτητος τῶν θεωρημάτων, ὑπ᾽

1 διά τινων Kronenberg: τῶν 8.

1 Compare the saying ascribed to Jesus by the Great
Mogul Akbar as inscribed on a gateway of the ruined city
Futtey-pore-Sikri in [ndia. ‘‘Jesus had said: ‘ The world

416

BOOK II. xxut. 34-41 ©

though without neglecting these, as far as this is

ible. For we must take care of our eyes too,
yet not as the highest thing, but we must take care
of them for the sake of the highest; because this
latter will not have its natural perfection unless it
uses the eyes with reason and chooses one thing
instead of another.

What, then, generally takes place? Men act
like a traveller on the way to his own country who
stops at an excellent inn, and, since the inn pleases
him, stays there. Man, you have forgotten your
pu ; you were not travelling to this but through
it... “But this is a fine inn.” And how many other
inns are fine, and how many meadows—yet simply
for passing through. But your purpose is the other
thing, to return to your country, to relieve the fear
of your kinsmen, to do the duties of a citizen your-
self, to marry, bring up children, hold the customary
offices. For you did not come into the world to
select unusually fine places, I ween, but to live and
go about your business in the place where you were
born and were enrolled as a citizen. Something
like this takes place also in the matter which we
are considering. Since a man must advance to
perfection through the spoken word and such
instruction as you receive here, and must purify his
own moral purpose and correct the faculty which
makes use of external impressions, and since the
instruction must necessarily be given by means of
certain principles, and in a particular style, and
with a certain variety and impressiveness in the

is but a bridge, over which you must pass, but must not
linger to build your dwelling.”” See Resch, Agrapha (1906),
no. 95, p. 292.
417

P2

42

43

44

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

αὐτῶν τινες τούτων ἁλισκόμενοι καταμένουσιν
αὐτοῦ, ὁ μὲν ὑπὸ τῆς λέξεως, ὁ δ᾽ ὑπὸ συλλο-
γισμῶν, ὁ δ᾽ ὑπὸ μεταπιπτόντων, ὁ δ᾽ ὑπ᾽ ἄλλου
τινὸς τοιούτου πανδοκείου, καὶ προσμείναντες
κατασήπονται ὡς παρὰ ταῖς Σειρῆσιν.

Ἄνθρωπε, τὸ προκείμενον ἣν σοι κατασκευάσαι
σαυτὸν χρηστικὸν ταῖς προσπιπτούσαις φαντα-
σίαις κατὰ φύσιν, ἐν ὀρέξει ἀναπότευκτον, ἐν δ᾽
ἐκκλίσει ἀπερίπτωτον, μηδέποτ᾽ ἀτυχοῦντα, μη-
δέποτε δυστυχοῦντα, ἐλεύθερον, ἀκώλυτον, ἀνανά-
γκαστον, συναρμόζοντα τῇ τοῦ Διὸς διοικήσει,
ταύτῃ πειθόμενον, ταύτῃ εὐαρεστοῦντα, μηδένα
μεμφόμενον, μηδέν᾽ αἰτιώμενον, δυνάμενον εἰπεῖν
τούτους τοὺς στίχους ἐξ ὅλης ψυχῆς

ἄγου δέ μ᾽, ὦ Ζεῦ, καὶ σύ γ᾽ ἡ Πεπρωμένη.

εἶτα τοῦτο τὸ προκείμενον ἔχων ἀρέσαντός cot
λεξειδίου, ἀρεσάντων θεωρημάτων τινῶν αὐτοῦ
καταμένεις καὶ κατοικεῖν προαιρῇ ἐπιλαθόμενος
τῶν ἐν οἴκῳ καὶ λέγεις “ ταῦτα κομψά ἐστιν";
τίς γὰρ λέγει μὴ εἶναι αὐτὰ κομψά; ἀλλ᾽ ὡς
δίοδον, ὡς πανδοκεῖα. τί γὰρ κωλύει φράζοντα

1 In Encheiridion 53 the other three verses are quoted;

**To that goal long ago to me assigned.
Tl follow and not falter ; if my will
Prove weak and crayen, still I’ll follow on.”

They are derived from a poem of Cleanthes (Von Arnim,
Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, I. rn Petey For a somewhat
indifferent translation of them into Latin, see Seneca, Epist.,
107. 11, who adds as a fifth verse in the pointed style
characteristic of him : Ducunt volentem fata, nolentem trahwunt.
‘«The willing are led by fate, the reluctant dragged.” It is
not impossible that the sentiment here expressed may be

418

BOOK IL. xxut. 41-44

form of these principles, some persons are captivated
by all these things and stay where they are; one is
captivated by style, another by syllogisms, another
by arguments with equivocal premisses, another by
some other “inn” of that sort, and staying there they
moulder away as though they were among the
Sirens.

Man, your purpose was to make yourself com-
petent to use conformably with nature the external
impressions that came to you, in desire not to fail
in what you would attain, and in avoidance not to
fall into what you would avoid, never suffering mis-
fortune, never ill fortune, free, unhindered, uncon-
strained, conforming to the governance of Zeus,
obeying this, well satisfied with this, blaming no
one, charging no one, able to say with your whole
heart the verses, beginning :

« Lead thou me on, O Zeus, and Destiny.” ἢ

And then, although you have this purpose, because
some petty trick of style, or certain principles, catch
your fancy, are you going to stay just where you
are and choose to dwell there, forgetful of the
things at home and saying “This is fine *’? Well,
who says that it is not fine? But only like a
passageway, like an “inn.” For what is to prevent

one of the remote and —— unconscious inspirations of
Cardinal Newman’s celebrated hymn,
** Lead, Kindly Light, amid the encircling gloom
Lead Thon me on !”
For his mind being haunted by ‘‘some texts of this kind,”
t.¢., that ‘‘God meets these who go in His way,” ¢fc., see
Ward's Life of John Henry Cardinal Newman, I. 55.

419

45

46

47

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

ὡς Δημοσθένης ἀτυχεῖν ; ; τί δὲ κωλύει συλλο-
γισμοὺς ἀναλύοντα ὡς Χίρύσιπητοξ ἄθλιον εἶναι,
πενθεῖν, φθονεῖν, ἁπλῶς τ αράσσεσθαι, κακοδαι-
μονεῖν ; οὐδὲ ἕν. ὁρᾷς οὖν ὅτι πανδοκεῖα ἦν
ταῦτα οὐδενὸς ἄξια, τὸ δὲ προκείμενον ἄλλο ἦν.
ταῦτα ὅταν λέγω πρός τινας, οἴονταί με κατα-
βάλλειν τὴν περὶ τὸ λέγειν ἐπιμέλειαν ἢ ἢ τὴν περὶ
τὰ θεωρήματα. ἐγὼ δ᾽ οὐ ταύτην καταβάλλω,
ἀλλὰ τὸ περὶ ταῦτ᾽ ᾿ἀκαταληκτικῶς » ἔχειν καὶ
ἐνταῦθα τίθεσθαι τὰς αὑτῶν ἐλπίδας. εἴ τις
τοῦτο παριστὰς βλάπτει τοὺς ἀκούοντας, κἀμὲ
τίθεσθε ἕνα τῶν βλαπτόντων. οὐ δύναμαι δ᾽
ἄλλο βλέπων τὸ κράτιστον καὶ τὸ κυριώτατον
ἄλλο λέγειν εἶναι, ἵν᾽ ὑμῖν χαρίσωμαι.

κδ΄. Πρός τινα τῶν οὐκ ἠξιωμένων ὑπ᾽
αὐτοῦ.

Εἰπόντος αὐτῷ τινος ὅτε Πολλάκις ἐπιθυμῶν
σον ἀκοῦσαι ἦλθον πρὸς σὲ καὶ οὐδέποτέ μοι
ἀπεκρίνω" καὶ νῦν, εἰ δυνατόν, παρακαλῶ σε
εἰπεῖν a μοι, Δοκεῖ σοι, ἔφη, καθάπερ ἄλλου
τινὸς εἶναι τέχνη οὕτως δὲ καὶ τοῦ λέγειν, ἣν ὁ
μὲν ἔχων ἐμπείρως ἐρεῖ, ὁ δὲ μὴ ἔχων ἀπείρως ;--- i
Δοκεῖ.---Οὐκοῦν ὁ μὲν διὰ τοῦ λέγειν αὐτός τε
ὠφελούμενος καὶ ἄλλους οἷός τε ὧν ὠφελεῖν οὗτος
ἐμπείρως ἂν λέγοι, ὁ δὲ βλαπτόμενος μᾶλλον καὶ
βλάπτων οὗτος ἄπειρος, ἂν εἴη τῆς τέχνης ταύτης
τῆς τοῦ λέγειν; εὕροις ἂν τοὺς μὲν βλαπτομένους

1 Upton’s ‘‘ codex”: ταῦτα καταληκτικῶς 8.

420

aU BOOK II. xxitt. 44-Χχιν. 3

a man having the eloquence of Demosthenes and
yet being unhappy, and what is to prevent him
from analyzing syllogisms like Chrysippus, and yet
being wretched, from sorrowing, envying, in a word,
from being disturbed and miserable? Absolutely
nothing. You see, then, that these were “inns” of
no value, while your purpose was something else.
When I speak thus to some people they think that
I am disparaging the study of rhetoric or that of
general principles. Yet I am not disparaging this,
but only the habit of dwelling unceasingly on these
matters and setting one’s hopes in them. Ifa man
does his hearers harm by presenting this view, set
me down too as one of those who work harm.
But when I see that one thing is highest and
supreme, I cannot say the same of something else,
in order to gratify you, my hearers.

CHAPTER XXIV

To one of those whom he did not deem worthy

Someone said to him: I have often come to you,
wishing to hear you and you have never given me
an answer ; and now, if it be possible, I beg you to
say something to me. He answered: Do you think
that, just as in anything else there is an art, so
there is also an art in speaking, and that he who
has this art will speak with skill, while he who does
not have it will speak without skill ?—I do.—Then
he who by speaking benefits himself and is able to
benefit others would be speaking with skill, while
he who confers injury rather than benefit would be
without skill in this art of speaking? You would

VOL. 1. q 421

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

4 τοὺς δ᾽ ὠφελουμένους. οἱ δ᾽ ἀκούοντες πάντες
᾽ - 94.} Φ > 4 a \ A
ὠφελοῦνται ἀφ᾽ ὧν ἀκούουσιν ἢ Kal τούτων εὕροις
ἂν τοὺς μὲν ὠφελουμένους τοὺς δὲ βλαπτομένους ;
-- Καὶ τούτων, ἔφη.---Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐνταῦθα ὅσοι

\ ? , > 4 > “ “ ον ,
μὲν ἐμπείρως ἀκούουσιν ὠφελοῦνται, ὅσοι δ᾽ ἀπεί-

5 pws βλάπτονται ;---Ὡ μολόγει.--- ἔστιν ἄρα τις
ἐμπειρία καθάπερ τοῦ λέγειν οὕτως καὶ τοῦ

”

6 ἀκούειν ;— Eotxev.— Ei δὲ βούλει, καὶ οὕτως
/ > / Ν n “ ’

σκέψαι αὐτό. τὸ μουσικῶς ἅψασθαι τίνος σοι

δοκεῖ ;—Movorxod.—Ti δέ; τὸν ἀνδριάντα ὡς
δεῖ κατασκευάσαι τίνος σοι φαίνεται ;— Ανδριαν-
τοποιοῦ.--- Τὸ ἰδεῖν ἐμπείρως οὐδεμιᾶς σοι προσ-
δεῖσθαι φαίνεται τέχνης ;---ΠΠροσδεῖται καὶ τοῦτο.
> κ > \ \ /, € a lal bd ’ὔ
8 --Οὐκοῦν εἰ καὶ τὸ λέγειν. ὡς δεῖ τοῦ ἐμπείρου
> / Se ¢ \ 2 / > , a
ἐστίν, ὁρᾷς ὅτι καὶ τὸ ἀκούειν ὠφελίμως τοῦ
5 , ᾽ , \ \ \ / > ee J ,
9 ἐμπείρου ἐστίν; καὶ τὸ μὲν τελείως καὶ ὠφελίμως,
> 4 4 4 A > lal > Ν 4
εἰ βούλει, πρὸς τὸ παρὸν ἀφῶμεν, ἐπεὶ καὶ μακράν
l0 ἐσμεν ἀμφότεροι παντὸς τοῦ τοιούτου" ἐκεῖνο δὲ
was ἄν τις ὁμολογῆσαί μοι δοκεῖ, ὅτε ποσῆς γέ
a -“ ε lal
τινος τριβῆς περὶ τὸ ἀκούειν προσδεῖται ὃ τῶν
φιλοσόφων ἀκουσόμενος. ἢ γὰρ οὔ;
angel
11 Περὶ τίνος οὖν λέγω πρὸς σέ; δεῖξόν μοι. περὶ
τίνος ἀκοῦσαι δύνασαι; περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν;
τίνος; apa γε immov ;—Ov.— Adra βοός;---Οὔ.
la
12 —Ti οὖν; ἀνθρώπου;---Ναί.---Οἴδαμεν οὖν, τί
> Μ 7 e 4 > lal , εν
ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος, τίς ἡ φύσις αὐτοῦ, τίς ἡ ἔννοια;
ἔχομεν καὶ κατὰ ποσὸν περὶ τοῦτο τὰ ὦτα

“1

1 Schweighiuser: τοῦ 8,
422

BOOK II. xxiv. 3-12

find that some are injured and others benefited.
And are all those who hear benefited by what they
hear, or would you find that of them too some are
benefited but others injured ?—Yes, that is true
of them also, he said.—Then in this case too are all
those that show skill in listening benefited, but all
those that do not show such skill are injured ?—He
agreed.—Is there, therefore, also a certain skill
in listening, just as there is in speaking ?—So it
seems.—But, if you please, look at the matter from
this angle also: whose part do you think it is to
handle an instrument musically?—The musician’s.
—Very well, and whose part does it appear to you
to be to make a statue properly ?—The sculptor’s.—
Does it appear to you to require no art to look at
a statue with ‘skill?—This also requires art.—lIf,
then, to speak as one ought is the part of a skilled
person, do you see that to hear with benefit: to
himself is also the part of the skilled person? Now
as for perfection and benefit, if you please, let us
drop the consideration of them for the present, since
both of us are far removed from anything of that
sort; but this | think everyone would admit, that
the man who is going to listen to the philosophers
needs at least a certain amount of practice in listening.
Is it not so?

What, then, shall I talk to you about? Tell me.
What are you capable of hearing about? About
things good and evil? Good and evil for what?
Do you mean for a horse ?—No.— Well then, for an
ox?—No.—What then? For a man ?—Yes.—Do
we know, then, what a man is, what his nature is,
what the concept of man is? And have we ears
that are to any degree open with regard to this?

423

13

14

15

16

17

18

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

τετρημένα; ἀλλὰ φύσις τί ἐστιν ἐννοεῖς ἢ δύνα-
σαι καὶ κατὰ ποσὸν ἀκολουθῆσαί μοι λέγοντι;
ἀλλ᾽ ἀποδείξει χρήσομαι πρὸς σέ; πῶς; παρα-
κολουθεῖς γὰρ αὐτῷ τούτῳ, τί ἐστιν ἀπόδειξις ἢ
πῶς τι ἀποδείκνυται ἢ διὰ τίνων ; ἢ τίνα ὅμοια
μὲν ἀποδείξει ἐστίν, ἀπόδειξις δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν ; τί
γάρ ἐστιν ἀληθὲς οἶδας ἢ τί ἐστι ψεῦδος ; τί τίνι
ἀκολουθεῖ, τί τίνι μάχεταε ἢ ἀνομολογούμενόν
ἐστιν ἢ ἀσύμφωνον ; ἀλλὰ KWo σε πρὸς φίλοσο-
φίαν; πῶς παραδεικνύω σοι τὴν μάχην τῶν
πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, καθ᾽ ἣν διαφέρονται περὶ
ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ συμφερόντων καὶ ἀσυμφό-
ρων, αὐτὸ τοῦτο τί ἐστι μάχη οὐκ εἰδότε; | δεῖξον
οὖν μοι, τί περανῶ διαλεγόμενός σοι. κίνησόν
μοι προθυμίαν. ὡς ἡ κατάλληλος πόα τῷ προ-
βάτῳ φανεῖσα προθυμίαν αὐτῷ κινεῖ πρὸς τὸ
φαγεῖν, ἂν δὲ λίθον ἢ ἄρτον παραθῇς, οὐ κινηθή-
σεται, οὕτως εἰσί τινες ἡμῖν φυσικαὶ προθυμίαι καὶ
πρὸς τὸ λέγειν, ὅταν ὁ ἀκουσόμενος φανῇ τις, ὅταν
αὐτὸς ἐρεθίσῃ. ἂν δ᾽ ὡς λίθος ἢ χόρτος ἢ παρακεί-
μένος, πῶς δύναται ἀνθρώπῳ ὄρεξιν κινῆσαι; ἡ
ἄμπελος μή τι λέγει τῷ γεωργῷ “ἐπιμελοῦ μου";
ἀλλ᾽ αὐτὴ δι’ αὑτῆς ἐμφαίνουσα, ὅτι ἐπιμεληθέντι
λυσιτελήσει αὐτῷ, ἐκκαλεῖται πρὸς τὴν ἐπιμέ-
λειαν. τὰ παιδία τὰ πιθανὰ καὶ δριμέα τίνα οὐκ
ἐκκαλεῖται πρὸς τὸ συμπαίζειν αὐτοῖς καὶ συν-
έρπειν καὶ πρὸς τὸ συμψελλίξειν ; ὄνῳ δὲ τίς
1 Reiske: εἰδότα S.
424

BOOK II. xxiv. 12-18

Nay, have you a conception of what nature is, or can
you in any measure follow me when 1 speak? But
shall I use a demonstration for you? How can I?
For do you really understand what a proof is, or
how anything is demonstrated, or by what means?
Or what things resemble demonstration, but are not
demonstration? Do you know, for instance, what is
true, or what is false; what follows what, what con-
tradicts, or is out of agreement, or out of harmony
with what? But am 1 to interest you in philosophy ἢ
How shall I set before you the contradiction in the
ideas of the multitude, which leads them to disagree
about things good and evil, advantageous and dis-
advantageous, when you do not know what contra-
diction itself is? Show me, then, what I shall
accomplish by a discussion with you. Arouse in me
an eagerness for it. Just as suitable grass when
shown to the sheep arouses in it an eagerness to
eat, whereas if you set before it a stone or a loaf
of bread,} it will not be moved to eat, so we have
certain moments of natural eagerness for speech
also, when the suitable hearer appears, and when
he himself stimulates us. But when the would-be
hearer by our side is like a stone, or grass, how can
he arouse desire in the breast of aman? Does the
vine say to the husbandman, “Pay attention to
me’’? Nay, but the vine by its very appearance
shows that it will profit him to pay attention to it,
and so invites him to devote his attention. Who is
not tempted by attractive and wide-awake children
to join their sports, and crawl on all fours with
them, and talk baby talk with them? But who is

? The observation of nature is faulty; sheep will upon
oecasion eat bread, vegetables, and even meat.

425

19

20

21

22

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

προθυμεῖται συμπαίζειν ἤ συνογκᾶσθαι; καὶ
γὰρ εἰ μικρόν, ὅμως ὀνάριόν ἐστιν.

Τί οὖν μοι οὐδὲν λέγεις ;—Exeivo μόνον ἔχω
σοι εἰπεῖν, OTL ὁ ἀγνοῶν, τίς ἐστι καὶ ἐπὶ τί
γέγονεν καὶ ἐν tive τούτῳ τῷ κόσμῳ καὶ μετὰ
τίνων κοινωνῶν καὶ τίνα Τὰ ἀγαθά ἐστι καὶ τὰ
κακὰ καὶ τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ αἰσχρά, καὶ μήτε λόγῳ

θῶ Ὁ 3 ? ὃ / / 7
παρακολουθῶν μήτ᾽ ἀποδείξει, μήτε τί ἐστιν
ἀληθὲς ἢ τί ψεῦδος, μήτε διακρῖναι ταῦτα δυνά-

vw o>) / \ , Wii Sti Lal fy

μενος οὔτ᾽ ὀρέξεται κατὰ φύσιν οὔτ᾽ ἐκκλινεῖ οὔθ᾽
ὁρμήσει οὔτ᾽ ἐπιβαλεῖται, οὐ συγκαταθήσεται,
> > 4 > > / Ν 4 Ἀ ms
οὐκ avavevoet, οὐκ ἐφέξει, TO σύνολον κωφὸς Kal
τυφλὸς περιελεύσεται δοκῶν μέν τις εἶναι, ὧν δ᾽

a a a \
οὐδείς. νῦν yap πρῶτον τοῦθ᾽ οὕτως ἔχει ; οὐχὶ
> 2 ; > ΄ 2 , > > v7 ,
ἐξ οὗ γένος ἀνθρώπων ἐστίν, ἐξ ἐκεΐνου πάντα

P
Ta ἁμαρτήματα Kal τὰ ἀτυχήματα Tapa ταύτην

εἶ Μ / 5 / \ 3
τὴν ἄγνοιαν γεγένηται ; ᾿Αγαμέμνων xal.’Axir-
λεὺς διὰ τί ἀλλήλοις διεφέροντο; οὐχὶ διὰ τὸ

Ἁ 20. Υ͂ > \ , Ν ’ Ἃ
μὴ εἰδέναι, τίνα ἐστὶ συμφέροντα καὶ ἀσύμφορα ;

> ς Ν , 4 , > ὃ a a
οὐχὶ ὁ μὲν λέγει, ὅτε συμφέρει ἀποδοῦναι TO
πατρὶ τὴν Χρυσηΐδα, ὁ δὲ λέγει, OTL οὐ συμφέρει;
οὐχὶ ὁ μὲν λέγει, ὅτε δεῖ αὐτὸν λαβεῖν τὸ ἄλλου
γέρας, ὁ δέ, ὅτι οὐ δεῖ; οὐχὶ διὰ ταῦτα ἐπελά-

Μ
θοντο καὶ τίνες ἦσαν καὶ ἐπὶ τί ἐληλύθεσαν ; ἔα,
,
ἄνθρωπε, ἐπὶ ti ἐλήλυθας ; ἐρωμένας κτησό-
A , ae s » / Ὄ -“"
μενος ἢ πολεμήσων ; “πολεμήσων." τίσι; τοῖς
- lal ” > \
Τρωσὶν ἢ τοῖς “EAAnow ; “τοῖς Tpwaiv.” ἀφεὶς
426

- BOOK II. xxrv. 18-22

eager to play with an ass, or to join its braying?
For however small it may be, it is still nothing but
a little ass.

Why, then, have you nothing to say to me >—There
is only one thing I can say to you—that the man who
does not know who he is, and what he is born for, and
what sort of a world this is that he exists in, and whom
he shares it with ; and does not know what the good
things are and what are the evil, what the noble and
what the base; and is unable to follow either reason
or demonstration, or what is true and what is false,
and cannot distinguish one from the other; and will
manifest neither desire, nor aversion, nor choice, nor
purpose in accordance with nature; will not assent,
will not dissent, will not withhold judgement—such a
man, to sum it all up, will go about deaf and blind,
thinking that he is somebody, when he really is
nobody. What! do you think that this is something
new? Has it not been true from the time when the
human race began to be, that every mistake and
every misfortune has been due to this kind of ignor-
ance? Why did Agamemnon and Achilles quarrel ?
Was it not because they did not know what things
are expedient and what are inexpedient? Does not
one of them say that it is expedient to give Chryseis
back to her father, while the other says that it is not
expedient? Does not one of them say that he ought
to get some other man’s meed of honour, while the
other says that he ought not? Is it not true that
this made them forget who they were and what they
had come for? Ho, there, man, what have you come
for? To get sweethearts or to fight? ‘To fight.”
With whom? The Trojans or the Greeks? “The
Trojans.” Well, then, are you turning your back on

427

23

25

26

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

οὖν τὸν “Extopa ἐπὶ τὸν βασιλέα τὸν σαυτοῦ
σπᾷς τὸ ξίφος ; σὺ δ᾽, ὦ βέλτιστε, ἀφεὶς τὰ τοῦ
βασιλέως ἔργα,

Ψ΄ / ?
ᾧ λαοί τ᾽ ἐπιτετράφαται Kal τόσσα μέμηλεν,

\ 7 , a . /
περὶ κορασιδίου διαπυκτεύεις τῷ πολεμικωτάτῳ
τῶν συμμάχων, ὃν δεῖ παντὶ τρόπῳ περιέπειν
καὶ φυλάττειν ; καὶ χείρων γίνῃ κομψοῦ apyze-

La a
péws, ὃς τοὺς καλοὺς μονομάχους διὰ πάσης
> , ΝΜ Κ. ere o + A nr
ἐπιμελείας ἔχει ; ὁρᾷς, οἷα ποιεῖ ἄγνοια περὶ τῶν
συμφερόντων ;
«᾿Αλλὰ κἀγὼ πλούσιός εἰμι." μή τι οὖν TOD
>
Ἀγαμέμνονος πλουσιώτερος ; “ ἀλλὰ Kal καλός
> ᾽ν ΄, = nn ὧν , ,
εἰμι. μή τι οὖν τοῦ ᾿Αχέίλλέως καλλίων ;
“ ἀλλὰ καὶ κόμιον κομψὸν ἔχω. ὁ δ᾽ ᾿Αχιλλεὺς
οὐ κάλλιον καὶ ξανθόν ; καὶ οὐκ ἐκτένιζεν αὐτὸ
a O° Μ ἥς 3 \ i > /
κομψῶς ovd ἔπλασσεν. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἰσχυρὸς
εἰμι." μή τι οὖν δύνασαι λίθον ἄραι ἡλίκον ὁ
"Rh A-£ "» -» ᾿ \ > 5, 0 κοΐ
κτωρ ἢ ὁ Αἴας ; “adda καὶ εὐγενῆς. μὴ τι
ἐκ θεᾶς μητρός, μή τι πατρὸς ἐγγόνου Διός ; τί
οὖν ἐκεῖνον ὠφελεῖ ταῦτα, ὅταν καθήμενος κλαίῃ
διὰ τὸ κορασίδιον ; “ ἀλλὰ ῥήτωρ εἰμί." ἐκείνος
δ᾽ οὐκ ἦν; οὐ βλέπεις πῶς κέχρηται τοῖς δεινο-
΄ ~ c 7 ‘ ᾽ὔ > ~ A
τάτοις τῶν Ἑλλήνων περὶ λόγους ᾿Οδυσσεῖ καὶ
Φοδικι, πῶς αὐτοὺς ἀστόμους πεποίηκε;

1 Homer, /liad, II. 25, translated by Bryant.

2 The reference is obscure; possibly Chryses is meant
(Wolf and others), but this seems most unlikely, or there may
be a sneering allusion to some contemporary of the philo-
sopher, who was excessively interested in gladiators (Schenkl).
I am inclined to think rather of Calchas, the high priest
of the Achaeans, who treats both Agamemnon and Achilles
with more civility than they would seem to deserve, at least

428

BOOK II. xxiv. 22-26

Hector and drawing your sword against your own
king? As for you, O best of men, are you turning
your back on your duties as king,

Who has the charge of nations and sustains
Such mighty cares,}

and for the sake of a paltry damsel engage in a fist-
fight with the greatest warrior among your allies, a
man whom you ought to honour and protect in every
way? And do you sink below the level of an elegant
high priest who treats the noble gladiators with
all respect?? Do you see the sort of thing that
ignorance of what is expedient leads to?

“But I too am rich.” You are not, then, richer
than Agamemnon, are you? “But I am also hand-
some.” You are not, then, handsomer than Achilles,
are you? “But I have also a fine head of hair.”
And did not Achilles have a finer, and golden hair,
too? And did he not comb it elegantly and dress it
up? “But I am also strong.” You are not, then,
able to lift as large a stone as Hector or Aias lifted,
are you? “But I am also noble born.” Your
mother is not a goddess, is she, or your father of the
seed of Zeus? What good, then, does all this do him
when he sits in tears about the damsel? “But I am
an orator.” And was not he? Do you not observe
how he has dealt with Odysseus and Phoenix, the
most skilful of the Greeks in eloquence, how he
stopped their mouths καὶ ὃ

in the opinion of Epictetus, who had no undue reverence for
the t of the Epic.

3 The reference is to the spirited and convincing speeches
of Achilles (J?iad, 1X.) in answer to the appeals of Odysseus
and Phoenix.

429

27
28

29

[Ὡ

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

Ταῦτά σοι μόνα ἔχω εἰπεῖν καὶ οὐδὲ ταῦτα
προθύμως.---Διὰ τί ;-- Ὅτι με, οὐκ ἠρέθισας. εἰς
τί γὰρ ἀπιδὼν ἐρεθισθῶ 1 ὡς οἱ ἱππικοὶ περὶ τοὺς
ἵππους τοὺς εὐφυεῖς ; εἰς τὸ σωμάτιον ; αἰσχρῶς
αὐτὸ πλάσσεις. εἰς τὴν ἐσθῆτα ; > καὶ ταύτην
τρυφερὰν ἔχεις. εἰς σχῆμα, εἰς βλέμμα; εἰς
οὐδέν. ὅταν ἀκοῦσαι θέλῃς φιλοσόφου, μὴ λέγε
αὐτῷ ὅτι “οὐδέν μοι λέγεις ; ” ἀλλὰ μόνον
δείκνυς σαυτὸν οἷον 7’? ἀκούειν καὶ ὄψει, πῶς
κινήσεις τὸν λέγοντα.

, - -“
κε΄. Πῶς ἀναγκαῖα τὰ λογικά ;

Τῶν παρόντων δέ τενος εἰπόντος Πεῖσόν με,
ὅτε τὰ λογικὰ χρήσιμά ἐστιν, Θέλεις, ἔφη,
ἀποδείξω σοι τοῦτο;--Ναί.---Οὐκοῦν λόγον μ᾽
ἀποδεικτικὸν διαλεχθῆναι δεῖ ;---Ὁ μολογήσαντος
δὲ Πόθεν οὖν εἴσῃ, ἄν σε σοφίσωμαι "π--Σιωπή-
σαντος δὲ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου Ὁρᾷς, ἔφη, πῶς αὐτὸς
ὁμολογεῖς ὅτε ταῦτα ἀναγκαιά ἐστιν, εἰ χωρὶς
αὐτῶν οὐδ᾽ αὐτὸ τοῦτο δύνασαι μαθεῖν, πότερον
ἀναγκαῖα ἢ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖά ἐστιν.

κς΄. Τί τὸ ἴδιον τοῦ ἁμαρτήματος ;
Πᾶν ἁμάρτημα μάχην περιέχει. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ὁ
ἁμαρτάνων οὐ θέλει ἁμαρτάνειν, ἀλλὰ κατορ-

1 Wolf: ἐρεθίσω 8.
2 Schenkl: τοῦ S.

430

- BOOK II. xxiv 27-xxvi. 1

This is all I have to say to you, and even for this I
have no heart—Why so?—Because you have not
stimulated me. For what is there in you that I may
look at and be stimulated, as experts in horseflesh are
stimulated when they see thoroughbred horses? At
your paltry body? But you makeit ugly by the shape
which you give to it.4 At your clothes? There is
something too luxurious about them, also. At your
air, at your countenance? I have nothing to look at.
When you wish to hear a philosopher, do not ask him,
“ Have you nothing to say to me?” but only show
yourself capable of hearing him, and you will see
how you will stimulate the speaker.

CHAPTER XXV
How is logic necessary ?

WueEn someone in his audience said, Convince me
that logic is necessary, he answered : Do you wish me
to demonstrate this to you >—Yes.— Well, then, must
I use a demonstrative argument?—And when the
questioner had agreed to that, Epictetus asked him,
How, then, will you know if I impose upon you ?—
As the man had no answer to give, Epictetus said:
Do you see how you yourself admit that all this
instruction is necessary, if, without it, you cannot so
much as know whether it is necessary or not?

CHAPTER XXVI
What is the distinctive characteristic of error ?

Every error involves a contradiction. For since he
who is in error does not wish to err, but to be right,

1 That is, by pasture, overeating, or lack of exercise.
431

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

2 θῶσαι, δῆλον ὅτι ὃ μὲν θέλει οὐ ποιεῖ. τί yap
ὁ κλέπτης θέλει πρᾶξαι; τὸ αὑτῷ συμφέρον.
> = %: Se 7 , > ede ® \ ,
οὐκ οὖν, εἰ ἀσύμφορον ἐστιν αὐτῷ τὸ κλέπτειν,
8 ὃ μὲν θέλει ποιεῖ. πᾶσα δὲ ψυχὴ λογικὴ φύσει
διαβέβληται πρὸς μάχην: καὶ μέχρι μὲν ἂν μὴ
al 7 id > , > , > \
παρακολουθῇ τούτῳ, ὅτε ἐν μάχῃ ἐστίν, οὐδὲν
κωλύεται τὰ μαχόμενα ποιεῖν: παρακολουθή-
σαντα δὲ πολλὴ ἀνάγκη ἀποστῆναι τῆς μάχης
\ a Ὁ“ ς \ > \ a ἐς ᾿ >
καὶ φυγεῖν οὕτως ὡς καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ ψεύδους ava-
-“ \ > , lal > / ¢ a ,
νεῦσαι πικρὰ ἀνάγκη τῷ αἰσθανομένῳ, ὅτι ψεῦδός
39 / % “ Ν ΄ e > “
ἐστιν: μέχρι δὲ τοῦτο μὴ φαντάζηται, ὡς ἀληθεῖ
ἐπινεύει αὐτῷ.
ε >
4 Δεινὸς ovv ἐν λόγῳ, ὁ δ᾽ αὐτὸς καὶ προτρε-
\ ee Ν 4. ς ’ e ,
πτικὸς Kal ἐλεγκτικὸς οὗτος ὁ δυνάμενος ἑκάστῳ
παραδεῖξαι τὴν μάχην, καθ᾽ ἣν ἁμαρτάνει, καὶ
a n a a , > - Ν
σαφῶς παραστῆσαι, πῶς ὃ θέλει οὐ ποιεῖ καὶ ὃ μὴ
5 θέλει ποιεῖ. ἂν γὰρ τοῦτο δείξῃ τις, αὐτὸς ἀφ᾽
"»" , \ \ “A ‘
αὑτοῦ ἀναποχωρήσει. μέχρι δὲ μὴ δεικνύῃς, μὴ
θαύμαζε, εἰ ἐπιμένει" κατορθώματος γὰρ φαντασίαν
6 λαμβάνων ποιεῖ αὐτό. διὰ τοῦτο καὶ Σωκράτης
ταύτῃ τῇ δυνάμει πεποιθὼς ἔλεγεν ὅτι “ ἐγὼ
ἄλλον μὲν οὐδένα εἴωθα παρέχειν μάρτυρα ὧν
͵ὕ > a > > \ fol ¥ Ν
λέγω, ἀρκοῦμαι δ᾽ ἀεὶ τῷ προσδιαλεγομένῳ καὶ
ἐκεῖνον ἐπιψηφίζω καὶ καλῶ μάρτυρα καὶ εἷς ov
1 οὗτος ἀρκεῖ μοι ἀντὶ πάντων. ἤδει γάρ, ὑπὸ
432

BOOK II. χχνι. 1-7

it is clear that he is not doing what he wishes. For
what does the thief wish to achieve? His own
interest. Therefore, if thievery is against his
interest, he is not doing what he wishes. Now every
rational soul is by nature offended by contradiction ;
and so, as long as a man does not understand that he
is involved in contradiction, there is nothing to
prevent him from doing contradictory things, but
when he has come to understand the contradiction,
he must of necessity abandon and avoid it, just as a
bitter necessity compels a man to renounce the false
when he perceives that it is false; but as long as the
falsehood does not appear, he assents to it as the
truth.

He, then, who can show to each man the contra-
diction which causes him to err, and can clearly
bring home to him how he is not doing what he
wishes, and is doing what he does not wish, is strong
in argument, and at the same time effective both in
encouragement and refutation. For as soon as any-
one shows a man this, he will of his own accord
abandon what he is doing. But so long as you do
not point this out, be not surprised if he persists in
his error ; for he does it because he has an impression
that he is right. That is why Socrates, because he
trusted in this faculty, used to say: “I am not in the
habit of calling any other witness to what I say, but
I am always satisfied with my fellow-disputant, and
I call for his vote and summon him as a witness, and
he, though but a single person, is sufficient for me in
place of all men.”? For Socrates knew what moves

1 Compare II. 12, 5, and the note on that passage.
1 Supplied by Wolf.

433

ARRIAN’S DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS

τινος λογικὴ ψυχὴ κινεῦται, ὁμοίως ζυγῷ ἐπιρ:

ρέψει,Σ ἄν τε θέλῃς ἄν τε μή. λογικῷ ἡγε-

μονικῷ δεῖξον μάχην καὶ ἀποστήσεται" ἂν δὲ μὴ

δεικνύῃς, αὐτὸς σαυτῷ μᾶλλον ἐγκάλει ἢ τῷ μὴ

πειθομένῳ. ἜΝ
1 Added by Schweighiuser.

* Schenkl: ἐπιθρέψει or ἐπειθρέψει S. Many conjectural
restorations have been proposed. ᾿

434

BOOK II. xxvi. 7

a rational soul, and that like the beam of a balance it
will incline,! whether you wish or no. Point out to
the rational governing faculty a contradiction and it
will desist; but if you do not point it out, blame
yourself rather than the man who will not be
persuaded.

1 The text is very uncertain (see critical note). The

ral idea, however, is pretty clearly that expressed by

icero, Acad. Pri. 11. 38; Ut enim necesse est lancem in libra
ponderibus tmpositis deprimi, sic animum perspicuis cedere.

435

Academics, a, 4 371 Π.

Academy, 171 Tas

Acceptably to the sane things done,

Achilles, 87, 143, 159, 183, 185, 415,
427, 429

331
Activity, a duty of man, 75
Actor, 197, 199
Admetus, 3

pee ah desire for, ἐξ 143
of weaknesses, 383 ff.

Γέται 253

Adultery, 238 ff., 279, 353

pposee nag 143, 159, 185, 427, 429
pinus, 15, 19

275, .
Sieauidien eatee 183, $81, 399
er ᾿ ᾽
oath of, 105
403

Amphitheatre, 163
Analysis of 233
Anger, 99, 121 ff., 167, 177 ppt 353
Animals, ‘tor the service of man, 45,

109, 261; different from men, 43,

67, 181, 259
set in eds 161, 205, 243

per eresy jaa, 361, 363
Anti-social doctrines, 373, 376

Appropriate, bars 23, 179
ropriation to

mS one’s own needs,
1
Archedemus, 237, 349, 363

art of, 291 ff.

See also
premisses ; ypothetical arguments
or syllogisms ; Syllogisms.

ats ast donkey, 127, 131, 243, 261,

Assayer εὐ silver, 233

Assent, 31, 119, 121, 177, 341, 347

Athena, statue of, 263, 265, 367

Athenian, 63 f., 399

Athens, 163, 331, 333, 379

Athlete, 21, 31, 151, 195, “~ 347, 357
of Euripides, 187

Avarice, 351, 353
Avengers, 375
pihies oy 11, 29, 31

Baby talk, 425
Balance, 185, 289, 435. See also
terion.

Cri.
Bal])l play, 241, 243
Banquet, 169, ” 333, 361, 363
Baptists, 273
Bath, 381, 383, 389
ἔτεος as ero, 331

Beard 23; 111, 413
Beheading, 11, 13, 19, 23, 127, 187,193
Reem the, to prevail over the worse,

Binds -augur, 257

Birth, 63, 65, 97

Books, 31, 33, 405; cost of, 33
Boreas, li

Boxers, 355

Briseis, re |

Brother, and brothers, 97, 99, 107;
duty δέ, 277
Brates, 25

ν 437

INDEX

Buffoon, 197
Bugbears, 217
Bull, 23
Buskins, 197, 199

Oaesar, 21, 25, 65, 75, 105, 133, 135,
197, 203, 2538, 301, 303, 311, 365.
Calm, 27, 2
Calypso, τὸς
Oapital punishment, abolition of, 123
Oapitol, 59, 135
ter, 307

Caution, 213 δ...

Chains and settee, 18, 127, 131, 187

Ohamberlain, 133

Child and children, 79 ff., 95, 149, 151,
157, eg 217, 329, 331, "333, 343,

395, 42

Choice, 11, 31, 35, 179, 341

Cavean eth ah

tas,

Ohryseis, 143

Chrysippus, 29, 31, 35, 36, 77, 117, 119,
249, 333, 347, 349, 361, 363, 421

Ciconians, 363

Circumstances, 251

Cithaeron, 155

Citharoede, 203, 297, 299, 323, 325

Citizen, duty of, 91, 275, 277, 417;
of universe, 63, 65, 275, 319

Cleanthes, 31, 117 361, 363

Coinage, testing of, 139

Colophon, 311

Common property, 235, 237

Company of men, 95

Complex thing, a, 269

Compulsion, 119, 121

Confidence, 213 ff., 229, 265, 267, 297

Conflict of opinions, 287

Consideration, 205

Contemplation, 203

Contentment, 89 ff.

Contradictions, 371, 373, 433

Control, things under our control, and
not under our control, 7-13,.33, 49,
97, 99, 125, 145, 147, 157, 189, 217,
227, 239, 297, 299, 301, 369

Corinth, 333, 343

Corinthian, 63 f.

Councillor, 277

Craftsman (= God), 265

Oriterion, 17, 81, 83, 115, 287. See
also Balance; Measure; Standard.

Croesus, 25

438

Cross, 229
Cupping ~~ 339

Day and and N: ihe Ἂ ment, 1

51: εϑϑ, ἕν 175,
wt 219, 239, 261,
Decisions ‘of will, B7, a 89, 121, 165,
317, 319
Deer, 215

say the, 101. See also Divine, the ;
Demeter, 381 Γ ΔῈ eatin

ent from, 41 ft, 11, 315
poke 11, 27, 29, 31, 226, ping
Destiny, 419

Dice, 237, 239

Difficulties, 151 ff., 157 ff., 205 ft.
Dio, the name, 93, 81, 303 :
Diodorus, 359, 361 ,
Diogenes, the ‘Babylonian, 363
Diogenes, the Oynic, 153, 231, 233

thing, a, 269
Display of philosophy, 167 f., 361; 365
Divination, 119, 121, 255 ff.
Divine, the, 89, 91, 261, 377. See also

wing, 241, 329
Duty, 179, 341, 347
Dysentery, 391

Earthquakes, 253, 329

Ecbatana, 333

Educated man and education, 17, 145,
171, 195, 199, 201, 207, 219, 221, 227,
45°

3
Egoism. See Self-interest.
Egyptians, 81, 143, 273, 287
Eloquence, 413, 415, 421
End, man’s, ai 205; The End, by
or cations .

ymem:
Rpanhroairea} 48 (73), 133, 169

INDEX

oT ta, Ἧς, Τὸ, 17,118, hn
a7, Oss, 169, 191, 253, 297, 349,
353, 361, 369, 371

ff.
41, 149, 151, Eo 367,

373, 375, 377, 399, 4,
on Ἡνίκα, δ 1, 303, 305,

Ee sare of, 121 ff., 431 ff.

Impres-
sions, external.

atari santa” 175, 227, 231, 239,

Byeesives, 391

327
Fair, 313, 315
Fallacy

See Chains.
Fever, 131, 147, 241, 251, 353, 395
Fidelity, 233
Fields of study, 341, 343, 345, 347
229

Forgiving, 403, 405

Foundation, 317, 319

Fox, 27

Free and freedom, 91, 93, 95, 165, 219,
221, 227, 345

Freedom of choice, 29

Friendship, 391 ff.
Furies, 375

Galli, 377
Game, 157, 159
Gellius, Lucius, 5
—— pein tee 337
( —— spirit), 105

355, 429

God, 11, 25, 37, 41, 45, 65, 103, 111,
121, 141, 151, 187, 191, 195, 199,
205, 221, 241, 249, 257, 259, 261,
263, 265, 309, 313, 335, 337, 343,
859, 357, 367, 369, 405, 407, 413:

as father, 2 :’ kinshi ΓᾺ 99:

law of, 187,41 189. See also Another.

oat * 25, 89, 91, 93, 97, 141, 345.
9

Good, the, 141, 143, 145, 149, 157,
178, 187, 208, 213, 229, 239, 259,
261, 281, 321, 363; the good man.

Good and excellent man, 91, 275, 289

Governing principle or faculty, 107,
139, Sanaghy 357, a

Grain, heads μος 249

Grain supply, 75

—— Ss 137, 257, 269

Gratitude, 37, 111, 113, 407
Great King (of Persia), 399

273, 427, 429
Groaning, 127
Gyara, 163, 253
Gymnasium, 21, 329, 331
Habit, 173, 349, 351, 353, 357
Had 1
Happiness, 29, 239
Harmony with N ature, 31, 33, 35, 79,

93, 95, 107, 145, 167; will in
harmony with what happens, 307

Hellauicus, 361, 363
1

439

INDEX

Helvidius Priscus, 19, 21

Heracles, 47 f., 380, 355

Heraclitus, 229

Hesiod, 359

Hippocrates, 63, 339

Hippolytus, The, of Euripides, 187

Homer, 11, 91

Honourable, the, 399

Horse, 25, 431

Horse-race, 85

Hymn of praise, 113

Hypothetical arguments or syllo-
gisms, 51 ff., 161, 165, 169, 197,
199, 2

Ignorance, 425, 427

Iliad, The, 181

Diam, 399

Impressions, external, 9, 137, 171,
179, 181, 349 ff., 355, 357, 361, 381,
391; use of, 9, i, 27, 99, 137, 141,
205, 213, 259, 261, 311, "369, 407,
417, 41

Incompatible, the, 83

Inconsistency, 383 ff., 393

Incontinence, 385

Incubation, 327

Indifference in things, 247

Indifferent, things, 205, 271, 301, 363

Injury, 281

Inn, 185, 417, 419, 421

Innate concept, 283, 285

Insanity, 91

Interest, a man’s. See Selj-interest.

Interpreter, 117

Introduction to Philosophy, 193

Invincible athlete, the, 127, 129

Involuntary, the, 385

Irrational, the, 15 ff.; animals, 43, 67

Jealousy, 385

Jesus, saying of, 416

Jews, 81, 143, 273 (= Christians).

Judge, 247

Judgement, 131,.185, 187, 189, 217,
317, 319, 321 ff., 329, 333, 401, 403,
409, 407; suspended judgement,
121

Jumping-weights, 31, 391
Kings, 189

Kinship with gods, 63 ff., 97
Kore, 381

Lacedaemonians, 15, 399
440

tr

Laticlave, 108: See also’ Tepe Prae-
stri

Lamp, 125, 13h 191, 349 2 ensateic
Lateran

Law or laws of the gods, or God, 101, ;
187, 189, 191, 329; law of raga
pai re 870
i 9
Liar, The, ἃ work by Chrysippus, 46,
347; asophism, 355, 389 ὃ
Life, 247

A

Lion, 23, γεν: 209
Liste tening, art or skill or stitioa in,
42

Logic, need of, 51 ff., So Be 113, “ise
117, 173, 431
Love, 385, 391, 393

res

Lycurgus, 379 ey rr

Macedonians, 399

Madman, 187, 29: 317, 319 τ'

Madness, 91, 321 A neeie

Magnanimity, 237 ff. ee

Mammy, 331, 333, , 885

Man, 203, 245, 42 different from
animals, 183, ΕΣ τὰ a γ.

duties of, 275 if.; portion x God,
a, 261, 263; profession of. ΕΝ
273s social being, 149, 2s pd ae
Marcian aqueduct, 330, 8
Marriage, 79, 417 jee

Master, 203; ‘The Master” ar
ment, 353, "355, 358, 359, 361,

Materials, 34 43

Measure, 115, 377. seb ἐμ ὁναδήδει

Medea, 178, 179, 343

Meletus, 191, 229 ©

See Addenda,
ger eds 323. See also Denarius, and
Drach

ma.

Moral, purpose, or choice. 88, ἀν: νι ᾿
121, 131, 133, 185, 187, 93,
201, 213, 215, 217, 225, ase 353
277, 281, 282, 301, 315, 321, vite
401, 407, 409, 411, 413, 415, 411

Mother, duties of, 83

Mawes (Mys), slave of Tp IgRTR 148,

Mules, 243

INDEX

Music, 7, 9, 201, 299, 307
Naso, 307, 310
Natural, 245

ature, (including man’s nature
79, 81, 93, 101, nae ΤΆΤ, 163, na?
175, 191, 375; will of, 117, 119.
See also ‘armony with Ν᾽ ‘ature.

Necklace, 403
i bcp 163; baths of, 331
icopalis, 7, 137, 163, 169, 253, 389

ose, running, how to treat it, 47, 325
wos. ws a

45 47, ei “=p
Siinie cen: a 1, 355
Opinion, 87, 121, 135, 733, 271, 287
Orator, 323

?

Orestes, 375 4
Own, one’s, 155, 157, 159, 249, 329
Ox, 413

Paean, 253

Pancratiasts, 355
Panthoides, 361
Pantry, 271
Parents, 95, 97, 167
Particular instances,

See Application

Pheidias, 45, 263, 367

Philip, 305

τυ πεφα and philosophers, 13,.21,
23, 27, 63, 73, 75, 77, 85, 121, 139,

351, 377, 379, 387, 423, 431

Philosophy, 107, 149, 169, 283, 309,

The, of Euripides (of
BS sa eos ior

piterehery 301, 313, 319, 339

Physics, The, by Epicurus, 411

Praetor, 221
Praise, 323, ery See also Applause.
Praise, hymn 113
Prannenertane: 143 fE., 173, 185, 283,

285, 337, 339, 341
Priam, 35, 361, 363
Primary importance, being of, 261, 275
Principal faculty, 141
Principles, philosophic, 389, 391
Prison, 95, 187, 193, 253

335

Profession, various kinds of, 267
Profitable, the, 179

, 283
Providence, 41 ff, 101, 109, 309
Pyrrho, 171, 175

Pythian priestess, 379

pepe 201
Quiescent, The, 355

Rational, Nar aesiag 433, 435; animal
(= man), 43

Reasoning, art of, 113 ff.

Reason, or the reasoning faculty, 9; 25,
59 ff. 97, 137 f%., 193

Recommendat

Religion, origin of,

Renunciation, 155, 163, 329, 331, 343

Responsibili for self, 73, 87, 119,
180, 181, 183, 187, 303, 343

Reticence, 195, 203

Reviling, 165

Revolution of universe, 219

441

INDEX

Rhetoric, 421
Rhodes, 229

seer, the long, of tragic actors, 197,
99

Romans, 81, 143, 399

Rome, 13, 65, 71, 73, 75, 85, 87, 131,

153, 163, 169, 197, 253, 295
Rufus (Musonius Rufus), 13, 59, 73
Rule of life, 165
Runner, 33

Salutation, 249

Sanctity, 377, 379

Sarpedon, 173

Saturnalia, 159, 195

Scholar, caught in adultery, 233 ff.
School atter.dant, 83, 85

School exercises, 75, 77, 169, 207, 221,
223, 253, 283, 303, 307, 321, 327,

331, 333, 345, 347, 387, 389

School, frequenter of, 89

Sciron, 335

ng, 15, 17

Scout, of philosophy, 153

Second field of age 341, 345

Self-examination, 3

Self-interest, 131, 138, 147, 175, 397,
399, 401, 403

Self-love, 133

ale τὸ ΤΥΛΟΣ ἀξ 279, 281,

Senate, 15, es

Senators, ies, 165

Sense impressions, 179, 181, 185, 187

Senses, evidence of, 177

Serenity, 27

Sheep, 151, 269, 425

Shoemaker, 307

Sick mind, 321

Sirens, 419

Slave ‘and slavery, 67, bee! 131, 203,
221, 227, 381, 385, 413

Smith, 9

Smoke in the house, 161, 163

Snake, 163

Social relations, 309

Socrates, 23, 25, 35, 63 f., 71, 91, 95,
117, 131, 165, 171, 191, 195, 203,
205, 217, 223, 227, 229, 237, 243,
253, 291, 293, 305, 333, 355, 433

Soldiers, 105, 109

Son, duty of, 95,277

Sophisms, 171

Sophocles, 187

Sorrow, 333

Soul, 103, 295, 297

442

379, 403

Sparta, 379

Speech, 409; art of speaking, 421
Sponges, 85°

Standard, bras by Epicurus, 411

Standard of pene tee 115, 185, 287
289, 303,377. See also Criterion.
Starving, 317, 411

State, of men and of gods, 245;

small copy of universal state, 245
Steadfastness, 187 ff., 237, 239, 315 ff.

Stoics, 201, 273, 291, "365, 367, 375

Storks’ nests, 181, 183

Strength of character, 39

Stupidity, cer

Style, 417, 4

Suicide, 15, 1, 67 f., 157, 163, 219,
317, 381, ‘411

Sun, 103, 133

Surgery, 165

Susa, 333

Swallows’ nests, 181

Swine’s flesh, 143

Syllogisms, 51 ff., 61, 149, 195, 197,
199, 201, 225, 388, 247, 303, 345)
389, 391, 41 3, 42

Sympathy ‘in Ni ature, 101, 103

Symposium, The, of Xenophon, 295

Syrians, 81, 143, 273, 287

Tax for manumission of slave, 221

Teaching, skillin, 291, reg ἐν 295

Technique, instruction in, 307

Theo, the name, 231

Theopompus, 339

Thermopylae, 379

Thersites, 415

Theseus, 335

Thief, 125, 127, 191, 433

Things Possible, works by Chrysippus
and by Antipater, 363

Third field of study, 341, (347)

Thrasea, 13

Three campaigns, the, 310, 311

Timidity, 385

Tragedy, 35, 155, 187, 331

Tragic actor, 197, 199, 203

Tragic réle, 155, 799

Tranquillity, 219, 223, 225

Transitoriness of life, 241

Traveller, 417, 419

Tribuneship, 135

Triptolemus, 35

Trojans, 427

Trojan shore, 363

Troy, 183

99, 127, 129 ff., 187, 221, 251;
ts, 305

Will, 92, 95, 121, 147, 307
Witness for God, 199; to arguments

by acts, 201
Wolf, 27, 151, 237
Wool, 243
Women common property, 235, 237
Wrestling school, 23
Xenophon, 117, 295, 347

Zeno, 31, 117, 139, 141, 301

9, 1s. 155, 49, 95, 99, 105, 131,
133, 147, 157, 159, 173, 263, 267
343, 345, 369, 419, 429: Father of

ἃ of gods, 133; Fruit-giver,
133, 147; Rain-bringer, 133, 147:
Saviour, 147; statue at Olympia,
45, 263, 367

443

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ARISTOTLE: Portics and Lonetnus. W. Hamilton Fyfe;
DEMETRIUS ON StyLE. W. Rhys Roberts. (5th Imp. revised.)

ArIstoTLE: Poxrrics. H. Rackham. (4th Imp. revised.)

ARISTOTLE: ProspteMs. W.S.Hett. 2Vols. (2nd Imp. revised.)

4

Arntsrortte: RaETorIca Ap ALEXANDRUM (with PROBLEMs.
Vol. I1.). H. Rackham.

Arrran: History oF ALEXANDER and Inpica. Rev. E. Iliffe
Robson. 2 Vols. (Vol. 1. 3rd Imp., Vol. I. 2nd Imp.)
ArHENAEUS: DerPnosopHistaE. C. B. Gulick. 7 Vols
(Vols. 1., [IV.-VI. 2nd Imp.)

Sr. Basm: Lerrers. R. J. Deferrari. 4 Vols. rig

Cf. Oprran
Daprunis ΑΝ CuxtoE. Thorniey’s Translation revised by
J. M. Edmonds: and Parrnentus. 8. Gaselee. (4th Imp.)
DeMostTHENES I: OtynTHtacs, Puitippics and Mrvor Ora
wions. I1.-XVIJ. anp XX. J. H. Vince. (2nd Imp.)-
DeMostHEeNEs II: Der Corona and De Fatsa LEeGaTIone.
C. Aber nd gg Ὁ Β H. Vince. (3rd Imp.-revised.)
DEMOSTHENES ANDF

[V-V1: Privare Orations and ἵν NEAERAM.
A. T. Murray. (Vol. 1V. 2nd Imp.)

DeMostHENEsS VII: ΕὌΝΕΒΑΙ, Speecn, Eroric Essay, Exorpia
and Lerrers. N. W. and N. J. DeWitt.

Dio Cassrus: Roman History. E. Cary. 9 Vols. (Vols. 1.
and ΤΙ. 3rd Imp., Vols. 111.-1X. 2nd Imp.)

Dio Cxrysostom. J. W. Cohoon and H. Lamar Crosby. 5 Vols.
Vols. 1.-IV. 2nd Imp.)

Dioporvs Stcutus. 12 Vols Vols. 1.-Vl. C. H. Oldfather.
Vol VII. C. L. Sherman. Vols. [X. and X. R. M. Geer.
(Vols. L-IV. 2nd Imp.)

Diocenes Larrtius. ΒΕ. Ὁ. Hicks. 2 Vols. (Vol. lL. 4th Imp.
Vol. I. 3rd Imp.)

Dionystus or Haticarnassus: Roman Antiquities. Spel
man’s translation revised by E. Cary 7 Vols. (Vols. L-V
2nd Imp.)

pe cigs W. A. Oldfather. 2 Vols. (Vol. 1. 3rd Imp., Π. 2nd
mp.)

Evrrmes. A. 5. Way. 4 Vols. (Vols. L and Π a Imp.
ΤΠ. and [V. 6th Imp.) a.

Evsesius: EccLEsIaAsTICcAL SEP τα
J. E. L..Oulton. 2 Vols. “Vol. 1 Srd Imp am Eo)
Gaten: On THE Natural Facuttizs. ” 5 Brock. (4th Imp.)
Tue Greek ANTHOLOGY: W. R. Rn 5 Vols. (Vols. I. and
Η. 5th Imp., Vol. U1. 4th Imp., Vols. IV. and V. τοῆκας a4
Greek Etecy anp lamsus with the ANACREONTEA. J.
Edmonds. 2 Vols. (Vol. Ll. 3rd Imp., Vol. IL. 2nd Imp.)
Tse Greex Bucomo Porrs (THEocrirus, Bion, Moscxvs).
J. M. Edmonds. (7th Imp. revised.)
pve Maruematicat Works. Ivor Thomas. 2 Vols. (2nd
tendons Ct. THEOPHRASTUS: CHARACTERS

Heroportus. A. D. Godley. 4 Vols. (Vols. L.-III. ath Imp.,
Vol. IV. 3rd Imp.)

ἨΈΒΙΟΡ anp THE Homeric Hymwys. Η. G. Evelyn White.
(7th Imp. revised and enlarged.)

ΗΙΡΡΟΟΒΑΤΕΒ and the Fragments or HEeractEirus. W. H. 8.
Jones and Εἰ. T. Withington. 4 Vols. (3rd Imp.)

Homer: Iniap. A. T. Murray. 2 Vols. (Vol. (ἢ Ith Imp
Vol. Il. 6th Imp.)

Homer: Opysszy. A. T. Murray. 2 Vols. (8th Imp.)

Isanus. Εἰ W. Forster. (3rd Imp.)

ge ae George Norlin and LaRue Van Hook. 3 Vols. ane

mp.)

St. JoHN DAaMASCENE: BARLAAM AND loasapH. Rev. G. R.
Woodward and Harold Mattingly. (3rd Imp. revised.) τ΄

Josrruus. H. St. J. Thackeray and Ralph Marcus. 9 Vols.
Vols. 1.-. 11. (Vol. V. 3rd Imp., Vols. 1.-IV., VI. and VIL.
2nd Imp.)

Jutian. Wilmer Cave Wright. 3 Vols. (Vols. 1. and Il. 3rd
Imp., Vol. III. 2nd Imp.) ;

Luctan. A. M. Harmon. 8 Vols. Vols. I.-V. (Vols. 1. and
Il. 4th Imp., Vol. II. 3rd Imp., Vols. IV. and V. 2nd Imp.)

LycoPHRON. Of. CALLIMACHUS.

Lyra Grazca. J. M. Edmonds. 3 Vols. (Vol. 1. 4th Imp.
Vol. 11. revised and enlarged, and 111. 3rd Imp.) ~

Lysiras. W.R. M. Lamb. (2nd Imp.) ;

Maneruo. W. G. Waddell: Protemy: Trrrasistos. Ε΄, E.
Robbins. (3rd Imp.) "δι

Marcus AurRELIus. C. R. Haines. (4th Imp. revised.)

Menanver. F.G. Allinson. (3rd Imp. revised.)

Mryor Attic Orators (ANTIPHON, ANDOCIDES, LycuRGUs,
Demapes, Drnarcuus, HyprreipEes). K. J. Maidment and
J. O. Burrt. 2 Vols. (Vol. I. 2nd Imp.) Ἵ

Nonnos: Dionysiaca. W.H.D. Rouse. 3 Vols.. (2nd Imp.)

Oprian, ConttuTHus, TrypHIoDoRus. A. W. Mair. (2nd Imp.)

Papyri. Non-Lirerary SEtectTions. A. 8. Hunt and C. C.
Edgar. 2 Vols. (Vol. 1. 2nd Imp.) LirERaRy SELECTIONS.
Vol. I. (Poetry). D. L. Page. (3rd Imp.)

ParrHentius. Cf. DAPHNIS AND CHLOE.

Pausantss: DEscrIption or Greece. W. H. 5. Jones. 5
Vols.- and Companion Vol. arranged by R. E. Wycherley.
(Vols. I. and Ill. 3rd Imp., cae If., IV. and V. 2nd Imp.)

Puito. 10 Vols. Vols. I.-V.; H. Colson and Rev. G.
Whitaker. Vols. VI.-IX.; H. Colson. (Vols. 1L.-IIl.
V.-IX. 2nd Imp., Vols. 1. and IV., 3rd Imp.) ;

PHILO: two supplementary Vols. (Lranslation only.) Ralph
Marcus.

Puiostratus: THe Lire or ApPpoLLonius or Tyana. F.C.
Conybeare. 2 Vols. (Vol. 1. 4th Imp., Vol. 11. 3rd Imp.) ὁ
PHILOsSTRATUS: IMAGINES; CALLISTRATUS:~ DESCRIPTIONS.
A. Fairbanks. ΡΞ
PuHitostRatus and Evunaprius: Lives ΟΕ THE SOPHISTS.
Wilmer Cave Wright. (2nd Imp.)

6

Prypar. Sir J. ating (1th Imp. revised.)
Prato: CHARMIDES, ALCIBIADES, Hrpparcuus, THE Lovers,
Tueaces, Minos and Epmvomis. W. R. M. Lamb. (2nd

Imp.)

pias : Cratytus, ParMENIDES, GREATER Hippias, LESSER
Hiepras. H. N. Fowler. (4th Imp.)

Prato: EutuypHro, Apotocy, Criro, PHAEDO, PHAEDRUS.
Η. Ν. πρφωρᾷ (11th Imp.)

Prato: Lacnues, ProTacorss, MENo, Eutnypremus. W. ΒΕ. M.
Lamb. τέ Imp. revised.)

Prato: Laws. Rev. R. G. Bury. he (3rd Imp.)

Prato: Lysis, Sympostum, Goretas. . ἘΝ ἽΝ b. (5th
Imp. revised.)

Prato: Rerusiic. Paul Shorey. 2 Vols (Vol. 1. 5th Imp.,
Vol. Il. 4th Imp.)

Prato: STaTEsMAN, Puitesus. H.N. Fowler; Ion. W.R.M.
Lamb. (4th Imp.)

Puato: THEAETETUs and Sopnist. H.N. Fowler. (4th Imp.)

Piato: Tirmarus, Crrrias, CirroPpHo, MENEXENUS, EPISTULAE.
Rev. R. G. Bury. (3rd Imp.)

Piurarco: Moratra. 14 Vols. Vols. 1-V. F. C. Babbitt;
pe Vi. W. C. Helmbold; Vol. X. H. N. Fowler. (Vols.

I-VI. and X. 2nd Imp.)

ProurarcH: THE PaRAttet Lives. B. Perrin. 11 Vols.
(Vols. L., II., VI., VII., and XI. 3rd Imp. Vols. III.—V. and
VIII.-X. 2nd Imp.)

Potysrus. W. ΒΕ. Paton. 6 Vols. (2nd Imp.)

Procorius: History or THE Wars. H. B. Denia: 7 Vols.
(Vol. 1. 3rd Imp., Vols. I1.-VIL. 2nd Imp.)

ProtemMy: TETRABIBLOs. Cf. MANETHO.

Quintus Smyrnagzus. A. S. Way. Verse trans. (3rd Imp.)

Sextus Emprricus. Rev. R. G. Bury. 4 Vols. (Vol. 1. 3rd
Imp., Vols. U1. and II. 2nd Imp.)

Sopnoctes. F. Storr 2 Vols. (Vol. 1. 10th Imp. Vol. Π. 6th
Imp.) Verse trans.

Srraso: GrocraPpHy. Horace L. Jones. 8 Vols. (Vols. 1.,.V
and VIII. 3rd Imp., Vols. I1., ITI., IV., VI., and VII. 2nd Imp.)

THEOPHRASTUS : CHARACTERS. J. M. Edmonds. HERopDEs,
ete. A. D. Knox. (3rd Imp.)

THEopHRastus: Enquiry mTo Prants. Sir Arthur Hort,
Bart. 2 Vols. (2nd Imp.)

Tuucypipes. C. F. Smi 4 Vols. (Vol. 1. 5th Imp., Vols.
II., ΠΙ., and IV. 3rd Imp. revised.)

TRYPHIODORUS. Cf. Oprran.

XENOPHON: CyrRoPpaEDIA. Walter Miller. 2 Vols. (Vol. I. 4th
Imp., Vol. Il. 3rd Imp.)

XENOPHON : HELLENICA, ANABASIS, APOLOGY, and SyMPosruM.
C. L. Brownson and O. J. Todd. 3 Vols. (Vols. I. and III.
3rd Imp., Vol. Il. 4th Imp.)

XENOPHON : MeMoRABILIA and Ozconomicus. Εἰ. C. Marchant.
(3rd Imp.)

ΧΈΝΟΡΗΟΝ : Scripra Μινοβα. E. C. Marchant. (3rd Imp.)

7

IN PREPARATION

Greek Authors

AELIAN: ON THE NATURE OF ANIMALS. A, ae Ronee

ARISTOTLE: History or AniImMats. A. L
CaLLIMACHUS: FRAGMENTS. C, A. ἀβαάας ΤῊ ‘
PLormvus: A. H. Armstrong. ;

Latin Authors

Sr. AUGUSTINE: CiTy oF Gop.

Cicero: Pro Sestio, In Vatintum. J. H. Freese and R. Gardner.

Cicero: Pro Car.tio, DE Provinciuts CoNnsuLARIBUS, PRO
Batzo. J.H. Freese and R. Gardner.

PHAEDRUuS. Ben E. Perry.

DESCRIPTIVE PROSPECTUS ON APPLICATION

London WILLIAM HEINEMANN LTD
Cambridge, Mass. HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS

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